Law and Economics Commons^™

Navigating The Eu’S Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive: Strategic Implications For Us Companies, Silvia Ciacchi, Michael Faure, Sharon Oded

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The European Union’s (“EU”) Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (“CSDDD” or the “Directive”) introduces new human rights and environmental obligations that reshape global corporate governance. This paper explores its impact on US companies, with a particular focus on compliance strategies under both direct and indirect applicability. It contrasts tactical compliance, which emphasizes risk mitigation while meeting minimum legal requirements, against strategic compliance, where companies use sustainability to gain a competitive edge in the market.

This paper highlights how varying enforcement levels across EU Member States may incentivize companies to “forum shop” or choose jurisdictions with more relaxed enforcement. It also …

Values Primacy & Total Governance Through Activism, Carliss N. Chatman, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

In the aftermath of George Floyd’s murder, public companies swift-ly pledged sweeping equity commitments—only to abandon them under political and market pressure. These reversals were not aberrations. They were opportunistic, performative, and reactionary marketing responses. They expose a governance regime in which stakeholder interests are structurally reversible because they remain doctrinally optional, lacking the institutional interlock needed to create binding accountability across stakeholder roles.

This Article explores how stakeholder power is already embedded in corporate governance through interlocking initiatives grounded in shared values. Stakeholder activism—boycotts, proxy votes, viral campaigns—is not merely expressive; it is an overlooked form of governance. Drawing …

The Sec Proposed Cybersecurity Infrastructure Rules And New Disclosure Requirements, Neal F. Newman, Lawrence J. Trautman, Brian Elzweig

Faculty Scholarship

In addition to regulation of securities market issuers, the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) is also responsible for regulation of those entities that provide the networks, either electronic or physical, that enable the functioning of our securities markets. On February 9, 2022, the Commission published a Release for Cybersecurity Risk Management for Investment Advisers, Registered Investment Companies, and Business Development Companies containing proposals that, if adopted, would establish a new cybersecurity incident reporting and disclosure regime and require registered investment advisers (“advisers”) and investment companies (“funds”) to implement policies and procedures designed to address cyber risks. The comment period for …

Sex & Startups, Jens Frankenreiter, Talia B. Gillis, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Private law offers a unique solution to the problem of long-term fiscal commitment. When Congress enacts a spending program that will take many years to reach fruition, there is a risk of a subsequent Congress or President cutting off funding in the interim. There is no escape from the problem within appropriations law itself. One solution, however, is to entrust private sector allies as vessels of long-term commitment. As a matter of political economy, that solution draws on policy-feedback theory. As a matter of law, the solution rests on a mechanism that Congress already uses but has not recognized its …

Texas, Delaware, And The New Controller Primacy, Christine Hurt

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

In January 2024, Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla, Inc., initiated the process of moving Tesla’s state of incorporation from Delaware to Texas, citing concerns over Delaware corporate law. The move sparked discussions about the dominance of Delaware corporate law and its recent rulings, with critics accusing Court of Chancery judges of favoring shareholder interests over controller innovation and managerial discretion.

The shift away from Delaware is set against a backdrop of increasing judicial scrutiny in the Delaware Court of Chancery, where plaintiffs have recently seen successes in litigation against controlling shareholders, corporate directors, and officers. Concerns over Delaware’s evolving legal …

On Blockchain As A Tool Against Corporate Corruption, Yannis Normand

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

Over the last decades domestic and international legal frameworks have successfully coalesced to limit corrupt behavior worldwide. However, despite their success, current regulatory tools are not sufficiently well-equipped to address corruption in modern economic settings. These mechanisms can often be too costly to implement, too cumbersome to induce compliance, politically manipulatable, and may disincentivize foreign investment and internal corporate monitoring efforts. To address such drawbacks, policymakers should consider the introduction of blockchain-based tools in developing future anti-corruption efforts.

Blockchain can serve as a foundation for structures that can make it more attractive, easier and cost-efficient to monitor economic transactions, to …

Understanding The Big Three’S Wavering Support Of Environmental And Social Shareholder Proposals, Jeff Schwartz, Jefferson Jensen

Seattle University Law Review

Because of their substantial equity portfolios, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street (the Big 3) are central players in corporate governance. It is, therefore, critical to understand how they vote. One puzzle is that their support for shareholder proposals on environmental and social matters appears to waiver. In 2020, for instance, BlackRock supported 11.1% of environmental proposals at S&P 500 firms. In 2021, it seemingly reversed course, supporting 55.2%. It then flipped again, supporting 32.1% in 2022. Such statistics suggest that the Big 3 are constantly changing their views on these topics. This Article seeks to better understand whether this is …

Altering Rules: The New Frontier For Corporate Governance, Gabriel Rauterberg, Sarath Sanga

Articles

Corporate law has taken a contractarian turn. Shareholders are increasingly contracting around its foundational rules—statutory rights, the fiduciary duty of loyalty, even the central role of the board—and Delaware courts are increasingly enforcing these contracts. In the one case where they did not, the legislature swiftly overruled the decision and adopted a new statutory provision permitting boards to completely cede their powers to a shareholder by contract. These developments have sparked a polarized debate, with some calling for a return to mandatory rules, while others push for total contractual freedom.

We argue, however, that the best approach lies neither in …

Unequal Ownership, Ofer Eldar, Rory Van Loo

Faculty Scholarship

Market concentration and weak competition do not just lead to lower efficiency but also result in corporate profits flowing primarily to wealthy households that own a disproportionate share of public corporations. We demonstrate that this is a growing distributional problem not only due to familiar reasons in the literature, most notably shifts in market power, but also due to changes in the socio-economic makeup of ownership. Over the past twenty years, households in the bottom 90 percent of wealth have seen their share of stock ownership decline by half. That is, the ownership of corporations has become increasingly concentrated among …

A Democratic Participation Model For Corporate Governance, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Corporate law is in the grip of a fundamental conundrum: whether corporations should seek only to serve shareholders or instead attend to the interests of all stakeholders. The doctrine of shareholder primacy, which focuses the corporation’s attention on the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth, has been startingly successful, capturing the theory and practice of corporate governance for roughly fifty years. But recently the costs of this monomaniacal focus on the financial interests of one set of corporate participants have become clearer. At a time when the original reasons for restricting the corporate franchise to shareholders have been shown to rest …

Anticompetitive Directors, Lane Miles, Mark A. Lemley, Rory Van Loo

Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust scholars have virtually ignored the question of who controls corporations by sitting on their boards of directors. We show that the problem of who sits on boards of directors is considerably greater than previously believed. Drawing on a new dataset spanning both public and private companies across multiple industries, we find evidence that individual board members sit simultaneously on boards of competitors throughout the economy, despite such “interlocking directorates” being illegal under antitrust law. Many of these individuals are senior directors at private equity, venture capital, and other firms investing in the competing firms on whose boards they sit. …

Anticipating The Effects Of The Brazilian New Business Environment Law's Corporate Governance Provisions On Minority Shareholder Protection, Dean Farmer

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

To encourage minority shareholder protections and public investment in Brazilian corporations, Brazil passed the New Business Environment Law. The New Business Environment Law’s Corporate Governance Provisions require that all corporations have at least one independent board member, have different individuals serving as their CEO and board chairperson, and grant increased power to the general shareholders’ meeting. This Note predicts that the New Business Environment Law’s Corporate Governance Provisions will have an inconsequential effect on Brazilian minority shareholder protections. Traditional American means of achieving minority shareholder protections may be ineffective in Brazil, due to legal, institutional, and cultural differences between the …

Limits To Asset Manager Adaptation, Madison Condon

Faculty Scholarship

In Our Lives in Their Portfolios, Brett Christophers provides an account of the rise of ‘asset manager society’ – a world in which the infrastructures of public life are converted from public to private ownership. Here I use Christophers’ analysis to comment on growing calls for asset manager investment in climate adaptation. The asset manager business model requires ever-escalating returns, a poor fit with the now unavoidable losses that climate change promises to bring.

Labor Law, Ownership, And The Firm, Sanjukta Paul

Law & Economics Working Papers

Labor law has its own working theory of the business firm, not derivable from another area of law. This "theory of the firm," which the affirmative provisions of labor law are taken to both modify and preserve, is more overtly hierarchical than in other areas. This is true across the main functional domains of labor law: union formation; expressive and associational rights; and the scope of collective bargaining. A rich vein of existing scholarship deals with both hierarchy and deference to property within labor law. The arguments of this essay emerge from considering these aspects of labor law in conjunction …

Fifa's One Association - One Vote Rule: Does Democratic Governance Ensure Its "Corporate" Integrity?, Ilias Bantekas

American University Business Law Review

This article suggests that in the absence of any requirement in favor of democratic governance of corporations and non-profit entities in national law, as well as in light of a general practice of bifurcated systems (oscillating between de jure equality and power-based governance) in respect of intergovernmental organizations, a nondemocratic governance structure in international sports federations would not deviate from the general rule. What is clearly at stake in complex organizations is effectiveness in achieving the aims of the organization, irrespective if all members are satisfied. The deceptively democratic nature of sporting federations such as FIFA is very much the …

Corporate Governance Through Social Media, Christina M. Sautter

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Retail investors and other stakeholders are vigorously and loudly taking positions regarding corporate governance issues on social media. They are gathering on social media to discuss which stocks to invest in and to debate and collectively act on corporate governance-related matters. Propelled by new technologies and social media, retail investor engagement has shifted away from traditional venues like corporate voting and shareholder proposals. Retail investors have opened tens of millions of new brokerage accounts since 2020. These new retail investors, primarily Millennials and GenZ’ers, are adept at using technology and naturally gather and obtain information on social media. A co-author …

Initiation Payments, Scott Hirst

Faculty Scholarship

Many of the central discussions in corporate governance, including those regarding proxy contests, shareholder proposals, and other activism or stewardship, can be understood as a single question: Is there under-initiation of corporate changes that investors would collectively prefer?

This Article sheds light on this question in three ways. First, the Article proposes a theory of investor initiation, which explains the hypothesis that there is under-initiation of collectively-preferred corporate change by investors. Even though investors collectively prefer that certain corporate changes take place, the costs to any individual investor from initiating such changes through high-cost proxy contests, or even low-cost shareholder …

The Meme Stock Frenzy: Origins And Implications, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee

Law & Economics Working Papers

In 2021, several publicly traded companies, such as GameStop and AMC, became “meme stocks,” experiencing a sharp rise in their stock prices through a dramatic influx of retail investors into their shareholder base. Analyses of the meme stock surge and its implications for corporate governance have focused on the idiosyncratic creation of online communities around particular stocks during the COVID-19 pandemic. In this Article, we argue that the emergence of meme stocks is part of longer-running digital transformations in trading, investing, and governance. On the trading front, the sudden abolition of commissions by major online brokerages in 2019 reduced entry …

The Millennial Corporation: Strong Stakeholders, Weak Managers, Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

In a prior paper, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and The New Millennial Corporate Governance, we argued that the index funds’ sudden shift towards socially-responsible investment, after decades of ignoring or opposing it, was driven by the competition to manage growing Millennial wealth. In our view, the main contribution of that paper was identifying sharp differences between Millennials and prior generations over investment, consumption, and employment. It has now become clear that this contribution has implications far beyond index-fund environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) activism and is in fact completely transforming the corporate world, marking a fundamental shift in …

A Proposed Sec Cyber Data Disclosure Advisory Commission, Lawrence J. Trautman, Neal Newman

Faculty Scholarship

Constant cyber threats result in: intellectual property loss; data disruption; ransomware attacks; theft of valuable company intellectual property and sensitive customer information. During March 2022, The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a proposed rule addressing Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure, which requires: 1. Current reporting about material cybersecurity incidents; 2. Periodic disclosures about a registrant’s policies and procedures to identify and manage cybersecurity risks; 3. Management’s role in implementing cybersecurity policies and procedures; 4. Board of directors’ cybersecurity expertise, if any, and its oversight of cybersecurity risk; 5. Registrants to provide updates about previously reported cybersecurity …

Initial Public Offering And Optimal Corporate Governance, Albert H. Choi

Law & Economics Working Papers

This paper examines the long-standing debate over whether firms have a market-based incentive to adopt optimal governance provisions at their initial public offering (IPO). Various scholars and practitioners have argued that firms that offer stock to the public with suboptimal governance structure will be penalized by the market through a lower IPO price. At the same time, others have documented empirical evidence that many IPO firms have putatively suboptimal governance provisions, such as anti-takeover provisions and dual class structure, and many, especially those with dual-class structure, enjoy a market premium at their IPO. This paper attempts to bridge this gap. …

Enabling Esg Accountability: Focusing On The Corporate Enterprise, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

Environmental, social, and governance accountability for companies has become an important topic in popular and academic debate in modern society. The idea that corporations should have ESG goals has been embraced by major investment companies, employees, and many corporations themselves. Yet, less attention has been focused on how corporate enterprise law—which governs how corporations structure their relationships between parent corporations and their subsidiaries—creates or contributes to the ESG concerns that the public has with corporations in the first place. Modern enterprise law allows corporations, particularly those operating across national borders, to use their subsidiaries to avoid responsibility for their public …

Taking Corwin Seriously, Itai Fiegenbaum

Lewis & Clark Law Review

Corporate law’s most important development is founded on a misunderstanding of the channels and consequences of shareholder empowerment. The Article’s title references the seminal Delaware Supreme Court decision that ruled that a positive shareholder vote effectively insulates a friendly sale from judicial oversight. Central to Corwin’s reasoning is the notion that the shareholder vote provides an effective restraint against insider overreaching. Yet every deal that includes a premium over the market price is assured of shareholder approval. The doctrinal lynchpin’s real-life insignificance exposes a baffling inconsistency in contemporary takeover jurisprudence.

This Articles makes two novel contributions to the bourgeoning scholarship …

Shareholder Wealth Maximization: A Schelling Point, Martin Edwards

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

Imagine a reality television game show where two contestants begin the game in two different places in New York City. The object of the game is for the two contestants to find each other, but they do not know anything about each other and they have no way of communicating. If they succeed, both contestants win a prize. If they fail, they get nothing. With no ability to explicitly bargain over the meeting, the parties have to make an educated guess about what the other person is most likely to do. Most people, confronted with this sort of tacit …

The Sec's Shareholder Proposal Rule: Creating A Corporate Public Square, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, we take advantage of this Symposium’s goals to think broadly about the future of Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the shareholder proposal rule. We set forth a vision for the rule to address boardroom insularity by likening the shareholder proposal rule as the public square for shareholders. The existence of such a forum would redound to the benefit of investors, officers, and boards of directors as a fount of current and useful information about their investors’ and stakeholders’ concerns.

Stock Buyback Ability To Enhance Ceo Compensation: Theory, Evidence, And Policy Implications, Nitzan Shilon

Lewis & Clark Law Review

I report that stock buyback ability to enhance CEO compensation has reached a record high amount corresponding to one-third of total pay. Also, I refute the common wisdom that this ability is attributed mainly to buyback impact on per share criteria that determine annual bonuses. Instead, I show that because of recent reforms in executive compensation design, the ability of buybacks to boost the amount of CEO stock-based compensation has become ten times higher than their potential to increase annual bonuses. I argue, first, that the potential of stock buybacks to enhance their compensation provides CEOs with incentives to conduct …

Extending Democracy To Corporate Governance And Beyond, Edward Rubin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This article proposes a different rationale for corporate democracy, one that extends more broadly to all forms of employment. It is based on an equivalence, not an analogy. The equivalence is that subordination feels essentially the same to an individual whether a public or a private entity is carrying it out. As recognized in the public arena, it undermines people’s dignity and autonomy, and at least threatens—and often produces—actual oppression. Based on this equivalence, this article proposes a different argument for corporate democracy. Proponents of democracy in the public sphere believe that the citizens of a nation should control its …

Index Funds And The Future Of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, And Policy, Lucian Bebchuk, Scott Hirst

Faculty Scholarship

Index funds own an increasingly large proportion of American public companies. The stewardship decisions of index fund managers—how they monitor, vote, and engage with their portfolio companies—can be expected to have a profound impact on the governance and performance of public companies and the economy. Understanding index fund stewardship, and how policymaking can improve it, is thus critical for corporate law scholarship. In this Article we contribute to such understanding by providing a comprehensive theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis of index fund stewardship.
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/="/">We begin by putting forward an agency-costs theory of index fund incentives. Stewardship decisions by …

Singapore Company Law And The Economy: Reciprocal Influence Over 50 Years, Vincent Ooi, Cheng Han Tan

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

A strong reciprocal relationship has existed between Singapore Company Law (SCL) and the economy since Independence in 1965. Swift Parliamentary responses to economic events and successful implementation of Government policies has made it possible to clearly attribute cause and effect to statutory amendments and economic events in turn, proving the reciprocal relationship between the two. The first theme of this article seeks to explain the fundamental characteristics of SCL that have resulted in such an unusually strong reciprocal relationship: (1) Autochthonous nature of SCL; (2) Responsive nature of legislation; and (3) Government control at multiple levels of implementation. The second …

The Enduring Distinction Between Business Entities And Security Interests, Ofer Eldar, Andrew Verstein

Faculty Scholarship

What are business entities for? What are security interests for? The prevailing answer in legal scholarship is that both bodies of law exist to partition assets for the benefit of designated creditors. But if both bodies of law partition assets, then what distinguishes them? In fact, these bodies of law appear to be converging as increasing flexibility irons out any differences. Indeed, many legal products, such as securitization vehicles, insurance products known as captive insurance, and mutual funds, employ entities to create distinct asset pools. Moreover, recent legal innovations, such as “protected cells,” which were created to facilitate such products, …