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The Role Of Efficiency Justifications In U.S.-American And West German Merger Control Law: A Comparison, Christian Westerhausen

LLM Theses and Essays

When merger control laws first emerged in the United States and West Germany in the early 1900s, some businessmen and economists argued that the efficiency of businesses was impeded by antimerger laws. They contended that only very large businesses could realize significant efficiencies, be internationally competitive, and attain technological progress. This paper analyzes the role that these efficiency arguments had on the laws in West Germany and the United States, respectively. German law mainly upheld the idea that preservation of competition was most important for business efficiency, but also included a provision that firms could put forward the social desirability …

Competition, Integration And Economic Efficiency In The Eec From The Point Of View Of The Private Firm, Michel Waelbroeck

Michigan Law Review

As early as 1956, experts appointed by the six original Member State governments to investigate measures to pursue integration after the failure of the European Defence Community clearly established this link between the abolition of barriers to trade and an increase in the intensity of competition. In what has come to be known as the "Spaak Report," the experts noted the technology gap then separating Europe from the United States and proposed, as a remedial measure, the creation of a ''vast zone of common economic policy, constituting a powerful production unit, and allowing a continued expansion, and increased stability, an …

Law And Economy, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Law and Economy by Kelvin Jones

Folded, Spindled, And Mutilated: Economic Analysis And U.S. V. Ibm, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated: Economic Analysis and U.S. v. IBM

Mobility Factors In Antitrust Cases: Assessing Market Power In Light Of Conditions Affecting Entry And Fringe Expansion, William H. Wentz

Michigan Law Review

To assist courts and litigants in developing and utilizing information on mobility factors in a meaningful manner, I have attempted in this Article to outline a basic approach for analyzing the competitive and efficiency significance of mobility factors in a litigative context. In Part I, I lay the necessary foundation: discussing the importance of mobility factors in accepted economic theory, explaining the sources of the current confusion and controversy about "entry barriers" and deriving from the debate areas of fundamental agreement among economists. Building on this common ground, I develop in Part II a basic approach to consideration of mobility …

United Kingdom Regulation Of Transnational Corporate Concentration, J. Denys Gribbin

Michigan Journal of International Law

This article begins by describing the United Kingdom's policy toward outward and inward direct investment and then sets out the essentials of the competition laws that are among the major, nondiscriminatory regulatory mechanisms that affect corporate behavior and planning. The article also analyzes the development of competition policy as a microeconomic instrument along with its application to monopoly, oligopoly, and cartels involving transnational corporations. Competition policy, except for cartels, is shown to be relatively benign toward mergers until recently, and with respect to monopoly and oligopoly has sought remedies in regulation of prices and behavior rather than through structural change. …

Pennsylvania Antitrust Law: What Is The Commonwealth's Policy On Competition, Stephanie G. Spaulding

Duquesne Law Review

Because there is no state antitrust statute in Pennsylvania, it is difficult to ascertain the Commonwealth's policy on restrictive trade practices. The author of this comment looks first to Pennsylvania common law, then to selected Pennsylvania statutes, to determine if there is a clearly enunciated policy on competition. She concludes that Pennsylvania cases and legislation provide little help to the lawyer or business person seeking to determine what is encouraged and what is proscribed.

Reflections On Recent Oecd Activities: Regulation Of Multinational Corporate Conduct And Structure, Kurt Stockmann

Michigan Journal of International Law

In recent, years, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has repeatedly addressed, in a variety of forms, the problem of transnational corporate concentration. In the field of restrictive business practices, it has made suggestions on specific antitrust problems, issued council recommendations, and promulgated the 1976 Concil Guidelines for multinational enterprises. Not surprisingly for an organization that adheres to the principle of unanimity and, consequently, is governed by the law of the smallest common denominator, these efforts have thus far focused more on procedure than on substance. Even where quasisubstantive rules have been adopted, such as in competition guideline …

The Monopoly Component Of Inflation In Food Prices, Neal Smith

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Part I examines monopoly power in the food industry, paying close attention to the increased economic strength of monopolies and the economic costs caused by monopoly power. Part II details the problems resulting from monopoly power in one segment of the food industry-the meatpacking industry. Part III calls upon the Congress to undertake new antitrust initiatives to reverse the food industry's trend toward increasing concentration. It cannot be said with certainty that food price inflation would totally disappear if the consumer loss due to monopoly were removed from the food manufacturing and retailing sectors. Doing away with these losses, however, …

The "Economic" Analysis Of Transnational Mergers, William James Adams

Michigan Journal of International Law

No congregation of lawyers can be considered complete without a token economist. The role of the economist consists of describing the economic mode of analyzing the legal problem under consideration. Unfortunately from the standpoint of the token, economists rarely agree on criteria appropriate for the appraisal of economic phenomena. With respect to transnational corporate mergers, four modes of analysis may be described legitimately as economic.

International Implications Of Limitations On "Aggregate Concentration", David Boies

Michigan Journal of International Law

Traditionally, antitrust laws have been concerned with competition and concentration within a single market. In the past few years, however, increasing attention has been given to economywide or aggregate concentration-especially when such concentration is accomplished by merger rather than by internal growth. In 1979 and 1980, Congress considered Senate Bill S. 600 which would limit mergers based on size criteria that are unrelated, at least directly, to proof of a lessening of competition within any given market. The international implications of applying this principle are complex and difficult, and have yet to be fully addressed. It is the purpose of …

Regulating Multinational Corporate Concentration-The European Economic Community, John Temple Lang

Michigan Journal of International Law

It is the purpose of this article to discuss the policies and goals of the efforts of the European Communities to regulate multinational corporate concentration. For reasons that will become clear in the course of the article, it is necessary to start by outlining the means available to the European Communities, both presently and potentially, to promote these policies. It is not possible to see what those policies might be or how they are likely to develop without understanding the practical implications of the various legal rules on which the Community might rely in the future. This article does not …

Appendix 1: Foreign Monopoly And Merger Law

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Appendix consists of brief descriptions of the monopoly and merger laws of several nations. These descriptions are not intended to provide a complete statement of any one nation's antitrust statutes and case law. Rather, they are included in this volume to permit the reader to observe the widely divergent approaches to the regulation of economic concentration. These summaries may not contain the latest case law developments or statutory amendments. It is hoped, however, that they provide a sound starting point for investigation of the regulatory regimes of the nations included in this collection.

Regulation Of Concentration Through Merger Control: Germany's Continuing Efforts, Kurt Stockmann

Michigan Journal of International Law

The Federal Republic of Germany's Law Against Restraints on Competition (the ARC), establishes an extensive regime for regulating market-dominating enterprises. Therefore, large corporations, both national and multinational, are the subject of particular scrutiny in the Federal Republic. Rather than identify and address all the provisions pertinent to corporate concentration (a task whose tedium would be matched only by its enormity), this analysis will undertake three tasks: (1) briefly describe the general scope of West German merger law, (2) discuss the application of the law to cases of transnational concentration, and (3) explain the proposed Fourth Amendment to the ARC as …

Annotated Bibliography

Michigan Journal of International Law

Corporate concentration of both a national and transnational character is one of the more oblique topics in antitrust literature. Books and articles in the area tend to focus on narrow aspects of this issue, or on the regulatory efforts of particular countries and international organizations. The annotations which follow highlight some of the leading writings on industrial concentration.

Sherman Act Applications To Predation By Controlled Economy Enterprises Marketing In The United States: Departures From Mechanical Formulae, Deborah M. Levy

Michigan Journal of International Law

In a reproachful dissent in United States v. Columbia Steel, the late Justice Douglas sought to remind his brethren what the antitrust laws of the United States are all about: [A]ll power tends to develop into a government in itself. Power that controls the economy should be in the hands of elected representatives of the people, not in the hands of an industrial oligarchy. Industrial power should be decentralized.... That is the philosophy and the command of the Sherman Act.

Introduction: Transnational Corporate Concentration-The Issues, Thomas E. Kauper

Michigan Journal of International Law

Competition policy in the United States, particularly reflected in antitrust policy, in recent years has focused on corporate structure. To some, this emphasis simply reflects a belief in a close correlation between corporate structure and behavior. A single firm monopoly inevitably will restrict output and raise prices above levels that would prevail under competition conditions, distorting allocative efficiency. The behavioral pattern is a direct consequence of structure. Many believe that high corporate concentration, even short of single firm monopoly, is at least conducive to, if not a cause of, monopolistic behavior. Some also view high corporate concentration, and the aggregation …

Doctrines And Problems Relating To U.S. Control Of Transnational Corporate Concentration, Douglas E. Rosenthal, Stuart E. Benson, Lisa Chiles

Michigan Journal of International Law

It is the principal thesis of this article that important recent case decisions in U.S. antitrust law reflect just this conflict over the extent to which intraindustry (horizontal) concentration is economically harmful. We are at a point where the future direction of the law is difficult to discern. Until there is greater U.S. policy agreement, and consistency within U.S. law itself, it is unlikely that any common transnational response will emerge to even horizontal corporate concentration. Ironically, it may not be possible to clarify U.S. antitrust law as long as the underlying policy conflict remains so sharp. For the present, …

Appendix 2: Recent United States Legislative Antitrust Proposals

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Appendix consists of brief descriptions of the monopoly and merger laws of several nations. These descriptions are not intended to provide a complete statement of any one nation's antitrust statutes and case law. Rather, they are included in this volume to permit the reader to observe the widely divergent approaches to the regulation of economic concentration. These summaries may not contain the latest case law developments or statutory amendments. It is hoped, however, that they provide a sound starting point for investigation of the regulatory regimes of the nations included in this collection.

Economic Analysis And Antitrust Law, Thomas D. Morgan

Vanderbilt Law Review

Economic Analysis and Antitrust Law by Terry Calvani and John Siegfried

Professors Calvani and Siegfried have collected, in less than four hundred pages, an extraordinarily useful set of articles providing general information about antitrust economic issues. Some of the articles are classics in the field, while some challenge the existing wisdom. One might have wished for somewhat greater coverage of issues involving vertical relationships, and indeed a separate volume might even have been appropriate on those subjects. The choices made, however, were basically sound, and the editing is both intelligent and useful. This collection could be profitably assigned and used …

Monopolistic Competition, Second Best, And The Antitrust Paradox: A Review Article, Richard S. Markovits

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself by Robert H. Bork

A Practitioner's Guide To The Maryland Antitrust Act, William L. Reynolds Ii, James D. Wright

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Legal Status Of Joint Ventures Under The Antitrust Laws: A Summary Assessment, Joseph F. Brodley

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Attempts And Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer To The Prophylactic Riddle Of Section Two, Edward H. Cooper

Articles

The efforts of activist antitrust lawyers to redefine the contours of attempted monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act1 have again forced the courts to wrestle with the classic antitrust dilemma: How far must single-firm competitive behavior be restrained to make competition free? The answer given by the majority of current decisions is that, absent some other established offense, single-firm behavior should be prohibited as an attempt to monopolize only when there is a specific intent to monopolize and the firm has come dangerously near to unlawful monopolization. A contemporary challenge to this orthodox answer is rapidly gaining force. …

Patents And Antitrust Law, Merrill N. Johnson

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Patents and Antitrust Law by Ward S. Bowman, Jr.

Contracts, Conditions, And The Clayton Act: Causes Of Action Available To A Dealer Injured By An Exclusive-Dealing Arrangement, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

It is the purpose of this Comment to re-examine two of the three requirements of section 3 of the Clayton Act-with particular emphasis on the sale-or-contract-for-sale requirement-in an attempt to determine whether the formidable obstacle that judicial interpretation has made of these requirements is consistent with either the letter or spirit of the section. In discussing these requirements, this Comment will only consider the rights of parties who have at one time made purchases from a seller who utilizes exclusive-selling arrangements.

Developments In Anti-Combines Administration, A. A. Fatouros

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Law, Attempts To Monopolize A Method Of Doing Business, Daniel U. Livermore Jr.

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Monopolies: Interpreting The Qualifying Clause Of Section 7, Clayton Act, C. Gibson Downing

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Monopoly In America, By Walter Adams And Horace M. Gray, Phil C. Neal

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.