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Articles 61 - 90 of 387
Full-Text Articles in Constitutional Law
The Riddle Of Race-Based Redistricting, Travis Crum
The Riddle Of Race-Based Redistricting, Travis Crum
Scholarship@WashULaw
The Supreme Court has adopted divergent interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause as applied to race and redistricting. Vote dilution doctrine requires mapmakers to consider race to ensure that racial minorities are not packed or cracked. Congress, moreover, has embraced vote dilution doctrine in Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. By contrast, racial gerrymandering doctrine triggers strict scrutiny if mapmakers subordinate traditional redistricting principles to race, thereby threatening Section 2’s constitutionality.
To resolve this doctrinal riddle, this Essay examines whether, as originally understood, the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment governed the use of race during redistricting. The Equal Protection Clause …
An Originalist Approach To Prospective Overruling, John O. Mcginnis, Michael Rappaport
An Originalist Approach To Prospective Overruling, John O. Mcginnis, Michael Rappaport
Notre Dame Law Review
Originalism has become a dominant jurisprudential theory on the Supreme Court. But a large number of precedents are inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning and overturning them risks creating enormous disruption to the legal order. This article defends a prospective overruling approach that would harmonize precedent with originalism’s rise and reduce the disruption from overrulings. Under prospective overruling, the Court declares that an existing statute violates the original meaning but will continue to be enforced because declaring it unconstitutional would produce enormous costs; however, future statutes of this type will be voided as unconstitutional. Under our approach, the Court would …
Originalism After Dobbs, Bruen, And Kennedy: The Role Of History And Tradition, Randy E. Barnett, Lawrence B. Solum
Originalism After Dobbs, Bruen, And Kennedy: The Role Of History And Tradition, Randy E. Barnett, Lawrence B. Solum
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In three recent cases, the constitutional concepts of history and tradition have played important roles in the reasoning of the Supreme Court. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization relied on history and tradition to overrule Roe v. Wade. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen articulated a history and tradition test for the validity of laws regulating the right to bear arms recognized by the Second Amendment. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District looked to history and tradition in formulating the test for the consistency of state action with the Establishment Clause.
These cases raise important questions about …
Originalism After Dobbs, Bruen, And Kennedy: The Role Of History And Tradition, Randy E. Barnett, Lawrence B. Solum
Originalism After Dobbs, Bruen, And Kennedy: The Role Of History And Tradition, Randy E. Barnett, Lawrence B. Solum
Faculty Scholarship
In three recent cases, the constitutional concepts of history and tradition have played important roles in the reasoning of the Supreme Court. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization relied on history and tradition to overrule Roe v. Wade. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen articulated a history and tradition test for the validity of laws regulating the right to bear arms recognized by the Second Amendment. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District looked to history and tradition in formulating the test for the consistency of state action with the Establishment Clause.
These cases raise important questions about …
The Immorality Of Originalism, Jack M. Beermann
The Immorality Of Originalism, Jack M. Beermann
Faculty Scholarship
The central claim of this essay is that in interpreting the U.S. Constitution, it is immoral to choose original intent over social welfare, broadly conceived. Once this argument is laid out and defended on its own terms, I support the central claim with a variety of arguments, including the defective process pursuant to which the Constitution was enacted, the deeply flawed substantive content of the Constitution, the incongruity of fidelity to the views of a generation of revolutionaries, the current virtual imperviousness of the Constitution to amendment, the failure of the Constitution to resolve fundamental questions concerning the allocation of …
Flourishing, Virtue, And The Common Good Constitutionalism, Lawrence B. Solum
Flourishing, Virtue, And The Common Good Constitutionalism, Lawrence B. Solum
Faculty Scholarship
In Common Good Constitutionalism, Professor Adrian Vermeule articulates a conception of the common good. Vermeule has much to say about the common good, but very little to say about the substantive component of his conception, which he describes as “happiness or flourishing.” This Article articulates a conception of the common good that is grounded in a virtue-centered conception of human flourishing. Humans are rational and social creatures, and therefore, flourishing for humans consists in rational and social activities that express the human excellence or virtues. The common good requires communities that facilitate human flourishing in three ways: (1) by creating …
Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Shugerman
Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
What did the “Decision of 1789” decide about presidential removal power, if anything? It turns out that an emerging consensus of scholars agrees that there was not much consensus in the First Congress.
Two more questions follow: Is the “unitary executive theory” based on originalism, and if so, is originalism a reliable method of interpretation based on historical evidence?
The unitary executive theory posits that a president has exclusive and “indefeasible” executive powers (i.e., powers beyond congressional and judicial checks and balances). This panel was an opportunity for unitary executive theorists and their critics to debate recent historical research questioning …
Freehold Offices Vs. "Despotic Displacement": Why Article Ii "Executive Power" Did Not Include Removal, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Freehold Offices Vs. "Despotic Displacement": Why Article Ii "Executive Power" Did Not Include Removal, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
The Roberts Court has relied on an assertion that Article II’s “executive power” implied an “indefeasible” or unconditional presidential removal power. In the wake of growing historical evidence against their theory, unitary executive theorists have fallen back on a claim of a “backdrop” or default removal rule from English and other European monarchies. However, unitary theorists have not provided support for these repeated assertions, while making a remarkable number of errors, especially in the recent “The Executive Power of Removal” (Harvard L. Rev. 2023).
This Article offers an explanation for the difficulty in supporting this historical claim: Because …
Serving Only To Oppress: An Intersectional And Critical Race Analysis Of Constitutional Originalism Inflicting Harm, Ethan Dawson
Serving Only To Oppress: An Intersectional And Critical Race Analysis Of Constitutional Originalism Inflicting Harm, Ethan Dawson
Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality
“[T]imes can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.” - Justice Anthony Kennedy, Lawrence v. Texas (2003)
This Note will first focus on a historical analysis of originalist constitutional interpretation, drawing attention to initial disparities in the Constitution incompatible with our current social context. It will discuss modern originalism as a method of perpetuating systemic shortcomings, drawing specific attention to originalist interpretation as a method of oppression against white women and people of color, specifically Black women. In analyzing the harm originalism does to …
An Originalist Theory Of Due Process Of Law, Randy E. Barnett
An Originalist Theory Of Due Process Of Law, Randy E. Barnett
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
As the sole originalist on the program, my first task is to define what originalism is so that we are all on the same page. Originalism can be summarized in one sentence: the meaning of the Constitution should remain the same until it's properly changed - by amendment.
Originalism is not a single theory. It is a family of theories, and that family shares two common precepts. The first is called the Fixation Thesis: the meaning of a text is fixed at the time that that text is promulgated. The Fixation Thesis is a descriptive claim about how language works …
Book Review: Rearranging The Apple Cart: Good-Faith Originalism And The Fourteenth Amendment, Daniel Coble
Book Review: Rearranging The Apple Cart: Good-Faith Originalism And The Fourteenth Amendment, Daniel Coble
ConLawNOW
This essay reviews the book by Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick, The Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment: Its Letter and Spirit (2021). Ask any constitutional law professor about how judges should or do interpret the Constitution, and you will likely hear an answer that ends in “ism.” In their latest book, Professors Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick discuss an “ism” that is found in our nation’s highest court, state courts, and academia: originalism. No matter which constitutional interpretation “ism” that one follows, this book provides an intimate and historical view of what two leading originalist scholars believe is the …
Historic Preservation: Launched From Grand Central Terminal, But Derailing, Kraz Greinetz
Historic Preservation: Launched From Grand Central Terminal, But Derailing, Kraz Greinetz
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the Supreme Court authorized the practice of historic preservation. Ruling that when a city designates a building as "historic" and therefore restricting its development, it is not a "taking" of private property that requires just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Since that time, historic preservation has proliferated in America's cities. But it's time for another look. Since Penn Central was decided, the facts and law of property regulation in the United States have changed. And the decision, which was wrong from an originalist perspective when it was decided, has …
The Departure From The Original Intent Of The 14th Amendment, Johnny B. Davis
The Departure From The Original Intent Of The 14th Amendment, Johnny B. Davis
Helm's School of Government Conference - 2021-2024
No abstract provided.
Is History Repeating Itself? The Role Of The Supreme Court In Protecting Minority Rights, Alyssa Fox, Annabelle Crawford
Is History Repeating Itself? The Role Of The Supreme Court In Protecting Minority Rights, Alyssa Fox, Annabelle Crawford
Brigham Young University Prelaw Review
Throughout history, the role of the Supreme Court has been debated. Some individuals argue for strict interpretation of the Constitution, while others argue that the ideals of the Constitution should be prioritized. Landmark cases decided by the Supreme Court demonstrate the shift between the protection of state sovereignty and minority rights. This article argues that the Supreme Court is responsible to intervene on behalf of minority and historically-disadvantaged groups when their rights are threatened or infringed upon by state and federal governments.
The Fourth Amendment In A Digital Age: Defining Boundaries In Law Enforcement Surveillance Of The Home, Josh Hoffman, Jared Xia
The Fourth Amendment In A Digital Age: Defining Boundaries In Law Enforcement Surveillance Of The Home, Josh Hoffman, Jared Xia
Brigham Young University Prelaw Review
As our country enters a new digital age, emerging technologies have increased the ability of law enforcement to monitor American citizens more closely. The tracking of suspects through thermal imaging, video monitoring, and cell phone GPSs are just a few examples of the unlocked potential now available to investigating authorities. When directed at the home, these technologies allow for unprecedented encroachment of our most intimate sphere of daily life. With this accelerating prevalence of technology in surveillance practices comes the need to reassess what boundaries the Fourth Amendment defines for our privacy. This paper explores the application of the Reasonable …
The Article Iii "Party" And The Originalist Case Against Corporate Diversity Jurisdiction, Mark Moller, Lawrence B. Solum
The Article Iii "Party" And The Originalist Case Against Corporate Diversity Jurisdiction, Mark Moller, Lawrence B. Solum
Faculty Scholarship
Federal courts control an outsize share of big-ticket corporate litigation. And that control rests, to a significant degree, on the Supreme Court’s extension of Article III’s Diversity of Citizenship Clause to corporations. Yet, critics have questioned the constitutionality of corporate diversity jurisdiction from the beginning.
In this Article and a previous one, we develop the first sustained critique of corporate diversity jurisdiction.
Our previous article demonstrated that corporations are not “citizens” given the original meaning of that word. But we noted this finding alone doesn’t sink general corporate diversity jurisdiction. The ranks of corporate shareholders include many undoubted “citizens.” And …
Constitutional Text, Founding Era History, And The Independent-State-Legislature Theory, Dan T. Coenen
Constitutional Text, Founding Era History, And The Independent-State-Legislature Theory, Dan T. Coenen
Georgia Law Review
One question raised by proponents of the so-called independent-state-legislature theory concerns the extent to which state courts can apply state constitutional requirements to invalidate state laws that concern federal elections. According to one proposed application of the theory, state courts can never subject such laws to state-constitution-based judicial review. According to another application, federal courts can broadly, though not invariably, foreclose state courts from drawing on state constitutions to invalidate federal-election-related state legislation. This article evaluates whether either of these positions comports with the original meaning of the Constitution. Given the article’s focus on the originalist methodology, it directs attention …
What's Originalism After Transunion?: Picking An Originalist Approach That Gets Standing Back On Track, Julian Gregorio
What's Originalism After Transunion?: Picking An Originalist Approach That Gets Standing Back On Track, Julian Gregorio
Notre Dame Law Review Reflection
This Note argues that not only is standing fascinating and contested, but it is so important that the Court should reconsider standing doctrine in appropriate future cases. While the TransUnion case came and went without much kerfuffle outside of legal circles, standing does not find itself sailing smoothly. As noted, perhaps the Court’s most reliable originalist just dissented from a case that largely restates the current law on standing. And Justice Kagan, perhaps the Court’s most influential liberal, wrote that after TransUnion, standing jurisprudence “needs a rewrite.” Given the current makeup of the Court, any reconsideration of standing doctrine …
No Sense Of Decency, Kathryn E. Miller
No Sense Of Decency, Kathryn E. Miller
Washington Law Review
For nearly seventy years, the Court has assessed Eighth Amendment claims by evaluating “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” In this Article, I examine the evolving standards of decency test, which has long been a punching bag for critics on both the right and the left. Criticism of the doctrine has been fierce but largely academic until recent years. Some fault the test for being too majoritarian, while others argue that it provides few constraints on the Justices’ discretion, permitting their personal predilections to rule the day. For many, the test is seen …
No Sense Of Decency, Kathryn E. Miller
No Sense Of Decency, Kathryn E. Miller
Articles
For nearly seventy years, the Court has assessed Eighth Amendment claims by evaluating “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” In this Article, I examine the evolving standards of decency test, which has long been a punching bag for critics on both the right and the left. Criticism of the doctrine has been fierce, but largely academic until recent years. Some fault the test for being too majoritarian, while others argue that it provides few constraints on the Justices’ discretion, permitting their personal predilections to rule the day. For many, the test is seen …
A Challenge To "Equitable Originalism" - The History Of Injunctions As A Principle-Based Adaptable Judicial Power, Anna C. Conley
A Challenge To "Equitable Originalism" - The History Of Injunctions As A Principle-Based Adaptable Judicial Power, Anna C. Conley
Faculty Law Review Articles
“Equitable originalism” is a judicial philosophy that only injunctions allowable in English chancery courts at the time of America’s founding in the 1780s are allowable in federal courts today. Accordingly, previously unknown types of injunctions, such as structural or nationwide injunctions, are prohibited exercises of judicial power.
This article asks whether historical analysis supports the assertion that the founders intended to crystalize federal equitable powers in the 1780s. The answer is no. Analysis of Article III, federal legislation, rules of court, treatises and caselaw in the late 1700s and 1800s illustrate that the United States received equity from the colonies …
Originalism And The Meaning Of "Twenty Dollars", Michael L. Smith
Originalism And The Meaning Of "Twenty Dollars", Michael L. Smith
Faculty Articles
Originalism claims to provide answers, or at least assistance, for those hoping to interpret a Constitution filled with wide-ranging, morally loaded terminology. Originalists claim that looking to the original public meaning of the Constitution will constrain interpreters, maintain consistency and predictability in judicial decisions, and is faithful to ideals like democratic legitimacy. This essay responds with the inevitable, tough question: whether originalism can tell interpreters what the Seventh Amendment's reference to "twenty dollars" means--both as a matter of original meaning and for interpreters today.
While this appears to be an easy question, I demonstrate that rather than telling modern legal …
Originalism, Common Good Constitutionalism, And Transparency, Michael L. Smith
Originalism, Common Good Constitutionalism, And Transparency, Michael L. Smith
Faculty Articles
A theory of interpretation that is more transparent tends to be preferable to less transparent alternatives. Increased transparency tends to promote the values of constraint, democratic legitimacy, and an understanding of what the law is. Under a transparency rubric, originalism, as a standard of interpretation, performs better than common good constitutionalism. Originalism provides a better defined (though still imperfect) basis for determining the correctness of claims about what the Constitution means. Common good constitutionalism's reliance on morally and politically loaded terminology makes it elusive as a standard of interpretation which tends to match the desires of the interpreter. At the …
Levels Of Generality & Originalism: Proposing A New Way Forward As Originalism Continues To Expand, Marquan Robertson
Levels Of Generality & Originalism: Proposing A New Way Forward As Originalism Continues To Expand, Marquan Robertson
Mitchell Hamline Law Review
No abstract provided.
Gouverneur Morris And The Drafting Of The Federalist Constitution, William M. Treanor
Gouverneur Morris And The Drafting Of The Federalist Constitution, William M. Treanor
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The Salmon P. Chase Colloquium series has had two themes: One is great moments in constitutional law, and the other is people who have been forgotten but should not have been. This colloquium is primarily in the latter category—it is about a forgotten founder of the Constitution. But the Constitution has more than one forgotten founder. I did a Google search this afternoon for “Forgotten Founder” and there are a whole series of books on various people who are the Constitution’s Forgotten Founder. So the Chase Colloquium series has another decade of subjects: Luther Martin, George Mason, Charles Pinckney, Roger …
Living Traditionalism, Sherif Girgis
Living Traditionalism, Sherif Girgis
Journal Articles
From the Article
This Article offers the first comprehensive analysis of the Court’s living traditionalism, which turns out to include scores of cases spanning every subject and Justices of every stripe. Next, the Article identifies a fundamental but previously unrecognized tension in the method itself: If the Court gives living-traditionalist cases full weight as precedent, it defeats the reasons for using the method at all. Put another way, it is incoherent to treat political practices as a ratchet: capable of moving law in one direction (e.g., against a right in 2022) but not the other (in favor of the right …
Akhil Amar’S Unusable Past, Gregory Ablavsky
Akhil Amar’S Unusable Past, Gregory Ablavsky
Michigan Law Review
A Review of The Words That Made Us: America’s Constitutional Conversation, 1760–1840. By Akhil Reed Amar.
The Constitutional Law Of Interpretation, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark
The Constitutional Law Of Interpretation, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark
Notre Dame Law Review
The current debate over constitutional interpretation often proceeds on the assumption that the Constitution does not provide rules for its own interpretation. Accordingly, several scholars have attempted to identify applicable rules by consulting external sources that governed analogous legal texts (such as statutes, treaties, contracts, etc.). The distinctive function of the Constitution—often forgotten or overlooked—renders these analogies largely unnecessary. The Constitution was an instrument used by the people of the several States to transfer a fixed set of sovereign rights and powers from one group of sovereigns (the States) to another sovereign (the federal government), while maintaining the “States” as …
Delegation At The Founding: A Response To Critics, Julian Davis Mortenson, Nicholas Bagley
Delegation At The Founding: A Response To Critics, Julian Davis Mortenson, Nicholas Bagley
Articles
This essay responds to the wide range of commentary on Delegation at the Founding, published previously in the Columbia Law Review. The critics’ arguments deserve thoughtful consideration and a careful response. We’re happy to supply both. As a matter of eighteenth-century legal and political theory, “rulemaking” could not be neatly described as either legislative or executive based on analysis of its scope, subject, or substantive effect. To the contrary: Depending on the relationships you chose to emphasize, a given act could properly be classified as both legislative (from the perspective of the immediate actor) and also executive (from the perspective …
Taking Care With Text: "The Laws" Of The Take Care Clause Do Not Include The Constitution, And There Is No Autonomous Presidential Power Of Constitutional Interpretation, George Mader
Law Faculty Scholarship
“Departmentalism” posits that each branch of the federal government has an independent power of constitutional interpretation—all branches share the power and need not defer to one another in the exercise of their interpretive powers. As regards the Executive Branch, the textual basis for this interpretive autonomy is that the Take Care Clause requires the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” and the Supremacy Clause includes the Constitution in “the supreme Law of the Land.” Therefore, the President is to execute the Constitution as a law. Or so the common argument goes. The presidential oath to “execute …