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Full-Text Articles in Law
Admissibility Of Co-Conspirator Statements In A Post-Crawford World, Michael L. Seigel, Daniel Weisman
Admissibility Of Co-Conspirator Statements In A Post-Crawford World, Michael L. Seigel, Daniel Weisman
Michael L Seigel
This Article takes the position that co-conspirator statements must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they are testimonial and thus subject to exclusion under the Confrontation Clause. Further, in light of the fact that the author of the majority opinions in Crawford and Davis was Justice Antonin Scalia, this Article examines whether interpreting the Sixth Amendment as a bar to the admission of certain coconspirator statements would violate an originalist interpretation of that provision. The conclusion reached is that it would not. In the current era of ever-narrowing rights for criminal defendants, reaffirming the law's commitment to …
Supreme Court, Bronx County, People V. Paul, Adam D'Antonio
Supreme Court, Bronx County, People V. Paul, Adam D'Antonio
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Appellate Division, First Department, People V. Bradley, Kathleen Egan
Appellate Division, First Department, People V. Bradley, Kathleen Egan
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
You Blew It: The Confrontation Clause & Breathalyzers As Testimonial Evidence, Stephanie Tuorto
You Blew It: The Confrontation Clause & Breathalyzers As Testimonial Evidence, Stephanie Tuorto
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Case For A Constitutional Definition Of Hearsay: Requiring Confrontation Of Testimonial, Nonassertive Conduct And Statements Admitted To Explain An Unchallenged Investigation, The , James L. Kainen
James L. Kainen
Crawford v. Washington’s historical approach to the confrontation clause establishes that testimonial hearsay inadmissible without confrontation at the founding is similarly inadmissible today, despite whether it fits a subsequently developed hearsay exception. Consequently, the requirement of confrontation depends upon whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay, testimonial, and, if so, whether it was nonetheless admissible without confrontation at the founding. A substantial literature has developed about whether hearsay statements are testimonial or were, like dying declarations, otherwise admissible at the founding. In contrast, this article focuses on the first question – whether statements are hearsay – which scholars have thus far …
Court Of Appeals Of New York - People V. Nieves-Andino, Jason Gines
Court Of Appeals Of New York - People V. Nieves-Andino, Jason Gines
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Making The Right Call For Confrontation At Felony Sentencing, Shaakirrah R. Sanders
Making The Right Call For Confrontation At Felony Sentencing, Shaakirrah R. Sanders
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Felony sentencing courts have discretion to increase punishment based on un-cross-examined testimonial statements about several categories of uncharged, dismissed, or otherwise unproven criminal conduct. Denying defendants an opportunity to cross-examine these categories of sentencing evidence undermines a core principle of natural law as adopted in the Sixth Amendment: those accused of felony crimes have the right to confront adversarial witnesses. This Article contributes to the scholarship surrounding confrontation rights at felony sentencing by cautioning against continued adherence to the most historic Supreme Court case on this issue, Williams v. New York. This Article does so for reasons beyond the unacknowledged …
The Mold That Shapes Hearsay Law, Richard D. Friedman
The Mold That Shapes Hearsay Law, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
In response to an article previously published in the Florida Law Review by Professor Ben Trachtenberg, I argue that the historical thesis of Crawford v. Washington is basically correct: The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment reflects a principle about how witnesses should give testimony, and it does not create any broader constraint on the use of hearsay. I argue that this is an appropriate limit on the Clause, and that in fact for the most part there is no good reason to exclude nontestimonial hearsay if live testimony by the declarant to the same proposition would be admissible. I …