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Articles 301 - 314 of 314

Full-Text Articles in Evidence

Confidence In Probability: Burdens Of Persuasion In A World Of Imperfect Knowledge, Neil B. Cohen Jun 1985

Confidence In Probability: Burdens Of Persuasion In A World Of Imperfect Knowledge, Neil B. Cohen

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Statistical Significance And The Burden Of Persuasion, David H. Kaye Jan 1983

Statistical Significance And The Burden Of Persuasion, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

In most endeavors concerned with the acquisition of knowledge, quantitative information is welcomed. In law, however, it appears sometimes that scientific or numerical evidence makes cases harder, not easier. Nevertheless, there are many cases and administrative proceedings, in such areas as environmental law, food and drug regulation, and civil rights, in which statistical data obtained by observation or experiment are readily accepted as assisting in the proper resolution of disputed issues of fact. When courts or administrators confront scientific and statistical evidence in these proceedings, they are not always certain of how to weigh the evidence or whether they should …


Mccormick On Evidence And The Concept Of Hearsay: A Critical Analysis Followed By Suggestions To Law Teachers, Roger C. Park Jan 1981

Mccormick On Evidence And The Concept Of Hearsay: A Critical Analysis Followed By Suggestions To Law Teachers, Roger C. Park

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments And The Burden Of Proof: A Response To Dr. Cohen's Reply, David H. Kaye Jan 1981

Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments And The Burden Of Proof: A Response To Dr. Cohen's Reply, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

This article responds to L. Jonathan Cohen's critique of the author's position regarding the problem of naked statistical evidence. Cohen argues that the kind of probability at work in litigation does not conform to the axioms of mathematical probability. The author responds by suggesting that the familiar theory of probability needs no revision to account for the reluctance of a few courts to permit plaintiffs to prevail on the strength of background statistics alone. One need not adopt Dr. Cohen's esoteric mathematical structure to explain the burden of proof in civil cases. The article shows that whether or not one …


Investigative Stops In High Crime Areas, Richard A. Gonzales Jan 1980

Investigative Stops In High Crime Areas, Richard A. Gonzales

Faculty Scholarship

This article questions what constitutes reasonable suspicion of criminal activity particularly within high crime area. Some of the referenced cases:

  • People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509, 324 N.E.2d 872 (1975)
  • U.S. v. Magda, 409 F.Supp. 734,740 (S.D. N.Y. 1976)
  • Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 ( 1968)
  • Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 ( 1968)
  • U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)
  • U.S. v. Flores, 462 F. Supp. 702 (E.D. NS. 1978)
  • U.S. v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1977)
  • U.S. v. Constantine, 567 F.2d 266 ( 4th Cir. 1977)
  • People v. Bower, 24 …


Mathematical Models And Legal Realities: Some Comments On The Poisson Model Of Jury Behavior, David H. Kaye Jan 1980

Mathematical Models And Legal Realities: Some Comments On The Poisson Model Of Jury Behavior, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

While a mathematical model cannot reflect all the elements of reality, modeling involves drastic simplifications, and those expounding the mathematical model would recognize the complexity of the elements. This article illuminates this cause with a mathematical model that seems to be in vogue, developed by the renowned mathematician Simeon Poisson. It reviews the Poisson model in order to enucleate its many assumptions. It also explains why these assumptions may introduce serious errors into the probabilities calculated according to the model. It also indicates one reason that even a relatively error free model would have limited usefulness in resolving the constitutional …


New York Proposed Code Of Evidence: Article V, The Symposium: The New York Proposed Code Of Evidence, Michael M. Martin Jan 1980

New York Proposed Code Of Evidence: Article V, The Symposium: The New York Proposed Code Of Evidence, Michael M. Martin

Faculty Scholarship

Article V of the New York Proposed Code of Evidence sets forth the rules of evidentiary privilege. Unlike other articles of the Proposed Code, it differs significantly from its federal counterpart. Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence consists of only rule 501, which provides that, unless otherwise required by the constitution or federal statute, privileges in federal courts are governed by "the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted... in the light of reason and experience." Rule 501 further provides, however, that questions of privilege in civil cases as to which state law supplies the …


Probabilities And Proof: Can Hla And Blood Group Testing Prove Paternity?, David H. Kaye, Ira Mark Ellman Jan 1979

Probabilities And Proof: Can Hla And Blood Group Testing Prove Paternity?, David H. Kaye, Ira Mark Ellman

Faculty Scholarship

Advancing medical technology has produced tests which offer the opportunity to resolve paternity disputes with more accuracy than unaided traditional evidentiary techniques are likely to obtain. Because the biology underlying the statistical evidence in paternity cases offers a wealth of previously unavailable information which is certain to revolutionize the adjudication of paternity suits, but it is important that the courts not become so mesmerized by these new sources of evidence that they neglect to subject them to traditional principles of evidence applicable to all testimony. Additionally, for some time scholars have disagreed on the proper application of a probability formula …


Confessions Of A Horizontalist: A Dialogue On The First Amendment, Larry Yackle Jan 1979

Confessions Of A Horizontalist: A Dialogue On The First Amendment, Larry Yackle

Faculty Scholarship

It is hardly surprising that the Supreme Court has never developed a satisfying theory of the first amendment. Free speech and press problems are many and varied, demanding the most delicate balance of interests in order to preserve a system of freedom of expression and at the same time afford proper respect for competing governmental objectives. Doctrine adapted to one medium of expression may not sit well when applied to others. With the passage of time, changes in technology, economic conditions, and the very nature of expression tend to outstrip the Court's ability to keep pace with doctrinal innovations. There …


Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress Did Not Write Into The Federal Rules Of Evidence , Michael M. Martin Jan 1978

Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress Did Not Write Into The Federal Rules Of Evidence , Michael M. Martin

Faculty Scholarship

This Article focuses on the question whether, or to what extent, a federal court is bound by the explicit and implicit restrictions placed by Congress on a court's power to admit evidence. This is a question that did not arise prior to adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence because previous prospective rulemaking in the procedural area was in truth a judicial exercise. Although Congress had an implicit veto power over rules of procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court, it never exercised that power. Thus, a lower court's decision to disregard a rule of procedure raised, as a practical matter, …


Evidence: Prior Crimes And Prior Bad Acts Evidence, Paul W. Grimm Jan 1976

Evidence: Prior Crimes And Prior Bad Acts Evidence, Paul W. Grimm

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Uncertain Rule Of Certainty: An Analysis And Proposal For A Federal Evidence Rule, The , Michael M. Martin Jan 1973

Uncertain Rule Of Certainty: An Analysis And Proposal For A Federal Evidence Rule, The , Michael M. Martin

Faculty Scholarship

Two characteristic principles of Anglo-American evidence law are the requirement that witnesses testify only to their personal observations (the "first-hand knowledge" rule) and the prohibition against witnesses testifying to their inferences (the "opinion" rule). However, a longstanding exception to these principles permits witnesses possessed of skill or learning to draw inferences, often from facts they have not personally observed. Because such expert opinion testimony is exceptional, it is hedged about with various restrictions in addition to those such as relevancy which apply to all testimony. The predicate for admission of expert opinion testimony generally consists of two elements. First, the …


Former-Testimony Exception In The Proposed Federal Rules Of Evidence, The , Michael M. Martin Jan 1971

Former-Testimony Exception In The Proposed Federal Rules Of Evidence, The , Michael M. Martin

Faculty Scholarship

According to one member of the Advisory Committee which drafted them, the proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates were promulgated to "improve the truth-finding capacity of the courts," as well as to provide the benefits of simplification and uniformity. In much the same way that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have led to modernization of procedural rules in many states, the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence may be the vehicle by which improvements unsuccessfully codified in the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence can finally be achieved across the United …


The Consent Problem In Wiretapping & Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring With The Consent Of A Participant In A Conversation, Kent Greenawalt Jan 1968

The Consent Problem In Wiretapping & Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring With The Consent Of A Participant In A Conversation, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

The extent to which American society should permit wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping has been considered by judges, legislators and scholars for many years, although this consideration has yet to result in legal rules that respond rationally and consistently to the conflicting demands of privacy and effective law enforcement. Constitutional analysis has, until very recently, relied on concepts like "physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area," producing distinctions with little relation to underlying social values; statutory restrictions on wiretapping have been much more severe than those imposed on eavesdropping, though the latter, particularly in light of the rapidly developing technology, poses …