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Articles 1621 - 1650 of 2122

Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

Legal Context: Reading Statutes In Light Of Prevailing Legal Precedent, Bradford Mank Jan 2002

Legal Context: Reading Statutes In Light Of Prevailing Legal Precedent, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

An important question is when judges should consider contextual evidence about the meaning of a statute. Judges usually will read a statute's text in light of judicial precedent prevailing at the time of its enactment to understand the contemporary meaning of various words or phrases in the statute.' A more difficult issue is whether courts should consider contemporary judicial context if a statute's text is silent about an issue. The use of contemporary context to imply statutory meaning has been especially controversial where the issue is whether courts should imply a private right of action.


Effectuating Censorship: Civic Republicanism And The Secondary Effects Doctrine, 35 J. Marshall L. Rev. 189 (2002), Brandon K. Lemley Jan 2002

Effectuating Censorship: Civic Republicanism And The Secondary Effects Doctrine, 35 J. Marshall L. Rev. 189 (2002), Brandon K. Lemley

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.


Freedom Of The Private-University Student Press: A Constitutional Proposal, 36 J. Marshall L. Rev. 139 (2002), Brian J. Steffen, John E. Ferguson Jan 2002

Freedom Of The Private-University Student Press: A Constitutional Proposal, 36 J. Marshall L. Rev. 139 (2002), Brian J. Steffen, John E. Ferguson

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.


Reflecting On The Virtual Child Porn Decision, 36 J. Marshall L. Rev. 211 (2002), David L. Hudson Jan 2002

Reflecting On The Virtual Child Porn Decision, 36 J. Marshall L. Rev. 211 (2002), David L. Hudson

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Courts' Inconsistent Treatment Of Bethel V. Fraser And The Curtailment Of Student Rights, 36 J. Marshall L. Rev. 181 (2002), David L. Hudson Jan 2002

The Courts' Inconsistent Treatment Of Bethel V. Fraser And The Curtailment Of Student Rights, 36 J. Marshall L. Rev. 181 (2002), David L. Hudson

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.


Lincoln, Marshall And The Judicial Role, David F. Forte Jan 2002

Lincoln, Marshall And The Judicial Role, David F. Forte

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

Abraham Lincoln understood judicial activism. For Lincoln, the paradigm of the unrestrained Supreme Court was the decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford. Lincoln saw the "illegitimacy" of Dred Scott not in that the Supreme Court had overturned an act of Congress. It was, rather, that the Supreme Court, in the guise of making a legal decision, instead made a political decision. Even worse, it was a political decision that sought to redefine the polity in fundamental, constitutional terms. Lincoln's position echoed the most eloquent articulation of judicial review ever made by the Court: in Marbury vs. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall …


Beyond Interpretation, Pierre Schlag Jan 2002

Beyond Interpretation, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.


Introduction: Favorite Insurance Cases Symposium, Jeffrey W. Stempel Jan 2002

Introduction: Favorite Insurance Cases Symposium, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

Insurance law scholars and teachers sometimes feel, with a mixture of paranoia and justification, that insurance law simply does not receive its proper respect in the hierarchy of legal education and law generally.

Consider the law school curriculum. In none of America’s nearly 200 ABA-approved law schools in insurance law a required course. Nor is it considered a course that, although not required, prudent students “must” be sure to take before they graduate (e.g. Evidence, Corporations). Enrollments may be respectable but the class is seldom oversubscribed, even where the law school is located in an insurance hub city. Although other …


System And Lifeworld In Habermas's Theory Of Law, Hugh Baxter Jan 2002

System And Lifeworld In Habermas's Theory Of Law, Hugh Baxter

Cardozo Law Review

Jürgen Habermas's recent work on law and democracy divides into two parts. With his "discourse theory of law and democracy," Habermas seeks to explain the conditions under which modern constitutional legal and political orders may claim legitimacy. Here Habermas's method is primarily philosophical and legal-theoretical. The second part of the project - the part on which this article focuses - develops what Habermas calls his "communication theory of society." Here Habermas seeks to "translate" the normative conclusions of his discourse theory into a substantive social-theoretical model. The idea is to determine whether the ambitious normative theory of democracy is plausible …


Treaties And The Eleventh Amendment, Carlos Manuel Vázquez Jan 2002

Treaties And The Eleventh Amendment, Carlos Manuel Vázquez

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Supreme Court's recent invigoration of federalism doctrine has revived a question that had long lain dormant in constitutional law: whether and to what extent federalism limits apply to exercises of the Treaty Power. In the days before the famous switch in time that saved nine, the Court in Missouri v. Holland upheld a statute passed by Congress to implement a treaty even though it assumed that the statute would exceed Congress's legislative power under Article I in the absence of the treaty. The significance of this holding abated considerably when the Court embraced a broader interpretation of the Commerce …


A Subversive Strand Of The Warren Court, Gary Peller Jan 2002

A Subversive Strand Of The Warren Court, Gary Peller

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The choice between "de jure" and "de facto" standards of review arises whenever a legal standard is needed to identify violations of specific constitutional rights or norms in particular cases. The issue is methodological in the sense that the question is faced regardless of the particular right or norm at issue (although it is not really true that the choice between these methodologies would have no influence on the choice of rights or norms to apply). A de Jure approach limits the imposition of constitutional norms to cases in which the state has affirmatively acted to help create a particular …


Tradition, Principle And Self-Sovereignty: Competing Conceptions Of Liberty In The United States Constitution, Robin West Jan 2002

Tradition, Principle And Self-Sovereignty: Competing Conceptions Of Liberty In The United States Constitution, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The “liberty” protected by the United States Constitution has been variously interpreted as the “liberty” of thinking persons to speak, worship and associate with others, unimpeded by onerous state law; the liberty of consumers and producers to make individual market choices, including the choice to sell one’s labour at any price one sees fit, free of redistributive or paternalistic legislation that might restrict it; and the liberty of all of us in the domestic sphere to make choices regarding reproductive and family life, free of state law that might restrict it on grounds relating to public morals. Although the United …


Law's Constitution: A Relational Critique, Victoria Nourse Jan 2002

Law's Constitution: A Relational Critique, Victoria Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

It is a simple fact: we begin from others. Without others we, quite literally, could not live, feel, be born. Every mother, every mother's partner, every father, every child, knows this. But law sees these relations as something lesser, as foreign. Mention the word "relationship" to the average lawyer and she will likely assume that you are talking about sex, dating, or perhaps marriage. She may even wonder what "relationship" has to do with the law at all.

In this paper, the author wonders whether it is possible to flip that equation, to think of the relational as central, rather …


The Law And Large Numbers, Paul H. Edelman Jan 2002

The Law And Large Numbers, Paul H. Edelman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Can mathematics be used to inform legal analysis? This is not a ridiculous question. Law has certain superficial resem­blances to mathematics. One might view the Constitution and various statutes as providing "axioms" for a deductive legal sys­tem. From these axioms judges deduce "theorems" consisting of interpretation of these axioms in certain situations. Often these theorems are built on previously "proven" theorems, i.e. earlier decisions of the court. Of course some of the axioms might change, and occasionally a theorem that was once true becomes false; the former is a common feature of mathematics, the latter, though theoretically not possible in …


A Measure Of Freedom, James W. Nickel Sep 2001

A Measure Of Freedom, James W. Nickel

Articles

No abstract provided.


Memorandum Of Argument For Leave To Appeal Of The Appellant James R. Demers, Court Of Appeal For Province Of British Columbia, Jeffrey C. Tuomala Jun 2001

Memorandum Of Argument For Leave To Appeal Of The Appellant James R. Demers, Court Of Appeal For Province Of British Columbia, Jeffrey C. Tuomala

Faculty Publications and Presentations

No abstract provided.


Privatization And Political Accountability, Jack M. Beermann Jun 2001

Privatization And Political Accountability, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

This article is an attempt to draw some general connections between privatization and political accountability. Political accountability is to be understood as the amenability of a government policy or activity to monitoring through the political process. Although the main focus of the article is to examine different types of privatization, specifically exploring the ramifications for political accountability of each type, I also engage in some speculation as to whether there are there situations in which privatization might raise constitutional concerns related to the degree to which the particular privatization reduces political accountability for the actions or decisions of the newly …


Constitutional Revolutions: A New Look At Lower Appellate Review In American Constitutionalism, Robert Justin Lipkin Apr 2001

Constitutional Revolutions: A New Look At Lower Appellate Review In American Constitutionalism, Robert Justin Lipkin

The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process

Judicial review allows the Supreme Court of the United States to perform revolutionary constitutional change. The United States Courts of Appeals could also be a vehicle for revolutionary constitutional adjudication.


The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court's Failures In Dickerson, Paul G. Cassell Mar 2001

The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court's Failures In Dickerson, Paul G. Cassell

Michigan Law Review

Where's the rest of the opinion? That was my immediate reaction to reading the Supreme Court's terse decision in Dickerson, delivered to me via email from the clerk's office a few minutes after its release. Surely, I thought, some glitch in the transmission had eliminated the pages of discussion on the critical issues in the case. Yet, as it became clear that I had received all of the Court's opinion, my incredulity grew.


Miranda, Dickerson, And The Puzzling Persistence Of Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, Stephen J. Schulhofer Mar 2001

Miranda, Dickerson, And The Puzzling Persistence Of Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, Stephen J. Schulhofer

Michigan Law Review

Dickerson v. United States preserves the status quo regime for judicial oversight of police interrogation. That result could be seen, in the present climate, as a victory for due process values, but there remain many reasons for concern that existing safeguards are flawed - that they are either too restrictive or not restrictive enough. Such concerns are partly empirical, of course. They depend on factual assessments of how much the Miranda rules do restrict the police. But such concerns also reflect a crucial, though often unstated, normative premise; they presuppose a certain view of how much the police should be …


Identifying And (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, And Incidental Rights In Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Susan R. Klein Mar 2001

Identifying And (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, And Incidental Rights In Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Susan R. Klein

Michigan Law Review

The Miranda conundrum runs something like this. If the Miranda decision represents true constitutional interpretation, and all unwarned statements taken during custodial interrogation are "compelled" within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause, the impeachment and "fruits" exceptions to Miranda should fall. If it is not true constitutional interpretation, than the Court has no business reversing state criminal convictions for its violation. I offer here what I hope is a satisfying answer to this conundrum, on both descriptive and normative levels, that justifies not only Miranda but a host of similar Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Court decisions as well. In Part …


Separated At Birth But Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda And The Due Process Notice Cases, George C. Thomas Iii Mar 2001

Separated At Birth But Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda And The Due Process Notice Cases, George C. Thomas Iii

Michigan Law Review

Paraphrasing Justice Holmes, law is less about logic than experience. Courts and scholars have now had thirty-four years of experience with Miranda v. Arizona, including the Court's recent endorsement in Dickerson v. United States last Term. Looking back over this experience, it is plain that the Court has created a Miranda doctrine quite different from what it has said it was creating. I think the analytic structure in Dickerson supports this rethinking of Miranda. To connect the dots, I offer a new explanation for Miranda that permits us to reconcile Dickerson and the rest of the post-Miranda doctrine with the …


In The Stationhouse After Dickerson, Charles D. Weisselberg Mar 2001

In The Stationhouse After Dickerson, Charles D. Weisselberg

Michigan Law Review

Miranda v. Arizona established the high water mark of the protections afforded an accused during a custodial interrogation. During the decades that followed, the United States Supreme Court allowed Miranda's foundation to erode, inviting a direct challenge to the landmark ruling. In Dickerson v. United States, the Court turned back such a challenge and placed Miranda upon a more secure, constitutional footing. This Article explores the impact of Dickerson in the place where Miranda was meant to matter most: the stationhouse. As I have described elsewhere, Supreme Court decisions have influenced a number of California law enforcement agencies to instruct …


Miranda, The Constitution, And Congress, David A. Strauss Mar 2001

Miranda, The Constitution, And Congress, David A. Strauss

Michigan Law Review

Are Miranda warnings required by the Constitution, or not? If they are, why has the Supreme Court repeatedly said that the rights created by Miranda are "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution"? If not, why can't an Act of Congress, such as 18 U.S.C. 3501, declare them to be unnecessary? These were the central questions posed by United States v. Dickerson. It is not clear that the majority opinion ever really answered them. The majority said that "Miranda is constitutionally based," that Miranda has "constitutional underpinnings," that Miranda is "a constitutional decision," and that Miranda "announced a constitutional rule." …


Miranda'S Mistake, William J. Stuntz Mar 2001

Miranda'S Mistake, William J. Stuntz

Michigan Law Review

The oddest thing about Miranda is its politics - a point reinforced by the decision in, and the reaction to, Dickerson v. United States. In Dickerson, the Supreme Court faced the question whether Miranda ought to be overturned, either directly or by permitting legislative overrides. The lawyers, the literature, and the Court split along right-left - or, in the Court's case, right-center - lines, with the right seeking to do away with Miranda's restrictions on police questioning, and the left (or center) seeking to maintain them. The split is familiar. Reactions to Miranda have always divided along ideological lines, with …


Questioning The Relevance Of Miranda In The Twenty-First Century, Richard A. Leo Mar 2001

Questioning The Relevance Of Miranda In The Twenty-First Century, Richard A. Leo

Michigan Law Review

Miranda v. Arizona is the most well-known criminal justice decision - arguably the most well-known legal decision - in American history. Since it was decided in 1966, the Miranda decision has spawned voluminous newspaper coverage, political and legal debate, and academic commentary. The Miranda warnings themselves have become so well-known through the media of television that most people recognize them immediately. As Patrick Malone has pointed out, the Miranda decision has added its own lexicon of words and phrases to the American language. Perhaps with this understanding in mind, George Thomas recently suggested that the Miranda warnings are more well-known …


Duncan Kennedy, A Critique Of Adjudication: Fin De Siècle, David Kennedy Mar 2001

Duncan Kennedy, A Critique Of Adjudication: Fin De Siècle, David Kennedy

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.


Starbucks And The New Federalism: The Court's Answer To Globalization, Robert Knowles Jan 2001

Starbucks And The New Federalism: The Court's Answer To Globalization, Robert Knowles

Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


In The Wake Of Crosby V. National Foreign Trade Council: The Impact Upon Selective Purchasing Legislation Throughout The United States, 34 J. Marshall L. Rev. 827 (2001), Ako Miyaki-Murphy Jan 2001

In The Wake Of Crosby V. National Foreign Trade Council: The Impact Upon Selective Purchasing Legislation Throughout The United States, 34 J. Marshall L. Rev. 827 (2001), Ako Miyaki-Murphy

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.


Procedural Reforms In Capital Cases Applied To Perjury, 34 J. Marshall L. Rev. 453 (2001), Steven Clark Jan 2001

Procedural Reforms In Capital Cases Applied To Perjury, 34 J. Marshall L. Rev. 453 (2001), Steven Clark

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.