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Higher Education Administration Commons™
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- Politics (2)
- Academic Freedom (1)
- Academic Integrity (1)
- Arrow Theorem (1)
- Collective irrationality (1)
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- Condorcet cycling (1)
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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Higher Education Administration
On The Need To Balance Endowments And Academic Integrity, Ahmed Souaiaia
On The Need To Balance Endowments And Academic Integrity, Ahmed Souaiaia
Ahmed E SOUAIAIA
As universities face revenues shortfalls due to national and global economic trends, administrators are forced to look for alternative funding streams. Some of the attractive options consist of creating satellite campuses in rich countries and accepting donors from individuals, corporations, and governments. What is the price of such new partnerships and what is the function of endowments for donors and the universities?
Foreword, Sherry Penney
Foreword, Sherry Penney
Sherry Penney
The author of the foreword speaks about how this issue touches on the subjects of women's rights and how their struggle to break through the glass ceiling has given them more empowerment than ever. The article also speaks about the works within the issue and how each one talks about the struggle, the progress, and success of women in today's working and educational world.
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …