Constitutional Law Commons^™

Mutually Intelligible Principles?, Andrew J. Ziaja

Pace Law Review

Are the nondelegation, major questions, and political question doctrines mutually intelligible? This article asks whether there is more than superficial resemblance between the nondelegation, major questions, and political question concepts in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825), an early nondelegation case that has become focal in recent nondelegation and major questions scholarship and jurisprudence. I argue that the nondelegation and political question doctrines do interact conceptually in Wayman, though not as current proponents of the nondelegation doctrine on the Supreme Court seem to understand it. The major questions doctrine by contrast conscripts the nondelegation …

Macro-Judging And Article Iii Exceptionalism, Merritt E. Mcalister

UF Law Faculty Publications

Over the last half-century, the federal courts have faced down two competing crises: an increase in small, low-value litigation thought unworthy of Article III attention and an increase in the numbers and complexity of “big” cases thought worthy of those resources. The choice was what to prioritize and how, and the answer the courts gave was consistent across all levels of the federal judiciary. Using what this Article calls “macro-judging,” Article III judges entrenched their own power and autonomy to focus on the work they deemed most “worthy” of their attention, while outsourcing less “important” work to an array of …

Is It Time To Bury Barry? Why An Old Change At The Legislature Requires A New Look At Washington's Nondelegation Doctrine, Daniel A. Himebaugh

Washington Law Review Online

Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court of Washington adopted a relaxed version of the nondelegation doctrine in a case called Barry and Barry v. Department of Motor Vehicles. The Barry rule, which only loosely restricts the delegation of policy-making power from the Legislature to other bodies, is now widely applied in Washington State. However, the Barry Court’s reasons for adjusting the nondelegation doctrine were based on an outdated understanding of the Legislature, especially its regular session schedule. While the Legislature’s regular sessions have changed since 1972—becoming longer and more frequent due to constitutional amendment—the Court has not considered how …

Bring On The Chicken And Hot Oil: Reviving The Nondelegation Doctrine For Congressional Delegations To The President, Loren Jacobson

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

The so-called “nondelegation doctrine” posits that Congress may not transfer its legislative power to another branch of government, and yet Congress delegates its authority routinely not only to the President, but to a whole host of other entities it has created and that are located in the executive branch, including executive branch agencies, independent agencies, commissions, and sometimes even private parties. Recognizing that “in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives,” the Supreme Court of the United States …

Some Observations On Separation Of Powers And The Wisconsin Constitution, Chad M. Oldfather

Marquette Law Review

In recent years the Wisconsin Supreme Court has decided several high- profile cases concerning the separation of powers under the state constitution. In the abstract, questions concerning the separation of powers do not seem inherently partisan, largely because the partisan balance of government will shift over time. Yet, as has been the case with many of its recent decisions, the justices’ votes have broken along what most observers regard as partisan lines, and the opinions have featured heated prose including accusations of result orientation and methodological illegitimacy.

Health Choice Or Health Coercion? The Osha Emergency Temporary Standard Covid-19 Vaccination Mandates: Ax Or Vax, Savannah Snyder

Helm's School of Government Conference - 2021-2024

No abstract provided.

Countering Gerrymandered Courts, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The key insight in Professor Miriam Seifter's outstanding article Countermajoritarian Legislatures is that state legislatures are usually antidemocratic due to partisan gerrymandering, whereas state governors and judiciaries are insulated from gerrymandering by statewide elections (or selection), and thus they should have a more prominent role in framing election law and in enforcing the separation of powers.

This Piece offers afriendly amendment: These observations are true, so long as states do not gerrymander their state supreme courts into antidemocratic districts. The problem is that historically, judicial elections emerged generally as districted elections, and often with regional and partisan politics shaping those …

Impartial Justice: Restoring Integrity To Impeachment Trials, Justin D. Rattey

Pepperdine Law Review

In recent decades, we have witnessed the diminution of the impeachment process by various actors—especially political parties. But the Founders envisioned a vastly different process, one that was insulated from partisanship. In Alexander Hamilton’s words, impeachment trials were assigned to the Senate because the Senate is “a tribunal sufficiently dignified [and] sufficiently independent.” Examples from the most recent impeachment trials of President Donald J. Trump reflect the Senate’s loss of dignity and independence, with Senator McConnell pledging to work with the White House throughout the first impeachment process and senators from both parties conceding that they made up their minds …

Decoding Nondelegation After Gundy: What The Experience In State Courts Tells Us About What To Expect When We're Expecting, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

The nondelegation doctrine theoretically limits Congress’s ability to delegate legislative powers to the executive agencies that make up the modern administrative state. Yet, in practice, the U.S. Supreme Court has, since the New Deal, shied away from enforcing any limits on congressional delegation. That may change in the near future. In Gundy v. United States, the Court narrowly upheld a delegation, and a dissent signaled deep doubts about the Court’s longstanding “intelligible principle” standard and offered a new framework to replace it. Subsequent events strongly suggest that the Court is poised to move in the direction contemplated by the dissent …

Reasoning V. Rhetoric: The Strange Case Of “Unconstitutional Beyond A Reasonable Doubt”, Hugh D. Spitzer

Articles

An odd formulation has frequented American constitutional discourse for 125 years: a declaration that courts should not overturn a statute on constitutional grounds unless it is “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” This concept has been thought of as a presumption, a standard, a doctrine, or a philosophy of coordinate branch respect and judicial restraint. Yet it has been criticized because “beyond a reasonable doubt” is at root an evidentiary standard of proof in criminal cases rather than a workable theory or standard for deciding constitutional law cases. This article discusses the history and use of “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt,” …

Violence And Nondelegation, Jacob D. Charles, Darrell A. H. Miller

Faculty Scholarship

Debates over delegation are experiencing a renaissance. These debates presuppose an initial distribution of constitutional authority between actors that cannot be redistributed, or that can be redistributed only according to some clear ex ante set of rules. Nondelegation in this sense often arises in debates about separation of powers and intergovernmental delegation, although scholars have begun applying the concept to delegations to private corporations and other private actors. The public delegation doctrine restricts one branch of government from transferring its constitutional authority to another branch, while the private delegation doctrine limits transfer of government power to private entities. In this …

Justice Ginsburg’S Cautious Legacy For The Equal Rights Amendment, Julie Suk

Faculty Scholarship

History will remember the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (RBG) as the “founding mother” of constitutional gender equality in the United States. This Article unpacks her legacy for inclusive constitutional change, unearthing her lifelong commitment to the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which was adopted fifty years ago by Congress in 1972. It took nearly half a century for the Amendment to be ratified by the thirty-eight states required by Article V, with Virginia becoming the last state to ratify it in 2020—the year of Justice Ginsburg’s death. Because the last three ratifications occurred decades after congressionally imposed time limits, RBG …

The Electoral Count Mess: The Electoral Count Act Of 1887 Is Unconstitutional, And Other Fun Facts (Plus A Few Random Academic Speculations) About Counting Electoral Votes, Jack Beermann, Gary Lawson

FIU Law Review

In this essay, and in light of the controversy that arose in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, we explain the constitutional process for counting electoral votes. In short, every four years, the Twelfth Amendment requires the President of the Senate (usually the Vice President of the United States) to open certificates provided by state presidential electors and count the votes contained therein. The Constitution allows no role for Congress in this process, and thus, the provisions of the Electoral Count Act purporting to grant Congress the power, by concurrent resolution, to reject a state’s electoral votes, is unconstitutional. …

House Rules: Congress And The Attorney-Client Privilege, David Rapallo

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In 2020, the Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision in Trump v. Mazars establishing four factors for determining the validity of congressional subpoenas for a sitting president’s personal papers. In an unanticipated move, Chief Justice John Roberts added that recipients of congressional subpoenas have “long been understood” to retain not only constitutional privileges, but common law privileges developed by judges, including the attorney-client privilege. This was particularly surprising since Trump was not relying on the attorney-client privilege and the Court had never treated this common law privilege as overriding Congress’s Article I power to set its own procedures for conducting …

Making Appointment The Means Of Presidential Removal Of Officers Of The United States, David M. Driesen

Lewis & Clark Law Review

This Article examines the relationship between appointment and removal of officers of the United States, focusing on the administrations of Andrew Jackson, Andrew Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Donald Trump. These administrations’ use of appointment and removal underlines the potential tension between political removal accomplished without Senate approval of a successor and the Constitution’s goal of securing the rule of law.

To remedy these issues, this Article proposes that Congress pass a statute forbidding presidential removal of an agency head (and other Senate-approved appointees) until the President nominates a qualified successor or until the Senate confirms a successor. Integrating Appointments Clause …

Litigating The Separation Of Powers, Elizabeth Earle Beske

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.

Keeping It Complex With Philip Hunton, John Locke, And The United States Federal Judiciary: On The Merit Of Murkiness In Separation Of Powers Jurisprudence, Michelle M. Kundmueller

Political Science & Geography Faculty Publications

This article draws on the resources of a little-known political theorist, Philip Hunton, to explain the function of “murky” jurisprudence in the maintenance of separation of powers over time. In the era immediately before the drafting of the United States Constitution, separation of powers was a touted remedy to tyranny. But if government is thus moderated, a critical question arises: who will judge the precise contours of each institution’s powers? This article addresses this longstanding question by comparing the solutions offered by Philip Hunton, John Locke, and the United States judiciary. I conclude that the judiciary’s decried inability to clarify …

The False Allure Of The Anti-Accumulation Principle, Kevin Stack, Michael Herz

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Today the executive branch is generally seen as the most dangerous branch. Many worry that the executive branch now defies or subsumes the separation of powers. In response, several Supreme Court Justices and prominent scholars assert that the very separation-of-powers principles that determine the structure of the federal government as a whole apply with full force within the executive branch. In particular, they argue that constitutional law prohibits the accumulation of more than one type of power-—legislative, executive, and judicial—-in the same executive official or government entity. We refer to this as the anti-accumulation principle. The consequences of this principle, …

Inspectors General And The Law Of Oversight Independence, Andrew C. Brunsden

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

President Trump’s defiance of basic norms threatened the oversight institutions of American democracy. His brazen assault on the prosecutorial and investigative independence of federal law enforcement was well documented. Yet few have thoroughly scrutinized his violations of the oversight independence of internal institutions that monitor the government to promote integrity, transparency, and accountability. This Article examines the independence of Inspectors General (IGs), the internal watchdogs of the Executive Branch, and the President’s attacks on the institution. President Trump breached long-standing independence norms when he fired or replaced IGs in retaliation for their legitimate exercise of oversight duties. Then, in some …

A Scapegoat Theory Of Bivens, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Scholarship

Some scapegoats are innocent. Some warrant blame, but not the amount they are made to bear. Either way, scapegoating can allow in-groups to sidestep social problems by casting blame onto out-groups instead of confronting such problems—and the in-groups’ complicity in perpetuating them—directly.

This Essay suggests that it may be productive to view the Bivens regime’s rise as countering various exercises in scapegoating and its retrenchment as constituting an exercise in scapegoating. The earlier cases can be seen as responding to social structures that have scapegoated racial, economic, and other groups through overaggressive policing, mass incarceration, and inequitable government conduct more …

Not A King: President Trump And The Case For Presidential Subpoena Reform, Robert J. Denault

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

In Trump v. Vance and Trump v. Mazars, the Supreme Court heard two expansive claims of presidential immunity from grand jury and Congressional subpoenas for the personal papers of the president. In both cases, the Court rejected the President’s claims. Despite winning both cases, the grand jury and Congress did not receive evidence relevant to potential misconduct by the President until after he left office—a remarkable feat for a President who did not win a single case or appeal in his effort to block either subpoena.

This Note argues for significant reforms in response to President Trump’s unprecedented success …

Federalism Limits On Non-Article Iii Adjudication, F. Andrew Hessick

Pepperdine Law Review

Although Article III of the Constitution vests the federal judicial power in the Article III courts, the Supreme Court has created a patchwork of exceptions permitting non-Article III tribunals to adjudicate various disputes. In doing so, the Court has focused on the separation of powers, concluding that these non-Article III adjudications do not unduly infringe on the judicial power of the Article III courts. But separation of powers is not the only consideration relevant to the lawfulness of non-Article III adjudication. Article I adjudications also implicate federalism. Permitting Article I tribunals threatens the role of state courts by expanding federal …

“Drive-By” Jurisdiction: Congressional Oversight In Court, Daniel Epstein

Pepperdine Law Review

On July 9, 2020, in Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP and Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts did not adequately consider the separation of powers concerns attendant to congressional subpoenas for presidential information. Given that the question presented in Mazars concerned whether Congress had a legitimate legislative purpose in subpoenaing the President’s personal records, the Supreme Court’s decision is anything but a model of clarity. The Court simultaneously opined that disputes “involving nonprivileged, private information” “do[ ] not implicate sensitive Executive Branch deliberations” while claiming “congressional subpoenas for the President’s information unavoidably pit …

Against Congressional Case Snatching, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Atticus Deprospro

William & Mary Law Review

Congress has developed a deeply problematic habit of aggrandizing itself by snatching cases from the Article III courts. One form of contemporary case snatching involves directly legislating the outcome of pending litigation by statute. These laws do not involve generic amendments to existing statutes but rather dictate specific rulings by the Article III courts in particular cases. Another form of congressional case snatching involves rendering ongoing judicial proceedings essentially advisory by unilaterally permitting a disgruntled litigant to transfer a pending case from an Article III court to an executive agency for resolution. Both practices involve Congress reallocating the business of …

Checks And Balances In The Criminal Law, Daniel Epps

Vanderbilt Law Review

The separation of powers is considered essential in the criminal law, where liberty and even life are at stake. Yet the reasons for separating criminal powers are surprisingly opaque, and the “separation of powers” is often used to refer to distinct, and sometimes contradictory, concepts.

This Article reexamines the justifications for the separation of powers in criminal law. It asks what is important about separating criminal powers and what values such separation serves. It concludes that in criminal justice, the traditional Madisonian approach of separating powers between functionally differentiated political institutions—legislature, executive, and judiciary—bears no necessary connection to important values …

Neither Safe, Nor Legal, Nor Rare: The D.C. Circuit’S Use Of The Doctrine Of Ratification To Shield Agency Action From Appointments Clause Challenges, Damien M. Schiff

Seattle University Law Review

Key to the constitutional design of the federal government is the separation of powers. An important support for that separation is the Appointments Clause, which governs how officers of the United States are installed in their positions. Although the separation of powers generally, and the Appointments Clause specifically, support democratically accountable government, they also protect individual citizens against abusive government power. But without a judicial remedy, such protection is ineffectual—a mere parchment barrier.

Such has become the fate of the Appointments Clause in the D.C. Circuit, thanks to that court’s adoption—and zealous employment—of the rule that agency action, otherwise unconstitutional …

Cases And Materials On West Virginia Constitutional Law, Robert M. Bastress Jr.

Open Access Law Books

No abstract provided.

Legislative Redistricting In The Time Of Covid, Norman R. Williams

Lewis & Clark Law Review

Due to the COVID pandemic, the U.S. Census Bureau was unable to provide 2020 census data to Oregon in time for the Legislature to engage in redistricting during the 2021 session, as required by the Oregon Constitution. As a result of this delay, the Oregon Legislature asked the Oregon Supreme Court to push back the constitutionally imposed deadlines for redistricting—a request which the Court agreed to in part. This Essay examines the Court’s power to revise constitutionally prescribed deadlines and the extent to which any districting plan must be based on federal census data.

The People's Court: On The Intellectual Origins Of American Judicial Power, Ian C. Bartrum

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

This article enters into the modern debate between “consti- tutional departmentalists”—who contend that the executive and legislative branches share constitutional interpretive authority with the courts—and what are sometimes called “judicial supremacists.” After exploring the relevant history of political ideas, I join the modern minority of voices in the latter camp.

This is an intellectual history of two evolving political ideas—popular sovereignty and the separation of powers—which merged in the making of American judicial power, and I argue we can only understand the structural function of judicial review by bringing these ideas together into an integrated whole. Or, put another way, …

Free Speech And Democracy: A Primer For Twenty-First Century Reformers, Toni M. Massaro, Helen Norton

Publications

Left unfettered, the twenty-first-century speech environment threatens to undermine critical pieces of the democratic project. Speech operates today in ways unimaginable not only to the First Amendment’s eighteenth-century writers but also to its twentieth-century champions. Key among these changes is that speech is cheaper and more abundant than ever before, and can be exploited — by both government and powerful private actors alike — as a tool for controlling others’ speech and frustrating meaningful public discourse and democratic outcomes.

The Court’s longstanding First Amendment doctrine rests on a model of how speech works that is no longer accurate. This invites …