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Articles 271 - 300 of 310
Full-Text Articles in Evidence
The New Wave Of Hearsay Reform Scholarship, Roger C. Park
The New Wave Of Hearsay Reform Scholarship, Roger C. Park
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Juror Decision Making And The Evaluation Of Hearsay Evidence, Roger C. Park, Peter Miene, Eugene Borgida
Juror Decision Making And The Evaluation Of Hearsay Evidence, Roger C. Park, Peter Miene, Eugene Borgida
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Jurors' Perceptions Of Eyewitness And Hearsay Evidence, Roger C. Park, Margaret Bull Kovera, Steven D. Penrod
Jurors' Perceptions Of Eyewitness And Hearsay Evidence, Roger C. Park, Margaret Bull Kovera, Steven D. Penrod
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Struggling To Stop The Flood Of Unreliable Expert Testimony, David L. Faigman
Struggling To Stop The Flood Of Unreliable Expert Testimony, David L. Faigman
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Credal Probability, David H. Kaye
Credal Probability, David H. Kaye
Faculty Scholarship
This article responds to Paul Bergman and Al Moore's doubt that ideal triers of facts would be Bayesians. They argue that Bayes' rule, and probability theory in general, fails as a theoretical factfinding model. While probability has long been an accepted measure of belief in empirical propositions and the validity of inductive arguments, this articles addresses Bergman and Moore's doubts directly. It shows how their examples demonstrating the "frequentist" character of Bayesian methodology or the fallacies in Bayesian analysis are easily handled without a frequentist interpretation of probability. Then it shows that an ideal juror's partial beliefs will conform to …
Evidence Engendered, Kit Kinports
Evidence Engendered, Kit Kinports
Faculty Scholarship
Part I of this article briefly describes feminist legal theory and its evolution. Part II then discusses the extent to which evidence as a whole is a gendered topic that reflects predominantly male traits and ideals, and Part III analyzes various specific evidentiary doctrines from a feminist perspective. Finally, Part IV examines way of incorporating feminist theories in teaching an evidence course.
The Whole Truth?: How Rules Of Evidence Make Lawyers Deceitful, Bruce A. Green
The Whole Truth?: How Rules Of Evidence Make Lawyers Deceitful, Bruce A. Green
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Admissibility Of Dna Evidence, David H. Kaye
The Admissibility Of Dna Evidence, David H. Kaye
Faculty Scholarship
In contrast to the widespread acceptance of red blood cell grouping, blood serum protein and enzyme analysis, and HLA typing, the evidentiary status of forensic applications of recombinant-DNA technology is in flux. A proper evidentiary analysis must attend to the fact that there is no single method of DNA typing. As with the more established genetic tests, the probative value of the laboratory findings depends both on the procedure employed and the genetic characteristics that are discerned. This paper describes some of these procedures and the theory that lies behind them, and then considers the developing case law. Given the …
Procedural Options For Resolving Hearsay Issues, Roger C. Park
Procedural Options For Resolving Hearsay Issues, Roger C. Park
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Evidence Scholarship, Old And New, Roger C. Park
Evidence Scholarship, Old And New, Roger C. Park
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Form And Function In The Administration Of Justice: The Bill Of Rights And Federal Habeas Corpus, Larry Yackle
Form And Function In The Administration Of Justice: The Bill Of Rights And Federal Habeas Corpus, Larry Yackle
Faculty Scholarship
Part I critiques the Report's insistence that accurate fact finding exhausts, or nearly exhausts, the objectives of criminal justice, identifies the fundamental role of the Bill of Rights in the American political order, and situates federal habeas corpus within that framework. Part II traces the Report's historical review of the federal habeas jurisdiction and critiques the Report's too-convenient reliance on selected materials that, on examination, fail to undermine conventional understandings of the writ's development as a postconviction remedy. Part III responds to the Report's complaints regarding current habeas corpus practice and refutes contentions that the habeas jurisdiction overburdens federal dockets …
Challenging Witness Competency , Michael M. Martin
Challenging Witness Competency , Michael M. Martin
Faculty Scholarship
Despite the modern trend to hear all the evidence, a surprising number of witnesses can still be challenged on competency grounds.
Mapping The Human Genome And The Meaning Of Monster Mythology, George J. Annas
Mapping The Human Genome And The Meaning Of Monster Mythology, George J. Annas
Faculty Scholarship
Pre-Columbian cartographers drew their maps to the extent of their knowledge, and then wrote in the margins, "Beyond this point there are dragons." With the voyage of Columbus, we lost both our fear of the geographic frontier and our innocence. We accept that knowledge can generally overpower fear; but we have also learned that the application of new knowledge often has a dark side that can lead to brutality and disaster. The discovery of America, for example, led to unforeseen value conflicts of justice and fairness involving native Americans that were "resolved" only by their merciless subjugation and genocidal destruction. …
"I Didn't Tell Them Anything About You": Implied Assertions As Hearsay Under The Federal Rules Of Evidence, Roger C. Park
"I Didn't Tell Them Anything About You": Implied Assertions As Hearsay Under The Federal Rules Of Evidence, Roger C. Park
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Bracton, The Year Books, And The "Transformation Of Elementary Legal Ideas" In The Early Common Law, David J. Seipp
Bracton, The Year Books, And The "Transformation Of Elementary Legal Ideas" In The Early Common Law, David J. Seipp
Faculty Scholarship
The language of the common law has a life and a logic of its own, resilient through eight centuries of unceasing talk. Basic terms of the lawyer's specialized vocabulary, elementary conceptual distinctions, and modes of argument, which all go to make “thinking like a lawyer” possible, have proved remarkably durable in the literature of the common law. Two fundamental distinctions—between “real” and “personal” actions and between “possessory” and “proprietary” remedies—can be traced back to their early use in treatises of the first generations of professional common law judges and in reports of courtroom dialogue from the first generations of professional …
What Is Bayesianism? A Guide For The Perplexed, David H. Kaye
What Is Bayesianism? A Guide For The Perplexed, David H. Kaye
Faculty Scholarship
Bayes' Theorem, Bayesian statistics and Bayesian inference have been the subject of sharp dispute in various writings about legal rules of evidence and proof. This article disentangles the many meanings of "Bayesianism." It sketches several competing interpretations of probability, some leading schools of statistical inference, and the elements of Bayesian decision theory. In the process, it notes the aspects of Bayesian theory that have been applied in studies of forensic proof.
Plemel As A Primer On Proving Paternity, David H. Kaye
Plemel As A Primer On Proving Paternity, David H. Kaye
Faculty Scholarship
Although in the past courts only permitted genetic evidence in paternity suits to prove that an accused man was not the father, with the advent of new genetic tests, which easily can exclude ninety to nitey-five percent of the population in most cases, the supreme courts of Massachusetts, Oregon, and Utah have held that various genetic tests may be used to prove paternity. While a positive move, the admissibility of genetic proof of paternity raises serious questions as to the manner in which this evidence should be presented in court. In the interests of efficiency, some jurisdictions seem to dispense …
The Rationale Of Personal Admissions, Roger C. Park
The Rationale Of Personal Admissions, Roger C. Park
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Common Law Remedies Of Employees Injured By Employer Use Of Polygraph Testing, Deborah J. Weimer
Common Law Remedies Of Employees Injured By Employer Use Of Polygraph Testing, Deborah J. Weimer
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Validity Of Tests: Caveant Omnes, David H. Kaye
The Validity Of Tests: Caveant Omnes, David H. Kaye
Faculty Scholarship
A great debate swirls about the use of polygraph tests in criminal cases. Similar concerns about individual privacy and freedom arise with proposals and projects involving widespread testing of government employees for drugs and deception. Required diagnostic testing for certain diseases - most notoriously, for AIDS - raises similar concerns. Incorrect conclusions about who has taken illicit drugs, who has AIDS, and who is lying can be devastating. Yet, perfect knowledge is unattainable. Errors are inevitable. Questions of what the tendency is for these tests to err, which measures are appropriate for deciding whether to use a screening test, and …
A Subject Matter Approach To Hearsay Reform, Roger C. Park
A Subject Matter Approach To Hearsay Reform, Roger C. Park
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Cost Of Acceptability: Blue Buses, Agent Orange, And Aversion To Statistical Evidence, Neil B. Cohen
The Cost Of Acceptability: Blue Buses, Agent Orange, And Aversion To Statistical Evidence, Neil B. Cohen
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Do We Need A Calculus Of Weight To Understand Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt?, David H. Kaye
Do We Need A Calculus Of Weight To Understand Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt?, David H. Kaye
Faculty Scholarship
The commentary on a paper by L.J. Cohen, prepared for a symposium on probability and inference in the law of evidence, shows that the legal requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt can be understood simply as demanding a sufficiently high probability that the prosecution's narrative or story of the facts, which captures all the elements of the offense, is true. No separate measure of the "weight" of the totality of the evidence is required to understand the burden of persuasion. Any incompleteness in the evidence can be accounted for by a conditional probability that includes the presence of any …
Is Proof Of Statistical Significance Relevant?, David H. Kaye
Is Proof Of Statistical Significance Relevant?, David H. Kaye
Faculty Scholarship
The classic treatises on evidence note that the court or jury must weigh the evidence, and upon weighing it, determine whether the plaintiff or the defendant prevails. Some courts, however, have indicated that statistical evidence should not be admitted unless it is subjected to a procedure known as 'hypothesis testing.' There are many rather mechanical procedures for performing these tests and a number of judges, attorneys, and law professors have suggested that hypothesis testing provides an objective, scientific means of settling disputed questions on which statistical evidence is brought to bear. Yet, many circumstances arise in which courts or administrators …
The Hearsay Rule And The Stability Of Verdicts: A Response To Professor Nesson, Roger C. Park
The Hearsay Rule And The Stability Of Verdicts: A Response To Professor Nesson, Roger C. Park
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Battered Woman Syndrome And Self-Defense: A Legal And Empirical Dissent, David L. Faigman
The Battered Woman Syndrome And Self-Defense: A Legal And Empirical Dissent, David L. Faigman
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Confidence In Probability: Burdens Of Persuasion In A World Of Imperfect Knowledge, Neil B. Cohen
Confidence In Probability: Burdens Of Persuasion In A World Of Imperfect Knowledge, Neil B. Cohen
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Statistical Significance And The Burden Of Persuasion, David H. Kaye
Statistical Significance And The Burden Of Persuasion, David H. Kaye
Faculty Scholarship
In most endeavors concerned with the acquisition of knowledge, quantitative information is welcomed. In law, however, it appears sometimes that scientific or numerical evidence makes cases harder, not easier. Nevertheless, there are many cases and administrative proceedings, in such areas as environmental law, food and drug regulation, and civil rights, in which statistical data obtained by observation or experiment are readily accepted as assisting in the proper resolution of disputed issues of fact. When courts or administrators confront scientific and statistical evidence in these proceedings, they are not always certain of how to weigh the evidence or whether they should …
Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments And The Burden Of Proof: A Response To Dr. Cohen's Reply, David H. Kaye
Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments And The Burden Of Proof: A Response To Dr. Cohen's Reply, David H. Kaye
Faculty Scholarship
This article responds to L. Jonathan Cohen's critique of the author's position regarding the problem of naked statistical evidence. Cohen argues that the kind of probability at work in litigation does not conform to the axioms of mathematical probability. The author responds by suggesting that the familiar theory of probability needs no revision to account for the reluctance of a few courts to permit plaintiffs to prevail on the strength of background statistics alone. One need not adopt Dr. Cohen's esoteric mathematical structure to explain the burden of proof in civil cases. The article shows that whether or not one …
Mccormick On Evidence And The Concept Of Hearsay: A Critical Analysis Followed By Suggestions To Law Teachers, Roger C. Park
Mccormick On Evidence And The Concept Of Hearsay: A Critical Analysis Followed By Suggestions To Law Teachers, Roger C. Park
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.