Jurisprudence Commons^™

The Rule Of Law And The Perils Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In a world where circumstances never changed and where every judicial decision was unassailably correct, applying the doctrine of stare decisis would be a breeze. Fidelity to precedent and commitment to sound legal interpretation would meld into a single, coherent enterprise. That world, alas, is not the one we live in. Like so much else in law, the concept of stare decisis encompasses a series of trade-offs-and difficult ones at that. Prominent among them is the tension between allowing past decisions to remain settled and establishing a body of legal rules that is flexible enough to adapt and improve over …

Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method And The Path Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel

Journal Articles

Constitutional precedents give rise to a jurisprudential tug-of-war. On one side is the value of adhering to precedent and allowing the law to remain settled. On the other side is the value of departing from precedent and allowing the law to improve. In this Article, I contend that negotiating the tension depends on bridging the divide between constitutional precedent and interpretive method. My aim is to analyze the ways in which theories of precedent are, and are not, derivative of overarching methods of constitutional interpretation. I seek to demonstrate that although certain consequences of deviating from precedent can be studied …

Precedent And Jurisprudential Disagreement, Amy Coney Barrett

Journal Articles

This Article, a contribution to a symposium on constitutional foundations, maintains that an unappreciated function of stare decisis is that of referee between competing visions of the Constitution. Stare decisis is styled as a doctrine of error-correction, but in controversial cases, "error" is often a stand-in for disagreement about first principles. In these cases, stare decisis functions less to guide the business of correcting mistakes — a conception that oversimplifies the reality of pluralism on the Court — than to mediate intense disputes about the Court’s role in interpreting the Constitution. Identifying this function of stare decisis offers a different …

Suboptimal Social Science And Judicial Precedent, Ben Grunwald

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role Of Precedent In The Unfolding Dialectic Of Brady V. Maryland, Colin Starger

All Faculty Scholarship

Does stare decisis constrain the expansion of constitutional doctrine? Does existing precedent preclude the Supreme Court from expanding a criminal defendant’s right to exculpatory evidence? While commentators frequently clash on when stare decisis should prevent the Court from overruling its own precedents, the question of when fidelity to precedent should inhibit doctrinal expansion is surprisingly under-theorized. This Article begins to fill this gap through an in-depth case study of stare decisis and the expansion of criminal due process doctrine.

This Article analyzes the longstanding constitutional dialectic between procedural and substantive schools of criminal due process. Focus is on Brady v. …

Stare Decisis And The Rule Of Law: A Layered Approach, Jeremy Waldron

Michigan Law Review

Stare decisis remains a controversial feature of the legal systems that recognize it. Some jurists argue that the doctrine is at odds with the rule of law; others argue that there are good rule-of-law arguments in favor of stare decisis. This Article considers one possible good rule-of-law argument. It suggests that we should approach stare decisis in a layered way, looking at what the rule of law requires of the various judges involved in the development of a precedent. One rule-of-law principle, the principle of constancy, counsels against lightly overturning such precedents as there are. But that is not in …

Stare Decisis In The Inferior Courts Of The United States, Joseph W. Mead

Nevada Law Journal

While circuit courts are bound to follow circuit precedent under “law of the circuit” the practice among federal district courts is more varied and uncertain, routinely involving little or no deference to their own precedent. I argue that the different hierarchical levels and institutional characteristics do not account for the differences in practices between circuit and district courts. Rather, district courts can and should adopt a “law of the district” similar to that of circuit courts. Through this narrow proposal, I explore the historical stare decisis practices in federal courts that are not Supreme.

Transtemporal Separation Of Powers In The Law Of Precedent, Randy Beck

Scholarly Works

The rule of stare decisis creates a presumption that a court’s ruling on a legal question remains binding in later decisions by the same court or hierarchically inferior courts. This presumption promotes stability in the law and protects reliance interests. Decisions that narrowly construe or overrule prior opinions can therefore seem like unprincipled threats to the rule of law.

This article seeks to highlight some countervailing themes in the case law, showing that stability and the protection of reliance interests are not the exclusive concerns underlying the law of precedent. The relevant doctrine attempts to balance these objectives with competing …

Stare Decisis And Constitutional Text, Jonathan F. Mitchell

Michigan Law Review

Almost everyone acknowledges that stare decisis should play a significant role when the Supreme Court of the United States resolves constitutional cases. Yet the academic and judicial rationales for this practice tend to rely on naked consequentialist considerations, and make only passing efforts to square the Court's stare decisis doctrines with the language of the Constitution. This Article offers a qualified defense of constitutional stare decisis that rests exclusively on constitutional text. It aims to broaden the overlapping consensus of interpretive theories that can support a role for constitutional stare decisis, but to do this it must narrow the circumstances …

Stare Decisis As Judicial Doctrine, Randy J. Kozel

Journal Articles

Stare decisis has been called many things, among them a principle of policy, a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations, and simply the preferred course. Often overlooked is the fact that stare decisis is also a judicial doctrine, an analytical system used to guide the rules of decision for resolving concrete disputes that come before the courts.

This Article examines stare decisis as applied by the U.S. Supreme Court, our nation’s highest doctrinal authority. A review of the Court’s jurisprudence yields two principal lessons about the modern doctrine of stare decisis. First, the doctrine is comprised largely of malleable factors …

Structure And Precedent, Jeffrey C. Dobbins

Michigan Law Review

The standard model of vertical precedent is part of the deep structure of our legal system. Under this model, we rarely struggle with whether a given decision of a court within a particular hierarchy is potentially binding at all. When Congress or the courts alter the standard structure and process offederal appellate review, however, that standard model of precedent breaks down. This Article examines several of these unusual appellate structures and highlights the difficulties associated with evaluating the precedential effect of decisions issued within them. For instance, when Congress consolidates challenges to agency decision making in a single federal circuit, …

"Undead" Wartime Cases: Stare Decisis And The Lessons Of History, Harlan G. Cohen

Faculty Scholarship

References to the “lessons of history” are ubiquitous in law. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in recent debates over U.S. counterterrorism policy. In response to the Bush Administration’s reliance on World War II-era decisions - Johnson v. Eisentrager, Ex Parte Quirin, Hirota v. MacArthur, and In re Yamashita - opponents have argued that these decisions have been rejected by the “lessons of history.” They argue that the history of wartime cases is one marked by executive aggrandizement, panic-driven attacks on civil liberties, and overly quiescent courts - none of which should be repeated.

But what does it really …

The Michigan Supreme Court, Stare Decisis, And Overruling The Overrulings, Robert A. Sedler

Law Faculty Research Publications

No abstract provided.

Under-The-Table Overruling, Christopher J. Peters

All Faculty Scholarship

In this contribution to a Wayne Law Review symposium on the first three years of the Roberts Court, the author normatively assesses the Court's practice of "under-the-table overruling," or "underruling," in high-profile constitutional cases involving abortion, campaign-finance reform, and affirmative action. The Court "underrules" when it renders a decision that undercuts a recent precedent without admitting that it is doing so. The author contends that underruling either is not supported by, or is directly incompatible with, three common rationales for constitutional stare decisis: the noninstrumental rationale, the predictability rationale, and the legitimacy rationale. In particular, while the latter rationale - …

A Constitutional Significance For Precedent: Originalism, Stare Decisis, And Property Rights, Polly J. Price

Faculty Articles

The discussions in this Article proceed as follows. Part I briefly introduces several areas of contemporary debate for which this inquiry is relevant. In Part II, I examine previous scholarly evaluations of the doctrine of precedent in the formative period. I provide an alternative explanation for the adoption by American courts of rhetoric favoring stare decisis, one that links the rhetoric used by these courts with the predominant property discourse of the Founding period and with the Marshall Court’s subsequent emphasis on vested rights and the Contracts Clause. I suggest that the stare decisis property rule gained widespread acceptance as …

Does Stare Decisis Apply In The Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Context, Meghan J. Ryan

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Throughout the past few decades, the Supreme Court has steadily chipped away at the death penalty. It was only recently, however, that courts have confronted what role precedent plays in the Eighth Amendment death penalty context. Surprisingly, few scholars have yet explored this important and complicated issue. Precedent in this area is unique because the law of the Eighth Amendment is always changing and the Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to be applied more broadly in the death penalty context. This Article argues that precedent in the Eighth Amendment death penalty context does not apply in the typical fashion. Instead …

The Supreme Court In Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, And The Future Of Unenumerated Rights, Lawrence B. Solum

Faculty Scholarship

This essay advances a formalist conception of constitutional stare decisis. I shall argue that instrumentalist accounts of precedent are inherently unsatisfying and that the Supreme Court should abandon adherence to the doctrine that it is free to overrule its own prior decisions. These moves are embedded in a larger theoretical framework - a revival of formalist ideas in legal theory that I shall call "neoformalism" to distinguish my view from the so-called "formalism" caricatured by the legal realists (and from some other views that are called "formalist").

In Part II, The Critique of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, we set the stage …

Precedent, Super-Precedent, Michael B. W. Sinclair

ExpressO

The idea of super-precedent was first posited by (then) Prof. Posner & Prof. Landis 30 years ago, but as a throw-away, and was not picked up in the jargon. In 2000 Judge Michael Luttig of the 4th Circuit used it –as “super stare decisis” –and this time it did gain a following. “Super-precedent” –and even “super-duper precedent” --had an airing at both the Alito and Roberts hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee and soon generated a couple of academic articles. No doubt there will be more. This is my contribution to the debate.

How, if at all, are we to …

Precedent In The Federal Courts Of Appeals: An Endangered Or Invasive Species?, John B. Oakley

The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process

No abstract provided.

A Simple Prescription For Texas's Ailing Court System: Stronger Stare Decisis., Andrew T. Solomon

St. Mary's Law Journal

Several Texas Supreme Court Justices have recently criticized Texas’s appellate justice system for its failure to provide consistency and the unfairness it produces, namely how litigants are treated differently despite the identical factual circumstances. Despite the warnings of various Texas Justices, neither the Texas Supreme Court nor the Texas Legislature have done much to rectify the lack of uniform justice received by Texas litigants. Most of the proposals to reform the Texas appellate justice systems’ unfairness have focused exclusively on structural changes. While structural changes could help reduce inconsistent “justice”, these reforms fail to address the main substantive problem—Texas’s weak …

The Supreme Court In Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, And The Future Of Unenumerated Rights, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This essay advances a formalist conception of constitutional stare decisis. The author argues that instrumentalist accounts of precedent are inherently unsatisfying and that the Supreme Court should abandon adherence to the doctrine that it is free to overrule its own prior decisions. These moves are embedded in a larger theoretical framework--a revival of formalist ideas in legal theory that he calls "neoformalism" to distinguish his view from the so-called "formalism" caricatured by the legal realists (and from some other views that are called "formalist").

In Part II, The Critique of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, the author sets the stage by …

A Goode Judge Is Hard To Find: An Essay On Legal Realism And Law School Casebooks, Thomas Hayes

Journal of Legal Education

No abstract provided.

How Is Constitutional Law Made?, Tracey E. George, Robert J. Pushaw Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Bismarck famously remarked: "Laws are like sausages. It's better not to see them being made." This witticism applies with peculiar force to constitutional law. Judges and commentators examine the sausage (the Supreme Court's doctrine), but ignore the messy details of its production. Maxwell Stearns has demonstrated, with brilliant originality, that the Court fashions constitutional law through process-based rules of decision such as outcome voting, stare decisis, and justiciability. Employing "social choice" economic theory, Professor Stearns argues that the Court, like all multimember decisionmaking bodies, strives to formulate rules that promote both rationality and fairness (p. 4). Viewed through the lens …

Judging In The Quiet Of The Storm., Shirley S. Abrahamson

St. Mary's Law Journal

Justice Benjamin Cardozo evaluates the elements he believes motivate judges in deciding cases in The Nature of the Judicial Process. Judge Cardozo focuses primarily on common-law courts deciding common-law cases. Although state-court dockets cover a wider variety of topics today and the legal landscape has changed, The Nature of the Judicial Process remains influential. The basis of Judge Cardozo’s approach is to first extract principles from past cases and apply them to new fact situations. Cardozo refers to this process as the method of philosophy. As precedent cannot readily solve all new disputes, this process may require judges select from …

Lee V. Weisman: Whither The Establishment Clause And The Lemon V. Kurtzman Three-Pronged Test?, Thomas A. Schweitzer

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Stare Decisis "Exception" To The Chevron Deference Rule, Rebecca White

Scholarly Works

In this article, the author discusses how Chevron intersects with one important competing norm - stare decisis. Stare decisis counsels the Court to adhere to its own decisions, particularly statutory ones, absent substantial justification for departure. To what extent should stare decisis apply when an agency's interpretation of a statute, otherwise deserving of deference under Chevron, conflicts with a prior interpretation of the statute by the Supreme Court?

This article suggests the following answer: If the Court's prior opinion upheld the agency's interpretation as one reasonable reading of the statute, but not the only one possible, and the agency thereafter …

Right To Counsel

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Interaction Between State And Federal Right To Counsel: The Overruling Of Bartolomeounsel: The Overruling Of Bartolomeo, Joseph D. Sullivan

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Contempt Of Congress: A Reply To The Critics Of An Absolute Rule Of Statutory Stare Decisis, Lawrence C. Marshall

Michigan Law Review

In the law school tradition of "suspending belief," Professor Eskridge has created a hypothetical in which I, in my first case as Chief Justice of the United States, must decide whether to adhere to various antiquated and seemingly erroneous precedents interpreting the Mann Act. Eskridge assumes that I will feel compelled to adhere to these decisions, for to do otherwise, he contends, would force me to abandon the proposal for an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis that I advanced recently in this Law Review. Eskridge then offers a variety of critiques of my thesis, coming from perspectives as diverse …

Precedent And Legal Authority: A Critical History, Charles W. Collier

UF Law Faculty Publications

In this Article, Professor Charles Collier traces out a general theory of precedential authority through historical sources. The Article focuses on three particularly influential views of precedent: Wambaugh's concept of dictum, Oliphant's concept of stare decisis, and Goodhart's concept of ratio decidendi. These views illustrate an underlying tension between two distinct doctrines of precedential authority. The first doctrine, derived from humanistic thought, restricts-legal authority as narrowly as possible to the express terms of an original text. The second doctrine draws on the broad, generalizing tendencies of the empirical sciences and their corresponding conceptions of scientific authority. The two doctrines coexist …