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Law and Economics

Boston University School of Law

Law and economics

Articles 1 - 12 of 12

Full-Text Articles in Law

Trial Selection And Estimating Damages Equations, Keith N. Hylton Jan 2023

Trial Selection And Estimating Damages Equations, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

Many studies have employed regression analysis with data drawn from court opinions. For example, an analyst might use regression analysis to determine the factors that explain the size of damages awards or the factors that determine the probability that the plaintiff will prevail at trial or on appeal. However, the full potential of multiple regression analysis in legal research has not been realized, largely because of the sample selection problem. We propose a method for controlling for sample selection bias using data from court opinions.


Replicability In Empirical Legal Research, Jason Chin, Kathryn Zeiler Oct 2021

Replicability In Empirical Legal Research, Jason Chin, Kathryn Zeiler

Faculty Scholarship

As part of a broader methodological reform movement, scientists are increasingly interested in improving the replicability of their research. Replicability allows others to perform replications to explore potential errors and statistical issues that might call the original results into question. Little attention, however, has been paid to the state of replicability in the field of empirical legal research (ELR). Quality is especially important in this field because empirical legal researchers produce work that is regularly relied upon by courts and other legal bodies. In this review article, we summarize the current state of ELR relative to the broader movement towards …


Law And Economics Versus Economic Analysis Of Law, Keith N. Hylton Aug 2019

Law And Economics Versus Economic Analysis Of Law, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

I agree with Calabresi's general distinction between Economic Analysis of Law and Law and Economics. However, these broad categories may obscure important differences between types of law and economics scholarship. I would distinguish positive economic analysis from normative economic analysis, and positivist legal analysis from nonpositivist analysis. The four categories generated by these distinctions provide a more fine-grained map of the styles of reasoning in law and economics, and has implications for the future of law and economics.


The Future Of Law And Economics And The Legacy Of Guido Calabresi, Wendy J. Gordon, Alain Marciano, Giovanni B. Ramello Aug 2019

The Future Of Law And Economics And The Legacy Of Guido Calabresi, Wendy J. Gordon, Alain Marciano, Giovanni B. Ramello

Faculty Scholarship

In 1991, the American Law and Economics Association identified Guido Calabresi, Ronald Coase, Henry Manne and Richard Posner as the founders of the 'law and economics' movement. The European Journal of Law and Economics has already devoted a special issue to each of the last three. It is now Calabresi's turn. The order has no particular meaning and the current issue in Calabresi's honor does not depend on a desire to complete the list. Rather, we waited for a very special occasion to celebrate Calabresi's work - the publication of his latest book, The Future of Law and Economics (2016).


Nuisance, Keith N. Hylton Jul 2014

Nuisance, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This entry sets out the law and the economic theory of nuisance. Nuisance law serves a regulatory function: it induces actors to choose the socially preferred level of an activity by imposing liability when the externalized costs of the activity are substantially greater than the externalized benefits or not reciprocal to other background external costs. Proximate cause doctrine plays a role in supplementing nuisance law.


The Fair Use Doctrine: Markets, Market Failure And Rights Of Use, Wendy J. Gordon Jan 2014

The Fair Use Doctrine: Markets, Market Failure And Rights Of Use, Wendy J. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

Markets are most acceptable when they serve efficiency and other goals. It is only under transaction-costless conditions of perfect knowledge, flawless and cost-free enforcement, full monetization, and instantaneous ability to organize and negotiate, that markets are guaranteed to generate efficient outcomes. And even then, markets could fall short as social tools, because goals other than allocative efficiency may fail to be met.


Biomedical Ethics And The Law: A Critical Perspective, Keith N. Hylton Jan 2007

Biomedical Ethics And The Law: A Critical Perspective, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

Health law, a fast growing field of scholarship, appears to consist largely of two schools. One focuses on health care antitrust, taking as its fundamental premise the notion that health care markets should be distinguished from and treated differently than other markets. This premise underlying health care antitrust is based on a few recurring features of health care markets, such as informational asymmetry, that are taken as sufficient bases for treating them differently.1 The other school of health law is biomedical ethics, which has taken on increasing importance in view of the many tradeoffs that arise when health care …


The Economic Theory Of Politics And Legal Interpretation In The United States, Jack M. Beermann Jan 1991

The Economic Theory Of Politics And Legal Interpretation In The United States, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Economic Rents And Essential Facilities, Keith N. Hylton Jan 1991

Economic Rents And Essential Facilities, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper presents an economic analysis of the essential facility doctrine of antitrust. According to this doctrine, a firm or group of firms that possesses exclusive access to a cost-reducing facility must be prepared to share such access on fair terms with competitors.


Interest Group Politics And Judicial Behavior: Macey's Public Choice, Jack M. Beermann Jan 1991

Interest Group Politics And Judicial Behavior: Macey's Public Choice, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The economic theory of government has lately gained the acceptance in legal circles that it has long enjoyed in political science and economics. The economic theory, also known as "public choice," analyzes and explains government action and private political activity according to the basic assumption of economics, that individuals respond to economic incentives in their environments in a self-interested manner. The economic theory is thus useful descriptively, to explain diverse political phenomena, and prescriptively, to help formulate reform strategy.


The Law And Economics Of Organ Procurement, Keith N. Hylton Jul 1990

The Law And Economics Of Organ Procurement, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper presents an economic analysis of the organ procurement system in the U.S. and examines proposals to alleviate the shortage of transplantable organs. The paper's principal conclusions are: (1) Although non-market solutions deserve the highest priority, demand increases fueled by improvements in transplant technology will probably make some market-based solution necessary in the future. (2) Quality deterioration and coercion will not necessarily be worrisome problems under a market-based procurement system.


An Inadequate Basis For Health, Safety, And Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, Michael S. Baram Jan 1980

An Inadequate Basis For Health, Safety, And Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, Michael S. Baram

Faculty Scholarship

The use of cost-benefit analysis in agency decisionmaking has been hailed as the cure for numerous dissatisfactions with governmental regulation. Using this form of economic analysis arguably promotes rational decisionmaking and prevents health, safety, and environmental regulations from having inflationary and other adverse economic impacts. Closer analysis, however, reveals that the cost-benefit approach to regulatory decisionmaking suffers from major methodological limitations and institutional abuses. In practice, regulatory uses of cost-benefit analysis stifle and obstruct the achievement of legislated health, safety, and environmental goals.

This Article critically reviews the methodological limitations of cost-benefit analysis, current agency uses of cost-benefit analysis under …