Jurisprudence Commons^™

Old Rulings, New Reasons, Jack Boeglin

Michigan Law Review

When the Supreme Court does away with a longstanding legal principle, what should become of the hundreds, if not thousands, of precedents across the judicial system that rely upon it? Does some residual precedential value continue to attach to a decision even after its reasoning has been rejected? Or should it be overturned unless it can be upheld on a new, independently persuasive legal basis?

These are the questions courts must ask when deciding whether to “reharmonize” precedent. A court reharmonizes a past decision by supporting it on alternative grounds that better fit with changing legal or factual understandings.

The …

Should Judicial Opinions Be Read Like Statutes?, Margaret H. Lemos

Northwestern University Law Review

Should judicial opinions be interpreted with an eye to their purpose, context, or the intent of their authors, or should interpreters focus on the ordinary meaning of the text? Opinions present the same sorts of interpretive puzzles as other legal texts, and yet they have been omitted from the debates over interpretive methodology that dominate the fields of constitutional and statutory interpretation. The omission is no accident: the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly—and with increasing frequency in recent years—that judicial opinions are not to be read like statutes. Yet neither courts nor commentators have explained why the principles that ground …

Standing On Stare Decisis After Students For Fair Admissions, Areeb Asif, Lindsey Roloff

Northwestern University Law Review

The Supreme Court recognized nearly half a century ago in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke that “the ‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.” Nevertheless, the Court seriously undercut efforts to bring such a future to life by striking down race-conscious admissions programs in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College and Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of North Carolina (collectively SFFA). Though SFFA’s binding effect is limited to educational institutions, …

Stare Decisis, Maine Law Review

Maine Law Review

Stare decisis, a doctrine fundamental to common law decisionmaking, requires a court to resolve disputes within the framework provided by the rationales and results of prior cases addressed to similar legal and factual relations. It seeks to reconcile the law's two great warring imperatives, that which requires a rational scheme of consistent authority serving the broad social goals of predictability, uniformity, and finality, with that which demands individual results informed by principle and applied with flexibility and discretion—in a word, justice. On the one hand, by focusing on how legal theory has interacted with fact on correlative earlier occasions the …

From Downes To Dobbs: Why Stare Decisis Should Not Stop The Court From Overturning The Territorial Incorporation Doctrine, Gino Piccinini

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

No abstract provided.

City Of Portland V. Depaolo: Defining The Role Of Stare Decisis In State Constitutional Decisionmaking, Thad B. Zmistowski

Maine Law Review

Five years ago, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, aligned itself with a growing number of states by adopting the primacy method of state constitutional decisionmaking. Under the primacy method, a state court decides an issue of constitutional law by first looking to that state's own constitution; if the issue is resolvable on state constitutional grounds, the federal constitutional grounds are not reached. Adoption of the primacy method by numerous state courts has generated considerable debate concerning issues of state constitutional law. Little discussion, however, has focused on the methodology of state constitutional adjudication. As a …

Overturning Sffa V. Harvard, David Hinojosa, Chavis Jones

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice

One of the first lessons law students learn is the importance of stare decisis. It not only serves as a tool to learn how to apply settled law to argument and persuasive writing, but foundationally stare decisis helps promote the public’s trust, confidence, and faith in the judicial system. Thus, when the Supreme Court issued its 6-3 opinion in 2023 in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard/University of North Carolina (“Harvard”), most onlookers viewed the decision as being the final nail in the coffin for affirmative action in higher education admissions. However, we—the authors—are among the minority.

In …

Problems With Authority, Amy J. Griffin

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

Judicial decision-making rests on a foundation of unwritten rules—those that govern the weight of authority. Such rules, including the cornerstone principle of stare decisis, are created informally through the internal social practices of the judiciary. Because weight-of-authority rules are largely informal and almost entirely unwritten, we lack a comprehensive account of their content. This raises serious questions—sounding in due process and access to justice—about whether judicial decision-making rests ultimately on judges’ arbitrary and unexamined preferences rather than transparent and deliberative processes. These norms of authority are largely invisible to many, including parties appearing before the courts. They govern the …

Slaughtering Slaughter-House: An Assessment Of 14th Amendment Privileges Or Immunities Jurisprudence, Caleb Webb

Senior Honors Theses

In 1872, the Supreme Court decided the Slaughter-House Cases, which applied a narrow interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14^th Amendment that effectually eroded the clause from the Constitution. Following Slaughter-House, the Supreme Court compensated by utilizing elastic interpretations of the Due Process Clause in its substantive due process jurisprudence to cover the rights that would have otherwise been protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In more recent years, the Court has heard arguments favoring alternative interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause but has yet to evaluate them thoroughly. By applying the …

Taking Liberties: The Supreme Court’S New Hierarchy Of Rights And Its Victims, Richard B. Katskee

Faculty Scholarship

The legitimacy of our unelected Supreme Court comes from the nature and structural limitations on judicial power. Courts do not make policy in the abstract. Rather, Article III requires federal judges to decide only real, live disputes, on the facts before them. Stare decisis then prevents the courts from changing legal rules willy-nilly. The big, important changes come instead through collective decision-making by our elected representatives. When courts do break from stare decisis, it is normally to expand protections for the politically disempowered. Those protections then make legislatures more representative and act as brakes on abuses of minorities by an …

Problems With Authority, Amy J. Griffin

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Judicial decisionmaking rests on a foundation of unwritten rules—those that govern the weight of authority. Such rules, including the cornerstone principle of stare decisis, are created informally through the internal social practices of the judiciary. Despite the central role of such rules in judicial decisionmaking, we lack a good account of how they are created, revised, and enforced. There is something paradoxical and troubling about the notion that the rules of the game are determined by the players as they play the game according to those rules. Because weight-of-authority rules are largely informal and almost entirely unwritten, we don’t even …

Three Observations About Justice Alito's Draft Opinion In Dobbs - Commentary, John M. Greabe

Law Faculty Scholarship

[Excerpt] "There is much to say about Justice Samuel Alito's draft opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, which was leaked from the United States Supreme Court on May 2 [2022].

Obviously, the most significant direct consequence of the proposed decision, which overrules Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) while upholding the constitutionality of a Mississippi law that outlaws most abortions after 15 weeks of pregnancy, would be the restriction or elimination of abortion services throughout much of the nation. This will have all sorts of attendant consequences, large and smaller, many of which …

Settled Law, G. Alexander Nunn, Alan M. Trammell

Faculty Scholarship

“Settled law” appears frequently in judicial opinions — sometimes to refer to binding precedent, sometimes to denote precedent that has acquired a more mystical permanence, and sometimes as a substantive part of legal doctrine. During judicial confirmation hearings, the term is bandied about as Senators, advocacy groups, and nominees discuss judicial philosophy and deeper ideological commitments. But its varying and often contradictory uses have given rise to a concern that settled law is simply a repository for hopelessly disparate ideas. Without definitional precision, it risks becoming nothing more than empty jargon.

We contend that settled law is actually a meaningful …

Janus-Faced Judging: How The Supreme Court Is Radically Weakening Stare Decisis, Michael Gentithes

William & Mary Law Review

Drastic changes in Supreme Court doctrine require citizens to reorder their affairs rapidly, undermining their trust in the judiciary. Stare decisis has traditionally limited the pace of such change on the Court. It is a bulwark against wholesale jurisprudential reversals. But, in recent years, the stare decisis doctrine has come under threat.

With little public or scholarly notice, the Supreme Court has radically weakened stare decisis in two ways. First, the Court has reversed its long-standing view that a precedent, regardless of the quality of its reasoning, should stand unless there is some special, practical justification to overrule it. Recent …

Justice Gorsuch's Views On Precedent In The Context Of Statutory Interpretation, Hillel Y. Levin

Scholarly Works

The doctrine of precedent, in its stare decisis form, presents a challenge to any originalist. This doctrine provides that a court should (at least sometimes) be bound by its own precedent, even if that precedent was wrongly decided in the first place. Yet if the original meaning of the text at issue is a judge’s focus, why should an intervening decision of the court—and a mistaken one at that— matter at all? Despite this tension, every originalist also at least purports to care about precedent.

This Essay focuses on Justice Gorsuch’s apparent views on precedent in the context of statutory …

Precedent In A Polarized Era, Zachary S. Price

Notre Dame Law Review

My Review begins below in Part I with a brief synopsis of Professor Kozel’s argument. Part II then discusses his theory’s particular value, and challenges, in our historical moment of acute polarization and political conflict over constitutional law. To make Part II’s claims more concrete, Part III then turns to Janus and Wayfair. It uses the two cases to illustrate pressures courts may face in the years ahead and assesses how well these decisions accord with Kozel’s theory. The Review ends with a conclusion reflecting more broadly on the importance of stare decisis and other institutional restraints in the current …

Precedent And Disagreement, Glen Staszewski

Michigan Law Review

A review of Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent.

Nonmajority Opinions And Biconditional Rules, Adam N. Steinman

Faculty Scholarship

In Hughes v. United States, the Supreme Court will revisit a thorny question: how to determine the precedential effect of decisions with no majority opinion. For four decades, the clearest instruction from the Court has been the rule from Marks v. United States: the Court's holding is "the position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." The Marks rule raises particular concerns, however, when it is applied to biconditional rules. Biconditionals are distinctive in that they set a standard that dictates both success and failure for a given issue. More formulaically, they combine an …

Precedent And The Semblance Of Law, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

Like its author, Randy Kozel's *Settled Versus Right* is insightful, thoughtful, and kind, deeply committed to improving the world that it sees. But despite its upbeat tone, the book paints a dark picture of current law and the current Court. It depicts a society whose judges are, in a positive sense, *lawless* -- not because they disregard the law, but because they are without law, because they have no shared law to guide them. What they do share is an institution, a Court, whose commands are generally accepted. So *Settled Versus Right* makes the best of what we've got, reorienting …

Case Law, Adam N. Steinman

Faculty Scholarship

Although case law plays a crucial role in the American legal system, surprisingly little consensus exists on how to determine the “law” that any given “case” generates. Lawyers, judges, and scholars regularly note the difference between holdings and dicta and between necessary and unnecessary parts of a precedent-setting decision, but such concepts have eluded coherent application in practice. There remains considerable uncertainty about which aspects of a judicial decision impose prospective legal obligations as a matter of stare decisis and to what extent.

This Article develops a counterintuitive, but productive, way to conceptualize case law: the lawmaking content of a …

Dead Precedents, Riley T. Svikhart

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Part I explores the Roberts Court’s reluctance to overrule Supreme Court precedents more thoroughly. Part II provides a modest account for this phenomenon. Section II.A considers the relationship between the Roberts Court’s reluctance to overrule Supreme Court precedents and its law declaration bent. Section II.B evaluates this reluctance in light of the doctrinal commitment of stare decisis. Finally, Section II.C examines the link between the Roberts Court’s treatment of dying precedents and its trademark adherence to the constitutional avoidance doctrine.

The Highest Court: A Dialogue Between Justice Louis Brandeis And Justice Antonin Scalia On Stare Decisis, P. Thomas Distanislao Iii

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Precedent And Speech, Randy J. Kozel

Michigan Law Review

The U.S. Supreme Court has shown a notable willingness to reconsider its First Amendment precedents. In recent years, the Court has departed from its prior statements regarding the constitutional value of false speech. It has revamped its process for identifying categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection. It has changed its positions on corporate electioneering and aggregate campaign contributions. In short, it has revised the ground rules of expressive freedom in ways large and small. The Court generally describes its past decisions as enjoying a presumption of validity through the doctrine of stare decisis. This Article contends that within the context …

The Curious Case Of Cell Phone Location Data: Fourth Amendment Doctrine Mash-Up, Monu Bedi

Northwestern University Law Review

Police surveillance ability and information gathering capacity have a dynamic relationship with technology. Greater advancements in technology make it easier for the police to surveil individuals and collect information. This state of affairs leads to heightened concerns over Fourth Amendment protection. This issue has most recently played out in the context of police collecting cell phone location data. Courts disagree on whether and to what extent this data garners Fourth Amendment protection. Underlying this disagreement rests a hitherto overlooked tension between two interrelated Fourth Amendment doctrines—the third-party and the public disclosure doctrines. While both vitiate privacy protection and are commonly …

Personal Stare Decisis, Hiv Non-Disclosure, And The Decision In Mabior, Elaine Craig

Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press

This article discusses the concept of personal stare decisis and the issue of horizontal precedent through examination of Canada's jurisprudence on the (over) criminalization of HIV non-disclosure. The Court's reasoning in R v Cuerrier and R v Mabior, as well as the trial decisions decided since Mabior are examined. The point is not to suggest that Justice McLachlin’s approach in Cuerrier offered the perfect solution to this issue. Indeed, as Isabel Grant argues, a better approach would remove non-disclosure of HIV status from the sexual assault criminal law regime and in its stead reintroduce the use of offences such …

What's A Lower Court To Do? Limiting Lawrence V. Texas And The Right To Sexual Autonomy, John Tuskey

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Week After, Lawrence K. Karlton

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel

Michigan Law Review

The scope of Supreme Court precedent is capacious. Justices of the Court commonly defer to sweeping rationales and elaborate doctrinal frameworks articulated by their predecessors. This practice infuses judicial precedent with the prescriptive power of enacted constitutional and statutory text. The lower federal courts follow suit, regularly abiding by the Supreme Court’s broad pronouncements. These phenomena cannot be explained by—and, indeed, oftentimes subvert—the classic distinction between binding holdings and dispensable dicta. This Article connects the scope of precedent with recurring and foundational debates about the proper ends of judicial interpretation. A precedent’s forward- looking effect should not depend on the …

To Say What The Law Is: Rules, Results, And The Dangers Of Inferential Stare Decisis, Adam N. Steinman

Faculty Scholarship

Judicial decisions do more than resolve disputes. They are also crucial sources of prospective law, because stare decisis obligates future courts to follow those decisions. Yet there remains tremendous uncertainty about how we identify a judicial decision’s lawmaking content. Does stare decisis require future courts to follow the rules stated in a precedent-setting opinion? Or must future courts merely reconcile their decisions with the ultimate result of the precedent-setting case? Although it is widely assumed that a rule-based approach puts greater constraints on future courts, two recent Supreme Court decisions—Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes and Ashcroft v. Iqbal—turn this conventional …

Precedent: What It Is And What It Isn't; When Do We Kiss It And When Do We Kill It?, Ruggero J. Aldisert

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.