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Incentives To Take Care Under Contributory And Comparative Fault, Keith N. Hylton, Benjamin Ogden
Incentives To Take Care Under Contributory And Comparative Fault, Keith N. Hylton, Benjamin Ogden
Faculty Scholarship
Previous literature on contributory versus comparative negligence has shown that they reach equivalent equilibria. These results, however, depend upon a stylized application of the Hand Formula and an insufficiently coarse model of strategic incentives. Taking this into account, we identify a set of cases where care by one agent significantly increases the benefits of care by the other. When such cases obtain under bilateral harm, comparative negligence generates greater incentives for care, but this additional care occurs only when care is not socially optimal. By contrast, under unilateral harm or asymmetric costs of care, contributory negligence creates socially excessive care. …
Negligence And Two-Sided Causation, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin, Hyo-Youn Chu
Negligence And Two-Sided Causation, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin, Hyo-Youn Chu
Faculty Scholarship
We extend the economic analysis of negligence and intervening causation to "two-sided causation" scenarios. In the two-sided causation scenario the effectiveness of the injurer's care depends on some intervention, and the risk of harm generated by the injurer's failure to take care depends on some other intervention. We find that the distortion from socially optimal care is more severe in the two-sided causation scenario than in the one-sided causation scenario, and generally in the direction of excessive care. The practical lesson is that the likelihood that injurers will have optimal care incentives under the negligence test in the presence of …
Information And Causation In Tort Law: Generalizing The Learned Hand Test For Causation Cases, Keith N. Hylton
Information And Causation In Tort Law: Generalizing The Learned Hand Test For Causation Cases, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
This paper discusses the economics of causation in tort law, describing precise implications for precautionary incentives when courts are and are not perfectly informed. With precautionary incentives identified, we can ask whether the causation inquiry enhances welfare, and if so under what conditions. Perhaps the most important innovation applies to the Hand Formula. When causation is an issue, the probability of causal intervention should be part of the Hand test, and the generalized Hand test offers a method of distinguishing significant classes of causation cases. I close with implications for the moral significance of causation and for economic analysis of …
Causation In Tort Law: A Reconsideration, Keith N. Hylton
Causation In Tort Law: A Reconsideration, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
Causation is a source of confusion in tort theory, as well as a flash point for the debate between consequentialist and deontological legal theorists.1 Consequentialists argue that causation is generally determined by the policy grounds for negligence, not by a technical analysis of the facts.2 Conversely, deontologists reject the view that policy motives determine causation findings.
Causation has also generated different approaches within the consequentialist school. Some take an essentially forward- looking approach to formalizing causation analysis, finding causation analysis to be subsumed within the Hand Formula.4 Another approach within the consequentialist school closely examines the incentive …
Negligence, Causation, And Incentives For Care, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin
Negligence, Causation, And Incentives For Care, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin
Faculty Scholarship
We present a new model of negligence and causation and examine the influence of the negligence test, in the presence of intervening causation, on the level of care. In this model, the injurer's decision to take care reduces the likelihood of an accident only in the event that some nondeterministic intervention occurs. The effects of the negligence test depend on the information available to the court, and the manner in which the test is implemented. The key effect of the negligence test, in the presence of intervening causation, is to induce actors to take into account the distribution of the …
New Private Law Theory And Tort Law: A Comment, Keith N. Hylton
New Private Law Theory And Tort Law: A Comment, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
This comment was prepared for the Harvard Law Review symposium on “The New Private Law,” as a response to Benjamin Zipursky’s principal paper on torts. I find Zipursky’s reliance on Cardozo’s Palsgraf opinion as a foundational source of tort theory troubling, for two reasons. First, Cardozo fails to offer a consistent theoretical framework for tort law in his opinions, many of which are difficult to reconcile with one another. Second, Palsgraf should be understood as an effort by Cardozo to provide greater predictability, within a special class of proximate cause cases, by reallocating decision-making power from juries to judges. It …
Negligence, Causation And Information, Stephen G. Marks
Negligence, Causation And Information, Stephen G. Marks
Faculty Scholarship
This note suggests a model to unify, in a simple information-based framework, the notion of negligence and the various notions of causation. In effect, the model demonstrates that negligence, probabilistic cause and cause-in-fact represent an identical concept applied to different information sets. This note uses the unified framework to develop a simple algorithm for the practical application of the principles of causation in the law of negligence.