Constitutional Law Commons^™

Mcculloch V. Madison: John Marshall's Effort To Bury Madisonian Federalism, Kurt T. Lash

Law Faculty Publications

"In his engaging and provocative new book, The Spirit of the Constitution: John Marshall and the 200-Year Odyssey of McCulloch v. Maryland, David S. Schwartz challenges McCulloch’s canonical status as a foundation stone in the building of American constitutional law. According to Schwartz, the fortunes of McCulloch ebbed and flowed depending on the politics of the day and the ideological commitments of Supreme Court justices. Judicial reliance on the case might disappear for a generation only to suddenly reappear in the next. If McCulloch v. Maryland enjoys pride of place in contemporary courses on constitutional law, Schwartz argues, then this …

Pills, Public Nuisance, And Parens Patriae: Questioning The Propriety Of The Posture Of The Opioid Litigation, Michelle L. Richards

University of Richmond Law Review

The opioid crisis has been in litigation for almost twenty years on various fronts, including criminal prosecutions of pharmaceutical executives, civil lawsuits by individuals against drug manufacturers and physicians, class actions by those affected by opioid abuse, and criminal actions filed by the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). In the early 2000s, opioid litigation began with individual plaintiffs filing suit against manufacturers and others for damages allegedly related to opioid use. The litigation has since expanded significantly in terms of the type of plaintiffs and defendants, the nature of the claims being asserted, and the damages attributable to the crisis.

The …

Constitutional Rights Before Realism, Jud Campbell

Law Faculty Publications

This Essay excavates a forgotten way of thinking about the relationship between state and federal constitutional rights that was prevalent from the Founding through the early twentieth century. Prior to the ascendancy of legal realism, American jurists understood most fundamental rights as a species of general law that applied across jurisdictional lines, regardless of whether these rights were constitutionally enumerated. And like other forms of general law, state and federal courts shared responsibility for interpreting and enforcing these rights. Nor did the Fourteenth Amendment initially disrupt this paradigm in ways that we might expect. Rather than viewing rights secured by …

Popular Constitutional Argument, Thomas G. Donnelly

Law Faculty Publications

Critics have long attacked popular constitutionalists for offering few clues about how their theory might work in practice—especially inside the courts. These critics are right. Popular constitutionalism—as a matter of both theory and practice—remains a work in progress. In this Article, I take up the challenge of developing an account of (what I call) popular constitutional argument. Briefly stated, popular constitutional argument is a form of argument that draws on the American people’s considered judgments as a source of constitutional authority—akin to traditional sources like text, history, structure, and doctrine. Turning to constitutional theory, I situate popular constitutional argument within …

Navigating 21st Century Tax Jurisdiction, Hayes R. Holderness

Law Faculty Publications

Hailed as a massive victory for the states, the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. brought dated state tax jurisdiction standards into the twenty-first century, freeing the states to tax internet vendors. However, the decision left the larger state tax jurisdiction doctrine undertheorized and at a crossroads: should the doctrine concern itself only with notice and fairness issues akin to those found in the due process personal jurisdiction realm, or should it also concern itself with protecting interstate commerce from undue state tax burdens?

This Article argues for the latter path by developing a robust theory …

Compelled Subsidies And Original Meaning, Jud Campbell

Law Faculty Publications

The rule against compelled subsidization of speech is at the forefront of modem First Amendment disputes. Challenges to mandatory union dues, laws preventing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and the federal "contraceptive mandate" have all featured variants of the anti-subsidization principle, reasoning that the government cannot compel people to support the objectionable activities of others. But the literature currently fails to evaluate modem compelled-subsidy doctrine in terms of the original meaning of the First Amendment. This Essay takes up that task.

Approaching any question of original meaning requires a willingness to encounter a constitutional world that looks very …

The Workers' Constitution, Luke Norris

Law Faculty Publications

This Article argues that the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Social Security Act of 1935, and Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 should be understood as a “workers’ constitution.” The Article tells the history of how a connected wave of social movements responded to the insecurity that wage earners faced after the Industrial Revolution and Great Depression by working with government officials to bring about federal collective bargaining rights, wage and hour legislation, and social security legislation. It argues that the statutes are tied together as a set of “small c” constitutional commitments in both their histories and theory. …

The Historical Case For Constitutional "Concepts", Glenn E. Chappell

University of Richmond Law Review

The concepts/conceptions dichotomy is prominent in both the philosophy of language and the field of constitutional interpretation. It is most prominently illustrated through the provisions in the Constitution that contain broad, open-ended moral language. Those who hold the “conceptions” view believe that the legal content of those provisions includes both abstract moral concepts and its communicators’ subjective beliefs about, or conceptions of, how those concepts should apply. Under this view, the judge’s role is mostly empirical: he is tasked with examining historical evidence to ascertain those conceptions, which in turn supply applicational criteria by which he can decide specific cases. …

The Popular Constitutional Canon, Thomas G. Donnelly

Law Faculty Publications

Popular constitutionalism scholarship has often left out the American people. Sure, ordinary citizens make cameo appearances—often through the actions of elected officials and elite movement leaders. However, focusing on high politics among elite actors—even if those actors are not judges—simply is not enough. If popular constitutional views do, indeed, matter, then we can expect constitutional partisans to try to manipulate the processes through which these views emerge. Some constitutional scholars have made a start, reflecting on the importance of the constitutional canon. However, these scholars focus mostly on the legal canon and often ignore its popular analog. At the same …

The Invention Of First Amendment Federalism, Jud Campbell

Law Faculty Publications

When insisting that the Sedition Act of 1798 violated the First Amendment, Jeffersonian Republicans cast their argument in historical terms, claiming that the Speech and Press Clauses eliminated any federal power to restrict expression. Scholars, in turn, have generally accepted that Republicans had a consistent understanding of the First Amendment throughout the 1790s. But Founding Era constitutionalism was dynamic in practice, even while often conservative in rhetoric, and scholars have missed the striking novelty of the principal argument against the Sedition Act. Republicans had taken a rights provision and transformed it into a federalism rule.

Mostly ignored in the literature, …

The Enumerated-Rights Reading Of The Privileges Or Immunities Clause: A Response To Barnett And Bernick, Kurt T. Lash

Law Faculty Publications

In prior scholarship, I have argued that the historical evidence suggests that the public originally understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause as protecting enumerated constitutional rights, including (though not limited to) those rights listed in the first eight amendments, but not as protecting absolute enumerated rights such as the unenumerated right to contract protected in cases like Lochner v. New York. In a recent article, Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick canvass more than two decades of my historical work on the Fourteenth Amendment and claim that I have failed to present a persuasive argument in favor of what they call …

"Cyborg Justice" And The Risk Of Technological-Legal Lock-In, Rebecca Crootof

Law Faculty Publications

Although Artificial Intelligence (AI) is already of use to litigants and legal practitioners, we must be cautious and deliberate in incorporating AI into the common law judicial process. Human beings and machine systems process information and reach conclusions in fundamentally different ways, with AI being particularly ill-suited for the rule application and value balancing required of human judges. Nor will “cyborg justice”—hybrid human/AI judicial systems that attempt to marry the best of human and machine decisionmaking and minimize the drawbacks of both—be a panacea. While such systems would ideally maximize the strengths of human and machine intelligence, they might also …

The People's Lawyer: The Role Of Attorney General In The Twenty-First Century, Mark J. Herring

University of Richmond Law Review

For the last five years, it has been my privilege to serve the people as their attorney general. The origin of the position of attorney general can be traced back centuries, but in a world that has become more interconnected, complex, and fast-paced, what does the role of a state attorney general entail in the twenty-first century and beyond? Is the proper role as a diligent but reactive defender of statutes and state agencies, or is there a deeper responsibility that calls for a more proactive and engaged use of its tools and authority? I have found that the job …

Non-Contact Excessive Force By Police: Is That Really A Thing?, Michael J. Jacobsma

University of Richmond Law Review

When people hear the words “police” and “excessive force,” they usually associate those words with an unjustified assault and battery, or lethal force made against suspects by law enforcement officers during an arrest or investigation. When such acts occur, the victim of the excessive force has the right to pursue a civil action against the police officer pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if committed by state or local police, or a Bivens action if committed by federal agents. But can a police officer be sued for excessive force without making any physical contact with the plaintiff? The answer to …

Race, Speech, And Sports, Matthew J. Parlow

University of Richmond Law Review

Race, sports, and free speech rights intersected in a very controversial and public way during the 2016 and 2017 National Football League (“NFL”) seasons. On August 26, 2016, Colin Kaepernick spurred a national debate when he refused to stand during the playing of the national anthem before the NFL preseason game between the Green Bay Packers and the San Francisco 49ers, Kaepernick’s team at the time.

Enforcing Statutory Maximums: How Federal Supervised Release Violates The Sixth Amendment Rights Defined In Apprendi V. New Jersey, Danny Zemel

University of Richmond Law Review

The Sixth Amendment commands that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” Trial by a jury of one’s peers is a fundamental American legal right, existing in the earliest colonies before being codified in both Article III of the Constitution and the Sixth Amendment. The jury trial right derives from “the mass of the people,” ensuring that “no man can be condemned of life, or limb, or property, or reputation, without the concurrence of the …

Characterizing Power For Separation-Of-Powers Purposes, Tuan N. Samahon

University of Richmond Law Review

The U.S. Constitution parcels "legislative," "executive," and "judicial" powers among the separate branches of the federal government, but leaves those powers undefined. Accordingly, characterizing exercises of power becomes an important threshold inquiry in separation-of-powers disputes. This symposium Essay canvasses four competing judicial approaches to the characterization of power: functional inquiry; identity-of-the-officer formalism; historical induction; and skepticism. In this area, Justice Scalia's formalism has been particularly influential but created considerable tension with original public meaning originalism. This Essay explains how Scalia's formalism led to his embrace of delegation and concludes by cautioning against judicial oversimplification in the characterization inquiry.

Issue 3: Table Of Contents

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Acknowledgments, Andrew E. Hemby

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Non-Originalist Separation Of Powers, Eric J. Segall

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

The President, Prosecutorial Discretion, Obstruction Of Justice, And Congress, Henry L. Chambers Jr.

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

States Suing The Federal Government: Protecting Liberty Or Playing Politics?, Elbert Lin

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

What Did The First Amendment Originally Mean?, Jud Campbell

Law Faculty Publications

The First Amendment says that “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” For Americans, this language is familiar. But what exactly does it mean? How far do the speech and press clauses restrict governmental power? The founders, as we will see, answered these questions very differently than we typically do today. And the reasons why highlight fundamental shifts in American constitutional thought.

Mostly Settled, But Right For Now, Corinna Lain

Law Faculty Publications

Randy Kozel’s book, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent, is a laudable effort to make the law more stable, more cohesive, more impersonal — an effort to show that the law can endure even as Justices come and go. The core of his contribution is a proposed doctrine of stare decisis that disentangles deference to precedent from the interpretive methodologies that led to the precedent in the first place, and that so often determine the amount of deference a precedent gets. As a purely doctrinal project, Settled Versus Right naturally assumes that if we fix the doctrine, we’ll fix …

Marriage Equality Comes To The Fourth Circuit, Carl Tobias

Law Faculty Publications

Marriage equality has come to America. Throughout 2014, several federal appellate courts and numerous district court judges across the United States invalidated state constitutional or statutory proscriptions on same-sex marriage. Therefore, it was not surprising that Eastern District of Virginia Judge Arenda Wright Allen held that Virginia’s bans were unconstitutional in February. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed her opinion that July. North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia District Judges rejected these jurisdictions’ prohibitions during autumn, and the Supreme Court approved marriage equality the next year. Because marriage equality in the Fourth Circuit presents …

Enforcing Statutory Maximums: How Federal Supervised Release Violates The Sixth Amendment Rights Defined In Apprendi V. New Jersey, Danny Zemel

Law Student Publications

The Sixth Amendment commands that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” Trial by a jury of one’s peers is a fundamental American legal right, existing in the earliest colonies before being codified in both Article III of the Constitution and the Sixth Amendment. The jury trial right derives from “the mass of the people,” ensuring that “no man can be condemned of life, or limb, or property, or reputation, without the concurrence of the …

Enforcing The Rights Of Due Process: The Original Relationship Between The Fourteenth Amendment And The 1866 Civil Rights Act, Kurt T. Lash

Law Faculty Publications

For more than a century, legal scholars have looked to the 1866 Civil Rights Act for clues regarding the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the 1866 version of the Act protected only citizens of the United States, most scholars believe that the Act should be used as a guide to understanding the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship-based Privileges or Immunities Clause. A close look at the original sources, however, reveals that the 1866 Civil Rights Act protected rights then associated with the requirements of due process. The man who drafted Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, John Bingham, expressly described …

The "Irish Born" One American Citizenship Amendment, Kevin C. Walsh

Law Faculty Publications

Our Constitution has a deferred maintenance problem because we have fallen out of the habit of tending to its upkeep ourselves. The silver lining is a double benefit from any constitutional maintenance projects that we undertake now. These projects are good not only for what they do to our Constitution, but also for making us exercise self-government muscles that have atrophied from civic sloth.

Fortunately, the time has never been better to repeal one of our Constitution’s most pointlessly exclusionary provisions. The President of the United States is married to a naturalized citizen. And nobody can legitimately question the patriotism …

The Highest Court: A Dialogue Between Justice Louis Brandeis And Justice Antonin Scalia On Stare Decisis, P. Thomas Distanislao Iii

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Anchors Aweigh: Analyzing Birthright Citizenship As Declared (Not Established) By The Fourteenth Amendment, Elizabeth Farrington

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.