Courts Commons^™

Litigating Original Meaning From Heller To Rahimi: The Role Of Lawyering In The Confused Path Of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, Lawrence Rosenthal

American University Law Review

The Second Amendment is on a jurisprudential march. An individual right to “keep and bear arms” for purposes unrelated to militia or military service was not recognized until the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision, applying what it took to be the original meaning of the “right to keep and bear arms” found in the Second Amendment, in District of Columbia v. Heller. Subsequently, the Court, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, invalidated a statute requiring a permit to carry concealable firearms on a showing of particularized need. Most recently, in United States v. Rahimi, …

The Downstream Consequences Of Transunion Llc V. Ramirez: Why 5 U.S.C. § 2954 Plaintiffs Have Article Iii Standing Consistent With Lower Courts’ Interpretation Of Transunion, Erin Mccoy

American University Law Review

The Supreme Court, in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, created additional standing hurdles by requiring plaintiffs to identify a common law historic-analogue when alleging a statutory harm. In doing so, the Court arguably limited informational standing—a unique Article III standing theory whereby plaintiffs may establish an injury for failure to receive information—because informational injuries did not exist at common law.

This Comment asks whether informational standing survives in a post-TransUnion universe, using 5 U.S.C. § 2954 and lower courts’ interpretation of TransUnion for guidance. The statute, § 2954, comes to light in a string of litigation involving the potential illegality …

Converse-Osborn: State Sovereign Immunity, Standing, And The Dog-Wagging Effect Of Article Iii, Carlos Manuel Vázquez

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

“[T]he legislative, executive, and judicial powers, of every well-constructed government, are co-extensive with each other . . . [T]he judicial department may receive from the Legislature the power of construing any . . . law [which the Legislature may constitutionally make].” Chief Justice Marshall relied on this axiom in Osborn v. Bank of the United States to stress the breadth of the federal judicial power: The federal courts must have the potential power to adjudicate any claim based on any law Congress has the power to enact. In recent years, however, the axiom has sometimes operated in the opposite direction: …

The Wages Of Hitching Wagons, Thomas B. Bennett

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

This article examines the challenges faced by states that align their constitutions with federal doctrine through the practice of "lockstepping"—adopting federal legal standards into state law. Lockstepping binds states to federal law, regardless of its trajectory. Part I traces the evolution of standing doctrine in both federal courts under Article III and Kentucky courts under its constitution. Part II presents an originalist critique of the federal injury-in-fact requirement, highlighting emerging efforts to abandon this requirement in federal courts. Part III discusses the dilemma states like Kentucky face, balancing constitutional interpretation, federalism, and legal stability.

Tracing The Roots Of A Poisonous Tree: On The Origins And Impact Of Criminal Terminology In A Civil Apprehension Scheme, Shani Mahiri King, Nicole Silvestri Hall

Articles (Current Faculty)

Language is powerful. It can affect how we think about and treat groups of people. Poor language choices have a massive impact on immigration law, an area of the law that determines how groups of perceived “outsiders” are classified and regulated. Language and bias in judicial opinions have been studied, but less research has been done on poor language choices in immigration statutes.

This Comment focuses on the harmful effects of poor language choices in immigration statutes, including the criminal terminology “arrest” and “warrant” in civil immigration apprehension statutes 8 U.S.C. Sections 1226 and 1357. Two fundamental problems arise when …

The Constitution As A Source Of Remedial Law, Carlos Manuel Vázquez

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In Equity’s Constitutional Source, Owen W. Gallogly argues that Article III is the source of a constitutional default rule for equitable remedies—specifically, that Article III’s vesting of the “judicial Power” “in Equity” empowers federal courts to afford the remedies traditionally afforded by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the Founding, and to develop such remedies in an incremental fashion. This Response questions the current plausibility of locating such a default rule in Article III, since remedies having their source in Article III would be available in federal but not state courts and would apply to state-law …

Situating Structural Challenges To Agency Authority Within The Framework Of The Finality Principle, Harold J. Krent

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Vested Patents And Equal Justice,, Adam J. Macleod

Faculty Articles

In a time of renewed interest in equal justice, the vested patent right may be timely again. Vested patent rights helped marginalized Americans to secure equal justice earlier in American history. And they helped to make sense of the law. Vested patent rights can perform those tasks again today.

The concept of vested rights render patent law coherent. And it explains patent law 's interactions with other areas of law, such as property, administrative, and constitutional law. The vested rights doctrine also can serve the requirements of equal justice, as it has several times in American history. Vested rights secure …

The Absurd Reach Of A "Colorblind" Constitution, David Hinojosa, Genevieve Bonadies Torres

American University Law Review

Affirmative action has long spurred debates over whether the Equal Protection Clause and subsequent civil rights legislation were intended to permit policies aimed at disrupting racial hierarchies, dismantling systemic discrimination, and ensuring equal opportunity for Black people and other historically marginalized groups. The current lawsuits pending before the Supreme Court challenging affirmative action admissions programs at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) and Harvard College are no exception. Like prior lawsuits, the plaintiff in both cases—Students for Fair Admissions (“SFFA”)—and its amici seek to turn back the clock on racial diversity at selective universities by urging the …

Presumptively Awful: How The Federal Government Is Failing To Protect The Constitutional Rights Of Those Adjudicated As Mentally Ill, As Illustrated By The 18 U.S.C. § 922(G)(4) Circuit Split, Kaitlyn M. Rubcich

Pepperdine Law Review

The Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits are split as to whether the 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) federal firearms ban violates the Second Amendment rights of those who were once adjudicated as mentally ill but have since returned to good mental health. In Beers v. Attorney General, the Third Circuit applied its own unique framework and held that § 922(g)(4) is constitutional. Meanwhile, the Sixth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny in Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department and deemed the statute unconstitutional, while in Mai v. United States, the Ninth Circuit also applied intermediate scrutiny but held that § 922(g)(4) is constitutional. …

Qualified Immunity, Sovereign Immunity, And Systemic Reform, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Scholarship

Qualified immunity has become a central target of the movement for police reform and racial justice since George Floyd’s murder. And rightly so. Qualified immunity, which shields government officials from damages for constitutional violations even in many egregious cases, should have no place in federal law. But in critical respects, qualified immunity has become too much a focus of the conversation about constitutional-enforcement reform. The recent reappraisal offers unique opportunities to explore deeper problems and seek deeper solutions.

This Article argues that the public and policymakers should reconsider other aspects of the constitutional-tort system—especially sovereign immunity and related protections for …

Answering The Call: A History Of The Emergency Power Doctrine In Texas And The United States, P. Elise Mclaren

St. Mary's Law Journal

During times of emergency, national and local government may be allowed to take otherwise impermissible action in the interest of health, safety, or national security. The prerequisites and limits to this power, however, are altogether unknown. Like the crises they aim to deflect, courts’ modern emergency power doctrines range from outright denial of any power of constitutional circumvention to their flagrant use. Concededly, courts’ approval of emergency powers has provided national and local government opportunities to quickly respond to emergency without pause for constituency approval, but how can one be sure the availability of autocratic power will not be abused? …

State Rejection Of Federal Law, Thomas B. Bennett

Faculty Publications

Sometimes the United States Supreme Court speaks, and states do not follow. For example, in 2003, the Arizona Supreme Court agreed to "reject" a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, because no "sound reasons justif[ied] following" it. Similarly, in 2006, Michigan voters approved a ballot initiative that, according to the legislature that drafted it, sought "at the very least to freeze' the state's ... law to prevent" state courts from following a ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court. Surprising though this language may be, there is nothing nefarious about these cases. Cooper v. Aaron this is not. Unlike more notorious …

The Insidious Effect Of Soundbites: Why Fences Aren't Punishment, Theresa Gabaldon

American University Law Review

This Article was inspired by two recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with the ability of the Securities and Exchange Commission to seek disgorgement of unlawfully obtained profits. The topic, however, is not disgorgement. That is a different article, published by the author in the Cornell Lazu Reviezu in 2020, on which this one builds. This Article focuses instead on jurisprudential methodology. The Court has begun to exhibit an unfortunate penchant for jurisprudence by soundbite—the functional equivalent of Googling its ozun precedents for pithy quotes taken out of context from inapt cases. The results are, to put it politely, mischievous.

This …

Reconsidering Section 1983'S Nonabrogation Of Sovereign Immunity, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Scholarship

Motivated by civil unrest and the police conduct that prompted it, Americans have embarked on a major reexamination of how constitutional enforcement works. One important component is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows civil suits against any “person” who violates federal rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that “person” excludes states because Section 1983 flunks a condition of crystal clarity.

This Article reconsiders that conclusion—in legalese, Section 1983’s nonabrogation of sovereign immunity—along multiple dimensions. Beginning with a negative critique, this Article argues that because the Court invented the crystal-clarity standard so long after Section 1983’s enactment, the caselaw …

The Jury Trial Reinvented, Christopher Robertson, Michael Shammas

Faculty Scholarship

The Framers of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the United States Constitution recognized that jury trials were essential for maintaining democratic legitimacy and avoiding epistemic crises. As an institution, the jury trial is purpose-built to engage citizens in the process of deliberative, participatory democracy with ground rules. The jury trial provides a carefully constructed setting aimed at sorting truth from falsehood.
/="/">
/="/">Despite its value, the jury trial has been under assault for decades. Concededly, jury trials can sometimes be inefficient, unreliable, unpredictable, and impractical. The COVID–19 pandemic rendered most physical jury trials unworkable but spurred some courts …

The Supreme Court's Reticent Qualified Immunity Retreat, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Scholarship

The recent outcry against qualified immunity, a doctrine that disallows damages actions against government officials for a wide swath of constitutional claims, has been deafening. But when the Supreme Court in November 2020 and February 2021 invalidated grants of qualified immunity based on reasoning at the heart of the doctrine for the first time since John Roberts became Chief Justice, the response was muted. With initial evaluations and competing understandings coming from legal commentators in the months since, this Essay explores what these cases appear to say about qualified immunity for today and tomorrow.

The Essay traces idealistic, pessimistic, and …

Federalism Limits On Non-Article Iii Adjudication, F. Andrew Hessick

Pepperdine Law Review

Although Article III of the Constitution vests the federal judicial power in the Article III courts, the Supreme Court has created a patchwork of exceptions permitting non-Article III tribunals to adjudicate various disputes. In doing so, the Court has focused on the separation of powers, concluding that these non-Article III adjudications do not unduly infringe on the judicial power of the Article III courts. But separation of powers is not the only consideration relevant to the lawfulness of non-Article III adjudication. Article I adjudications also implicate federalism. Permitting Article I tribunals threatens the role of state courts by expanding federal …

The Nature Of Standing, Matthew Hall, Christian Turner

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Most academic studies of standing have focused on restrictions on federal court jurisdiction drawn from Article III of U.S. Constitution and related doctrinal schemes developed by state courts. These rules are constructed atop a few words of the Constitution: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity," arising under various circumstances. The Supreme Court has interpreted these words to require federal courts to assess whether a plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact that is both fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant and redressable by a favorable ruling before proceeding to the merits of …

Against Congressional Case Snatching, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Atticus Deprospro

William & Mary Law Review

Congress has developed a deeply problematic habit of aggrandizing itself by snatching cases from the Article III courts. One form of contemporary case snatching involves directly legislating the outcome of pending litigation by statute. These laws do not involve generic amendments to existing statutes but rather dictate specific rulings by the Article III courts in particular cases. Another form of congressional case snatching involves rendering ongoing judicial proceedings essentially advisory by unilaterally permitting a disgruntled litigant to transfer a pending case from an Article III court to an executive agency for resolution. Both practices involve Congress reallocating the business of …

Comparative Judicialism, Popular Sovereignty, And The Rule Of Law: The Us And Uk Supreme Courts, Lissa Griffin, Thomas Kidney

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

What does the future hold for the US and UK Supreme Courts? Both courts face an uncertain future in which their roles in their constitutional systems will come under intense scrutiny and pressure. The tension between the rule of law, often seen as the preserve of the judicial branches of government, and the sovereignty of the elected branches is palpable. In a time of the “strong man,” allegedly “populist leaders” who seemingly are pushing the limits of the rule of law, the breakdown of collaboration and debate, and the ever-present influence of social media, this tension will only become more …

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents and Special Thanks.

Government Falsehoods, Democratic Harm, And The Constitution, Helen Norton

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Structure Of Intermediate Review, R. Randall Kelso

Lewis & Clark Law Review

Today, there are two well-established versions of intermediate review: stand- ard intermediate review, used for cases like gender discrimination or content-neutral regulations of speech in a public forum, and a heightened intermediate review standard used for content-based, subject-matter regulations of commercial speech under Central Hudson. Yet, in actual use, four other kinds of intermediate review tests have been formulated by the Court in some cases. These four should be viewed as “mutations” of the two kinds of intermediate review proper to apply. This Article discusses both the well-established versions of intermediate review, and the four variations on intermediate review applied …

Testa, Crain, And The Constitutional Right To Collateral Relief, Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Stephen I. Vladeck

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In Montgomery v. Louisiana, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state prisoners have a constitutional right to relief from continued imprisonment if the prisoner’s conviction or sentence contravenes a new substantive rule of constitutional law. Specifically, the Court held that prisoners with such claims are constitutionally entitled to collateral relief in state court—at least if the state courts are open to other claims for collateral relief on the ground that their continued imprisonment is unlawful. In our article, The Constitutional Right to Collateral Post-Conviction Relief, we argued that, under two lines of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Supremacy …

Judges As Superheroes: The Danger Of Confusing Constitutional Decisions With Cosmic Battles, H. Jefferson Powell

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

An Unfair Cross Section: Federal Jurisdiction For Indian Country Crimes Dismantles Jury Community Conscience, Alana Paris

Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy

Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, federal jury pools must reflect a fair cross section of the community in which a crime is prosecuted and from which no distinct group in the community is excluded. The community in which a crime is prosecuted varies widely in Indian country based on legislative reforms enacted by Congress to strip indigenous populations of their inherent sovereignty. Under the Major Crimes Act, the federal government has the right to adjudicate all serious crimes committed by one American Indian against another American Indian or non-Indian within Indian country. American Indian defendants under …

Judicial Precedent In Emerging Constitutional Jurisdictions: Formulating A Doctrine Of Constitutional Stare Decisis For Singapore, Kenny Chng

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

Judicial precedents in constitutional law raiseunique stare decisis considerations. While they are authoritative pronouncementson the proper interpretation of the Constitution and are thus an essentialcomponent of constitutional law, they are also merely judicial precedents – andthus susceptible to being overturned. These considerations have been thesubject of a well-developed body of literature, especially in the context of USSupreme Court constitutional precedents.Yet, despite being a constitutional supremacy, little attention has beenpaid in Singapore to the question of the proper judicial approach towardsconstitutional precedents. This paper aims to address this issue. It will discernthe de facto principles that Singapore judges have thus far …

Justice Diseased Is Justice Denied: Coronavirus, Court Closures, And Criminal Trials, Ryan Shymansky

West Virginia Law Review Online

This Article aims to consider the immediate impacts of the novel coronavirus on criminal defendants’ access to speedy trials by jury. In particular, it aims to examine whether court closures and delays could affect the substantive rights of criminal defendants—and particularly pretrial detainees—to a speedy and public trial by jury. To date, very little scholarship has considered this question. Yet the ideal of a speedy trial by jury is deeply embedded in our Constitution and our judicial system, and the potential for a pandemic to limit or negate that right should ring scholastic and judicial alarm bells.

This analysis proceeds …

The Opioid Litigation: The Fda Is Mia, Catherine M. Sharkey

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

It is readily agreed that federal preemption of state tort law alters the balance between federal and state power. Federal preemption is a high-profile defense in almost all modern products liability cases. It is thus surprising to see how little attention has been given to federal preemption by courts and commentators in the opioid litigation. Opioid litigation provides a lens through which I explore the role of state and federal courts and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in striking the right balance of power. My purpose here is not to resolve the divide among the few courts that have …