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Articles 61 - 90 of 306
Full-Text Articles in Law
What Lurks Below Beckles, Leah Litman, Shakeer Rahman
What Lurks Below Beckles, Leah Litman, Shakeer Rahman
Articles
This Essay argues that if the Supreme Court grants habeas relief in Beckles v. United States, then it should spell out certain details about where a Beckles claim comes from and who such a claim benefits. Those details are not essential to the main question raised in the case, but the federal habeas statute takes away the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to hear just about any case that would raise those questions. For that reason, this Essay concludes that failing to address those questions now could arbitrarily condemn hundreds of prisoners to illegal sentences and lead to a situation where the …
Defining Ambiguity In Broken Statutory Frameworks And Its Limits On Agency Action, Amanda Urban
Defining Ambiguity In Broken Statutory Frameworks And Its Limits On Agency Action, Amanda Urban
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
“The Problem” occurs when a statute’s provisions become contradictory or unworkable in the context of new or unforeseen phenomena, yet the statute mandates agency action. The application of an unambiguous statutory provision may become problematic or unclear. Similarly, unambiguous provisions may become inconsistent given a particular application of the statute. During the same term, in Scialabba and UARG, the Supreme Court performed a Chevron review of agency interpretations of statutes facing three variations of the Problem, which this Note characterizes as direct conflict, internal inconsistency, and unworkability. In each case, the Court defined ambiguity in various, nontraditional ways and …
On Viewing The Courts As Junior Partners Of Congress In Statutory Interpretation Cases: An Essay Celebrating The Scholarship Of Daniel J. Meltzer, Richard H. Fallon Jr
On Viewing The Courts As Junior Partners Of Congress In Statutory Interpretation Cases: An Essay Celebrating The Scholarship Of Daniel J. Meltzer, Richard H. Fallon Jr
Notre Dame Law Review
In this Essay, written in tribute to Dan Meltzer, I shall attempt to explicate his views regarding statutory interpretation in general, thematic terms. In doing so, I shall register my agreement with virtually all of Dan’s conclusions and frequently echo his practically minded arguments in support of them. But I shall also advance arguments—with which I cannot be entirely sure he would have agreed—that seek to show that his position reflected theoretical insights about how language works, not only in law, but also more generally in life. By seeking simultaneously to defend Dan’s views and to build on them, this …
Superfund Chaos Theory: What Happens When The Lower Federal Courts Don't Follow The Supreme Court, Steven Ferrey
Superfund Chaos Theory: What Happens When The Lower Federal Courts Don't Follow The Supreme Court, Steven Ferrey
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
There is legal chaos in the national Superfund. The Supreme Court reversed decisions of eleven federal circuit courts in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. There is no instance in modern Supreme Court history where the Court reversed every federal circuit court in the country, as it did in Atlantic Research. The Supreme Court’s reversal was through a unanimous decision. This was extraordinary: It not only reversed the entire legal interpretation of one of America’s most critical statutes, but also re-allocated billions of dollars among private parties.
The Supreme Court, when it rendered its decision, seemed to be rectifying a …
Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, Ryan David Doerfler
Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, Ryan David Doerfler
All Faculty Scholarship
Legislative intent is a fiction. Courts and scholars accept this by and large. As this Article shows, however, both are confused as to why, and, more importantly, as to what this entails.
This Article argues that the standard account of why legislative intent is a fiction—that Congress is a “they,” not an “it”—rests on an overly simplistic conception of shared agency. Drawing on contemporary work in philosophy of action, this Article contends that Congress as such has no intentions not because of difficulties in aggregating the intentions of individual members, but rather because Congress lacks the sort of delegatory structure …
The Scrivener’S Error, Ryan D. Doerfler
The Scrivener’S Error, Ryan D. Doerfler
Northwestern University Law Review
It is widely accepted that courts may correct legislative drafting mistakes, i.e., so-called scrivener’s errors, if and only if such mistakes are “absolutely clear.” The rationale is that if a court were to recognize a less clear error, it might be “rewriting” the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake.
This Article argues that the standard is much too strict. The current rationale ignores that courts can “rewrite,” i.e., misinterpret, a statute both by recognizing an error and by failing to do so. Accordingly, because the current doctrine is designed to protect against one type of mistake (false positives) but …
To Touch And Concern The United States With Sufficient Force: How American Due Process And Choice Of Law Cases Inform The Reach Of The Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel, Karima Tawfik
Michigan Journal of International Law
This Note explores the post-Kiobel ATS cases and argues that the Fourth Circuit’s approach to considering claims that manifest a close connection to the United States as potentially entitling the plaintiff to relief under the ATS is preferable to approaches that categorically bar claims when the alleged conduct has occurred abroad. Part I describes the Kiobel decision in more depth and the subsequent ATS case law to outline the contours of recent circuit cases. Part II demonstrates how domestic personal jurisdiction and choice of law principles weigh in favor of a more expansive reading of the ATS, as adopted …
Do I Need To Pin A Target To My Back?: The Definition Of "Particular Social Group" In U.S. Asylum Law, Nitzan Sternberg
Do I Need To Pin A Target To My Back?: The Definition Of "Particular Social Group" In U.S. Asylum Law, Nitzan Sternberg
Fordham Urban Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Statutory Interpretation As A Parasitic Endeavor, Stephen Ross
Statutory Interpretation As A Parasitic Endeavor, Stephen Ross
Stephen F Ross
The principal theme of this essay is that statutory interpretation is a project that requires advocates and judges to utilize the insights of three discrete disciplines apart from law: communications and linguistics to understand the way that legislative drafters use words to communicate to others, either in text or in extratextual legislative material; political science to describe the way that legislators behave in enacting statutes; and political theory to provide a normative guide for courts interpreting statutes in a constitutional democracy.
The Limited Relevance Of Plain Meaning, Stephen Ross
The Limited Relevance Of Plain Meaning, Stephen Ross
Stephen F Ross
In this essay, the author takes the position that linguists' principal expertise - ascertaining how language is used by ordinary speakers of English - is often of little value in interpreting controversial non-criminal federal statutes. Although linguistic techniques might still aid in understanding their meaning, the author's thesis is that extrinsic evidence that is known and accessible to this small sub-community - such as legislative history, established norms of construction, and other evidence about the context in which the legislation arose - is more likely than linguistic analysis to help an outside judge shed light on what Congress meant and …
Statutory Interpretation Stories, William Eskridge, Philip Frickey, Elizabeth Garrett, Stephen Ross
Statutory Interpretation Stories, William Eskridge, Philip Frickey, Elizabeth Garrett, Stephen Ross
Stephen F Ross
Stephen Ross contributed the chapter "The Story of Flood v. Kuhn: Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, At the Time. This title tackles the leading cases in the emerging statutory interpretation canon, as reflected in the casebooks. For each case, the leading scholar provides historical background (including details about the participants), a procedural history of the case, and an analysis of doctrinal and other lessons from the case. - From the Publisher
Reaganist Realism Comes To Detriot, Stephen Ross
Reaganist Realism Comes To Detriot, Stephen Ross
Stephen F Ross
Part I of this article discusses Detroit Newspapers and explains how in deferring to the Attorney General's interpretation of the Newspaper Preservation Act, Judge Silberman disregarded every applicable technique of statutory interpretation typically used to resolve the issue. Indeed, each of these techniques suggests that Attorney General Meese's interpretation of the Act was incorrect. This part of the article also demonstrates why deference to Meese was particularly inappropriate in light of the generally accepted justifications for judicial deference to administrative interpretations of statutes.
Part II explains that Detroit Newspapers is one of several opinions by conservative Reagan judicial appointees that …
Talking Textualism, Practicing Pragmatism: Rethinking The Supreme Court's Approach To Statutory Interpretation, Robert J. Pushaw Jr.
Talking Textualism, Practicing Pragmatism: Rethinking The Supreme Court's Approach To Statutory Interpretation, Robert J. Pushaw Jr.
Georgia Law Review
The Supreme Court's general approach to statutory
interpretation is analytically incoherent. On the one
hand, the Court has expressly endorsed "textualism":
enforcing the plain meaning (i.e., ordinary usage) of a
statute's words, and therefore refusing to consider non-
textual evidence unless the language is unclear. On the
other hand, the Court has implicitly applied
'oragmatism"-reaching the best practical result after
examining not only a statute's text but also Congress's
intent (as revealed by legislative history), its overall
purposes, precedent, and policy.
The two cases upholding the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
illustrate this practice of purporting to follow textualism,
but then …
Is Textualism Required By Constitutional Separation Of Powers?, Ofer Raban
Is Textualism Required By Constitutional Separation Of Powers?, Ofer Raban
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
This article examines the often-heard claim that textualism in statutory interpretation is mandated by constitutional separation of powers. The claim is examined using both the formalist and the functionalist approaches to separation of powers doctrine under the Federal Constitution. As we shall see, these doctrinal inquiries quickly devolve into examinations of the purposes and justification of textualism, and of separating the three branches of government. The article concludes not only that standing constitutional doctrine fails to support the textualist claim, but also that, as a matter of fact, textualism is a judicial philosophy that runs counter to the most basic …
Plain Meaning, Precedent, And Metaphysics: Lessons In Statutory Interpretation From Analyzing The Elements Of The Clean Water Act Offense, Jeffrey G. Miller
Plain Meaning, Precedent, And Metaphysics: Lessons In Statutory Interpretation From Analyzing The Elements Of The Clean Water Act Offense, Jeffrey G. Miller
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
This Article, the fifth in a series of five, completes the author’s detailed analysis of how federal courts have interpreted each element of the Clean Water Act (CWA) offense. Compiling statistics across the four prior articles, it draws conclusions about statutory interpretation in general, finding that the depth of legal analysis increases with the level of court; that environmentally positive results decrease with the level of court; that courts use only a small number of canons and other interpretive devices; that their uses of interpretive devices change over time; and that interpretive devices are not all outcome-neutral. The author also …
Presidential Signing Statements: A New Perspective, Christopher S. Yoo
Presidential Signing Statements: A New Perspective, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
This Article offers a new perspective on Presidents’ use of signing statements. Following the dichotomy reflected in the literature, I will analyze signing statements raising constitutional objections and those offering interpretive guidance for ambiguous provisions separately. With respect to constitutional interpretation of statutes by the executive branch, Presidents have long asserted the authority and obligation to consider constitutionality when executing statutes. The widespread acceptance of the President’s power to construe statutes to avoid constitutional problems and to refuse to defend the constitutionality of or to enforce statutes in appropriate cases confirms the propriety of this conclusion. If these fairly uncontroversial …
Holding On To Clarity: Reconciling The Federal Kidnapping Statute With The Trafficking Victims Protection Act, Benjamin Reese
Holding On To Clarity: Reconciling The Federal Kidnapping Statute With The Trafficking Victims Protection Act, Benjamin Reese
Michigan Law Review
In recent decades, the international community has come to recognize human trafficking as a problem of epidemic proportions. Congress responded to this global crisis in 2000 by passing the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and has since supplemented that comprehensive enactment. But, in light of the widespread use of psychological rather than physical coercion in trafficking cases, a long-standing split among federal courts regarding the scope of the federal kidnapping statute raises significant concerns about the United States’ efforts to combat traffickers. In particular, the broad interpretation adopted by several circuits threatens effective enforcement of statutes designed to prosecute traffickers, …
Is The Chief Justice A Tax Lawyer?, Stephanie Hoffer, Christopher J. Walker
Is The Chief Justice A Tax Lawyer?, Stephanie Hoffer, Christopher J. Walker
Christopher J. Walker
King v. Burwell is a crucial victory for the Obama Administration and for the future of the Affordable Care Act. It also has important implications for tax law and administration, as explored in the other terrific contributions to this Pepperdine Law Review Symposium. In this Essay, we turn to another tax-related feature of the Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court: It is hard to ignore the fingerprints of a tax lawyer throughout the opinion. This Essay focuses on two instances of a tax lawyer at work.
First, in the Chief’s approach to statutory interpretation one sees a tax lawyer as …
Three Words And The Future Of The Affordable Care Act, Nicholas Bagley
Three Words And The Future Of The Affordable Care Act, Nicholas Bagley
Articles
As an essential part of its effort to achieve near universal coverage, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extends sizable tax credits to most people who buy insurance on the newly established health care exchanges. Yet several lawsuits have been filed challenging the availability of those tax credits in the thirty-four states that refused to set up their own exchanges. The lawsuits are premised on a strained interpretation of the ACA that, if accepted, would make a hash of other provisions of the statute and undermine its effort to extend coverage to the uninsured. The courts should reject this latest effort …
Predicting The Fallout From King V. Burwell - Exchanges And The Aca, Nicholas Bagley, David K. Jones, Timothy Stoltzfus Jost
Predicting The Fallout From King V. Burwell - Exchanges And The Aca, Nicholas Bagley, David K. Jones, Timothy Stoltzfus Jost
Timothy S. Jost
The U.S. Supreme Court's surprise announcement on November 7 that it would hear King v. Burwell struck fear in the hearts of supporters of the Affordable Cara Act (ACA). At stake is the legality of an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rule extending tax credits to the 4.5 million people who bought their health plans in the 34 states that declined to establish their own health insurance exchanges under the ACA. The case hinges on enigmatic statutory language that seems to link the amount of tax credits to a health plan purchased "through an Exchange established by the State." According to …
Take It To The Limit: The Illegal Regulation Prohibiting The Take Of Any Threatened Species Under The Endangered Species Act, Jonathan Wood
Take It To The Limit: The Illegal Regulation Prohibiting The Take Of Any Threatened Species Under The Endangered Species Act, Jonathan Wood
Jonathan Wood
The Endangered Species Act forbids the “take” – any activity that adversely affects – any member of an endangered species, but only endangered species. The statute also provides for the listing of threatened species, i.e. species that may become endangered, but protects them only by requiring agencies to consider the impacts of their projects on them. Shortly after the statute was adopted, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service reversed Congress’ policy choice by adopting a regulation that forbids the take of any threatened species. The regulation is not authorized by the Endangered Species Act, but …
Practical Tips For Interpreting Statutory Overrides, Deborah A. Widiss
Practical Tips For Interpreting Statutory Overrides, Deborah A. Widiss
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.
Purposivism In The Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, Kevin M. Stack
Purposivism In The Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, Kevin M. Stack
Northwestern University Law Review
After decades of debate, the lines of distinction between textualism and purposivism have been carefully drawn with respect to the judicial task of statutory interpretation. Far less attention has been devoted to the question of how executive branch officials approach statutory interpretation. While scholars have contrasted agencies’ interpretive practices from those of courts, they have not yet developed a theory of agency statutory interpretation.
This Article develops a purposivist theory of agency statutory interpretation on the ground that regulatory statutes oblige agencies to implement the statutes they administer in that manner. Regulatory statutes not only grant powers but also impose …
Rethinking Special Education's "Least Restrictive Environment" Requirement, Cari Carson
Rethinking Special Education's "Least Restrictive Environment" Requirement, Cari Carson
Michigan Law Review
The federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act promotes the education of students with disabilities together with their nondisabled peers, requiring education in the “least restrictive environment” (“LRE”). This requirement has long been subject to competing interpretations. This Note contends that the dominant interpretation—requiring education in the least restrictive environment available—is deficient and allows students to be placed in unnecessarily restrictive settings. Drawing from child mental health law, this Note proposes an alternative LRE approach that requires education in the least restrictive environment needed and argues that this alternative approach is a better reading of the law.
Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, Christopher J. Walker
Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, Christopher J. Walker
Christopher J. Walker
The Constitution vests all legislative powers in Congress, yet Congress grants expansive lawmaking authority to federal agencies. As positive political theorists have long explored, Congress intends for federal agencies to faithfully exercise their delegated authority, but ensuring fidelity to congressional wishes is difficult due to asymmetries in information, expertise, and preferences that complicate congressional control and oversight. Indeed, this principal-agent problem has a democratic and constitutional dimension, as the legitimacy of administrative governance may well depend on whether the unelected bureaucracy is a faithful agent of Congress. Despite the predominance of lawmaking by regulation and the decades-long application of principal-agent …
Silent Similarity, Jessica D. Litman
Silent Similarity, Jessica D. Litman
Articles
From 1909 to 1930, U.S. courts grappled with claims by authors of prose works claiming that works in a new art form—silent movies—had infringed their copyrights. These cases laid the groundwork for much of modern copyright law, from their broad expansion of the reproduction right, to their puzzled grappling with the question how to compare works in dissimilar media, to their confusion over what sort of evidence should be relevant to show copyrightability, copying and infringement. Some of those cases—in particular, Nichols v. Universal Pictures—are canonical today. They are not, however, well-understood. In particular, the problem at the heart of …
Making The Peg Fit The Hole: A Superior Solution To The Inherant Problems Of Incorporated Definitions, Lindsey P. Gustafson
Making The Peg Fit The Hole: A Superior Solution To The Inherant Problems Of Incorporated Definitions, Lindsey P. Gustafson
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review
No abstract provided.
Reading Statutes In The Common Law Tradition, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski
Reading Statutes In The Common Law Tradition, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski
There is wide agreement in American law and scholarship about the role the common law tradition plays in statutory interpretation. Jurists and scholars of various stripes concur that the common law points away from formalist interpretive approaches like textualism and toward a more creative, independent role for courts. They simply differ over whether the common law tradition is worth preserving. Dynamic and strongly purposive interpreters claim the Anglo-American common law heritage in support of their approach to statutory interpretation, while arguing that formalism is an unjustified break from that tradition. Formalists reply that the common law mindset and methods are …
Aaron's Law: Reactionary Legislation In The Guise Of Justice, Matthew Aaron Viana
Aaron's Law: Reactionary Legislation In The Guise Of Justice, Matthew Aaron Viana
University of Massachusetts Law Review
This Note argues that the proposed amendment to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act dubbed “Aaron’s Law,” created in the wake of the prosecution and subsequent suicide of hacktivist Aaron Swartz, should not be enacted as it is overly reactionary legislation which would have unfortunate and unjust repercussions in the realm of civil litigation. This Note first describes the circumstances under which Mr. Swartz found himself prosecuted under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, namely his intrusion into, and downloading massive amounts of data from, large internet databases like PACER and JSTOR. This Note also explores the disputed interpretation of …
Longstanding Agency Interpretations, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Longstanding Agency Interpretations, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Fordham Law Review
How much deference—or what kind—should courts give to longstanding agency interpretations of statutes? Surprisingly, courts and scholars lack a coherent answer to this question. Legal scholars long have assumed that longstanding agency statutory interpretations are treated with heightened deference on judicial review, and federal courts sometimes have made statements suggesting that this is the case. But in practice, federal court review of longstanding agency interpretations—at both the U.S. Supreme Court and courts of appeals—turns out to be surprisingly erratic. Reviewing courts sometimes note the longevity of an agency’s statutory interpretation as a plus factor in their deference analysis but at …