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Full-Text Articles in Law

Practical Tips For Interpreting Statutory Overrides, Deborah A. Widiss Jul 2015

Practical Tips For Interpreting Statutory Overrides, Deborah A. Widiss

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem In Statutory Interpretation, Deborah Widiss Jan 2012

Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem In Statutory Interpretation, Deborah Widiss

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Statutory overrides — that is, amendments to supersede a judicial interpretation of a statute — are the primary mechanism by which Congress signals disagreement with court interpretations; they are essential to protect the separation of powers and the promise of legislative supremacy. But in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, the Supreme Court held that Congress’s override of a judicial interpretation of Title VII did not control the interpretation of identical language in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and further that Congress’s “neglecting” to amend the ADEA when it amended Title VII was a clear signal that Congress intended the …


Shadow Precedents And The Separation Of Powers: Statutory Interpretation Of Congressional Overrides, Deborah Widiss Jan 2009

Shadow Precedents And The Separation Of Powers: Statutory Interpretation Of Congressional Overrides, Deborah Widiss

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In both judicial decisions and critical commentary on statutory interpretation, the possibility of congressional override is generally considered a significant balance to the countermajoritarian reality that courts, through statutory interpretation, make policy. This Article demonstrates that the "check" on judicial power provided by overrides is not as robust as is typically assumed. One might assume that overridden precedents are functionally erased or reversed. But because Congress technically cannot overrule a prior decision, courts must determine whether the enactment of an override fully supersedes the prior judicial interpretation. Overrides thus raise unique, and previously largely ignored, questions of statutory interpretation. Using …


The Dynamic Judicial Opinion, William D. Popkin Jan 2002

The Dynamic Judicial Opinion, William D. Popkin

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Eskridge's article on Dynamic Statutory Interpretation advances an aggressively pragmatic theory of interpretation but has had more influence among academics than judges because of a failure to attend to the problems of writing a candid, pragmatic and dynamic judicial opinion. This article argues that, although not free from doubt, a candid judicial opinion is preferable, and discusses how to write such an opinion - suggesting that judges rely on the "intent of the statute," not legislative intent; and adopt a personal/exploratory style in presenting their views.


Law And Linguistics: Is There Common Ground?, William D. Popkin Jan 1995

Law And Linguistics: Is There Common Ground?, William D. Popkin

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Book Review. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation By William N. Eskridge, Jr., William D. Popkin Jan 1995

Book Review. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation By William N. Eskridge, Jr., William D. Popkin

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Legitimation And Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, And Community In Federal Indian Law, David C. Williams Jan 1994

Legitimation And Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, And Community In Federal Indian Law, David C. Williams

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Statutory Interpretation In State Courts -- A Study Of Indiana Opinions, William D. Popkin Jan 1991

Statutory Interpretation In State Courts -- A Study Of Indiana Opinions, William D. Popkin

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


United States V. Mcgoff: Can Lawyers Be Taught How To Read Statutes, Reed Dickerson Jan 1991

United States V. Mcgoff: Can Lawyers Be Taught How To Read Statutes, Reed Dickerson

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Foreword: Nonjudicial Statutory Interpretation, William D. Popkin Jan 1990

Foreword: Nonjudicial Statutory Interpretation, William D. Popkin

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In the past decade the study of statutory interpretation has gone from benign neglect to intense scrutiny, but the emphasis has remained on interpretation by courts. This symposium takes a different approach. The major theme is that interpretation depends on the interpreter and that we can gain insight into statutory interpretation, even by courts, from analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of nonjudicial interpreters. Part I of this Foreword places the symposium in the broader setting of recent literature on statutory interpretation, briefly reviewing the major schools of thought and explaining the contributors' perspectives. Part II sets forth my own views …


Obscene Telephone Calls: An Introduction To The Reading Of Statutes, Reed Dickerson Jan 1985

Obscene Telephone Calls: An Introduction To The Reading Of Statutes, Reed Dickerson

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Members of the legal profession continually confront problems of statutory interpretation. Unfortunately, most lawyers have been inadequately trained to read and to draft statutes, resulting in poorly reasoned judicial decisions and policy choices.

In this Article, Professor Dickerson explores common problems associated with statutory interpretation. In exploring these problems, he describes the cognitive process involved in reading a statute and the large fund of tacit assumptions that condition this process. Through a case study analysis, he suggests a method of approaching problems of statutory interpretation.


Law And Language: The Role Of Pragmatics In Statutory Interpretation, M. B.W. Sinclair Jan 1985

Law And Language: The Role Of Pragmatics In Statutory Interpretation, M. B.W. Sinclair

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In everyday conversation social conventions constrain our speech and aid understanding of the speech of others. These social conventions have been analyzed by the philosopher H.P. Grice and others. Professor Sinclair explores the applicability of such conventions to statutes and thereby derives a set of pragmatic rules of statutory construction. These rules explain some of the intuitions underlying "canons of construction" and their limitations and provide a basis for understanding and for criticizing some important judicial decisions.


Statutory Interpretation In America: Dipping Into Legislative History, Part Ii, Reed Dickerson Jan 1984

Statutory Interpretation In America: Dipping Into Legislative History, Part Ii, Reed Dickerson

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Statutory Interpretation In America: Dipping Into Legislative History, Part I, Reed Dickerson Jan 1984

Statutory Interpretation In America: Dipping Into Legislative History, Part I, Reed Dickerson

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Statutory Interpretation: Dipping Into Legislative History, Reed Dickerson Jan 1983

Statutory Interpretation: Dipping Into Legislative History, Reed Dickerson

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Statutory Interpretation: The Uses And Anatomy Of Context, Reed Dickerson Jan 1972

Statutory Interpretation: The Uses And Anatomy Of Context, Reed Dickerson

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Every communication that is generated by a written instrument consists of two elements which must be considered in arriving at the meaning of the communication. Those elements are: (1) the written vehicle itself, and (2) its surrounding context. The surrounding context which thus completes the communication consists only of those underlying cultural aspects which, when considered in relation to the written vehicle, are: (1) relevant to the written vehicle, (2) reliable, (3) shared by the author and the audience, and (4) relied on by both author and audience to complete the communication. The author suggests that those cultural elements which …


Statutory Interpretation: Core Meaning And Marginal Uncertainty, Reed Dickerson Jan 1964

Statutory Interpretation: Core Meaning And Marginal Uncertainty, Reed Dickerson

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Objectives In The Field Of Legislation, Frank Edward Horack Jan 1953

Objectives In The Field Of Legislation, Frank Edward Horack

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Cooperative Action For Improved Statutory Interpretation, Frank Edward Horack Jr. Jan 1950

Cooperative Action For Improved Statutory Interpretation, Frank Edward Horack Jr.

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


The Disintegration Of Statutory Construction, Frank E. Horack Jr. Apr 1949

The Disintegration Of Statutory Construction, Frank E. Horack Jr.

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Effect Of Statutory Limitation Of Term Of Office Created By Legislature Oct 1948

Effect Of Statutory Limitation Of Term Of Office Created By Legislature

Indiana Law Journal

Recent Cases: Interpretation and Construction


Congressional Silence: A Tool Of Judicial Supremacy, Frank Edward Horack Jr. Jan 1947

Congressional Silence: A Tool Of Judicial Supremacy, Frank Edward Horack Jr.

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Change In Interpretation After Reenactment Oct 1946

Change In Interpretation After Reenactment

Indiana Law Journal

Notes and Comments: Statutory Construction


Constitutional Liberties And Statutory Construction, Frank Edward Horack Jr. Jan 1944

Constitutional Liberties And Statutory Construction, Frank Edward Horack Jr.

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.