Law and Economics Commons^™

Risk And Design, James E. Krier

Articles

Risk springs from uncertainty,' uncertainty invites error, and, since error can be costly, we would prefer to avoid it (provided, of course, that avoidance is not more costly yet). While there is much in the Noll and Krier article2 about judgmental error under conditions of risk and uncertainty, there is little about ways to avoid it. So avoidance-more accurately, minimization-of error costs is the topic I want to address very briefly and partially here.

The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification For Enterprise Liability, Jon D. Hanson, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

This Article explores the insurance and deterrence implications of important and long overlooked facts. Consumers are insured through first-party mechanisms against most of the risks of product accidents. However, first-party insurers rarely and imperfectly adjust premiums according to an individual consumer's decisions concerning exactly what products she will purchase, how many of those products she will purchase, and how carefully she will consume them. Such consumer decisions we refer to as "consumption choices. " This failure by first-party insurers to adjust premiums according to consumption choices gives rise to a first-party insurance externality. Based on this insight, this Article offers …

Commentary: Implications Of Professor Scherer's Research For The Future Of Antitrust, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

One way to test the accuracy of Professor Scherer's research is to compare it to the best previous work in the area. Prior to his current article the best analysis of the state of economic thinking and knowledge during antitrust's formative period was presented twelve years ago by—Professor Scherer. This was a skeletal precurser to the well-documented version that he now presents, but his overall conclusions are identical. During the twelve years since his conclusions were presented in the Yale Law Journal no one has demonstrated that his research is in any way faulty or misleading, even though many have …

Whither Economic Duress? Reflections On Two Recent Cases, Andrew B.L. Phang

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

From its rather tentative and extremely recent beginnings, I the law relating to economic duress has developed at a relatively rapid pace during the last decade or so. We have had a series of decisions from various courts and jurisdictions* which, collectively at least, affirm the existence of the doctrine in English law. The pronouncements at the highest levels, however, have not purported to be definitive, and, as we shall see, have certainly not aided in a clarification and systematization of the doctrine of economic duress. The two recent decisions, which are the subject of the present comment, have merely …

Common Myths In The Economic Analysis Of Law, Alex Y. Seita

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.

What Can Be Done About Stock Market Volatility, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Volatility is as old as the financial markets. The bull market of 1986 and the crash that followed in 1987 were but the latest of periodic market gyrations that started with the South Sea Bubble and the Lombard Street run on commercial paper and have continued ever since.' Volatility in the financial markets would not be very important if market activity simply mirrored economic activity. Volatility would be much less important if the markets moved independently of the economy. But if we believe, as I do, that the markets and the economy are interdependent, and that their volatility is generally …

Antitrust's Protected Classes, Herbert Hovenkamp

Michigan Law Review

For purposes of argument, this essay assumes that efficiency ought to be the exclusive goal of antitrust enforcement. That premise is controversial. Nonetheless, several economic and legal theorists, primarily among the Chicago School of economics and antitrust scholarship, have developed an Optimal Deterrence Model based on this assumption. The Model is designed to achieve the optimum, or ideal, amount of antitrust enforcement. The Model's originators generally believe that there is too much antitrust enforcement, particularly enforcement initiated by private plaintiffs. I intend to show that, even if efficiency is the only antitrust policy goal, a broader array of lawsuits should …

State Takeover Statutes Revisited, Richard A. Booth

Michigan Law Review

I have a confession to make. The title of my article that appeared recently in this review, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, was deliberately chosen for its shock value. Since few if any reflective works have supported state takeover statutes, it occurred to me that a title suggesting there was something positive in them might get someone's attention. Clearly it did. In a recent piece entitled Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, Professors Lyman Johnson and David Millon take issue with my title. I say that they take issue with my title because it does not …

Combine And Conquer: Rethinking The Regulation Of Stock Index Futures, Marianne T. Spinelli

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.

Economic Analysis In The Courts: Limits And Constraints, Larry L. Chubb

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Politics Of Common Law In Theory And History, Ian Duncanson

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

This paper is concerned with the theme of law as an outsider, in theory and practice, and with its appearance as the cohesive force which intervenes to make social order possible. In the first part of the paper I look at two legal theories and at two examples of what I take to be liberal historiography. In the second part I discuss the English common law, and the implications of its close association with agrarian capitalism and City of London finance.

Models Of Market Behaviour And Competition Law: Exclusive Dealing, Marilyn Maccrimmon, Asha Sadanand

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

The paper arose out of the authors' belief that economic principles should, and probably will, play a larger role in the decisions of the new Competition Tribunal. The objective of the paper is to clarify some of the underlying assumptions and choices implicit in the regulation of competitive behaviour by examining the literature on economic analysis of market behaviour written by both economists and lawyers. The authors are especially concerned with the recent emphasis on strategic behaviour and its contrast to the Chicago school approach which recommends less interference with market behaviour. They examine the differences between the assumptions of …

A Colorado River Basin Authority: Opportunity For Sharing River Basin Management And Resources, David H. Getches

Boundaries and Water: Allocation and Use of a Shared Resource (Summer Conference, June 5-7)

32 pages.

Contains references.

Within The Hundredth Meridian: Western States And Their River Basins In A Time Of Transition, John M. Volkman, Kai N. Lee

Boundaries and Water: Allocation and Use of a Shared Resource (Summer Conference, June 5-7)

29 pages.

Contains footnotes.

Marketing Of Indian Reserved Water Rights, Jeanne S. Whiteing

Boundaries and Water: Allocation and Use of a Shared Resource (Summer Conference, June 5-7)

10 pages.

Unique Legal Issues Raised By Long Distance Water Transfer Proposals: Etsi, The Columbia River, Nawapa, Ralph W. Johnson

Boundaries and Water: Allocation and Use of a Shared Resource (Summer Conference, June 5-7)

12 pages.

Contains references.

Montana’S Response To Interjurisdictional Marketing Challenges, Deborah Beaumont Schmidt

Boundaries and Water: Allocation and Use of a Shared Resource (Summer Conference, June 5-7)

20 pages.

Contains references.

Allocating Groundwater Among Nations, States And Tribes, Ann Berkley Rodgers, Carolyn J. Abeita

Boundaries and Water: Allocation and Use of a Shared Resource (Summer Conference, June 5-7)

70 pages.

Agenda: Boundaries And Water: Allocation And Use Of A Shared Resource, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center

Boundaries and Water: Allocation and Use of a Shared Resource (Summer Conference, June 5-7)

Conference organizers and/or faculty included University of Colorado School of Law professors David H. Getches, Lawrence J. MacDonnell and Charles F. Wilkinson.

Boundaries and Water: Allocation and Use of a Shared Resource is the topic of the Center's annual summer program on water this June. Most of the major rivers in the western United States are shared between two or more states. Often tribal governments play an important role in water allocation and use decisions. International considerations also may be involved in some cases. These interjurisdictional issues extend to groundwater as well as surface water.

This conference will provide the …

Information Economics And Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws To Produce And Use Data, Mary L. Lyndon

Michigan Law Review

Just as laws may create entitlements to the use of information, they may also be written to distribute information and to encourage information production. This Article discusses the ways in which law affects the generation and distribution of information related to chemical exposure and toxicity. It describes the economic impact of recently enacted right-to-know laws and proposes that better and more abundant data could be produced if the law paid greater attention to basic economic principles that influence research and information systems.

Sugar Coated Bullets: Corruption And The New Economic Order In China, Mark Findlay, Thomas Chor-Wing Chiu

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

The recent political debate concerning the influence of corruption on the “new economic order” in the People's Republic of China is unique not only for its detailed and public manifestations, but also because it works around the acceptance of some degree of corporate private ownership of the means of production within China. The concern for corruption in Chinese government and commerce is not, of itself, novel.We prefer in this paper briefly to focus on the economic and political environment from within which this concern has been generated, to comment on the significance for the Government of the PRC in associating …

Environmental Faust Succumbs To Temptations Of Economic Mephistopheles, Or, Value By Any Other Name Is Preference, Carol M. Rose

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment by Mark Sagoff

Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen And Economists Do Not, Stewart Schwab

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Firm The Market and The Law by Ronald Coase

Lender Liability: A Survey Of Common-Law Theories, Frances E. Freund

Vanderbilt Law Review

Lender liability litigation has increased dramatically over the past several years. The increase in claims is hardly surprising when one considers recent multimillion dollar recoveries.' Such well-publicized verdicts against lenders serve to encourage borrowers to defend even routine collection claims by striking out at the lender.

Most often borrowers bring lender liability suits following commercial loan defaults. These suits are based on a number of common-law theories for liability including: breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,' and breach of good faith, as well as fraud, duress, interference, and negligence. Some suits also raise statutory claims under the bankruptcy laws, …

Toward A More “Just” Economics Of Justice - A Review Essay, Gary Minda

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.

Inconsistent Standards Of Substantive Due Process In Economic Regulations: A Result Of The Federalist System Of Government, Keith L. Hendricks

Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law

No abstract provided.

Judge Richard Posner's Wealth Maximization Principle: Another Form Of Utilitarianism?, Robin F. Grant

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Economics Of The Insurance Antitrust Suits: Toward An Exclusionary Theory, Peter Siegelman, Ian Ayres

Faculty Articles and Papers

On March 22, 1988, the Attorneys General of eight states filed antitrust actions in state and federal courts' alleging that major insurance and reinsurance companies colluded to boycott specific types of insurance coverage in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The suits suggest that this collusion was responsible for the unprecedented increase in premiums and concomitant erosion of coverage that has come to be known as "the insurance crisis."' The lawsuits have provoked fierce denials by insurance industry participants, including assertions that the suits, which came in an election year, were politically motivated.' The litigation is certain to …

The Problem Of Transaction Costs, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

Aldo Leopold And Western Water Law: Thinking Perpendicular To The Prior Appropriation Doctrine, Charles F. Wilkinson

Publications

No abstract provided.