Law Commons^™

Confronting Science: Expert Evidence And The Confrontation Clause, David H. Kaye, Jennifer L. Mnookin

David Kaye

In Crawford v Washington, the Supreme Court substantially changed its understanding of how the Confrontation Clause applies to hearsay evidence. Since then, the Court has issued three bitterly contested expert-evidence-related Confrontation Clause decisions, and each one has generated at least as many questions as answers. This article analyzes this trilogy of cases, especially the most recent, Williams v Illinois.

In Williams, the Court issued a bewildering array of opinions in which majority support for admitting the opinion of a DNA analyst about tests that she did not perform was awkwardly knitted together out of several incompatible doctrinal …

The History Of Children's Hearsay: From Old Bailey To Post-Davis, Thomas D. Lyon, Raymond Lamagna

Thomas D. Lyon

The papers in this symposium were originally prepared for the Section on Evidence of the 2007 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools.

Admissibility Of Co-Conspirator Statements In A Post-Crawford World, Michael L. Seigel, Daniel Weisman

Michael L Seigel

This Article takes the position that co-conspirator statements must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they are testimonial and thus subject to exclusion under the Confrontation Clause. Further, in light of the fact that the author of the majority opinions in Crawford and Davis was Justice Antonin Scalia, this Article examines whether interpreting the Sixth Amendment as a bar to the admission of certain coconspirator statements would violate an originalist interpretation of that provision. The conclusion reached is that it would not. In the current era of ever-narrowing rights for criminal defendants, reaffirming the law's commitment to …

Case For A Constitutional Definition Of Hearsay: Requiring Confrontation Of Testimonial, Nonassertive Conduct And Statements Admitted To Explain An Unchallenged Investigation, The , James L. Kainen

James L. Kainen

Crawford v. Washington’s historical approach to the confrontation clause establishes that testimonial hearsay inadmissible without confrontation at the founding is similarly inadmissible today, despite whether it fits a subsequently developed hearsay exception. Consequently, the requirement of confrontation depends upon whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay, testimonial, and, if so, whether it was nonetheless admissible without confrontation at the founding. A substantial literature has developed about whether hearsay statements are testimonial or were, like dying declarations, otherwise admissible at the founding. In contrast, this article focuses on the first question – whether statements are hearsay – which scholars have thus far …

Crawford & Its Progeny In Texas & The Nation's Other State Supreme Courts, Dannye Holley

Dannye Holley

CRAWFORD & ITS PROGENY IN TEXAS & THE

NATION’S OTHER STATE SUPREME COURTS

This article is designed to track three major conceptual themes. First, the elusive pursuit of scholarship which engages both the practicing bar and academics. Second, how our federalism is shaped by the interaction of the “Supreme Courts”. Finally, identifying metrics upon which to base a principled assessment of whether a United States Supreme Court decision is a “watershed” decision.

The article documents that Crawford and its progeny have created a powerful convergence of the interests of academics and the practicing bar. It does so by making reference …

8. Child Witnesses And The Confrontation Clause., Thomas D. Lyon, Julia A. Dente

Thomas D. Lyon

A Defense Attorney’S Guide To Confrontation After Michigan V. Bryant, Kathryn K. Polonsky

Kathryn K Polonsky

In 1603, the Crown charged Sir Walter Raleigh with high treason in part for plotting to murder King James I. In preparing for trial, Lord Cobham, Raleigh’s alleged co-conspirator, was interrogated and signed a sworn confession. During trial, the King used the Crown-procured ex parte testimony of Cobham against Raleigh. Raleigh demanded Cobham be brought before the court so Raleigh might interrogate him “face to face.” Raleigh was sure Cobham would prove his innocence. After all, Cobham had written a letter stating his charges against Raleigh contained no truth.

The Judges refused to allow Raleigh the use of Cobham’s exonerating …