Constitutional Law Commons^™

Popular Constitutionalism In A Populist Age, Thomas G. Donnelly

Law Faculty Publications

Popular constitutionalism burst onto the scene as a challenge to the constitutional authority of the Supreme Court. Decades later, popular constitutionalists remain susceptible to one of the earliest (and most potent) critiques of their project—the charge that they have done far too little to explain how their theory might work in practice. With the rise of modern populism, it’s also fair to ask whether popular constitutionalism is an approach that’s capable of meeting the challenges of the current constitutional moment. In this Article, I offer a new vision for popular constitutionalism—one that shows how the theory might work in practice, …

Race, Memory, And Authority In Constitutional Interpretation, Henry L. Chambers, Jr.

Law Faculty Publications

This Essay considers how America’s history and memory regarding race complicate constitutional interpretation. If scholars interpreted the Constitution merely to determine what the majority view of the Constitution may have been when it was ratified—its original public meaning (“OPM”)—the loose use of history and memory to interpret the Constitution might be acceptable. What the People—whose membership is contested—thought the Constitution meant when it was framed is interesting, so long as it does not bind us today. However, as Jack Balkin notes in Memory and Authority: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, lawyers and judges attempt to use history and …

Minor V. Happersett, Dobbs V. Jackson Women's Health Organization, And The Supreme Court's Refusal To Reconstruct America, Henry L. Chambers, Jr.

Law Faculty Publications

One hundred and fifty years ago, in the wake of the ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, the United States Supreme Court decided Minor v. Happersett. In Minor, the Court ruled Missouri could continue to deny women the right to vote based on their sex. The decision was simply reasoned. In the absence of clear constitutional text requiring Missouri to provide the right to vote to women or proof that the right to vote was a right of citizenship, Missouri had no obligation to allow women to vote. Some states had banned women citizens from voting since the country’s founding. Missouri …

Brief Of Amicus Curiae Professor Corinna Barrett Lain In Support Of Neither Party, Corinna Lain

Law Faculty Publications

“I don’t think it’s a secret that we inherited one of the worst, most incompetent and most ill-funded Department of Corrections in the country. . . [a]nd I don’t think it takes a leap to suggest that we should understand whether they are capable of carrying out the death penalty before we do it.” That is how Attorney General Kris Mayes described Arizona’s Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation & Reentry (“ADCRR”) less than two years ago. Ryan Thornell, director of the ADCRR, agreed, attesting in a declaration in 2023 that the ADCRR lacked “the necessary institutional knowledge and expertise to conduct …

Popular Originalism, Thomas G. Donnelly

Law Faculty Publications

Scholars are obsessed with the Roberts Court’s recent turn to history and tradition. But another source of authority has also emerged as an important feature of the Roberts Court’s approach to constitutional cases. In previous work, I have referred to this source of authority as popular meaning. While original meaning identifies the best reading of the Constitution’s text at the time of its ratification, popular meaning draws on sources of authority outside the courts to capture the constitutional views of the American people today. In this Article, I demonstrate how interpreters might draw on the Constitution’s popular meaning to help …

A Crust Of Bread: Religious Resistance And The Fourteenth Amendment, Kurt T. Lash, Stephanie Hall Barclay

Law Faculty Publications

In Employment Division v. Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court denied heightened constitutional protection to religiously motivated exercise burdened by neutral and generally applicable laws. The history presented in this Article suggests that the Smith approach conflicts with the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. Out of the crucible of religious abolitionist resistance to the Fugitive Slave Act emerged a substantive theory of constitutional religious freedom: American citizens should have the right to obey the Biblical command to care for the needy and provide the hungry a "crust of bread," even if doing so was contrary to neutral and generally …

The Beleaguered Sovereign: Judicial Restraints On Public Enforcement, Luke P. Norris, Helen Hershkoff

Law Faculty Publications

Looking back at the federal courts over the last generation, commentators will likely focus on their role in undermining the functioning of the regulatory state. Well-acknowledged in this story are Supreme Court decisions that have constrained administrative agencies under the newly minted “major questions” doctrine, as well as the Court’s blockbuster decision overruling the longstanding Chevron doctrine. The Court also has made it increasingly difficult for individuals—often workers and consumers, people of color, women, and those who live from paycheck to paycheck—to seek federal judicial redress for regulatory violations as private enforcers. And the Court has questioned whether certain private …

The Meaning And Ambiguity Of Section Three Of The Fourteenth Amendment, Kurt T. Lash

Law Faculty Publications

The Fourteenth Amendment established the constitutional conditions for the readmission of those states which had attempted to secede from the Union during the American Civil War. Section Three of that amendment, when enforced under the powers granted by Section Five, prevented the leaders of the recent rebellion from returning to Congress, holding any state level office, or receiving any appointment by Democrat President Andrew Johnson, absent congressional permission. Its focus, in other words, was on rebellious disruption of state level decisionmaking and the potentially disruptive appointments by President Johnson. Whether Section Three accomplishes anything more remains unclear as a matter …

Becoming The "Bill Of Rights": The First Ten Amendments From Founding To Reconstruction, Kurt T. Lash

Law Faculty Publications

The first ten amendments to the federal Constitution have no formal title. It is only by cultural tradition that Americans refer to these provisions as our national “Bill of Rights.” Until recently, most scholars assumed that this tradition could be traced back to the moment of ratification. Over the last decade or so, however, a number of scholars have challenged this assumption. These “Bill of Rights revisionists” claim that Americans did not commonly refer to the first ten amendments as “the bill of rights” until the twentieth century. Prior to that, most Americans either did not believe they had a …

The Roberts Court Revolution, Institutional Legitimacy, And The Promise (And Peril) Of Constitutional Statesmanship, Thomas G. Donnelly

Law Faculty Publications

Our nation is in the middle of a constitutional revolution. While many periods of constitutional transformation have arisen out of large-scale political realignments, the Roberts Court Revolution is a product of our nation’s long (and unusual) political interregnum. Even as neither political party has managed to secure enough support to reconstruct our nation’s politics, the Roberts Court—with its young and ambitious conservative majority—has already moved quickly to reconsider key pillars of the existing constitutional regime. This represents a challenging moment for the Roberts Court and its institutional legitimacy. To counteract this danger, the Justices might return to an old idea—one …

Popular Constitutionalism Inside The Courts: The Search For Popular Meaning, Thomas G. Donnelly

Law Faculty Publications

While commentators celebrate (or lament) the rise of originalism on the Roberts Court, another theory may prove as important to the future of constitutional law: popular constitutionalism. In a range of recent cases, Justices from across the ideological spectrum have proven themselves open to using sources of popular authority to address important constitutional issues. This is especially true of the two Justices at the Roberts Court’s ideological center: John Roberts and Brett Kavanaugh. Even so, the question remains how best to make popular constitutionalism work inside the courts. This question has vexed popular constitutionalists since the theory’s inception. In my …

Protecting Minority Representation In An Era Of Political Polarization And The Hollowing Out Of Voting Rights Protections, Henry L. Chambers, Jr.

Law Faculty Publications

The United States Supreme Court has hollowed out various voting rights protections, leaving all voters—minority and nonminority—less protected in a politically polarized America. Surprisingly, the Court has continued to protect representation for minority race voters who live in racially polarized areas. However, minority race voters risk losing that protection, typically provided through majority-minority districts authorized under the Voting Rights Act, if they build cross-racial coalitions with their neighbors. Under the Court’s interpretation of the VRA, cross-racial voting coalitions may be less protected than local majorities comprised of a single race of voters. The loss of such protection could leave their …

Solving Slapp Slop, Nicole J. Ligon

University of Richmond Law Review

In a substantial minority of states, wealthy and powerful individuals can, without much consequence, bring defamation lawsuits against the press and concerned citizens to silence and intimidate them. These lawsuits, known as “strategic lawsuits against public participation” (“SLAPP”s), are brought not to compensate a wrongfully injured person, but rather to discourage the defendants from exercising their First Amendment rights. In other words, when well resourced individuals feel disrespected by public criticism, they sometimes sue the media or concerned citizens, forcing these speakers to defend themselves in exorbitantly expensive defamation actions. In states without anti-SLAPP statutes—statutes aimed at protecting speakers from …

Douglass, Lincoln, And Douglas Before Dred Scott: A Few Thoughts On Freedom, Equality, And Affirmative Action, Henry L. Chambers Jr.

Law Faculty Publications

In 1854, Senator Stephen Douglas, Abraham Lincoln, and Frederick Douglass delivered speeches about the newly passed Kansas-Nebraska Act. That law opened the Kansas and Nebraska Territories to slavery by extending popular sovereignty, the practice of letting territorial majorities decide whether to allow slavery in a territory, to them. Given before Dred Scott v. Sandford, the infamous case in which the Supreme Court ruled that Black Americans—whether freeborn, freed, or enslaved—could not be citizens of the United States absent congressional action or constitutional amendment, the speeches are worth revisiting. They focus on whether or how slavery should be limited, reflecting …

The State Citizenship Clause, Kurt T. Lash

Law Faculty Publications

The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment declares: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is a citizen of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.” This opening sentence contains not one, but two citizenship clauses. The first defines national citizenship. The second defines state citizenship. Although significant historical scholarship exists regarding the other provisions in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, the State Citizenship Clause has been unstudied, unapplied and, quite often, unrecognized.

What Is The Standard For Obtaining A Preliminary Injunction In Virginia?, Stuart A. Raphael

University of Richmond Law Review

A perception exists that the Supreme Court of Virginia has not articulated the legal standard for adjudicating preliminary-injunction motions in Virginia circuit courts. For decades, lawyers and legal scholars have advocated that Virginia trial judges borrow the federal preliminary-injunction standard applied in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Virginia trial courts have generally followed that advice. Virginia courts at first applied the Fourth Circuit’s Blackwelder test, which called upon judges to balance the four traditional factors and allowed a stronger balanceof-hardship showing to offset a weaker showing of likely success on the merits. After the 2008 …

Redefining The Badges Of Slavery, Nicholas Serafin

University of Richmond Law Review

Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the authority to eliminate the “badges and incidents” of slavery. What constitutes an incident of slavery is clear: the incidents of slavery are the legal restrictions, such as submission to a master and a ban on the ownership of productive property, that were inherent in the institution of slavery itself. What constitutes a badge of slavery is far less certain, and relatively few legal scholars have examined the historical meaning of the metaphor. Nevertheless, there has emerged a renewed interest in Section 2, such that the literature now abounds with proposals for …

Replacing Tinker, Noah C. Chauvin

University of Richmond Law Review

In this Article, I wish to question whether reaffirming the animating spirit of Tinker is the best way to protect student speech rights. In allowing schools to punish student speech that school officials reasonably believe could be substantially disruptive, Tinker founds students’ free expression rights on unstable ground. This is true for two reasons. First, the Tinker standard allows school officials to regulate student speech based on their own perceptions of what its impacts will be. While these perceptions must be reasonable, courts have shown extraordinary deference to educators’ claims that student speech could be substantially disruptive. Second, the substantial …

A Virtual Reality: Preserving The Right To Appear "In Person" Before An Administrative Separation Board, Jeffrey Janaro, Christopher Clifton

Richmond Public Interest Law Review

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, courts and government agencies utilized

video teleconference (“VTC”) technology to conduct trials and hearings in

limited settings. However, as the pandemic progressed, a number of these

adjudicative bodies began to rely more heavily on VTC, and at least one military

service sanctioned the use of VTC to conduct administrative separation

proceedings. The administrative separation process is routinely used as an

employment action to separate military members from an armed service. Due

to its speed and efficiency, military commanders often elect to use the administrative

separation process over the more rigorous court-martial procedure

to effect good …

Keeping Our Republic, Ashlee A. Paxton-Turner

Law Faculty Publications

In championing the Constitution at a time when most Americans hardly felt any national allegiance, Alexander Hamilton insisted on “think[ing] continentally.” In other words, if the fledging nation were going to survive, the loose confederation of states formed under the Articles of Confederation was not the answer. For many Americans in 1787, the idea of abandoning  this loose confederation was a hard sell. But Hamilton, along with James Madison and John Jay, understood that a new structure of government was needed. And it is here—with this colonial trio—that our story begins. ...

Frenemy Federalism, Scott Bloomberg

University of Richmond Law Review

Federalism scholars have long been fascinated by the unique relationship between the federal government and states that have legalized marijuana. And with good reason. For the past fifty years, Congress has classified marijuana as a Schedule I drug under the federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), deeming the drug to have a high potential for abuse and no accepted medical use. Congress’s aim in establishing Schedule I of the CSA was to “eliminate the market in Schedule I substances.” Thus, possessing, distributing, and manufacturing marijuana are federally illegal. Congress’s objective notwithstanding, over two-thirds of the states (and territories) have legalized marijuana …

Out Of Sight And Out Of Mind: Criminal Laws Disguised Moral Culpability Requirement, Andrew Ingram

University of Richmond Law Review

Last spring, the Supreme Court of the United States made a little-remarked constitutional ruling in Kahler v. Kansas. Upon casual inspection, Kahler looks like a doctrinal dead-end. The petitioner asked the Supreme Court to recognize a due process right for mentally ill defendants to raise the M’Naghten right-and-wrong test of insanity, and the Court said, “No.” The petitioner’s failure notwithstanding, Kahler is not a barren vine. On the contrary, it is heavy-laden with new doctrinal insights for criminal law scholars.

The case deserves a thorough look—not for what it can teach us about constitutional contentions that the Court has …

Renewable Energy Federalism, Danielle Stokes

Law Faculty Publications

No one seriously questions that an improved and decarbonized energy supply system is a key component of climate change mitigation, but the United States’ system of federalism complicates the siting of utility-scale renewable energy facilities. The new Biden Administration presents the United States with an opportunity to reimagine how this country regulates renewable energy siting, allowing for substantial national progress in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Currently, primary siting authority for renewable energy projects rests with state and local governments, which generally exercise that authority through zoning and land use planning, while the federal government approves most interstate energy delivery systems. …

Supreme Court Legitimacy: A Turn To Constitutional Practice, Thomas G. Donnelly

Law Faculty Publications

Commentators offer the Justices consistent—if unsolicited—advice: tend to the Supreme Court’s institutional legitimacy. However, to say this—without saying more—is to say very little. Of course, constitutional theorists already wrestle with the meaning of legitimacy—its contours, its complexity, and its influence on the Justices. Political scientists debate the relationship between institutional concerns and judicial behavior. At the same time, previous scholars largely ignore issues of constitutional practice. This is a mistake. In this Article, I take up this neglected topic. To that end, I detail how the individual Justice might work to bolster the Court’s legitimacy in concrete cases. Part of …

The Emergence Of Neutrality, Jud Campbell

Law Faculty Publications

This Article traces two interwoven jurisprudential genealogies. The first of these focuses on the emergence of neutrality in speech and press doctrine. Content and viewpoint neutrality are now the bedrock principles of modern First Amendment law. Yet the history of these concepts is largely untold and otherwise misunderstood. Scholars usually assume that expressive-freedom doctrine was mostly undeveloped before the early twentieth century and that neutrality was central to its modern rebirth. But this view distorts and sometimes even inverts historical perspectives. For most of American history, the governing paradigm of expressive freedom was one of limited toleration, focused on protecting …

Rules And Standards In Justice Scalia's Fourth Amendment, Robert M. Bloom, Eliza S. Walker

University of Richmond Law Review

When looking at Justice Scalia’s approach to the Fourth Amendment, most would say he was an originalist and a textualist. Justice Scalia himself would like to explain, “I’m an originalist and a textualist, not a nut.” Although originalism and textualism were often prevalent in his Fourth Amendment decisions, even more important to his decision-making was his disdain for judicial activism. To limit judicial discretion, Justice Scalia frequently opted to impose bright-line rules rather than vague standards. This is apparent not only within his jurisprudence as a whole, but also specifically in his Fourth Amendment decisions.

This Article examines Justice Scalia’s …

Religious Exemptions As Rational Social Policy, Justin W. Aimonetti, M. Christian Talley

University of Richmond Law Review

In its 1963 decision Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to permit religious exemptions from general laws that incidentally burdened religious practice. Sherbert, in theory, provided stringent protections for religious freedom. But those protections came at a price. Religious adherents could secure exemptions even if they had no evidence the laws they challenged unfairly targeted their religious conduct. And they could thereby undermine the policy objectives those laws sought to achieve. Because of such policy concerns, the Court progressively restricted the availability of religious exemptions. In its 1990 decision Employment Division v. Smith …

Proffitt V. Florida: Distorting Death, Corinna Lain

Law Faculty Publications

This essay, Chapter 7 in Painting Constitutional Law, examines Xavier Cortada’s depiction of Proffitt v. Florida, the 1976 decision that approved Florida’s guided discretion statute after Furman v. Georgia had invalidated the death penalty in 1972. Cortada’s depiction is a fantastical piece, a piece that captures the horror of death by electrocution set against two columns of ominous looking Roman numerals. The Roman numerals represent the mechanical imposition of death — the formulaic approach to death penalty decision-making that tells sentencers to simply add up the columns of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and see where the balance lies. Cortada resists …

The Bivens "Special Factors" And Qualified Immunity: Duplicative Barriers To The Vindication Of Constitutional Rights, Amelia G. Collins

University of Richmond Law Review

Part I of this note traces the history of the Bivens cause of action and analyzes the original “special factors” that concerned the Supreme Court. Part I also outlines the purpose behind implying a Bivens cause of action for plaintiffs bringing constitutional claims. Part II includes the same analysis of the qualified immunity defense, both to its history and purpose. Part III demonstrates how the Supreme Court has incorporated the concerns addressed by qualified immunity into the “special factors” analysis, rather than acknowledging the mitigating nature of immunity defenses when examining if any “special factors” exist. Finally, Part IV argues …

Proving The Constitution: Burdens Of Proof And The Confrontation Clause, Enrique Schaerer

University of Richmond Law Review

In law, we never prove anything to 100% certainty. For factual propositions, the proponent has the burden of proving them to the satisfaction of a standard: a preponderance of the evidence at the low end; clear and convincing evidence in the middle; proof beyond a reasonable doubt at the high end. The standards are often explicit. Yet, for legal propositions, standards are often implicit or lacking altogether. This Article argues that, to decide legal issues, courts may look to similar burdens of proof that they use to decide factual issues. They should do so informally, using burdens of proof just …