Law Commons^™

Solving The Congressional Review Act’S Conundrum, Cary Coglianese

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Congress routinely enacts statutes that require federal agencies to adopt specific regulations. When Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, for example, it mandated that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopt an anti-corruption regulation requiring energy companies to disclose payments they make to foreign governments. Although the Dodd-Frank Act specifically required the SEC to adopt this disclosure requirement, the agency’s eventual regulation was also, like other administrative rules, subject to disapproval by Congress under a process outlined in a separate statute known as the Congressional Review Act (CRA).

After the SEC issued its …

Private Law Statutory Interpretation, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

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This Essay is an attempt to describe the basis and consequences of the disconnect between private law and legislation, both for private law theorizing and legal thinking more generally. It does so by focusing on “private law statutes,” legislation that creates or modifies rights and obligations between parties in their private capacities. Private law statutes do more than merely create private causes of action. While they create private causes, they do so on the basis of principles that are specific to the horizontal interaction between parties, rather than entirely for public-regarding policy reasons. While statutes in the areas traditionally identified …

Legislative History Is Dead; Long Live Legislative History, Genevieve B. Tung

Librarian Scholarship at Penn Law

Review of Victoria Nourse, Misreading Law, Misreading Democracy (Harvard 2016)

Chevron's Interstitial Steps, Cary Coglianese

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The Chevron doctrine’s apparent simplicity has long captivated judges, lawyers, and scholars. According to the standard formulation, Chevron involves just two straightforward steps: (1) Is a statute clear? (2) If not, is the agency’s interpretation of the statute reasonable? Despite the influence of this two-step framework, Chevron has come under fire in recent years. Some critics bemoan what they perceive as the Supreme Court’s incoherent application of the Chevron framework over time. Others argue that Chevron’s second step, which calls for courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, amounts to an abdication of judicial responsibility. …

Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, Ryan David Doerfler

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Legislative intent is a fiction. Courts and scholars accept this by and large. As this Article shows, however, both are confused as to why, and, more importantly, as to what this entails.

This Article argues that the standard account of why legislative intent is a fiction—that Congress is a “they,” not an “it”—rests on an overly simplistic conception of shared agency. Drawing on contemporary work in philosophy of action, this Article contends that Congress as such has no intentions not because of difficulties in aggregating the intentions of individual members, but rather because Congress lacks the sort of delegatory structure …

Presidential Signing Statements: A New Perspective, Christopher S. Yoo

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This Article offers a new perspective on Presidents’ use of signing statements. Following the dichotomy reflected in the literature, I will analyze signing statements raising constitutional objections and those offering interpretive guidance for ambiguous provisions separately. With respect to constitutional interpretation of statutes by the executive branch, Presidents have long asserted the authority and obligation to consider constitutionality when executing statutes. The widespread acceptance of the President’s power to construe statutes to avoid constitutional problems and to refuse to defend the constitutionality of or to enforce statutes in appropriate cases confirms the propriety of this conclusion. If these fairly uncontroversial …

Does The Packers And Stockyards Act Require Antitrust Harm?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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The Packers and Stockyards Act was enacted in 1921. Congress was plainly influenced by the 1919 publication of a Federal Trade Commission Report on the meatpacking industry. Consistent with the FTC’s jurisdiction and concerns, the Report dealt with deceptive and unfair practices as well as practices that were believed to violate the antitrust laws. The language of the PSA does much the same, mixing the two. Of its seven specific prohibitions, three contain antitrust-like provisions requiring a lessening of competition. Two others reach unfair and tort-like conduct without any requirement of harm to competition. The remaining two reach both anticompetitive …