Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Business Organizations Law (20)
- Law and Economics (12)
- Courts (9)
- International Trade Law (9)
- Legislation (9)
-
- Supreme Court of the United States (9)
- Comparative and Foreign Law (8)
- Legal History (6)
- Commercial Law (5)
- Communications Law (5)
- Consumer Protection Law (5)
- Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law (5)
- Intellectual Property Law (5)
- Litigation (5)
- Public Law and Legal Theory (5)
- Computer Law (4)
- European Law (4)
- Transnational Law (4)
- Administrative Law (3)
- Business (3)
- Science and Technology Law (3)
- Banking and Finance Law (2)
- Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics (2)
- Constitutional Law (2)
- Energy and Utilities Law (2)
- Health Law and Policy (2)
- Insurance Law (2)
- Internet Law (2)
- Institution
-
- University of Michigan Law School (71)
- Maurer School of Law: Indiana University (12)
- William & Mary Law School (8)
- Duke Law (2)
- Notre Dame Law School (2)
-
- University of Baltimore Law (2)
- University of Georgia School of Law (2)
- Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (2)
- Washington and Lee University School of Law (2)
- American University Washington College of Law (1)
- Boston University School of Law (1)
- Cleveland State University (1)
- Duquesne University (1)
- Penn State Dickinson Law (1)
- St. John's University School of Law (1)
- University of Florida Levin College of Law (1)
- University of Kentucky (1)
- University of Maine School of Law (1)
- University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law (1)
- University of Miami Law School (1)
- University of New Hampshire (1)
- University of Tennessee College of Law (1)
- Vanderbilt University Law School (1)
- West Virginia University (1)
- Publication Year
- Publication
-
- Michigan Law Review (25)
- Articles (23)
- Michigan Journal of International Law (12)
- Indiana Law Journal (9)
- Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review (4)
-
- William & Mary Law Review (4)
- Faculty Scholarship (3)
- University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform (3)
- All Faculty Scholarship (2)
- Articles by Maurer Faculty (2)
- Book Chapters (2)
- Faculty Publications (2)
- Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal (1994 - ) (2)
- Journal Articles (2)
- Washington and Lee Law Review (2)
- William & Mary Business Law Review (2)
- American University Law Review (1)
- Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present) (1)
- Duquesne Law Review (1)
- Federal Communications Law Journal (1)
- Kentucky Law Journal (1)
- LLM Theses and Essays (1)
- Law Faculty Articles and Essays (1)
- Maine Law Review (1)
- Maryland Law Review (1)
- Michigan Law Review First Impressions (1)
- Michigan Law Review Online (1)
- Scholarly Works (1)
- St. John's Law Review (1)
- Summer Institute on International and Comparative Law (1)
- Publication Type
Articles 31 - 60 of 118
Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
The Mpaa: A Script For An Antitrust Production, Ian G. Henry
The Mpaa: A Script For An Antitrust Production, Ian G. Henry
West Virginia Law Review
No abstract provided.
In Name Only: How Major League Baseball's Reliance On Its Antitrust Exemption Is Hurting The Game, Samuel G. Mann
In Name Only: How Major League Baseball's Reliance On Its Antitrust Exemption Is Hurting The Game, Samuel G. Mann
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
Concentration In Health Care Markets: Chronic Problems And Better Solutions, Barak D. Richman
Concentration In Health Care Markets: Chronic Problems And Better Solutions, Barak D. Richman
Faculty Scholarship
Health care providers with market power enjoy substantially more pricing freedom than monopolists in other markets, for a reason not generally recognized: US-style health insurance. Consequently, monopolies in health care cause undesirable redistribution of wealth and inefficient allocation of resources, both of which burden consumers at levels beyond those of other monopolists. The unusual costliness of monopoly power in health care markets demands far more policy attention than it has received. For starters, the health sector needs a more aggressive antitrust policy that effectively prevents the creation of new provider market power through mergers, alliances, or government immunity. An immediate …
Were Standard Oil's Railroad Rebates And Drawbacks Cost Justified?, Daniel A. Crane
Were Standard Oil's Railroad Rebates And Drawbacks Cost Justified?, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
In this essay, written for a symposium on the centennial anniversary of the Supreme Court's Standard Oil decision, I reexamine the costjustification question. In the first part, I explain why the cost-justification question is central to the entire case and its acquired and evolving historical meaning. In the second part, I review the evidence of claimed efficiencies passed on to the railroads. I conclude that there is evidence that Standard Oil passed along significant cost savings to the railroads and that these savings could have justified a portion of the rebates and drawbacks. However, I conclude that there is little …
Search Neutrality As An Antitrust Principle, Daniel A. Crane
Search Neutrality As An Antitrust Principle, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Given the Internet's designation as "the great equalizer,"' it is unsurprising that nondiscrimination has emerged as a central aspiration of web governance.2 But, of course, bias, discrimination, and neutrality are among the slipperiest of regulatory principles. One person's bias is another person's prioritization. Fresh on the heels of its initial success in advocating a net neutrality principle,' Google is in the uncomfortable position of trying to stave off a corollary principle of search neutrality.' Search neutrality has not yet coalesced into a generally understood principle, but at its heart is some idea that Internet search engines ought not to prefer …
Has The Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement?, Daniel A. Crane
Has The Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement?, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
The Justice Department’s recently filed antitrust case against Apple and several major book publishers over e-book pricing, which comes on the heels of the Justice Department’s successful challenge to the proposed merger of AT&T and T-Mobile, has contributed to the perception that the Obama Administration is reinvigorating antitrust enforcement from its recent stupor. As a candidate for President, then-Senator Obama criticized the Bush Administration as having the “weakest record of antitrust enforcement of any administration in the last half century” and vowed to step up enforcement. Early in the Obama Administration, Justice Department officials furthered this perception by withdrawing the …
Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, Daniel A. Crane
Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
The two leading merger systems-those of the United States and the European Union-treat the potential benefits and risks of mergers asymmetrically. Both systems require considerably greater proof of efficiencies than they do of potential harms if the efficiencies are to offset concerns over the accumulation or exercise of market power The implicit asymmetry principle has important systemic effects for merger control. It not only stands in the way of some socially desirable mergers but also may indirectly facilitate the clearance of some socially undesirable mergers. Neither system explicitly justifies this asymmetry, and none of the plausible justifications are normatively supportable. …
The Provider-Monopoly Problem In Health Care, Clark C. Havighurst, Barak D. Richman
The Provider-Monopoly Problem In Health Care, Clark C. Havighurst, Barak D. Richman
Faculty Scholarship
Although federal judges have resisted giving due effect to standard antitrust principles in scrutinizing mergers of nonprofit hospitals, the presence of health insurance makes it especially important to oppose monopoly in health services markets. U.S.-style health insurance gives monopolist providers extraordinary pricing freedom, thus exacerbating monopoly’s usual redistributive effects. Significant allocative inefficiencies - albeit not the kind generally associated with monopoly - also result when the monopolist is a nonprofit hospital. Because it is probably impossible to undo past hospital mergers creating undue market power, we suggest some alternative remedies. One is to apply antitrust rules against "tying" arrangements so …
Lorain, Aspen, And The Future Of Section 2 Enforcement, Xiao Jeff Liu
Lorain, Aspen, And The Future Of Section 2 Enforcement, Xiao Jeff Liu
Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review
The Sherman Antitrust Act § 2 makes monopolizing or attempting to monopolize a particular trade or aspects of a trade a federal felony. More specifically, Section 2 of the Act addresses a firm's unilateral conduct. Under the administration of former President George W. Bush, a comprehensive guideline titled Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act ("Bush Guidelines") was adopted in September of 2008 for enforcing Section 2 violations. Under President Barack Obama's administration, however, the enforcement of antitrust laws is expected to undergo a radical transformation. On May 11, 2009, Christine A. Varney, the Assistant …
Debunking The Purchaser Welfare Account Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us A Total Welfare Standard And Why We Should Keep It, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
The last several years have seen a vigorous debate among antitrust scholars and practitionersa bout the appropriates tandardf or evaluating the conduct of monopolists under section 2 of the Sherman Act. While most of the debate over possible standards has focused on the empirical question of each standard's economic utility, this Article undertakes a somewhat different task: It examines the normative benchmark that courts have actually chosen when adjudicating section 2 cases. This Article explores three possible benchmarks-producer welfare, purchaser welfare, and total welfare-and concludes that courts have opted for a total welfare normative approach to section 2 since the …
Does Monopoly Broth Make Bad Soup?, Daniel A. Crane
Does Monopoly Broth Make Bad Soup?, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
There is an oft-repeated maxim in U.S. antitrust law that a monopolist's conduct must be examined in its totality in order to determine its legality. Judges admonish that plaintiffs "should be given the full benefit of their proof without tightly compartmentalizating the various factual components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each." As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated in much-quoted language, "It is the mix of various ingredients ... in a monopoly broth that produces the unsavory flavor."' In this article, I examine the use and misuse of monopoly broth theories. Reflecting a …
The Monopoly Myth: A Comment On The Public Funding Of Sports Stadiums, Jeffrey Standen
The Monopoly Myth: A Comment On The Public Funding Of Sports Stadiums, Jeffrey Standen
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal (1994 - )
No abstract provided.
Substance, Procedure, And Institutions In The International Harmonization Of Competition Policy, Daniel A. Crane
Substance, Procedure, And Institutions In The International Harmonization Of Competition Policy, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Many people who pay attention to the rapid development of antitrust regimes across the globe hold two tenets in common. First, most of the relevant stakeholders would benefit if competition policy could be harmonized interjurisdictionally.' Second, and alas, this beneficial harmonization is unlikely to happen on a significant scale in the foreseeable future.2 To many, antitrust harmonization is thus a noble but utopian aspiration. I generally share both the former sentiment and the latter lament but both are far too general to be of much use without further specification. Uniformity of competition policy is valuable to be sure, but not …
Linkline's Institutional Suspicions, Daniel A. Crane
Linkline's Institutional Suspicions, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Antitrust scholars are having fun again. Not so long ago, they were the poor, redheaded stepchildren of the legal academy, either pining for the older days of rigorous antitrust enforcement or trying to kill off what was left of the enterprise. Other law professors felt sorry for them, ignored them, or both. But now antitrust is making a comeback of sorts. In one heady week in May of 2009, a front-page story in the New York Times reported the dramatic decision of Christine Varney-the Obama Administration's new Antitrust Division head at the Department of Justice-to jettison the entire report on …
Bargaining In The Shadow Of Rate-Setting Courts, Daniel A. Crane
Bargaining In The Shadow Of Rate-Setting Courts, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Judges will tell you that they are comparatively poor rate regulators. The specialized, technical competence and supervisory capacity that public utilities commissions enjoy are usually absent from judicial chambers. Nonetheless, when granting antitrust remedies-particularly remedies for monopolistic abuse of intellectual property-courts sometimes purport to act as rate regulators for the licensing or sale of the defendant's assets. At the outset, we should distinguish between two forms ofjudicial rate setting. In one form, a court (or the FTC in its adjudicative capacity) grants a compulsory license and sets a specific rate as part of a final judgment or an order. The …
Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright
Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright
Articles
Since we abhor suspense, we will quickly answer the question our title poses: No. As a general matter, bundled discounting schemes lower prices to consumers unless they are predatory—that is to say, unless they exclude rivals and thereby permit the bundled discounter to price free of competitive restraint. The corollary of this observation is that bundled discounting is generally pro-competitive and pro-consumer and should only be condemned when it is capable of excluding rivals. We pose and answer this question because it is at the heart of Section VI of Professor Elhauge’s provocative draft article which is the subject of …
Obama's Antitrust Agenda, Daniel A. Crane
Obama's Antitrust Agenda, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Antitrust law is back in vogue. After years in the wilderness, antitrust enforcement has reemerged as a hot topic in Washington and in the legal academy. In one heady week inMay of 2009, a frontpage story in the New York Times reported the dramatic decision of Christine Varney —theObama administration’s new AntitrustDivision head—to jettison the entire report onmonopolization offenses released by the Bush JusticeDepartment just eightmonths earlier. In a speech before the Center for American Progress, Varney announced that the Justice Department is “committed to aggressively pursuing enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.” As if to prove that …
Software Development As An Antitrust Remedy: Lessons From The Enforcement Of The Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement , William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers
Software Development As An Antitrust Remedy: Lessons From The Enforcement Of The Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement , William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers
Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review
An important provision in each of the final judgments in the government's Microsoft antitrust case requires Microsoft to "make available" to software developers the communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate "natively" (that is, without adding software) with Microsoft server operating systems in corporate networks or over the Internet. The short-term goal of the provision is to allow developers, as licensees of the protocols, to write applications for non-Microsoft server operating systems that interoperate with Windows client computers in the same ways that applications written for Microsoft's server operating systems interoperate with Windows clients. The long-term goal …
Holmes And The Bald Man: Why Rule Of Reason Should Be The Standard In Sherman Act Section 2 Cases, William J. Michael
Holmes And The Bald Man: Why Rule Of Reason Should Be The Standard In Sherman Act Section 2 Cases, William J. Michael
The University of New Hampshire Law Review
[Excerpt] "It has been argued that the antitrust laws’ legislative history supports the notion that the laws were meant to prohibit anticompetitive price cuts – regardless of whether they are below cost. Thus, predatory pricing claims used to turn simply on whether the allegedly predatory price was intended to harm rivals. In fact, liability for predatory price discrimination was found without requiring probable or actual monopolization. Yet some cases brought early under Section 2 suggest that below cost pricing was indicative of, if not proof of, the type of conduct Section 2 prohibits. The results under this old scheme were …
Squeeze Play: Analyzing Contraction In Professional Sports, Scott Rosner
Squeeze Play: Analyzing Contraction In Professional Sports, Scott Rosner
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal (1994 - )
No abstract provided.
Putting The Lid On State-Sanctioned Cartels: Why The State Action Doctrine In Its Current Form Should Become A Remnant Of The Past, Aaron C. Stine, Eric D. Gorman
Putting The Lid On State-Sanctioned Cartels: Why The State Action Doctrine In Its Current Form Should Become A Remnant Of The Past, Aaron C. Stine, Eric D. Gorman
University of Miami Law Review
No abstract provided.
Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), Alan J. Meese
Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Joint Statement Of Sumner M. Redstone Chairman And Chief Executive Officer Viacom Inc. And Mel Karmazin President And Chief Executive Officer Of Cbs Corp., Summer M. Redstone, Mel Karmazin
Joint Statement Of Sumner M. Redstone Chairman And Chief Executive Officer Viacom Inc. And Mel Karmazin President And Chief Executive Officer Of Cbs Corp., Summer M. Redstone, Mel Karmazin
Federal Communications Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Antitrust Enfocement And High-Technology Markets, William J. Baer, David A. Balto
Antitrust Enfocement And High-Technology Markets, William J. Baer, David A. Balto
Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review
Although the antitrust laws apply to all industries, the application must be tempered in each case by the myriad ways in which competition can be modified by structural, behavioral, technological, regulatory, and other characteristics. The Commission applies the antitrust laws with sensitivity to the special characteristics of high-tech industries and of intellectual property, but also with the recognition that--as in other industries--competition plays an important role in spurring innovation and in spreading the benefits of that innovation to consumers. This focus is not new. This balanced approach has roots that go back at least to the 1977 Antitrust Guide to …
Telecommunications In Transition: Unbundling, Reintegration, And Competition, David J. Teece
Telecommunications In Transition: Unbundling, Reintegration, And Competition, David J. Teece
Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review
The world economy is experiencing a technological revolution, fueled by rapid advances in microelectronics, optics, and computer science, that in the 1990s and beyond will dramatically change the way people everywhere communicate, learn, and access information and entertainment. This technological revolution has been underway for about a decade. The emergence of a fully-interactive communications network, sometimes referred to as the "Information Superhighway," is now upon us. This highway, made possible by fiber optics and the convergence of several different technologies, is capable of delivering a plethora of new interactive entertainment, informational, and instructional services that are powerful and user-friendly. The …
Reforming Fcc Regulation Of Dominant Telephone Carriers: Putting Some Teeth Into The Test For Predation, Thomas K. Gump
Reforming Fcc Regulation Of Dominant Telephone Carriers: Putting Some Teeth Into The Test For Predation, Thomas K. Gump
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Note examines the ineffective protections against predatory pricing by AT&T contained in the price cap scheme. Part I outlines price cap regulation and explains how the FCC hopes that a test based on the average variable cost standard will detect predatory pricing. Part II argues that the FCC erred in adopting an average variable cost standard as the test for telecommunications predation because that standard ignores the high fixed costs common to all firms in the industry. Part II demonstrates that AT&T could engage in predatory pricing despite the protections contained in the regulatory scheme. Part II then examines …
Commentary: Implications Of Professor Scherer's Research For The Future Of Antitrust, Robert H. Lande
Commentary: Implications Of Professor Scherer's Research For The Future Of Antitrust, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
One way to test the accuracy of Professor Scherer's research is to compare it to the best previous work in the area. Prior to his current article the best analysis of the state of economic thinking and knowledge during antitrust's formative period was presented twelve years ago by—Professor Scherer. This was a skeletal precurser to the well-documented version that he now presents, but his overall conclusions are identical. During the twelve years since his conclusions were presented in the Yale Law Journal no one has demonstrated that his research is in any way faulty or misleading, even though many have …
Workable Antitrust Policy, Frank H. Easterbrook
Workable Antitrust Policy, Frank H. Easterbrook
Michigan Law Review
One of the schools of thought in the economics of antitrust was called "workable competition." The adherents to this school believed that markets were prone to cartelization and that concentration was death on competition, but that occasionally competition might prove "workable." These scholars were suspicious of almost every industrial practice they saw. One of the manifestations of their work came to be known as the "structure-conduct-performance paradigm." The thesis was that you could tell whether competition was feasible from the structure of the market. If the top four firms had fifty percent or so of the sales, we should abandon …
Consumer Beware Chicago, Eleanor M. Fox
Consumer Beware Chicago, Eleanor M. Fox
Michigan Law Review
Professor Hovenkamp's article, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, reveals an important truth. Chicago School economics does not provide a superior roadmap to efficiency. I would take the critique one step further and assert: The main gap between Chicago and its critics is not even the design of the roadmap to efficiency. The main gap is social and political philosophy.
Rhetoric And Skepticism In Antitrust Argument, Herbert Hovenkamp
Rhetoric And Skepticism In Antitrust Argument, Herbert Hovenkamp
Michigan Law Review
In his essay on Workable Antitrust Policy Judge Easterbrook professes an extraordinary skepticism about economic models in general, and particularly about the ability of courts to use economic models to distinguish the competitive from the anticompetitive. But a profession of skepticism is itself a very powerful rhetorical device; it creates a perception of tough-mindedness, of refusal to yield real-world observations to analytic models or other abstractions, of extreme reluctance to accept any proposition that has not been clearly proven. Further, it is always very easy to be a skeptic, because every position ever taken except perhaps for a few tautologies …