Banking and Finance Law Commons^™

Defining Deference: Impacts Of Abandoning Chevron On Emerging Technology Governance And Administrative Law, R. Aubrey Davis Iii

Seattle University Law Review

Emerging technologies, particularly Artificial Intelligence (AI), often lead to unforeseen legal outcomes. Notable abuses in areas such as facial recognition, employment bias, and housing discrimination are well known. However, legislative responses to these issues either have been largely reactive or there has been no legislative response at all. In lieu of legislation, agencies have sought to fill the gap. For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently proposed a rule mandating voter notification for all AI-generated political phone calls citing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991 as authority. However, the TCPA was originally passed to curtail telemarketing, not …

Intellectual Property Or Modern Folklore? The Problem With Open Gaming Licenses In Tabletop Gaming, Rosie Midget

Seattle University Law Review

This Note addresses how courts and legislatures should address “Open Gaming Licenses” commonly attached to tabletop roleplaying games (TTRPGs), which game publishers use to promote a false image of accessibility—misleading consumers and building goodwill from the misunderstanding. Part I discusses what TTRPGs are, including the defining features of the hobby and culture surrounding it, as well as the unique interplay between publishers and players. Part II explores the question of which elements in a TTRPG system may be subject to copyright protection. Part III examines these elements in practice using Wizards of the Coast’s Dungeons and Dragons TTRPG as a …

Negative Trading In Congress, Peter Molk, Frank Partnoy

UF Law Faculty Publications

We investigate negative trading, such as short selling, by members of Congress. We find, based on a new comprehensive dataset of trades by members of Congress, that negative trading not only is common, but also is associated with positive abnormal financial returns. Simply put, members of Congress make money when they bet on stock price drops.

In contrast, we do not find a similar association for long positions taken by members of Congress. In other words, there is an asymmetry between “positive” versus “negative” congressional trading. This asymmetry has multiple implications for public policy.

Our main message is that proposals …

The "Not Seen" Effect Of International Financial Centers: Innovation In The Global Financial Ecosystem, Charlotte Ku, Andrew P. Morriss

Faculty Scholarship

International Financial Centers (IFCs) are hubs of legal and financial innovation, developing specialized frameworks that facilitate cross-border investment, enhance global capital mobility, and support economic growth. Through jurisdictional competition, professional clustering, and adaptive regulatory frameworks, IFCs have pioneered legal structures that enable enterprises of all sizes to participate in the global economy. Using case studies of the International Business Company, the Limited Liability Company, the Protected Cell Company, and advances in trust law and applying the theoretical frameworks of social scientist Richard Florida and psychologist Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi, this Article illustrates how IFCs serve as laboratories for financial experimentation, generating widely …

The Sec, Fraud, And Cryptocurrencies, Lawrence J. Trautman, Brian Elzweig, Neal F. Newman

Faculty Scholarship

The SEC’s Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2022–2026 is focused on the impact of the rapidly developing rate of change in new technologies that provide for markets to be more interconnected and interdependent than ever. Because Congress has yet to give the SEC, or any other agency, express authority to regulate cryptocurrency, the SEC has taken a regulation-by-enforcement approach. The SEC’s recent enforcement efforts relating to crypto asset securities were substantial, with enforcement actions addressing a range of alleged misconduct in the crypto asset securities space, including billion- dollar crypto fraud schemes; unregistered crypto asset offerings, platforms, and intermediaries; and …

Shaq, Ripple, And The Future Of Crypto Regulation, James C. Spindler

William & Mary Law Review

Crypto is at a regulatory crossroads. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other regulators have taken a hard line on enforcing traditional regulatory requirements that would severely limit crypto offering activities. At the same time, crypto advocates seek preferential treatment, under the guise of “regulatory clarity,” that would allow them to bypass much of the applicable regulatory regimes. After a halt to legislative activities, brought on by the FTX implosion and ensuing crypto winter, the battle for crypto’s future is currently in the courts. Two pending, bellwether cases—the class action against Shaquille O’Neal and other celebrity spokesmen for FTX, …

Regulating Decentralised Finance? A Singapore Perspective, Rachel Phang

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

The emergent phenomenon of decentralised finance (“DeFi”) can be understood as the performance of financial functions through applications that are built on distributed ledger technology and operate using cryptoassets and smart contracts, without the need for traditional centralised intermediaries. In what ways does DeFi challenge existing financial regulation, and how should regulation develop in light of the DeFi phenomenon? In addressing this question, this article provides an overview of DeFi, surveys the current regulatory landscape in Singapore, considers key regulatory issues and policy considerations associated with DeFi, and discusses some potential directions for the future development of the regulation of …

From Doing Business To B-Ready: World Bank’S New Rankings Represent A Rebrand, Not A Revamp, Fernanda G. Nicola, Dhaisy Paredes Guzman

Popular Media

In 2021, the World Bank shut down one of its flagship projects: the Doing Business index, a global ranking system that measured how easy it was to start and run a business in 190 countries. It followed an independent investigation that found World Bank officials had manipulated the rankings to favor powerful countries, including China and Saudi Arabia. The scandal raised serious concerns about the use of global benchmarks to shape development policy. Now, the Bank is trying again. In October 2024, it launched its newest flagship report, Business Ready. The 2025 spring meeting of the World Bank and its …

Lessons Learned: Fabrizio López-Gallo, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

Fabrizio López-Gallo served as the Bank of Mexico’s director general of financial stability during the COVID-19 pandemic, having been financial sector specialist and risk analysis and special projects manager for the central bank during the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The Mexican government declared a health emergency at the outbreak of the pandemic and implemented a general economic shutdown. The Bank of Mexico intervened by cutting rates and initiating extraordinary measures, such as adding bond swaps and loosening rules for minimum deposits at commercial banks to provide liquidity. It gave flexibility to commercial banks to grant forbearance on mortgage payments …

Lessons Learned: Cecilia Skingsley, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

During the Swedish banking crisis of the early 1990s, Cecilia Skingsley was the press secretary for the Ministry of Finance. She held various roles, including chief economist, at Swedbank, one of Sweden’s largest banks, from 2007 to 2013, a period that included the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Swedbank suffered heavy losses amid the GFC and relied on a government guarantee program for support. In 2013, she became a deputy governor of Sveriges Riksbank, Sweden’s central bank; in 2019, she became first deputy governor. Skingsley left the Riksbank in September 2022 to become head of the …

Lessons Learned: Philip Lane, Mary Anne Chute Lynch, Rosalind Z. Wiggins

Journal of Financial Crises

Philip Lane served as governor of the Central Bank of Ireland from 2015 to 2019. He introduced countercyclical capital and systemic buffer tools and initiated research into the role and risks of cross-border inflows across Ireland. As a member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) since 2015, Lane has advocated for the European Union to adopt macroprudential policies and tools. He hailed the work of the European Systemic Risk Board and similar institutions established after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis to share data, information concerning risks, and concerns over financial …

Lessons Learned: Giorgio Gobbi, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

Giorgio Gobbi joined the Economic Research Department of the Bank of Italy in 1990 and was assigned to carry out analysis and research on the banking industry. From 1998 to 2004, he headed the department’s Financial Intermediaries Office and represented the bank at the International Monetary Fund, the Bank of International Settlements, and the European Central Bank. Starting in 2007, Gobbi headed the Financial Structure and Intermediaries Division within the bank’s Structural Economic Analysis Department. He was appointed deputy head of the Financial Stability Unit in 2013 and became head of the Financial Stability Directorate in 2014.

Lessons Learned: J. Christopher Flowers, Mary Anne Chute Lynch

Journal of Financial Crises

J. Christopher Flowers has been managing director, CEO, and chairman of the private investment firm J.C. Flowers & Co. LLC for many years. During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–2009, Flowers was involved with investing in some of the largest banks and financial institutions in the world and advising and consulting with them on possible acquisitions, mergers, and sales as several of these firms began to collapse. In the fall of 2008, Flowers worked closely with the Bank of America (BofA) on proposals to acquire Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch, and he developed a plan for private investors to …

Eliminating Discount Window Stigma: What Can We Learn From Abroad?, Susan Mclaughlin

Journal of Financial Crises

This article picks up from an earlier Journal of Financial Crisis policy note on discount window design to see how the experiences of other central banks can inform work to redesign the discount window to reduce stigma. As explained in that article, banks’ reluctance to use the discount window is problematic for financial stability as it constrains the Fed’s ability to use its liquidity provision tools to stem runs and mitigate contagion in times of stress. The stigma associated with discount window borrowing in the United States is well documented and is a multifaceted phenomenon.

Lessons Learned: Jesper Berg, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

The career of Jesper Berg, a Danish economist, has spanned multiple financial crises. He held positions with the Danish central bank, Danmarks Nationalbank, from 2004 to 2010, first as head of market operations and later as head of financial stability. He had served as head of the capital markets and financial structure division at the European Central Bank from 2000 to 2004, and earlier he was an economist at the International Monetary Fund’s Exchange and Trade Relations Department. This Lessons Learned summary is based on an interview with Berg in December 2022, when he was director general of the Danish …

Liquidity Facilities Provided To Banks During The Dominican Republic Financial Crisis Of 2003, Marco Porfirio Martínez

Journal of Financial Crises

As part of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic (CBDR) released a comprehensive document providing an overview of the origins and handling of the 2003 financial crisis. This Archive Note builds on the highlights of that document by discussing primary factors that led to problems within Banco Intercontinental (Baninter), the bank that triggered the crisis; detailing measures the CBDR implemented to mitigate the situation; and addressing the consequences for two other major banks, Banco Mercantil and Bancrédito.

United States: Lehman Brothers Broker-Dealer Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Ayodeji George, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

On Sunday, September 14, 2008, a deal to sell the United States investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LBHI) to United Kingdom–based Barclays fell apart. US authorities informed LBHI that, given the lack of rescue funds, it would need to file for bankruptcy before Monday morning to avoid additional chaos for the firm and markets. However, authorities understood Barclays was still interested in buying Lehman’s broker-dealer subsidiary, Lehman Brothers Inc. (LBI). Federal Reserve and Treasury officials were concerned about the impact that the sudden failure of LBI could have on financial markets. LBI had $87 billion in secured overnight repurchase …

United States: First Republic Bank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2023, Salil Gupta, Jack French, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

First Republic Bank, a California-based institution with $212.6 billion in assets, lost $25 billion in deposits on Friday, March 10, 2023, following the closing of Silicon Valley Bank that morning. On Sunday, March 12, First Republic announced that it had access to $70 billion in unused liquidity owing to its borrowing capacity at the Federal Reserve, the Federal Home Loan Bank System, and JPMorgan Chase (JPMC). But First Republic’s depositors withdrew a further $40 billion of deposits on Monday, March 13. First Republic’s borrowings from the Federal Reserve rose as high as $109 billion between Friday, March 10, and Wednesday, …

United States: Citigroup Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

By November 21, 2008, against the backdrop of heavy losses during the Global Financial Crisis, Citigroup counterparties were substantially pulling back from the firm. On November 23, the US Department of the Treasury, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Federal Reserve announced a support package for Citi composed of a capital injection and a loss-sharing arrangement on $300.8 billion of assets. Under the Asset Guarantee Program (AGP), Citi would absorb the first $39.5 billion in losses on a mutually agreed upon pool of risky assets; the Treasury and FDIC provided $15 billion in loss protection after that, combined with Citi’s …

United States: Bear Stearns Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2008, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

On Thursday, March 13, 2008, the US investment bank Bear Stearns Companies approached the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), saying it expected many of its repurchase agreement (repo) counterparties would not “roll,” or renew, their repo agreements the next day. As a result, the firm would be obligated to repay many of its repo liabilities. Without an emergency loan, Bear would be forced to file for bankruptcy on Friday morning, March 14. Before the market opened on Friday, the FRBNY made an overnight loan for $12.9 billion through JPMorgan Chase Bank (JPMC) on a nonrecourse basis, which on-lent …

United Kingdom: Northern Rock Emergency Liquidity Program, 2007, Bailey Decker, Jack French, Eming Shyu

Journal of Financial Crises

Northern Rock plc was a bank in the United Kingdom (UK) that experienced rapid growth from 1998 to 2007. The bank was a large issuer of UK residential mortgage-backed securities. Its funding was primarily wholesale as its retail deposit growth had not kept up with its asset growth. By August 2007, Northern Rock’s credit default swap spreads were widening and its share price falling as conditions deteriorated in the markets on which it relied for short-term funding. To meet the bank’s substantial liquidity needs, the Bank of England (BoE) announced on September 14, 2007, that it would extend an emergency …

United States: Bank Of America Emergency Liquidity Program, 2009, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

On December 31, 2008, Bank of America (BofA) finalized its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, absorbing losses of $15.5 billion as a result. Regulators were concerned about BofA’s short-term liquidity position and ability to post more collateral if its credit rating was downgraded. On January 16, 2009, the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Department of the Treasury announced an interagency support package to BofA, which included an asset guarantee wherein all three agencies shared losses with BofA on a “ring-fenced” $118 billion pool of assets. Under the ring-fencing arrangement, known as the Asset Guarantee Program (AGP), BofA would …

United Kingdom: Hbos And Rbs Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Bailey Decker, Jack French

Journal of Financial Crises

Two United Kingdom–based banks, Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) and Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS), faced substantial liquidity needs during fall of 2008. To provide funding until recapitalization, the Bank of England (BoE) extended ad hoc emergency liquidity facilities to HBOS on October 1 and to RBS on October 7, 2008, comprising US dollars (USD) and British pounds sterling (GBP). As collateral for the 2008 assistance, HBOS and RBS posted pools of loans that were ineligible for the BoE’s market-wide operations. Aggregate usage of the two ad hoc facilities peaked at GBP 61.5 billion (USD 106.0 billion) on October …

Sweden: Carnegie Investment Bank Ab Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Sophia Alden, Jack French

Journal of Financial Crises

In October 2008, Carnegie Investment Bank AB (Carnegie) had trouble obtaining financing amid concerns about its financial health. However, Sweden’s central bank, the Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank), and the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) still viewed Carnegie as solvent. Between October 27 and 28, the Riksbank lent Carnegie 2.4 billion Swedish kronor (SEK). As collateral for the loan, Carnegie and its holding company, D. Carnegie & Co. AB (D. Carnegie), provided all shares and subsidiaries in Carnegie as well as all shares in a sister subsidiary under D. Carnegie, Max Matthiessen Holding AB (Max Matthiessen). On November 10, 2008, the FSA …

Switzerland: Credit Suisse Emergency Liquidity Program, 2023, Jack French, Owen Heaphy, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

Credit Suisse (CS) faced multiple challenges leading up to March 2023 including a significant outflow of client funds in the fourth quarter of 2022 and reputational loss resulting from a number of scandals in the preceding years. On Wednesday, March 15, 2023, shortly after two high-profile bank failures in the United States, a high-ranking official of the Saudi National Bank, a major shareholder, publicly said it would not provide any more capital for the company. Despite a joint statement from the Swiss National Bank (SNB) and the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) that CS was in compliance with capital …

Spain: Caja De Ahorros Castilla–La Mancha Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2009, Vincient Arnold, Lakshimi Swaminathan

Journal of Financial Crises

Following years of rapid credit expansion in the real estate sector and reliance on wholesale funding between 2000 and 2008, Caja de Ahorros de Castilla–La Mancha (CCM) found itself on the brink of insolvency in early 2009. Normally, a Eurosystem bank in CCM’s position would turn to the European Central Bank (ECB) to obtain liquidity through its standing financing facilities, but CCM lacked eligible collateral to tap them. Consequently, in February 2009, the Bank of Spain (BoS) provided emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) of EUR 900 million to CCM, secured against CCM assets, to help meet its liquidity needs. In March, …

Russia: Otkritie Emergency Liquidity Program, 2017, Benjamin Hoffner

Journal of Financial Crises

In July and August 2017, Otkritie Bank, Russia’s largest privately owned bank, experienced deposit runs related to concerns over Otkritie’s recent acquisitions, including a large, troubled bank and insurance company. The runs prompted Otkritie to heavily rely on the Central Bank of Russia’s (CBR’s) standing fixed-rate repurchase agreement (repo) facility to meet the outflow. By July, Otkritie had RUB 338.1 billion in outstanding repo loans from the CBR. As depositors continued to withdraw funds in August, the CBR provided Otkritie with an unsecured emergency loan of RUB 330 billion while Otkritie continued to borrow from the repo facility. On August …

Moldova: Consortium Of Banks Emergency Liquidity Program, 2014, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

In the fall of 2014, a bank fraud involving illegal loans and transfers resulted in USD 1 billion being stolen from the government of Moldova, which amounted to more than an eighth of Moldova’s GDP. In September 2014, it became clear to the National Bank of Moldova (NBM) that the banks involved in the fraud—Banca de Economii, Banca Sociala, and Unibank—were deeply insolvent and had been hiding that fact from regulators. In late November, the NBM issued 9.4 billion Moldovan lei (MDL; USD 640 million) in emergency credit to the banks at an interest rate of 10 basis points against …

Latvia: Parex Bank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

Heading into the Global Financial Crisis, JSC Parex banka was Latvia’s second-largest bank in terms of assets, comprising 13.8% of total assets in the Latvian banking sector. In autumn 2008, Parex faced a capital shortfall owing to massive credit and market losses in addition to liquidity problems and deposit runs of 240 million Latvian lats (LVL; USD 428.6 million). Parex had two senior syndicated loans maturing in February and June 2009, totaling EUR 775 million (USD 992 million). Latvian authorities said they doubted that Parex would be able to pay back, extend, or replace these loans. Authorities intervened at the …

Ireland: Anglo Irish Bank Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2009, Salil Gupta, Mahdi Khairallah, Nik Adlina Nik Moktar

Journal of Financial Crises

At the height of the Global Financial Crisis in September 2008, Anglo Irish Bank (Anglo), one of Ireland’s six core banks, specializing in commercial and residential real estate with EUR 101.3 billion in assets, faced severe losses. Irish authorities announced a blanket deposit and liability guarantee for the six banks including Anglo. At the same time, Anglo was offered standby liquidity facilities of EUR 3 billion from the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) and EUR 10 billion from the two largest Irish commercial banks, which were not drawn on at the time. Anglo was nationalized in January 2009, as deposit …