Metaphysics Commons^™

Emptiness Is Enlightenment: Two Interpretations Of Nāgārjuna's Middle Way As Buddhist Soteriology, Isabella R. Sullivan

Scripps Senior Theses

This thesis investigates the soteriological implications of Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā) as presented in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), or Root Verses of the Middle Way. While Nāgārjuna’s radical denial of intrinsic existence (svabhāva) is widely recognized as a masterful critique of metaphysics, modern scholarship remains divided on whether this "right view" can sufficiently ground the Buddhist Path to Liberation. This project centers on a comparative analysis of two prominent modern interpretations: Jay Garfield’s semantic anti-dualism and Giuseppe Ferraro’s anti-metaphysical realism.

The inquiry evaluates these perspectives against the doctrinal frameworks of the Four Noble Truths, dependent …

Anātman & Lack: Between Nāgārjuna And Lacan, Carter Morris

The Confluence

The notion of the Self lies at the heart of subjectivity. This paper aims to analyze and compare two intellectual traditions that have their own subversive philosophies of the Self and subjectivity—these two traditions being Mādhyamaka Buddhism and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Beginning with primers on both Nāgārjuna’s philosophy and Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory, this paper will discuss the comparative psychologies and philosophies of subjectivity presented by the ideas of non-Self and Lack, respectively. Also briefly compared are the implied metaphysics of both Śūnyatā and Lacanian Lack. An examination of these comparisons’ weaknesses follows along with some closing remarks.

A Madhyamaka Critique Of Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument, Tyler J. Jungbauer

Comparative Philosophy

Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience argument objects to the possibility of emergent causation (both downward and same-level) based on both (1) the causal overdetermination of both (a) higher-level emergent events and (b) lower-level basal events, and (2) the causal closure principle of the physical domain. Kim argues that emergent causation entails epiphenomenalism. Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy skeptically critiques the primary (ultimate) existence of causal phenomena and instead suggests that all such phenomena may only be secondarily (conventionally) existent. Mādhyamikas acknowledge that, conventionally, emergent phenomena appear to cause both basal phenomena and other emergent phenomena. However, contra Kim, Mādhyamikas doubt that causal relations ultimately …

Caducitas And Śūnyatā: A Neoplatonist Reading Of Nāgārjuna, Fabien Muller

Comparative Philosophy

In this paper I am addressing the question whether Nāgārjuna’s doctrine should be understood as a theory that describes reality itself (ontology) or as a theory of our relation to reality (epistemological, logical, psychological, etc.). To answer this question, I propose to compare Nāgārjuna’s concept of emptiness to that of ‘caducity’, a key element in the ontology of Renaissance Neoplatonist philosopher Francisco Patrizi. By showing that these concepts are similar, I argue that Nāgārjuna’s standpoint can be considered as that of ontology.

Appearance And Momentariness: The Nature Of Being Between Nāgārjuna, The Sarvāstivādins And Neo-Parmenidism, Federico Divino

Comparative Philosophy

In this article I will try to demonstrate the existence of points in common between the eternalist instances of Parmenidean philosophy and the Buddhist formulations made by some parts of the Abhidhamma, Nāgārjuna, and the Sarvāstivādins. These three philosophies have numerous points in common with Emanuele Severino’s formulations from the point of view of what is defined as neo-Parmenidism. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the points in common between these systems of thought are due to a basic affinity which, despite having led them to emphasize different themes, present similar reasoning and logical consequences, which allow …

Dialetheism, Paradox, And Nāgārjuna’S Way Of Thinking, Richard H. Jones

Comparative Philosophy

Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness, his ideas on “two truths” and language, and his general method of arguing are presented clearly by him and can be stated without paradox. That the dialetheists today can restate his beliefs in paradoxical ways does not mean that Nāgārjuna argued that way; in fact, their restatements misrepresent and undercut his arguments.

The Self: Kierkegaard And Buddhism In Dialogue, David Wisdo

Comparative Philosophy

Is it possible for there to be a fruitful dialogue between Søren Kierkegaard and Buddhists regarding the understanding of the self? In this paper, I explore the possibilities for such a dialogue by first discussing the rejection of substantialism shared by Kierkegaard and Buddhists. Next, although many Buddhists accept a reductionist account of the kind found in the Abhidharma tradition, Madhyamaka thinkers such as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti are well-known for offering an account of the self, based on the notion of emptiness (śūnyatā), which resembles in some ways the account of the self that is proposed by Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Anti-Climacus …

Moving, Moved And Will Be Moving: Zeno And Nāgārjuna On Motion From Mahāmudrā, Koan And Mathematical Physics Perspectives, Robert Alan Paul

Comparative Philosophy

Zeno’s Arrow and Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (Mūlamādhyamakakārikā, MMK) Chapter 2 (MMK/2) contain paradoxical, dialectic arguments thought to indicate that there is no valid explanation of motion, hence there is no physical or generic motion. There are, however, diverse interpretations of the latter text, and I argue they apply to Zeno’s Arrow as well. I also find that many of the interpretations are dependent on a mathematical analysis of material motion through space and time. However, with modern philosophy and physics we find that the link from no explanation to no phenomena is invalid and …

Neither Ātman Nor Anattā: Tapering Our Conception Of Selfhood, Roman Briggs

Comparative Philosophy

I provide critical discussion of conception of and talk of psychic integration which I take to be both excessive and deficient; these viciously extreme positions are championed by the Apostle Paul and St. Augustine (and both their religious and their secular cultural descendants in the West), and by Jacques Lacan and María Lugones (and their contemporaries), respectively. I suggest that we must negotiate a Buddhist-inspired understanding located between these extremes in endorsing any acceptable conception of the self, generally speaking—a conception which, contra the strong antirealist about selves, allows for the continued use of selfhood in everyday discourse, but which, …