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Articles 91 - 110 of 110
Full-Text Articles in Law
Confronting The Reluctant Accomplice, John G. Douglass
Confronting The Reluctant Accomplice, John G. Douglass
Law Faculty Publications
The Supreme Court treats the Confrontation Clause as a rule of evidence that excludes unreliable hearsay. But where the hearsay declarant is an accomplice who refuses to testify at defendant's trial, the Court's approach leads prosecutors and defendants to ignore real opportunities for confrontation, while they debate the reliability of hearsay. And even where the Court's doctrine excludes hearsay, it leads prosecutors to purchase the accomplice's testimony through a process that raises equally serious questions of reliability. Thus, the Court's approach promotes neither reliability nor confrontation. This Article advocates an approach that applies the Confrontation Clause to hearsay declarants in …
The Confrontation Clause: Statements Against Penal Interest As A Firmly Rooted Hearsay Exception, Amy N. Loth
The Confrontation Clause: Statements Against Penal Interest As A Firmly Rooted Hearsay Exception, Amy N. Loth
Cleveland State Law Review
This Article will explore why these types of confessions, called self-inculpatory statements, should be admissible under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Part IIA of this Article will discuss the two-part test set forth in Ohio v. Roberts. Part IIB will address Lilly v. Virginia, the Supreme Court's first attempt to resolve whether statements against penal interest are sufficiently reliable to be admissible under the Confrontation Clause. Part IIB will also explore the distinction between self-inculpatory and non-self-inculpatory statements, what constitutes a "firmnly rooted" hearsay exception, and also the policy concerns behind creating a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception. Part …
Lilly V. Virginia Glimmers Of Hope For The Confrontation Clause?, Richard D. Friedman
Lilly V. Virginia Glimmers Of Hope For The Confrontation Clause?, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
In 1662, in The Case of Thomas Tong and Others, which involved charges of treason against several defendants, the judges of the King's Bench conferred on a crucial set of points of procedure. As reported by one of the judges, Sir John Kelyng, the judges agreed unanimously that a pretrial confession made to the authorities was evidence against the Party himself who made the Confession, and indeed, if adequately proved could support a conviction of that party without additional witnesses to the treason itself. But -- again unanimously, and quite definitively -- the judges also agreed that the confession cannot …
Reconceiving The Right To Present Witnesses, Richard A. Nagareda
Reconceiving The Right To Present Witnesses, Richard A. Nagareda
Michigan Law Review
Modem American law is, in a sense, a system of compartments. For understandable curricular reasons, legal education sharply distinguishes the law of evidence from both constitutional law and criminal procedure. In fact, the lines of demarcation between these three subjects extend well beyond law school to the organization of the leading treatises and case headnotes to which practicing lawyers routinely refer in their trade. Many of the most interesting questions in the law, however, do not rest squarely within a single compartment; instead, they concern the content and legitimacy of the lines of demarcation themselves. This article explores a significant, …
Lilly V. Virginia: A Chance To Reconceptualize The Confrontation Right, Richard D. Friedman
Lilly V. Virginia: A Chance To Reconceptualize The Confrontation Right, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
In Lilly v. Virginia, the Supreme Court once again has the opportunity to grapple with the meaning of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendmel).t. The basic facts of Lilly are simple, for they present the ageold problem of accomplice confessions. Three men, Gary Barker and Ben and Mark Lilly, went on a crime spree, during which one of them shot to death a young man they had robbed and kidnaped. Ben Lilly was charged with being the triggerman, and Barker testified to that effect at Ben's trial. Mark did not testify. But Mark had made a statement to the …
Confrontation Confronted, Richard D. Friedman, Margaret A. Berger, Steven R. Shapiro
Confrontation Confronted, Richard D. Friedman, Margaret A. Berger, Steven R. Shapiro
Articles
The following article is an edited version of the amicus curiae brief filed with the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1998, in the case of Benjamin Lee Lilly v. Commonwealth of Virginia (No. 98-5881). "This case raises important questions about the meaning of the confrontation clause, which has been a vital ingredient of the fair trial right for hundreds of years," Professor Richard Friedman and his co-authors say. "In particular, this case presents the Court with an opportunity to reconsider the relationship between the confrontation clause and the law of hearsay." On June 10 the …
Confrontation: The Search For Basic Principles, Richard D. Friedman
Confrontation: The Search For Basic Principles, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the accused in a criminal prosecution the right "to be confronted with the Witnesses against him."' The Confrontation Clause clearly applies to those witnesses who testify against the accused at trial. Moreover, it is clear enough that confrontation ordinarily includes the accused's right to have those witnesses brought "face-toface," in the time-honored phrase, when they testify.2 But confrontation is much more than this "face-to-face" right. It also comprehends the right to have witnesses give their testimony under oath and to subject them to crossexamination. 3 Indeed, the Supreme Court has treated the accused's …
Focus On Faculty, Richard D. Friedman
Focus On Faculty, Richard D. Friedman
Other Publications
Professor Richard Friedman talks about his scholarship and work.
Truth And Its Rivals In The Law Of Hearsay And Confrontation (Symposium: Truth And Its Rivals: Evidence Reform And The Goals Of Evidence Law)." , Richard D. Friedman
Truth And Its Rivals In The Law Of Hearsay And Confrontation (Symposium: Truth And Its Rivals: Evidence Reform And The Goals Of Evidence Law)." , Richard D. Friedman
Articles
In this paper, I will look at the problem of hearsay and confrontation through the lens offered by this symposium's theme of "truth and its rivals." I will ask: To what extent does the law of hearsay and confrontation aspire to achieve the goal of truth in litigation? To what extent does it, or should it, seek to achieve other goals, or to satisfy other constraints on the litigation system? And, given the ends that it seeks to achieve, what should the shape of the law in this area be? My principal conclusions are as follows: In most settings, the …
Thoughts From Across The Water On Hearsay And Confrontation, Richard D. Friedman
Thoughts From Across The Water On Hearsay And Confrontation, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
This article draws on the history of the hearsay rule, and on recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, to argue that the right to confrontation should be recognised as a basic principle of the law of evidence, and that aspects of the Law Commission's proposals for reform of the hearsay rule, and of the Home Office's proposals for restrictions on the right of cross-examination, are therefore unsatisfactory.
Text, Texts, Or Ad Hoc Determinations: Interpretation Of The Federal Rules Of Evidence, Randolph N. Jonakait
Text, Texts, Or Ad Hoc Determinations: Interpretation Of The Federal Rules Of Evidence, Randolph N. Jonakait
Indiana Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Prior Statements Of A Witness: A Nettlesome Corner Of The Hearsay Thicket, Richard D. Friedman
Prior Statements Of A Witness: A Nettlesome Corner Of The Hearsay Thicket, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
In Tome v United States, for the fifth time in eight years, the Supreme Court decided a case presenting the problem of how a child's allegations of sexual abuse should be presented in court. Often the child who charges that an adult abused her is unable to testify at trial, or at least unable to testify effectively under standard procedures. These cases therefore raise intriguing and difficult questions related to the rule against hearsay and to an accused's right under the Sixth Amendment to confront the witnesses against him. One would hardly guess that, however, from the rather arid debate …
The Admission Of Hearsay Evidence Where Defedant Misconduct Causes The Unavailability Of A Prosecution Witness, Paul T. Markland
The Admission Of Hearsay Evidence Where Defedant Misconduct Causes The Unavailability Of A Prosecution Witness, Paul T. Markland
American University Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Supreme Court Rules On Statements Against Interest, Michael M. Martin
The Supreme Court Rules On Statements Against Interest, Michael M. Martin
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
After White V. Illinois: Fundamental Guarantees To A Hollow Right To Confront Witnesses, Patricia W. Bennett
After White V. Illinois: Fundamental Guarantees To A Hollow Right To Confront Witnesses, Patricia W. Bennett
Journal Articles
The thrust of this Article is three-fold: (1) to discuss the historical aspects of the Confrontation Clause and its interpretation by the United States Supreme Court, (2) to show that, with White v. Illinois, the Supreme Court lost its moorings with previous decisions and drifted into treacherous constitutional seas, and (3) to suggest a textual construction of the Confrontation Clause that would be harmonious with the hearsay rule while preserving the rights of the accused to face their actual accusers.
Beyond Maryland V. Craig: Can And Should Adult Rape Victims Be Permitted To Testify By Closed-Circuit Television?, Lisa Hamilton Thielmeyer
Beyond Maryland V. Craig: Can And Should Adult Rape Victims Be Permitted To Testify By Closed-Circuit Television?, Lisa Hamilton Thielmeyer
Indiana Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Constitutional Constraints On The Admissibility Of Grand Jury Testimony: The Unavailable Witness, Confrontation, And Due Process, Barbara L. Strack
Constitutional Constraints On The Admissibility Of Grand Jury Testimony: The Unavailable Witness, Confrontation, And Due Process, Barbara L. Strack
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Defendants, however, have raised serious constitutional objections to the introduction of grand jury testimony when the witness is unavailable to testify at trial. These claims have focused on the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment and the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Defendants have contended that the introduction of testimony from a grand jury proceeding which cannot be subjected to cross-examination fatally compromises the defendant's right to a fair trial. Lower courts are split over admitting grand jury testimony in these circumstances, and the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue. As a result, …
The Future Of Confrontation, Peter K. Westen
The Future Of Confrontation, Peter K. Westen
Michigan Law Review
The Supreme Court seems to be setting the stage for a long-awaited examination of the confrontation clause. It has been ten years since the Court endeavored in Dutton v. Evans to reconcile the evidentiary rules of hearsay with the constitutional commands of confrontation. Dutton came at the tail end of a string of confrontation cases that the Court had resolved without apparent difficulty. Not surprisingly, the Court approached Dutton in the evident belief that it could resolve the constitutional problems of hearsay once and for all. Instead, after oral argument in 1969 and a rehearing in 1970, the Court found …
Constitutional Restraints On The Exclusion Of Evidence In The Defendant's Favor: The Implications Of Davis V. Alaska, Michigan Law Review
Constitutional Restraints On The Exclusion Of Evidence In The Defendant's Favor: The Implications Of Davis V. Alaska, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
This Note, first, examines the Davis methodology for determining whether a foreclosed line of cross-examination warrants protection by the confrontation clause, and suggests a test employable by reviewing courts for making that determination. Then, the Note sketches the contours of the clash, prefigured by Davis, between the right of confrontation and the limitations on cross-examination that result from both the assertion of testimonial privileges and trial court relevance rulings.
The Confrontation Clause And The Scope Of The Unavailability Requirement, Jerry J. Phillips
The Confrontation Clause And The Scope Of The Unavailability Requirement, Jerry J. Phillips
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
The confrontation clause is that language of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution which provides, "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right… to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Despite the seemingly absolute language of the confrontation clause, which would suggest that no hearsay evidence may be admitted against an accused in a criminal proceeding, its guarantee has been subject to exception. For example, when either a witness to an event or his testimony is shown to be unavailable, others will be allowed to testify as to the information which the declarant-witness has related …