Law Commons^™

Externalities And The Common Owner, Madison Condon

Faculty Scholarship

Due to the embrace of modern portfolio theory, most of the stock market is controlled by institutional investors holding broadly diversified economy-mirroring portfolios. Recent scholarship has revealed the anti-competitive incentives that arise when a firm’s largest shareholders own similarly sized stakes in the firm’s industry competitors. This Article expands the consideration of the effects of common ownership from the industry level to the market-portfolio level, and argues that diversified investors should rationally be motivated to internalize intra-portfolio negative externalities. This portfolio perspective can explain the increasing climate change related activism of institutional investors, who have applied coordinated shareholder power to …

Declining Industrial Disruption, James Bessen

Faculty Scholarship

Recent research finds that markups are rising, suggesting declining competition. But does less price competition mean less Schumpeterian “creative destruction”/industry dynamism? This paper reports the first recent estimates of trends in the displacement of industry-leading firms. Displacement hazards rose for several decades since 1970 but have declined sharply since 2000. Using a production function-based model to explore the role of investments, acquisitions, and lobbying, we find that investments by dominant firms in intangibles, especially software, are distinctly associated with greater persistence and reduced leapfrogging. Software investments by top firms soared around 2000, contributing substantially to the decline. Also, higher markups …

Response To Oliar And Stern: On Duration, The Idea/Expression Dichotomy, And Time, Wendy J. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

Courts often use possession to determine who should own unclaimed resources. Yet, as Oliar and Stern demonstrate, the concept of possession is little more than a metaphor, capable of being applied to a broad range of phenomena. The authors helpfully deploy “time” as a metric to sort through the rules determining what should count as possession, and they survey the likely costs and benefits attached to choosing earlier versus later events as triggers for acquiring title.

With those tools in hand, Oliar and Stern employ “time” and the analogy of physical possession to address problems in copyright, patent, and trademark …

Index Funds And The Future Of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, And Policy, Scott Hirst, Lucian Bebchuk

Faculty Scholarship

Index funds own an increasingly large proportion of American public companies. The stewardship decisions of index fund managers—how they monitor, vote, and engage with their portfolio companies—can be expected to have a profound impact on the governance and performance of public companies and the economy. Understanding index fund stewardship, and how policymaking can improve it, is thus critical for corporate law scholarship. In this Article we contribute to such understanding by providing a comprehensive theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis of index fund stewardship.

We begin by putting forward an agency-costs theory of index fund incentives. Stewardship decisions by index funds …

Common Ownership And Executive Incentives: The Implausibility Of Compensation As An Anticompetitive Mechanism, David I. Walker

Faculty Scholarship

Mutual funds, pension funds and other institutional investors are a growing presence in U.S. equity markets, and these investors frequently hold large stakes in shares of competing companies. Because these common owners might prefer to maximize the values of their portfolios of companies, rather than the value of individual companies in isolation, this new reality has lead to a concern that companies in concentrated industries with high degrees of common ownership might compete less vigorously with each other than they otherwise would. But what mechanism would link common ownership with reduced competition? Some commentators argue that one of the most …

The Other Janus And The Future Of Labor’S Capital, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

Two forms of labor’s capital—union funds and public pension funds—have profoundly reshaped the corporate world. They have successfully advocated for shareholder empowerment initiatives like proxy access, declassified boards, majority voting, say on pay, private fund registration, and the CEO-to-worker pay ratio. They have also served as lead plaintiffs in forty percent of federal securities fraud and Delaware deal class actions. Today, much-discussed reforms like revised shareholder proposal rules and mandatory arbitration threaten two of the main channels by which these shareholders have exercised power. But labor’s capital faces its greatest, even existential, threats from outside corporate law. This Essay addresses …

Economic Theory Of Criminal Law, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

Economic theory of criminal law consists of normative and positive parts. Normative economic theory, which began with writings by Beccaria and Bentham, aims to recommend an ideal criminal punishment scheme. Positive economic theory, which appeared later in writings by Holmes and Posner, aims to justify and to better understand the criminal law rules that exist. Since the purpose of criminal law is to deter socially undesirable conduct, economic theory, which emphasizes incentives, would appear to be an important perspective from which to examine criminal law.

Positive economic theory, applied to substantive criminal law, seeks to explain and to justify criminal …

Law And Economics Versus Economic Analysis Of Law, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

I agree with Calabresi's general distinction between Economic Analysis of Law and Law and Economics. However, these broad categories may obscure important differences between types of law and economics scholarship. I would distinguish positive economic analysis from normative economic analysis, and positivist legal analysis from nonpositivist analysis. The four categories generated by these distinctions provide a more fine-grained map of the styles of reasoning in law and economics, and has implications for the future of law and economics.

Mistaken About Mistakes, Kathryn Zeiler

Faculty Scholarship

Theoretical work in behavioral economics aims to modify assumptions of standard neoclassical models of individual decision-making to better comport with observed behavior. The alternative assumptions fall into at least two categories: nonstandard preferences and psychological mistakes. Applications of behavioral economics models in law, however, tend to assume that deviations from standard neoclassical models are meant to build in psychological mistakes that produce regrettable choices. Often follow-on policy prescriptions suggest interventions that either help individuals choose correctly or go further to substitute the “correct” choices for those that mistake-prone individuals might choose in error. Such policy prescriptions are ill suited in …

The Future Of Law And Economics And The Legacy Of Guido Calabresi, Wendy J. Gordon, Alain Marciano, Giovanni B. Ramello

Faculty Scholarship

In 1991, the American Law and Economics Association identified Guido Calabresi, Ronald Coase, Henry Manne and Richard Posner as the founders of the 'law and economics' movement. The European Journal of Law and Economics has already devoted a special issue to each of the last three. It is now Calabresi's turn. The order has no particular meaning and the current issue in Calabresi's honor does not depend on a desire to complete the list. Rather, we waited for a very special occasion to celebrate Calabresi's work - the publication of his latest book, The Future of Law and Economics (2016).

Digital Market Perfection, Rory Van Loo

Faculty Scholarship

Google’s, Apple’s, and other companies’ automated assistants are increasingly serving as personal shoppers. These digital intermediaries will save us time by purchasing grocery items, transferring bank accounts, and subscribing to cable. The literature has only begun to hint at the paradigm shift needed to navigate the legal risks and rewards of this coming era of automated commerce. This Article begins to fill that gap first by surveying legal battles related to contract exit, data access, and deception that will determine the extent to which automated assistants are able to help consumers to search and switch, potentially bringing tremendous societal benefits. …

The Supreme Court Bar At The Bar Of Patents, Paul Gugliuzza

Faculty Scholarship

Over the past two decades, a few dozen lawyers have come to dominate practice before the U.S. Supreme Court. By many accounts, these elite lawyers—whose clients are often among the largest corporations in the world—have spurred the Court to hear more cases that businesses care about and to decide those cases in favor of their clients. The Supreme Court’s recent case law on antitrust, arbitration, punitive damages, class actions, and more provides copious examples.

Though it is often overlooked in discussions of the emergent Supreme Court bar, patent law is another area in which the Court’s agenda has changed significantly …

Price Discrimination & Intellectual Property, Michael J. Meurer, Ben Depoorter

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter reviews the law and economics literature on intellectual property law and price discrimination. We introduce legal scholars to the wide range of techniques used by intellectual property owners to practice price discrimination; in many cases the link between commercial practice and price discrimination may not be apparent to non-economists. We introduce economists to the many facets of intellectual property law that influence the profitability and practice of price discrimination. The law in this area has complex effects on customer sorting and arbitrage. Intellectual property law offers fertile ground for analysis of policies that facilitate or discourage price discrimination. …

Digital Platforms And Antitrust Law, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This Article is about "big data" and antitrust law. Big data, for my purposes, refers to digital platforms that enable the discovery and sharing of information by consumers, and the harvesting and analysis of consumer data by the platform. The obvious example of such a platform is Google. The big platforms owe their market dominance not to anticompetitive conduct, but to economies of scale. This Article discusses three types of anticompetitive conduct associated with digital platforms: kill zone expropriation, acquisition of nascent rivals, and denial of access to data. There is nothing so unusual about digital platforms that would require …

Comment On 'Error And Regulatory Risk In Financial Institution Regulation', Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

I agree with just about everything Jonathan Macey (2017) says in his symposium contribution. His claim that bureaucratic tendencies toward regularity—specifically, treating like cases alike—generate errors in categorization seems appropriate to me. His explanations of the pathologies in financial regulation should fall in the category of essential or required reading for anyone who chooses to write on the topic. Where I differ from Macey is in the choice of framework, or perspective from which to view the pathologies. Whereas Macey adopts an “error cost” framework, which is clearly appropriate for this symposium, I would build explicitly on a “public choice” …

The Law Officer (Lo) And Compliance Officer (Co): Status, Function, Liabilities, And Relationship, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

The rise of Compliance officers (COs) has raised questions about their status in institutions and comparisons to the Legal Officers (CLOs). While both officers deal with law and its enforcement, their functions and positions differ in fundamental ways. And while LOs position is recognized, the status of COs is evolving. However, these differences are slowly becoming clearer.

1. While the LO’s function is to provide legal advice to the institutional client, the CO’s function is to (i) evaluate the institution’s activities before violations take place and (ii) help prevent violations of the law by the institution. The CO should detect …

Oligopoly Pricing And Richard Posner, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

Over a span of nearly 50 years Richard Posner’s voice has loomed large over the subject of oligopoly pricingand antitrust. The span begins in 1969 with Posner’s publication of “Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach,” which argues for more aggressive enforcement of Section 1 in cases involving circumstantial evidence of conspiracy. The span ends with Posner’s opinion in In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, in 2015. The two writings, the first an academic article published early in Posner’s career and the second a judicial opinion published near the end of his time on the bench, suggest very different …

Serial Collusion By Multi-Product Firms, Michael J. Meurer, William Kovacic, Robert Marshall

Faculty Scholarship

We provide empirical evidence that many multi-product firms have each participated in several cartels over the past 50 years. Standard analysis of cartel conduct, as well as enforcement policy, is rooted in the presumption that each cartel in which a given firm participates is a singular activity, independent of other cartel conduct by the firm. We argue that this analysis is deficient in many respects in the face of serial collusion by multi-product firms. We offer policy recommendations to reign in serial collusion, including a mandatory coordinated effects review for any merger involving a serial colluder, regardless of the apparent …

The Policy Challenge Of Artificial Intelligence, James Bessen

Faculty Scholarship

New "artificial intelligence" (AI) technology promises to bring dramatic social and economic changes, demanding major policy changes. In intellectual property and antitrust law, AI will exacerbate a damaging trend: across all major sectors of the economy, proprietary information technology is increasing the market dominance of large firms. This trend might not seem like bad news, but it is evidence of a slowdown in the spread of technical knowledge throughout the economy. The result is rising industry concentration, slower productivity growth and growing wage inequality. The key challenge to IP and antitrust policy will be counter this trend yet maintain innovation …

Whom Should We Punish, And How? Rational Incentives And Criminal Justice Reform, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This Article sets out a comprehensive account of rational punishment theory and examines its implications for criminal law reform. Specifically, what offenses should be subjected to criminal punishment, and how should we punish? Should we use prison sentences or fines, and when should we use them? Should some conduct be left to a form of market punishment through private lawsuits? Should fines be used to fund the criminal justice system? The answers I offer address some of the most important public policy issues of the moment, such as mass incarceration and the use of fines to finance law enforcement. The …

Trends In Private Patent Costs And Rents For Publicly-Traded United States Firms, James Bessen, Peter Neuhausler, John L. Turner, Jonathan Williams

Faculty Scholarship

We use detailed data to estimate the private costs and private rents of United States patents for publicly-traded firms. In analyzing costs, we first introduce a novel theoretical model to interpret our estimates. We then combine lawsuit data from Derwent Litalert with non-practicing entity (NPE) lawsuits collected by Patent Freedom, and use an event-study approach to estimate losses suffered by alleged infringers during 1984-2009. To estimate rents, we combine patent data from the USPTO and EPO with financial data from COMPUSTAT, and use market-value regressions to estimate the value of patent rents for publicly-traded US firms during 1979-2002. We find …

Deterrence And Aggregate Litigation, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines the deterrence properties of aggregate litigation and class actions, with an emphasis on positive value claims. In the multiple victim scenario with positive value claims, the probability that an individual victim will bring suit falls toward zero with geometric decay as the number of victims increases. The reason is that the incentive to free ride increases with the number of victims. Deterrence does not collapse but is degraded. Undercompliance is observed, which worsens as the number of victims increases. Compliance is never socially optimal, and the shortfall from optimality increases with the number of victims. These results, …

The Real Reason The Investor Class Hates Pensions, David H. Webber

Shorter Faculty Works

No issue in America today better illustrates the divergent interests of working Americans and the 1 percent than pension reform. Substantial empirical evidence shows that America’s favored retirement vehicle — the 401(k), recently renounced by its own inventors — is grossly inadequate and will leave tens of millions of Americans with insufficient retirement assets. And yet states and cities are busy converting traditional pensions into these failing 401(k)s or equivalents, to the great benefit of money managers and the finance class.

What Explains Observed Reluctance To Trade? A Comprehensive Literature Review, Kathryn Zeiler

Faculty Scholarship

Valuation gaps and exchange asymmetries are among the most widely studied phenomena in the field of behavioral economics. The purpose of this chapter is to present the current state of the social science literature related to observed reluctance to trade. Numerous theories have been proposed and only a few might be safe to rule out based on the evidence to date. The chapter begins by describing the standard model of preferences, which generally assumes that valuation is independent of ownership status, and then catalogs early findings that seem to suggest that ownership status influences valuation. Early research tested various potential …

Optimal Remedies For Patent Infringement, Keith N. Hylton, Mengxi Zhang

Faculty Scholarship

This paper derives optimal remedies for patent infringement, examining damages awards and injunctions. The fundamental optimality condition that applies to both awards and injunctions equates the marginal static cost of intellectual property protection with the marginal “dynamic” benefit from the innovation thereby induced. When the social value of the patent is sufficiently high, the optimal award induces socially efficient investment by giving the innovator the entire social value of her investment.

The Agency Problems Of Institutional Investors, Scott Hirst, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen

Faculty Scholarship

We analyze how the rise of institutional investors has transformed the governance landscape. While corporate ownership is now concentrated in the hands of institutional investors that can exercise stewardship of those corporations that would be impossible for dispersed shareholders, the investment managers of these institutional investors have agency problems vis-à-vis their own investors. We develop an analytical framework for examining these agency problems and apply it to study several key types of investment managers.

We analyze how the investment managers of mutual funds - both index funds and actively managed funds - have incentives to under-spend on stewardship and to …

Law, Social Welfare, And Net Neutrality, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

Net neutrality generates wealth transfers from one type of internet content provider to another. In theory, these transfers might be socially desirable, and could be justified on the basis of informational externalities similar to those cited to justify fair use in copyright law. In practice, however, the conditions that justify fair use do not hold where net neutrality operates. Moreover, the internal subsidization required by net neutrality generates a regressive transfer. The welfare gains that might come from controlling anticompetitive abuse or government coercion through implementation of net neutrality can be achieved by alternative policies with less harmful consequences.

Trump & Vat: Nafta, Trade Barriers & Retaliatory Tariffs, Richard Thompson Ainsworth

Faculty Scholarship

During the first presidential debate President-elect Donald J. Trump argued that the value added tax (VAT) operated as a trade barrier to American business everywhere. He particularly pointed to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Mexico was a special concern. China was also a concern, but in this instance Trump was troubled both by China’s VAT and by China’s alleged currency manipulation.

This paper can only consider the VAT aspect of Trump’s trade policy. There appears to be some confusion about the operation of the VAT, particularly the border adjustment mechanism, and how US tariffs could “level the playing …

Blockchain, Bitcoin, And Vat In The Gcc: The Missing Trader Example, Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Musaad Alwohaibi

Faculty Scholarship

Blockchain is coming to tax administration and will cause fundamental change. This article considers the potential for blockchain technology as it applies to the introduction of a value added tax in the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Blockchain technology disrupts centralized ledgers. Blockchain improves efficiency, security and transparency. Perhaps no centralized ledger system presents more challenges than that of the modern tax administration. The central data storage system of a modern tax authority contains all return, payment, and audit activity for all taxpayers arranged tax-by-tax for three years or longer periods of time.

It is likely that blockchain will come first to …

Tip Of The Iceberg Ii: How The Intended-Uses Principle Produces Medical Knowledge And Protects Liberty, Christopher Robertson

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, the Food and Drug Administration’s pre-market approval process has come under increasing scrutiny as an infringement on liberty and a regulation of speech. In the first part of this symposium contribution, we offer a case study of Seroquel XR, showing how the FDA’s premarket approval process – and the restrictions on “off-label” promotion in particular – caused the drug company to produce and disseminate knowledge about safety and efficacy for new uses. The law successfully resolved the collective action problem of producing knowledge, even while the law protected the liberty of individual doctors and patients to use …