Constitutional Law Commons^™

Fletcher's Uncertainty Principle, Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Articles

am here to talk about the equal protection challenges facing Indian Country. I am going to give you my thesis right off the bat, which is that Haaland v. Brackeen decided the equal protection issue for us already, and we should behave as if it is decided.

I will explain what I mean by that. But first, let’s talk about what we will call the Mancari rule. The Mancari rule is fundamentally what Indian law is about, and it goes something like this—I am going to more or less paraphrase the guiding principle of Morton v. Mancari from 1974. Any …

Exit Through The White House: Congressional Constraints On Unilateral Presidential Withdrawal From Treaties, Taylor R. Dalton

Texas A&M Law Review

When does the U.S. President have the constitutional authority to withdraw from a treaty unilaterally? Where the U.S. Constitution details the making but not the exiting of treaties, the U.S. Supreme Court has largely left the issue open for the political branches to resolve. Many scholars argue that modern practice supports a conclusion that the President has the practical—if not legal—power to withdraw unilaterally from an Article II treaty or congressional-executive agreement without the consent of Congress. This argument is largely premised on the claim that Congress has acquiesced to executive practice, providing a gloss on expansive executive power to …

A Conversation With Justice Brett Kavanaugh, Brett M. Kavanaugh, J. Joel Alicea

Catholic University Law Review

On Thursday, September 26th, 2024, the Center for the Constitution and the Catholic Intellectual Tradition at The Catholic University of America hosted a conversation between Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh and Professor J. Joel Alicea. This was the inaugural event of the new Center. The conversation covered topics such as constitutional interpretation, the separation of powers, religious liberty, and the Catholic intellectual tradition. This is a transcript of the conversation, and the text appears substantially as it was delivered. The video of the event may be found at this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2sKvSwzkmqo.

The Basis For Election Exceptionalism In Justiciability And Related Doctrines: Constitutional Compensation In Light Of Purcell, Vikram D. Amar, Evan H. Caminker

Articles

Pursuant to the so-called Purcell doctrine, lower federal courts (and perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court itself) are supposed to refrain from issuing remedies that would alter the rules for election administration in the run-up to Election Day. Whether or not the Purcell rule’s purported justifications are persuasive (e.g., concerns about voter confusion, candidate and campaign expectations, smooth operation of election logistics), one tremendously problematic entailment of Purcell is that elections are held (and candidates are elected and policies are determined) even when serious doubt exists about the legality of the contests under federal statutes and the Constitution. Because of these …

The Appeal Of The Apex Court In Botswana: The Case Of Carter Morupisi V. State, Muna B. Ndulo, Louis Koen, Samantha Smit

SAIPAR Case Review

This case note discusses the Botswana Court of Appeal's ruling in Carter Morupisi v State, which addressed the High Court's unprecedented attempt to review a decision of the Court of Appeal. The commentary highlights the fundamental principle of judicial hierarchy and the separation of powers in Botswana's constitutional framework. The Court of Appeal emphatically rejected the High Court's jurisdiction to review its judgments, reaffirming its position as the final arbiter (highest judicial authority). The authors emphasise that while the High Court may raise constitutional questions with regards to Apex courts decisions, it cannot adjudicate on them, reinforcing the concept of …

Rays Of Hope For The Administrative State, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

The assault on Chevron has not yet been resolved, but it is next to impossible to believe that the sensible Justices of the Court will go any further than to reaffirm that deciding questions of the scope of agency authority is exclusively for judicial resolution (though perhaps with Skidmore-like attention to the views of the agency, so much more familiar with its statutes as a whole). This was the position clearly taken by the Court in 1940, in United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns., and to go beyond it into decision, rather than review, of agency judgments would …

Implied Consent In Administrative Adjudication, Grace Moore

Washington and Lee Law Review Online

Article III of the Constitution mandates that judges exercising the federal judicial power receive life tenure and that their pay not be diminished. Nonetheless, certain forms of adjudication have always taken place outside of Article III—in state courts, military tribunals, territorial courts, and administrative tribunals. Administrative law judges, employed by various federal administrative agencies, decide thousands of cases each year. A vast majority of the cases they decide deal with public rights, which generally include claims involving federal statutory rights or cases in which the federal government is a party. With litigant consent, however, the Supreme Court has upheld administrative …

Economic Security And The Separation Of Powers, Kathleen Claussen, Timothy Meyer

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” but today the exercise of the foreign commerce power resides primarily with the executive branch. That transfer of control is partly the result of significant delegations of responsibility for managing foreign commerce from Congress to the executive. It is also, however, the result of the securitization of foreign commerce. The executive branch asserts that foreign commerce issues fall under its constitutional powers over foreign affairs, and, thus, that it enjoys authority over foreign commerce that exceeds the scope of congressional delegations.

This Article makes three contributions. First, …

The Major Questions Doctrine At The Boundaries Of Interpretive Law, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s apparent transformation of the major questions doctrine into a clear statement rule demanding clear congressional authorization for “major” agency actions has already had, and will continue to have, wide-ranging impacts on American public law. Not the least of these is the impact it will have on the enterprise of statutory interpretation. Indeed, while it is easy to focus on the policy repercussions of a newly constrained Congress and newly hamstrung administrative state, this Article argues that equally important is the novel precedent that is set in this particular formulation of a clear statement rule, which stands almost …

The Right To Remove In Agency Adjudication, Christopher J. Walker, David Zaring

Articles

In SEC v. Jarkesy, the Supreme Court will decide the constitutional future of agency adjudication, especially in the context of agency enforcement actions and the imposition of civil penalties. If the Court agrees with the Fifth Circuit on any of its three independent reasons for unconstitutionality, agency enforcement and adjudication schemes across the federal regulatory state will be severely disrupted, in ways that are detrimental to both the regulator and the regulated. In this Essay, we propose a path forward: In certain circumstances, the regulated party should have a right to remove an enforcement action from an in-house agency adjudication …

Populist Constitutionalism, Anya Bernstein, Glen Staszewski

Faculty Scholarship

A Supreme Court majority has expressed hostility to administrative agencies. Yet, as this Article explains, agencies provide the primary site in our government for pluralistic contestation among disparate policy views. A political vision we identify as agonistic republicanism—a convergence among deliberative democrats, republican theorists, and agonism supporters—places such multilateral deliberation and debate among differing social groups at the foundation of democracy. A contrary vision, authoritarian populism, imagines a single leader embodying the will of a unified people with little use for the institutional mediation of divergent perspectives. This view, prominent in politics, enters legal theory through the rhetoric of judicial …

Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

What did the “Decision of 1789” decide about presidential removal power, if anything? It turns out that an emerging consensus of scholars agrees that there was not much consensus in the First Congress.

Two more questions follow: Is the “unitary executive theory” based on originalism, and if so, is originalism a reliable method of interpretation based on historical evidence?

The unitary executive theory posits that a president has exclusive and “indefeasible” executive powers (i.e., powers beyond congressional and judicial checks and balances). This panel was an opportunity for unitary executive theorists and their critics to debate recent historical research questioning …

Freehold Offices Vs. "Despotic Displacement": Why Article Ii "Executive Power" Did Not Include Removal, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The Roberts Court has relied on an assertion that Article II’s “executive power” implied an “indefeasible” or unconditional presidential removal power. In the wake of growing historical evidence against their theory, unitary executive theorists have fallen back on a claim of a “backdrop” or default removal rule from English and other European monarchies. However, unitary theorists have not provided support for these repeated assertions, while making a remarkable number of errors, especially in the recent “The Executive Power of Removal” (Harvard L. Rev. 2023).

This Article offers an explanation for the difficulty in supporting this historical claim: Because …

State Separation Of Powers And The Federal Courts, Ann Woolhandler

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

The cases discussed herein mostly surfaced in the regulatory era of the latter half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. This Article first discusses arguments as to state delegations of legislative power, and the Court’s rejection of legislative-style deference that state agencies often argued for. This Article next discusses the Court’s decisions as to state adjudicative bodies, and its refusal to treat state agency adjudicators as full-fledged courts. This Article then addresses the Court’s response to arguments for unreviewable executive discretion and to laws allowing delegations to private parties. It then addresses whether the discussion sheds light …

On The Nexus Between The Strength Of The Separation Of Powers And The Power Of The Judiciary, Rivka Weill

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

This Article makes four novel arguments: (1) There is an inverse relationship between the strength of a separation of powers structure and the strength of the judiciary. In a strong separation of powers structure, one should expect a weaker judiciary, and vice versa. This nexus exists empirically, and is supported on normative and strategic grounds. (2) This nexus is manifested through a web of common law doctrines that developed to support a given separation of powers structure and shape the judicial oversight of the political branches. This Article identifies a list of common law doctrines—including standing, justiciability, deference, and judicial …

The Indecisions Of 1789: Inconstant Originalism And Strategic Ambiguity, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The unitary executive theory relies on the First Congress and an ostensible "Decision of 1789" as an originalist basis for unconditional presidential removal power. In light of new evidence, the First Congress was undecided on any constitutional theory and retreated to ambiguity in order to compromise and move on to other urgent business.

Seila Law's strict separation-of-powers argument depends on indefeasibility (i.e., Congress may not set limits or conditions on the president's power of civil removal). In fact, few members of the First Congress defended or even discussed indefeasibility. Only nine of fifty-four participating representatives explicitly endorsed the presidentialist …

The False Promise Of Jurisdiction Stripping, Daniel Epps, Alan M. Trammell

Scholarly Articles

Jurisdiction stripping is seen as a nuclear option. Its logic is simple: By depriving federal courts of jurisdiction over some set of cases, Congress ensures those courts cannot render bad decisions. To its proponents, it offers the ultimate check on unelected and unaccountable judges. To its critics, it poses a grave threat to the separation of powers. Both sides agree, though, that jurisdiction stripping is a powerful weapon. On this understanding, politicians, activists, and scholars throughout American history have proposed jurisdiction-stripping measures as a way for Congress to reclaim policymaking authority from the courts.

The conventional understanding is wrong. Whatever …

A Challenge To "Equitable Originalism" - The History Of Injunctions As A Principle-Based Adaptable Judicial Power, Anna C. Conley

Faculty Law Review Articles

“Equitable originalism” is a judicial philosophy that only injunctions allowable in English chancery courts at the time of America’s founding in the 1780s are allowable in federal courts today. Accordingly, previously unknown types of injunctions, such as structural or nationwide injunctions, are prohibited exercises of judicial power.

This article asks whether historical analysis supports the assertion that the founders intended to crystalize federal equitable powers in the 1780s. The answer is no. Analysis of Article III, federal legislation, rules of court, treatises and caselaw in the late 1700s and 1800s illustrate that the United States received equity from the colonies …

Alexander Hamilton And Administrative Law: How America’S First Great Public Administrator Informs And Challenges Our Understanding Of Contemporary Administrative Law, Rodger D. Citron

Scholarly Works

Alexander Hamilton’s recognition and reputation have soared since the premiere of “Hamilton,” Lin-Manuel Miranda’s musical about him in 2015. For lawyers, Hamilton’s work on the Federalist Papers and service as the nation’s first Treasury Secretary likely stand out more than other aspects of his extraordinary life. Politics and economics were fundamental concerns addressed by the Framers in a number of ways, including what we now refer to as administrative law—the laws and procedures that guide government departments (or, as we say today, agencies). Indeed, “Hamilton” reminds us that questions of administration and administrative law have been with us since the …

White-Collar Courts, Merritt E. Mcalister

UF Law Faculty Publications

Article III courts are white-collar courts. They are, scholars have said, “special.” They sit atop the judicial hierarchy, and they are the courts of the one percent. We inculcate that sense of specialness in a variety of ways: federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they are the subject of a (perhaps overrated) class in law school; we privilege clerkships with federal judges more than with state-court judges; and we focus more scholarly attention on federal courts than state courts. They are, in short, the courts of the elite—jurisdictionally, doctrinally, and socially. Perhaps the singular importance of federal courts was …

Macro-Judging And Article Iii Exceptionalism, Merritt E. Mcalister

UF Law Faculty Publications

Over the last half-century, the federal courts have faced down two competing crises: an increase in small, low-value litigation thought unworthy of Article III attention and an increase in the numbers and complexity of “big” cases thought worthy of those resources. The choice was what to prioritize and how, and the answer the courts gave was consistent across all levels of the federal judiciary. Using what this Article calls “macro-judging,” Article III judges entrenched their own power and autonomy to focus on the work they deemed most “worthy” of their attention, while outsourcing less “important” work to an array of …

America's Other Separation Of Powers Tradition, Jonathan L. Marshfield

UF Law Faculty Publications

As the Supreme Court returns many critical issues to the states, the structure of state government is increasingly significant to the American constitutional order. From redistricting to reproductive rights, battles are raging over which state institutions should decide these important issues. Yet there is surprisingly little scholarship dedicated to the separation of powers under state constitutions. Instead, state doctrine and commentary tend to mimic themes in federal constitutional law and parrot Madisonian ideas of constitutional design. On this view, the separation of powers is based on carefully balanced intra-government rivalries fueled by the private ambition of the officers that staff …

Lessons Of The Plague Years, Barry Sullivan

Faculty Publications & Other Works

The COVID-19 pandemic has challenged governments of every description across the globe, and it surely would have tested the mettle of any American administration. But the pandemic appeared in the United States at a particularly inopportune time. January 2020 marked the beginning of a presidential election year in a deeply polarized country. President Donald Trump was a controversial figure, beginning the fourth year of a highly idiosyncratic administration. He was both a candidate for re-election and the subject of an ongoing impeachment proceeding. In these circumstances, the pandemic quickly became politicized. President Trump's response to the COVID-19 pandemic has often …

Expert Knowledge, Democratic Accountability, And The Unitary Executive, Barry Sullivan

Faculty Publications & Other Works

This essay, which was prepared for the Fordham Law Review's February 2023 symposium on the Unitary Executive, addresses the question whether the Constitution requires that the President have absolute control over the information that those charged with executive authority may provide to Congress and the public, regardless of how technical or essential to democratic governance that information may be, and notwithstanding the existence of legislation to the contrary. For example, does the Constitution require that the President must be free to substitute their judgment for that of an expert official charged by Congress with making determinations about the likely path …

Executive Secrecy: Congress, The People, And The Courts, Barry Sullivan

Faculty Publications & Other Works

Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) to ensure that “any person” could gain access to all the executive branch information that could safely be disclosed, without any special showing of need, thereby enhancing the ability of citizens to know what their government is doing. Writing in 1982, then-Professor Antonin Scalia ridiculed the concept of active citizenship which FOIA embodied, asserting that the statute was the product of “an obsession [with the idea] that the first line of defense against an arbitrary executive is do-it-yourself oversight by the public and . . . the press.” That was a “romantic …

A State Within A State: Re-Examining The Federal Lands Question And Its Effect On State Sovereignty, David Wilde

William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review

Though the path of the public lands debate is well-trodden, this Note will seek to answer the question in novel ways. First, it uses the Corpus of Founding Era American English to perform an objective linguistic analysis of the phrase “dispose of” in the Property Clause. Through this analysis, it appears that an ordinary person at the time the Constitution was adopted would most likely have read the phrase “dispose of” in the Property Clause to mean sell, give away, bestow, or put into another’s hand or power.

Next, this Note investigates the historical and philosophical understandings of state sovereignty …

Without Limit: Why Texas's Criminal Statutes Of Limitations Violate The State Constitution's Separation Of Powers Clause, Andrew Warthen

St. Mary's Law Journal

No abstract provided.

States Of Emergency: Covid-19 And Separation Of Powers In The States, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

No event in recent years has shone a brighter spotlight on state separation of powers than the COVID-19 pandemic. Over a more than two-year period, governors exercised unprecedented authority through suspending laws and regulations, limiting business activities and gatherings, restricting individual movement, and imposing public health requirements. Many state legislatures endorsed these measures or were content to let governors take the lead, but in some states the legislature pushed back, particularly — albeit not only—where the governor and legislative majorities were of different political parties. Some of these conflicts wound up in state supreme courts.

This Essay examines the states’ …

Appropriations, The Budget, And Public Debt Transparency: The Fiscal Panorama, Gillian E. Metzger, Anna Gelpern, Alissa Ardito Ashcroft, Erika Lunder, Karla Vasquez-Suarez

Faculty Scholarship

Appropriations, budget, and public debt law lurk in the recesses of public law. Every now and again, in a blaze of glory and spilled ink, they emerge under the guise of a constitutional issue. Should a constitutional question arise, usually separation of powers, amid a political stalemate, then an extended shutdown or debt ceiling drama steal the spotlight. After a last-minute compromise or, rarely, a judicial ruling, the green eyeshades return. Money, finance, public spending – whether mandatory or discretionary – exert little charm over lawyers, who went to law school to avoid arithmetic. But the federal government pays for …

Private Enforcement In The States, Diego A. Zambrano, Neel Guha, Austin Peters, Jeffrey Xia

Faculty Scholarship

Scholarship on U.S. litigation and civil procedure has scarcely studied the role of private enforcement in the states. Over the past two decades, scholars have established that, almost uniquely in the world, the U.S. often relies on private parties rather than administrative agencies to enforce important statutory provisions. Take your pick of any area in American governance, and you will find private rights of action: environmental law, civil rights, employment discrimination, antitrust, consumer protection, business competition, securities fraud, and so on. In each of these areas, Congress has deliberately empowered private plaintiffs instead of, or in addition to, government agencies. …