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Articles 31 - 60 of 387
Full-Text Articles in Constitutional Law
An Originalist Case For Birthright Citizenship Of Unlawful Immigrants' Children: Anti-Gypsy And Anti-Chinese Restrictions As Context, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
An Originalist Case For Birthright Citizenship Of Unlawful Immigrants' Children: Anti-Gypsy And Anti-Chinese Restrictions As Context, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
The Trump administration and other opponents of birthright citizenship for the children of “unlawful immigrants” make the following originalist claim about the Fourteenth Amendment: Even if the clause meant birthright citizenship, it applies today only to “lawful immigrants,” because the category of “unlawful immigrant” or “illegal immigrant” did not exist in the 1860s, when the clause was written and ratified. Opponents also argue that the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause originally implied a “loyalty” or “allegiance” requirement.
These assertions are historically inaccurate.
To the contrary, the concept of “unlawful immigrants” existed in the 1850s-60s, and Americans ratified birthright citizenship without indicating …
A Historical Case For A Robust But Non-Remedial Seventh Amendment, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
A Historical Case For A Robust But Non-Remedial Seventh Amendment, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
In Jarkesy, the Supreme Court rightly held that the Seventh Amendment required a jury trial for a case fundamentally similar to common law fraud, and it rightly limited the scope of the “public rights” exception to the Seventh Amendment. Grounded in historical and originalist methods, this essay makes four suggestions after Jarkesy:
- Following Jarkesy, the judiciary should continue a more robust enforcement of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The courts should eliminate the “public rights” exception to the Seventh Amendment, which does not appear to have an original link to the Seventh Amendment. The …
Differing Judicial Perspectives: A Look Into The Evolution And Constitutionality Of The United States' Administrative State, Buchanan Albert Cook
Differing Judicial Perspectives: A Look Into The Evolution And Constitutionality Of The United States' Administrative State, Buchanan Albert Cook
Honors Theses
Over time the United States’ administrative state has evolved into something that is quite unrecognizable from its inception in the early years of the nation. This essay will provide an account of the founding of the United States Constitution while recognizing the intent and design of the framers of the Constitution. In juxtapositioning this account with the current state of administrative agencies, questions over the constitutionality of such agencies will be posed. To answer these questions, an overview of the history of administrative agencies in the United States will be given alongside accompanying and significant Supreme Court Cases. This overview …
Originalism’S Precedent Problem, James Bernstein
Originalism’S Precedent Problem, James Bernstein
Northern Illinois University Law Review
This paper explores the tension between originalism and stare decisis in judicial decision-making. Originalism, which seeks to interpret the Constitution as understood at the time of its ratification, has gained bipartisan acceptance among judges. However, this interpretive approach faces challenges regarding precedent: How should originalist judges handle past decisions that deviate from the original public meaning of the Constitution? The paper examines this issue, particularly in light of originalists’ varied stances on the role of precedent.
Some originalists, like Antonin Scalia and Amy Coney Barrett, acknowledge the need for stare decisis to maintain legal stability, albeit with allowances for overturning …
Political Threads In Legal Tapestry: A Computational Analysis Of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 1934–2022, Reilly S. Steel
Political Threads In Legal Tapestry: A Computational Analysis Of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 1934–2022, Reilly S. Steel
Faculty Scholarship
How does the push and pull between law and politics shape the work of executive branch lawyers charged with providing “neutral” interpretations of the law? To shed light on this longstanding question, this Article undertakes the first large-scale computational analysis of legal interpretation in the executive branch of the United States federal government. Using a new dataset comprised of the texts of 12,879 pages of opinions issued by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice (DOJ), I use machine learning methods to explore markers of partisanship and ideology in these high-profile executive branch decisions.
Several important …
Trump V. United States And The Half-Originalist Presidency, Christine Kexel Chabot
Trump V. United States And The Half-Originalist Presidency, Christine Kexel Chabot
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Trump v. United States has been criticized for its ahistorical approach to presidential immunity. This Essay offers the first account of the historical mismatch between the Trump Court’s decision to immunize presidential removal power and Founding era conceptions of the presidency. Unlike the presumptive immunity that the Court recognized for most other official presidential acts, the immunity afforded for presidential removal power is absolute. The Court ruled that the President’s “unrestricted power of removal” can never be regulated by Congress or considered as evidence of wrongdoing, even when the President threatens removal to effectuate …
Some Realism About Originalism, William J. Novak
Some Realism About Originalism, William J. Novak
Michigan Law Review
A review of Memory and Authority: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation. By Jack M. Balkin.
The Misuse Of Ratification-Era Sources By Unitary Executive Theorists, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
The Misuse Of Ratification-Era Sources By Unitary Executive Theorists, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
This symposium essay suggests that, given an ostensibly originalist Supreme Court, the future depends on getting the past right. The unitary executive theory is approaching its political and doctrinal zenith in 2025, at the very moment it is approaching an evidentiary crisis. This essay details that crisis: a subset of misuses and misrepresentations of sources in the unitary executive scholarship. This subset focuses on serious misrepresentations of the Ratifications debates.
The Ratification debates appropriately have become the primary source of evidence for original public meaning, the dominant theory of originalism. The Ratification debates have always been a significant problem for …
The Miserly Message Of Grants Pass, Meghan J. Ryan
The Miserly Message Of Grants Pass, Meghan J. Ryan
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Grants Pass v. Johnson condoned states’ attempts to police homeless encampments. This was a significant blow to unhoused individuals and their allies. But the Court’s opinion also continued its march away from the longstanding evolving-standards-of-decency approach in Eighth Amendment cases. Grants Pass was something of an odd case in which to grant certiorari, but it served as an opportunity for the Court to send a quiet message that it would continue narrowing the Eighth Amendment’s scope. As in other recent cases, the Court applied a more historical approach than the one traditionally used in …
Is Originalism Bullshit?, Michael L. Smith
Is Originalism Bullshit?, Michael L. Smith
Lewis & Clark Law Review
It’s finally time to answer the big question. This Article draws on the surprisingly robust literature examining the definition, essence, and significance of bullshit and evaluates whether originalist constitutional interpretation fits the bill. I begin with Harry Frankfurt’s definition of bullshit as utterances made in pursuit of the speaker’s goals without regard for their truth value. I also rely on alternate formulations, including bullshit as unclarifiable nonsense as well as contextual and audience-centric variations of bullshit.
While not all instances of originalism are bullshit, I identify those instances which are, and go on to demonstrate that originalism is uniquely prone …
The Inevitability Of Adaptability - Comparative Contributions To Understanding Originalism, Anna C. Conley
The Inevitability Of Adaptability - Comparative Contributions To Understanding Originalism, Anna C. Conley
Faculty Law Review Articles
What can comparative law teach us about originalism as a constitutional interpretation method? After synthesizing existing comparative analyses, this article seeks to redefine comparative law’s role in understanding originalism. When defining originalism strictly to require adherence to fixed original meaning, originalism is not used by courts anywhere in the world. Instead, courts use history purposively to understand the intent behind constitutional text as one of many methods of interpretation. Comparative works suggest historical constitutional interpretation has a complex relationship with rights, politics and culture.
Comparative law can provide not only descriptive understandings of originalism but also interrogate its mandate that …
Dobbs V. Brown, Benjamin H. Barton
Dobbs V. Brown, Benjamin H. Barton
Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization1is the most important and impactful Supreme Court decision since at least Roe v. Wade, and potentially since Brown v. Board of Education. Past survey data show that most Americans can only name two Supreme Court opinions: Roe and Brown. Dobbs will surely join that list. This Article compares the history, drafting, and opinions of Dobbs and Brown to show what a missed opportunity Dobbs represents. Regardless of whether you agree or disagree with the opinion, it should be clear that Dobbs was one of those unique times (like that of Brown) where the Court …
Is Federal Question Jurisdiction Arising Or Setting, Lumen N. Mulligan
Is Federal Question Jurisdiction Arising Or Setting, Lumen N. Mulligan
Faculty Works
In this essay, I respond to Professor Arthur D. Hellman. Hellman argues that "there is reason to be concerned that the [federal] judicial system falls short of the Framers' expectations--primarily by denying many litigants in cases presenting federal questions 'their real day in an Article III court,' but also by fostering 'balkanization' rather than uniformity in the interpretation of federal law." It is a privilege to comment upon Hellman's thoughtful piece. In doing so, I begin by questioning the value of originalist interpretations of Article III jurisdiction both descriptively and normatively. I then turn to an intra-originalist critique that paints …
Does The Original Meaning Of The Fourteenth Amendment Protect Economic Liberty?, Randy E. Barnett
Does The Original Meaning Of The Fourteenth Amendment Protect Economic Liberty?, Randy E. Barnett
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In my remarks today, I will defend the proposition that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment protects "economic liberty." To clarify the issue, let me being by defining economic liberty. I define economic liberty as the right to acquire, use and possess private property and the right to enter into private contracts of one's choosing. If these rights are protected by the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, then we can conclude that the Amendment does protect economic liberty.
In my view, the evidence that the original meaning Fourteenth Amendment protects rights of private property and contract is overwhelming. …
The Abuses Of History In Constitutional Interpretation, Sherif Girgis
The Abuses Of History In Constitutional Interpretation, Sherif Girgis
Journal Articles
From the Article
Jack Balkin’s Memory and Authority powerfully describes the kaleidoscopic quality of historical arguments in constitutional law. The book also moves easily between description and prescription. This Essay explores whether it moves too easily from one to the other. I consider whether the book’s analysis is so keen to capture our actual practices that it leaves itself too few resources for evaluating them—whether its account of history’s uses, made expansive by a zeal to fit how lawyers actually reason, crowds out any robust account of how they ought not to reason. While I am inclined to think so, …
Book Review: We're All Traditionalists Now (Most Of The Time), Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Changing Constitution: Constitutional Law In The Trump-Era Supreme Court, Michael Gentithes
Book Review: We're All Traditionalists Now (Most Of The Time), Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Changing Constitution: Constitutional Law In The Trump-Era Supreme Court, Michael Gentithes
Akron Law Faculty Publications
This review highlights the scope and importance of Richard Fallon’s book, The Changing Constitution: Constitutional Law in the Trump-Era Supreme Court. Fallon, a giant of constitutional work, provides a comprehensive, accessible, and vitally important catalogue of the Court’s methodological changes in his posthumously published book. The book argues that while textualism and originalism “have achieved unparalleled prominence,” the Court is also “not consistently originalist” and often relies on a version of traditionalism, similar to but importantly distinct from originalism, that marks an important and undertheorized change. And in yet other areas, the Court eschews either originalism or traditionalism for …
Amicus In Wilcox V. Trump On Presidential Removal And Unitary Executive Theorists’ Errors, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Amicus In Wilcox V. Trump On Presidential Removal And Unitary Executive Theorists’ Errors, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
As courts ask whether Free Enterprise and Seila Law call into question Humphrey’s Executor and independent officers or agencies, the more immediate questions should be focused on new historical evidence and new fact-checking finding pervasive and repeated historical errors and misinterpretations at the foundation of the unitary executive theory of removal.
Since the Supreme Court decided Seila Law, a wave of new historical research has shown that the Founding generation did not understand Article II to grant the President an indefeasible removal power over executive officials. In response, pro-unitary executive scholars have tried to offer new historical support. That …
Originalisms' Indifferences?: Friendly Amendments To Sherif Girgis's "Originalism's Difference?", Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Originalisms' Indifferences?: Friendly Amendments To Sherif Girgis's "Originalism's Difference?", Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
Sherif Girgis’s Lecture Originalism’s Differences? reflects on what had differentiated originalism from other methods and why those differences are eroding. The differences are (or were): (1) avoiding “ostentatious moral reasoning”; (2) relatedly, constraining judges by requiring originalist historical evidence (i.e., tying judges’ hands); and (3) engaging historical research with more “intensity.” Girgis rightly criticizes the Court for engaging in the same kind of flexibility and creativity that originalists had long rejected.
In this commentary, I highlight our areas of agreement and offer friendly amendments. My title takes Girgis’s title two or three steps further: I use an “s-apostrophe” because I …
A Conversation With Justice Brett Kavanaugh, Brett M. Kavanaugh, J. Joel Alicea
A Conversation With Justice Brett Kavanaugh, Brett M. Kavanaugh, J. Joel Alicea
Catholic University Law Review
On Thursday, September 26th, 2024, the Center for the Constitution and the Catholic Intellectual Tradition at The Catholic University of America hosted a conversation between Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh and Professor J. Joel Alicea. This was the inaugural event of the new Center. The conversation covered topics such as constitutional interpretation, the separation of powers, religious liberty, and the Catholic intellectual tradition. This is a transcript of the conversation, and the text appears substantially as it was delivered. The video of the event may be found at this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2sKvSwzkmqo.
George Washington’S Teeth, Wittgenstein, And Two Gruesome Problems For Originalism, Scott Devito
George Washington’S Teeth, Wittgenstein, And Two Gruesome Problems For Originalism, Scott Devito
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review
With the conservative turn of the U.S. Supreme Court, originalism has become ascendant. This rise to preeminence should trouble the legal community because originalism is grounded on a naive understanding of the interpretative process. Once we wash away this naivety and delve more deeply into legislative interpretation, we see that originalism fails in three ways. First, here is recent empirical evidence that general meaning is rare and, as such, the original meaning required by the theory is unlikely to have existed. Second, originalism fails to take into account the Problem of Induction—that making generalized inferences from a limited dataset is …
Constructing A Liberal/Progressive “Constitution In Exile”: An Appreciation Of Jack Balkin’S Memory And Authority, James E. Fleming
Constructing A Liberal/Progressive “Constitution In Exile”: An Appreciation Of Jack Balkin’S Memory And Authority, James E. Fleming
Faculty Scholarship
Balkin’s book makes clear why many liberal/progressive criticisms of conservative originalists—that they get the history wrong or cherry-pick it, that they only selectively insist upon originalism and otherwise ignore it, and the like—deliver at best glancing blows (as far as the conservative originalists are concerned). For one thing, he shows that the construction of memory entails the construction of forgetting (or erasure),7 which is essential to originalist projects that whitewash our historical injustices and repudiate the progressive aspirations embodied in our history. Hence, when conservative originalists erase unjust aspects of our history, and liberals and progressives criticize them for not …
An Originalist Approach To Puerto Rico: Arguments Against The Status Quo, Micah Allred
An Originalist Approach To Puerto Rico: Arguments Against The Status Quo, Micah Allred
Notre Dame Law Review Reflection
Few originalists have grappled with a fundamental question about Puerto Rico: whether the Constitution permits the United States to hold the island indefinitely as nonstate territory. There are reasons to doubt that it does. The main purpose of the Constitution’s territorial provisions was to allow Congress to transition the then West-ern Territory into states. And, as a structural matter, Congress’s direct authority over Puerto Ricans conflicts with important constitutional principles such as federalism. But for originalists, arguments from purpose and structure are helpful only insofar as they elucidate the original meaning of the Constitution’s text. This Article lays out two …
Outcome Reasons And Process Reasons In Normative Constitutional Theory, Lawrence B. Solum
Outcome Reasons And Process Reasons In Normative Constitutional Theory, Lawrence B. Solum
Faculty Scholarship
Constitutional theory is a mess. Disagreements about originalism and living constitutionalism have become intractable. Constitutional theorists make some arguments that seem clearly fallacious and advance proposals that are pie in the sky. One of the reasons for the mess is an overreliance by constitutional theorists on “outcome reasons,” justifications that rely on the theorist’s beliefs about what outcomes are good and what outcomes are bad. This outcome-drive approach is exemplified by the so-called “canonical cases” argument, which evaluates positions in normative constitutional theory on the basis of its counterfactual implications for a handful of prior decisions of the Supreme Court. …
Corpus Linguistics And The Original Public Meaning Of The Sixteenth Amendment, Thomas R. Lee, Lawrence B. Solum, James C. Phillips, Jesse A. Egbert
Corpus Linguistics And The Original Public Meaning Of The Sixteenth Amendment, Thomas R. Lee, Lawrence B. Solum, James C. Phillips, Jesse A. Egbert
Faculty Scholarship
Moore v. United States raises the question whether unrealized gains, such as an increase in property value or a stock portfolio, constitute “incomes, from whatever source derived” under the original meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. Moore is widely viewed as the most important tax case to reach the United States Supreme Court in decades. It is also an opportunity for the Court to refine its theory and method of finding original meaning.
We focus here on the original public meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment—the ordinary, common meaning attributed to its text by the general public in 1913. So far, the …
The Problem Of Extravagant Inferences, Cass Sunstein
The Problem Of Extravagant Inferences, Cass Sunstein
Georgia Law Review
Judges and lawyers sometimes act as if a constitutional or statutory term must, as a matter of semantics, be understood to have a particular meaning, when it could easily be understood to have another meaning, or several other meanings. When judges and lawyers act as if a legal term has a unique semantic meaning, even though it does not, they should be seen to be drawing extravagant inferences. Some constitutional provisions are treated this way; consider the idea that the vesting of executive power in a President of the United States necessarily includes the power to remove, at will, a …
When Originalism Failed: Lessons From Tort Law, Donald G. Gifford, Richard C. Boldt, Christopher J. Robinette
When Originalism Failed: Lessons From Tort Law, Donald G. Gifford, Richard C. Boldt, Christopher J. Robinette
Faculty Scholarship
Two recent Supreme Court decisions upended American life. Opinions released on consecutive days in June 2022 overturned the right of reproductive choice nationwide and invalidated a statute regulating the carrying of concealed weapons in New York. The opinions were united by a common methodology. Pursuant to what one scholar terms “thick” originalism, history, as told by the majority, dictated the resolution of constitutional disputes.
This Article explores the use of thick originalism in several celebrated torts cases that raised constitutional issues. These cases illustrate two significant kinds of problems associated with a rigid historical approach to constitutional interpretation. The first …
The Death Of The Evolving Standards Of Decency, Meghan J. Ryan
The Death Of The Evolving Standards Of Decency, Meghan J. Ryan
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
The Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause is in jeopardy. The constitutionality of punishments is usually judged according to the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” And in evaluating these standards, the Court has traditionally looked to changing societal views on punishment. This is a living constitution approach to interpretation, and the Eighth Amendment is the only area of law in which the Court has consistently and explicitly ap-plied such an approach. But a living constitution approach is diametrically opposed to the current Court’s focus on originalism. This is the first originalist Court in history, and …
The Wages Of Hitching Wagons, Thomas B. Bennett
The Wages Of Hitching Wagons, Thomas B. Bennett
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
This article examines the challenges faced by states that align their constitutions with federal doctrine through the practice of "lockstepping"—adopting federal legal standards into state law. Lockstepping binds states to federal law, regardless of its trajectory. Part I traces the evolution of standing doctrine in both federal courts under Article III and Kentucky courts under its constitution. Part II presents an originalist critique of the federal injury-in-fact requirement, highlighting emerging efforts to abandon this requirement in federal courts. Part III discusses the dilemma states like Kentucky face, balancing constitutional interpretation, federalism, and legal stability.
The Mad Hatter’S Quip: Looking For Logic In The Independent State Legislature Theory, Nicholas Maggio, Foreword By Brendan Buschi
The Mad Hatter’S Quip: Looking For Logic In The Independent State Legislature Theory, Nicholas Maggio, Foreword By Brendan Buschi
Touro Law Review
The Supreme Court is set to hear a case that threatens the bedrock of America’s democracy, and it is not clear how it will shake out. The cumbersomely named “Independent State Legislature Theory” is at the heart of the case Moore v. Harper, which is before the Supreme Court this term. The theory holds that state legislatures should be free from the ordinary bounds of state judicial review when engaged in matters that concern federal elections. Despite being defeated a myriad of times at the Supreme Court, the latest challenge stems from a legal battle over North Carolina’s redistricting maps. …
Righteous Fury: A Natural Rights Approach To The Individual Right To Bear Arms Under The Ninth And Fourteenth Amendments, Nikhil Agarwal
Righteous Fury: A Natural Rights Approach To The Individual Right To Bear Arms Under The Ninth And Fourteenth Amendments, Nikhil Agarwal
CMC Senior Theses
The individual right to bear arms for self-defence has been grounded by the modern Supreme Court in the Second Amendment and incorporated against the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, a close examination of both the majority and dissenting opinions in each of the three landmark gun-rights cases decided by the Supreme Court this century- DC v. Heller, McDonald v. Chicago, and New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen- reveal how difficult is to determine the original meaning of the Second Amendment, and expose weaknesses in the Court’s current substantive due process …