Benefits and Compensation Commons^™

Gerald Davis, The Vanishing American Corporation (2016), James R. Blair

Markets, Globalization & Development Review

No abstract provided.

Parental Leave At Bsu – What We Have And What We Need, Martina B. Arndt, Laura Ramsey, Kimberly E. Fox, Pamela J. Russell Dr, Michael Young

Bridgewater Review

No abstract provided.

Is Cash Compensation For Long-Tenured Ceos Efficiently Allocated?, Yoshie Saito Lord

Accounting Faculty Publications

Uncertainty about a CEO’s ability is related to his/her length of service to a firm. Accordingly, monitoring systems should vary depending upon CEOs’ tenure. Long-tenured CEOs require less monitoring because their ability has been revealed over time. However, as CEOs advance in their careers, they are more likely to acquire power to influence board decisions. To analyze this implication, I use the previously reported differential sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to income-increasing and decreasing disposals. Contrary to prior findings, I find that cash compensation for long-tenured CEOs is positively associated with both income-decreasing but is shielded from income-increasing divesture decisions.

Management And Telework, Arlene J. Nicholas

Faculty and Staff - Articles & Papers

This chapter discusses telework as a desirable option for workers and a valuable tool for employers to attract and retain employees. Telework's many benefits are appealing to technologically competent and confident workers. Managers may be concerned with employee accessibility, productivity and possible loss of management roles (Arnold, 2006). When Yahoo CEO Marissa Meyer banned working from home, it was described as a step backward that countered studies of increased productivity, retention and job satisfaction that could demoralize the workers (Cohan, 2013; Gaudreau, 2013). An overview of benefits, incentives, organizational examples as well as possible deterrents and management resistance are identified.

Women In The Workforce, Courtney Beatty, Carol Wright

Undergraduate Research Conference

No abstract provided.

Be Well: Biss Enterprises Wellness And Fitness Program, Juanita Reyes, Rebecca Rhame, Lane O'Brien, Judith L. Biss

Undergraduate Research Conference

BE Well is a Wellness and Fitness program designed to be implemented in a fictitious company for the Administrative Communication course at Stephen F. Austin State University.

A team of three employees from the organization, Biss Enterprises, was asked to develop the program by the CEO of the company. The team researched and explored different options to create a wellness and fitness program suitable for all the employees in the company.

Do Teacher Pay For Performance Schemes Advance American Education? What Education And Business Can Learn From Each Other In The Education Reform Movement, Devin R. Bates

William & Mary Business Law Review

States are quickly moving away from the uniform salary schedule used to compensate teachers and are instead implementing various forms of Pay for Performance. While Pay for Performance compensation schemes have proved effective in some areas of business, they are not uniformly applicable and are ill-suited to education reform. By outlining recent developments in this area of the law and by reviewing the justifications for Pay for Performance schemes, this Note shows what education can learn from business and what business can learn from education. Ultimately, it is in the self-interest of businesses to oppose the implementation of Pay for …

Is 'Equal Pay For Equal Work' Merely A Principle Of Nondiscrimination?, Jeffrey Moriarty

Philosophy Faculty Publications

Should people who perform equal work receive equal pay? Most would say ‘yes’, at least insofar as this question is understood to be asking whether employers should be permitted to discriminate against employees on the basis of race or sex. But suppose the employees belong to all of the same traditionally protected groups. Is (what I call) nondiscriminatory unequal pay for equal work wrong? Drawing an analogy with price discrimination, I argue that it is not intrinsically wrong, but it can be deceptive, in which case it is wrong.

Public Sector Personnel Economics: Wages, Promotions, And The Competence-Control Trade-Off, Charles M. Cameron, John De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis

Faculty Scholarship

We model personnel policies in public agencies, examining how wages and promotion standards can partially offset a fundamental contracting problem: the inability of public sector workers to contract on performance, and the inability of political masters to contract on forbearance from meddling. Despite the dual contracting problem, properly constructed personnel policies can encourage intrinsically motivated public sector employees to invest in expertise, seek promotion, remain in the public sector, and develop policy projects. However, doing so requires internal personnel policies that sort "slackers" from "zealots." Personnel policies that accomplish this task are quite different in agencies where acquired expertise has …