Constitutional Law Commons^™

Book Review: Judicial Originalism As A Byproduct Of An Overly Difficult Amendment Process: Jill Lepore's We The People, Charles Britton

ConLawNOW

This essay reviews the book by Jill Lepore, We the People: A History of the U.S. Constitution, winner of the 2026 Pulitzer Prize for history.  It explains how Lepore examines the history of constitutional amendment—both successes and failures—to argue that frequent amendment was the democratic intent of the Framers. And shows how this amendment philosophy contradicts the originalism of the current Supreme Court.

Book Review: Justice Breyer's Problematic Pragmatism, Mark S. Kende

ConLawNOW

Courts often face difficult questions of statutory interpretation and constitutional interpretation. Various judges take different approaches. This essay reviews the book, Reading the Constitution, Why I Chose Pragmatism Not Textualism, authored by former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, who used methods that were often in the Court minority. Justice Breyer argued in favor of relying on purpose in federal statutory interpretation cases, and in favor of pragmatic balancing in federal constitutional cases. He was anti-formalistic and therefore generally opposed to textualism or originalism. The essay argues that this trade publication, intended for a general audience, has strengths and …

Making The Party Presentation Principle Safe For Originalism, Randy E. Barnett, Lawrence B. Solum

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court sometimes adheres to what it calls the “party presentation principle”—terminology that dates back to 2008. Although judicial articulations of the principle have been inconsistent and imprecise, the gist is the familiar notion that courts should resolve cases on the basis of the issues and reasons presented by the parties to the dispute. Conversely, questions not properly raised by the parties should be avoided by the Court. Thus, the Court has on several occasions declined to address arguments outside the scope of the questions raised by the parties in their petition for certiorari.

For originalists, the importance of …

The Interpretive Force Of Alexander Hamilton’S Early Expositions Of Presidential Power, Michael Stokes Paulsen

Pepperdine Law Review

The most important, rightly influential, early interpretations of the Constitution on presidential power concerning matters of war, peace, and foreign affairs flowed from the able pen of Alexander Hamilton in three sets of pseudonymous public essays: as “Publius” in The Federalist (1787–1788); as “Pacificus” (1793–1794); and “Camillus” (1795–1796). As Publius, Hamilton expounded a broad understanding of presidential constitutional power generally and of presidential power in war and foreign affairs specifically, including an essentially plenary Commander-in-Chief power over the conduct of authorized war (but with no constitutional power to initiate war: that power being explicitly and exclusively assigned to Congress). As …

The Establishment Clause And The Ten Commandments Post-Lemon, Richard Kato

Northern Illinois University Law Review

Louisiana recently passed a law requiring that a display of the Ten Commandments be placed in all public school classrooms in the state. The law is currently facing an Establishment Clause challenge in the Fifth Circuit. This Comment argues that Louisiana’s Ten Commandments law does not violate the original public meaning of the Establishment Clause. The history of the Establishment Clause suggests that noncoercive support of religion was widely accepted before and up through the time of the First Amendment’s enactment. Following Kennedy v. Bremerton School District’s abandonment of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, the Ten Commandments law must …

Federalist Politics And The Elusive Original Meaning Of The Free Exercise Clause, Jack Thorlin

Catholic University Law Review

Originalism requires interpreting the Constitution by reference to a provision’s original public meaning. But there is very little evidence of original public meaning for some constitutional provisions, most notably the Free Exercise Clause. Originalists have splintered into several different methodological approaches toward the Clause. Justices Scalia and O’Connor staked out opposing originalist views on the Clause thirty years ago in Employment Division v. Smith and City of Boerne v. Flores. In the Roberts Court, some of the conservative justices have attempted to apply a simple textualist interpretation of the Clause, but those efforts have not attracted most of the …

The Great Depression And Canada's Major Originalist Decade, Preston Jordan Lim

Faculty Publications

Few periods of Canadian history have been as momentous or terrible as the Great Depression. The Dominion and provincial governments’ inability to combat financial and environmental catastrophe led many Canadians to openly question the appropriateness of their constitutional framework. As legal historians have since documented, many leading jurists of the time believed that a strong central government could, through the institution of national programs, contain the Great Depression; in the eyes of these 1930s jurists, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—then Canada’s apex court—had sapped the federal government of its powers by misinterpreting the British North America Act, 1867 …

American Public Law Revolution, Victoria Frances Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Supreme Court has birthed a public law revolution. This revolution should not be known as a constitutional revolution because it is bigger than constitutional law—it covers statutory and administrative law as well. This revolution has been powered not by social movements, but by an interpretive philosophy known as originalism. Originalism has been deeply misunderstood by its critics. This Article examines three myths about originalism—that it is primarily about history, that it is a traditional theory of adjudication, and that it is democratic. Originalism is a semantic theory, not a theory of history, and it is a theory that privileges …

The Original Meaning And Understanding Of The Investigative Power Of The Grand Jury In The Constitution Of Alaska, Savannah Shoffner, Richard W. Garnett

Journal Articles

The investigatory, or reporting, power of grand juries refers to the body’s ability to issue statements on wide-ranging matters of public policy, generally aimed at exposing “inefficiency, neglect, or criminal or quasi-criminal conduct” by government officials. Grand jurors may propose an investigation themselves or respond to a request from a citizen. The reports produced by these investigations need not be tied to a specific indictment to be released.

Text, history, and tradition reveal that the grand jury has been understood as an intermediary between the government and the people, empowered to make public statements on the people’s behalf and entrusted …

The Evolution Of The Supreme Court's Second Amendment Jurisprudence, Kermit V. Lipez

Maine Law Review

We live in the shadow of an epidemic of gun violence. We dread the next report of an inevitable mass shooting. We no longer feel secure in public places. We fear for the safety of our children and our grandchildren at their schools. We shake our heads in disbelief at the empty ritual of "thoughts and prayers" for victims and their families. As one commentator put it, we suffer from the "[u]nbearable [m]onotony of [g]rief." Why must we live like this? Why are there no solutions? In conversations posing these questions, there are often references to the Supreme Court's Second …

Amicus Brief In Trump V. Barbara: An Originalist Defense Of Birthright Citizenship, Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Evan D. Bernick

Faculty Scholarship

For nearly all of the first 235 years under the Constitution, the citizenship of every child born in the United States to alien parents, with immaterial exceptions, was a given. Then, in 2025, the Trump administration changed course. Even though the Fourteenth Amendment makes no mention of limiting birthright citizenship to the children of domiciled parents, the Government now claims that is what “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” has always meant. While the Government and its amici admit that the common law recognized the citizenship of children of transient aliens, their remaining “survey of history range[s] from the constitutionally irrelevant” …

The Fallacies Of Originalism: Why Treating History And Tradition Alone As Dispositive Is Not Superior To The Tiers Of Scrutiny, Gage A. Johnson

Cleveland State Law Review

The goal of this Article is to develop the current history and tradition standard. I argue that the Bruen use of history and tradition is not a more principled or better way of interpreting the Constitution than the infamous tiers of scrutiny. This argument is supported by analyzing the way the Court has used history and tradition in reviewing restrictions on the Second Amendment and the push for it to be used under the First Amendment. I argue that Justice Thomas’s rigid application of history and tradition is essentially an ends-justifying-the-means analysis that is no different than the so called …

Book Review: We're All Traditionalists Now (Most Of The Time), Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Changing Constitution: Constitutional Law In The Trump-Era Supreme Court, Michael Gentithes

ConLawNOW

This review highlights the scope and importance of Richard Fallon’s book, The Changing Constitution: Constitutional Law in the Trump-Era Supreme Court. Fallon, a giant of constitutional work, provides a comprehensive, accessible, and vitally important catalogue of the Court’s methodological changes in his posthumously published book. The book argues that while textualism and originalism “have achieved unparalleled prominence,” the Court is also “not consistently originalist” and often relies on a version of traditionalism, similar to but importantly distinct from originalism, that marks an important and undertheorized change. And in yet other areas, the Court eschews either originalism or traditionalism for …

Originalism, Official History, And Perspectives Versus Methodologies, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper addresses a well-worn topic: originalism, the theory that judges should interpret the U.S. Constitution in a manner consistent with the intent of its framers. I am interested in the real-world effects of originalism. The primary effect advanced by originalists is the tendency of the approach to constrain the discretion of judges. However, I identify another effect of originalism: the creation of official histories, a practice that imposes a hidden tax on society. Another question I consider is whether originalism should be considered a methodology of analyzing the law or a perspective on the law; I argue that originalism …

The Comstock Act: Will The First Amendment Finally Bury This Zombie Law’S Speech Restrictions?, Morgan Garces

University of Miami Law Review

The Comstock Act of 1873 is a federal anti-obscenity law that, along with lascivious and filthy literature, explicitly restricts the sending of anything that can be used to procure an abortion—including writing. However, since the decision of Roe v. Wade, the law’s abortion-speech provisions had been considered long-dead—although never officially being overturned. Now that Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization has rescinded the right to an abortion, the law appears to be reaching out from its grave. Anti-abortion activists are currently looking to the Comstock Act as a federal abortion ban already on the books because of its ban …

An Originalist Interpretation Of Article Iii Permits And Favors Bivens Actions As A Recognition Of The Intrinsic Connection Between Rights And Remedies, Shrivathsan Margam S

Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice

The Bivens Doctrine, which stands for the principle that judges may infer private causes of action for money damages against federal officers from a constitutional text that does not expressly create such remedies, has faced attack from Originalists on the Supreme Court of the United States. Every case seeking to extend the Bivens principle to a new context meets rejection from the Court with concurrences calling for overturning it altogether. This Article will argue that an Originalist approach to interpreting the Constitution, specifically the Original Methods subset of the ascendant lens of Original Public Meaning, permits and counsels in favor …

Reconstituting A Constitution, And A Republic: The Architecture Of Authoritarian Rule, J. Maria Glover

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

A constitution can be remade without tearing it down, or even changing a single word. It is done by law.

“The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may establish,” whose “province and duty” it is to “say what the law is.” U.S. Const. Art. III §1; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 (Cranch) 137 (1803). It is not the power to remake the Constitution that grants it.

The Supreme Court is turning the inherited powers that hold power to law into instruments of its own aggrandizement. It is taking authority from …

Creation And The Republican Revival, William M. Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Gordon Wood's classic book Creation of the American Republic has long influenced legal thought and originalist scholarship in particular. It played a central role in the Republican Revival movement, an effort by leading scholars such as Cass Sunstein and Frank Michelman to recover a progressive originalism at the same time as conservative originalism was starting to shape constitutional jurisprudence. But, while the Republican Revival nominally relied on Wood, it misread central elements of his book - his concept of virtue and his belief that republicanism had largely been displaced at the time of the drafting of the Constitution.

The time …

Gienapp's Big Book: Conceptual Rupture, Modernism, And The End Of Originalism, Logan E. Sawyer Iii

Scholarly Works

For decades, we have lived in an age of partisan jurisprudence, in which nearly every Republican has embraced originalism, and nearly every Democrat has rejected it. One can mark the start of that era in multiple places, but one good choice is November 11th, 1977. That day, in the pages of National Review, William F. Buckley previewed Government by Judiciary, Raoul Berger’s originalist critique of the Warren Court’s rights revolution. The review, entitled “Berger’s Big Book,” was highly complimentary. Berger’s rebuke of Warren Court activism was, Buckley thought, “devastating.” And he was not alone. Following the publication of Government by …

Originalism As Disruption, Susan D. Carle

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

This Article challenges the conventional understanding of originalism as a method that promotes unchanging constitutional meanings. Drawing on four and a half decades of experience since Attorney General Edwin Meese first championed originalism as a conservative project, this Article demonstrates that originalism has generally proven destabilizing rather than stabilizing to constitutional law. Landmark cases such as New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, and Shelby County v. Holder show that the Supreme Court frequently deploys originalism when it seeks to upend settled constitutional doctrine, contradicting claims …

From Myers To Slaughter: A Brief Theory Of The Constitutionalization Of Secondary Sources, Dana Neacsu, Paul D. Callister

Faculty Works

For more than two centuries, American constitutional adjudication has relied upon secondary sources. Yet constitutional theory has almost entirely ignored them. Originalism debates constitutional text. Living constitutionalism debates constitutional evolution. Theories of precedent debate judicial authority. None asks a more fundamental question: What role do secondary sources play in constitutional adjudication? This Article argues that the answer has fundamentally changed in the last 100 of years. Chief Justice William Howard Taft's opinion in Myers v. United States (1926) marked a constitutional revolution by transforming secondary authorities from explanatory materials into evidence of constitutional continuity. Exactly one century later, Chief Justice …

The Unitary Theorists' Appointments Clause Problems, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The unitary executive theorists’ recent retreat to the Appointments Clause as a basis for unconditional presidential removal power is contradicted by the text and by overwhelming originalist evidence.

It is a surprising argument for a power of presidential removal, because the text of the Appointments Clause plainly requires both the President and Senate to appoint. The noncommon sense reading, that the president alone appoints, and thus the president can remove, was not in any of the Trump Administration’s briefs, but it was in a single amicus brief, and it was picked up in oral argument and the mainstream media.

This …

Five Lessons From Ken Kersch’S Conservatives And The Constitution For The Present Moment, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

Timothy Snyder’s On Tyranny, a New York Times bestseller, has the subtitle, “Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century.” Ken Kersch’s Conservatives and the Constitution: Imagining Constitutional Restoration in the Heyday of American Liberalism (2019) provides at least twenty lessons from the second half of the Twentieth Century about the development of conservative constitutional thought and activism. Although conservatism has changed in many ways since the 1954-1980 period on which Kersch’s book focuses, these lessons are relevant for understanding the present political moment, filled with concerns that the U.S., during the second Trump Administration, is lurching toward tyranny, authoritarianism, and …

Why Constitutional Argument Matters, Philip C. Bobbitt

Faculty Scholarship

The program for this symposium promised that I would be discussing the “descriptive grammar of constitutional law.” To put my purpose less benignly, I should say that I mean to attack the practice of limiting what I will call “modal analysis” to its descriptive virtues. Part of that attack will be the claim that courts and their commentators should pay closer attention to the modal requirements of the fundamental forms of constitutional discourse, but not because straying from this is a kind of grammatical faux pas. After all, if the system I have urged for constitutional analysis — the system …

A Conversation With Judge Stephanos Bibas, Stephanos Bibas, Kevin C. Walsh

Catholic University Law Review

On Friday, March 28th, 2025, the Catholic University Law Review hosted its annual spring symposium: Traditional Judicial Power & Doctrinal Development, which included a conversation between Judge Stephanos Bibas and Professor Kevin C. Walsh. The conversation covered topics such as standing, severability, and preliminary injunctions. This is a transcript of the conversation, and the text appears substantially as it was delivered.

Reckoning With Antisemitism In History And Tradition, Nathaniel Shaw Hay, Isaac Barnes May

Pepperdine Law Review

“History and tradition” has become a watchword of modern constitutional interpretation, shaping Supreme Court jurisprudence and framing ongoing debates over the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet this interpretive framework remains under-theorized in one critical respect: how should it grapple with the prejudices embedded in the very traditions it invokes? This Article examines that question through the lens of anti-Jewish discrimination in Anglo-American law, using this history as a case study to examine both the perils and promise of relying on history as a source of constitutional authority. For centuries, the common law excluded Jews from full civic participation in …

Take In Case Of Emergency: Reconciling Necessity Takings With The Original Meaning Of The Takings Clause, Tony Smith

Northwestern University Law Review

Does the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause permit the state to destroy property without compensation whenever it declares an emergency? The long-standing doctrine of necessity empowers the state to do exactly that.

Courts dating back to common law England have permitted governments to claim a privilege of necessity to avoid paying for private property they destroy in times of crisis. The privilege rests on the principle that the public good sometimes outweighs the harm the individual suffers. Today’s courts and academics stretch this principle to its limits, arguing necessity should be used as a vehicle for combating all manner of social …

The Evolution Of The Second Amendment And The American Gun Violence Epidemic: A Historical Analysis Of Political Self-Sabotage, Amanda Tureaud

Senior Theses

From the conception of the Bill of Rights until the 21st century, the Second Amendment was read and understood by the American population, both ordinary citizens and government officials, branches, and agencies inclusively, to allow the nation to have an armed military but not for private citizens to own and/or carry firearms. Since 2008, however, the Second Amendment has been interpreted as an absolute freedom for private citizens to own and carry semiautomatic assault weapons in the name of personal protection. This thesis holds that the evolution of society’s attitude on guns and gun control is specifically denoted by the …

Constitutional Futurisms, Jeremiah Chin

Northwestern University Law Review

How do we reckon with the past? The Supreme Court’s recent embrace of originalism as a mode of constitutional analysis relies almost exclusively on a view of history and tradition that would bind us to an understanding of principles and ideals that legitimized the exclusion of minority voices. Cases such as New York State Pistol and Rifle Ass'n v. Bruen use flavors of originalism as a framework to define rights and governmental powers through their historical antecedents, but this broad standard of interpretation is notably absent in the Court’s recent discussions of histories and traditions of racism in the United …

Book Review: Jonathan Gienapp, Against Constitutional Originalism: A Historical Critique, Timothy Smith

ConLawNOW

This essay reviews the new book, Against Constitutional Originalism by Professor Jonathan Gienapp. It shows how this important book complicates the legal theory of originalism and its understanding of the Constitution. Gienapp convincingly shows that Founding-era Americans had a very different understanding of the nature of constitutions—what they are and how they worked. The conception of the Constitution that feels natural to modern Americans actually developed gradually in the decades and centuries after the Founding and was not the original meaning. Gienapp contends that this creates foundational problems for the originalist approach to Constitutional interpretation. It exposes the fundamental misunderstanding …