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Articles 1 - 19 of 19
Full-Text Articles in Metaphysics
Advice For Nonactualists: Embrace Metaphysically Vague Ficta, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Advice For Nonactualists: Embrace Metaphysically Vague Ficta, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
I here critically discuss “the Selection Problem”, a vexing problem for metaphysicians who are realists about fictional entities and who further claim that such entities are identified with nonactualia. The Selection Problem arises due to the fact that the nonactualist is forced to defend the view that ficta are somehow discovered, or selected, by authors who then present them to us so we may entertain their exploits. But how exactly does an author manage this when there are a vast number of eligible candidates to be found in the relevant nonactual realms? I argue that the realist who is also …
Review Of Rene Van Woudenberg’S "The Epistemology Of Reading And Interpretation.”, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Review Of Rene Van Woudenberg’S "The Epistemology Of Reading And Interpretation.”, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
I here review Rene van Woudenberg’s monograph, The Epistemology of Reading and Interpretation
The Puzzle Of Fictional Resemblance, Jeffrey C. Goodman
The Puzzle Of Fictional Resemblance, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
This paper discusses a puzzle, the heart of which is this question: How is it that real individuals can resemble fictional individuals? It seems that any answer given by one who has taken a stand on the ontology of fictional individuals will come with significant drawbacks. An Anti-Realist will have to explain, or explain away, the apparent truth of our positive assertions of resemblance, while a Realist will have to explain how we are to understand resemblance in light of either the further claim that fictional characters are not associated with properties in the same way real individuals are, or …
Fictional Universal Realism, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Fictional Universal Realism, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
Certain realists about properties and relations identify them with universals. Furthermore, some hold that for a wide range of meaningful predicates, the semantic contribution to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which those predicates figure is the universal expressed by the predicate. I here address ontological issues raised by predicates first introduced to us via works of fiction and whether the universal realist should accept that any such predicates express universals. After discussing the lines of reasoning given by Braun (2015) and Sawyer (2015) for fictional universal anti-realism, I propose a novel, Kripke-inspired argument for the same. I ultimately …
On Inadvertently Created Tables: A Brockean Theory Of Concrete Artifacts, Jeffrey C. Goodman
On Inadvertently Created Tables: A Brockean Theory Of Concrete Artifacts, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
There has been a lot of discussion recently regarding abstract artifacts and how such entities (e.g., fictional characters like Sherlock Holmes, and mythological planets like Vulcan), if they indeed exist, could possibly be our creations. Much of this debate has been carried out by Stuart Brock and David Friedell in this journal. One interesting aspect of their discussion concerned the extent to which creative intentions play a role in the creation of artifacts, both abstract and concrete. I here address the creation of concrete artifacts in particular. I ultimately defend a Brock-inspired, heterodox view on which creative intentions are not …
Value And The Weight Of Practical Reasons, Joseph Raz
Value And The Weight Of Practical Reasons, Joseph Raz
Faculty Scholarship
Assuming that the value of options (actions, activities, or omissions) constitutes the proximate reason for pursuing them, this chapter considers whether we have reason to promote or maximise value. A proper argument would require establishing a negative, but raising doubts is less demanding — explaining some aspects of the relation between values and reasons that enable us to dispense with the doubtful thesis by illustrating alternative relations between values and reasons. Theses that value should be promoted are accompanied by a way of determining the strength of reasons (the stronger reason promotes more value). This chapter develops theoretical doubts about …
Review Of Anthony Everett's "The Nonexistent", Jeffrey C. Goodman
Review Of Anthony Everett's "The Nonexistent", Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
I here review Anthony Everett's monograph, The Nonexistent
Creatures Of Fiction, Objects Of Myth, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Creatures Of Fiction, Objects Of Myth, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
Artifactualists hold that some abstracta are contingent entities, products of the intentional activities of people. A great many artifactualists are fictional creationists, asserting that fictonal characters are abstracta of this sort, but some, notably Kripke (1973), Salmon (1998, 2002), and Braun (2005), further embrace mythical creationism. They hold that certain entities that figure in false theories are likewise abstracta that are produced by our intentional activities. A paradigm example would be Vulcan, the planet proposed by Le Verrier to be the cause of perturbations in the orbit of Mercury. I here argue that one may not reasonably take the metaphysical …
On Inadvertently Created Abstracta, Fictional Storytelling, And Scientific Hypothesizing, Jeffrey C. Goodman
On Inadvertently Created Abstracta, Fictional Storytelling, And Scientific Hypothesizing, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
In my “Creatures of Fiction, Objects of Myth” (2014), I present and defend an argument for thinking that mythical creationism – the view that mythical objects like phlogiston and Vulcan are abstract artifacts – is false. One intriguing sort of objection to my argument has been recently put forth by Zvolenszky (2016); she claims that a crucial premise is seen to be unjustified once one considers the phenomena of inadvertently created abstracta, specifically, inadvertently created fictional characters. I here argue that even if we admit inadvertently created abstracta into our ontology, my argument survives. I ultimately defend a view on …
Review Of Peter Alward's "Empty Revelations", Jeffrey C. Goodman
Review Of Peter Alward's "Empty Revelations", Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
I here review Peter Alward's monograph Empty Revelations
A Problem For Fine Individuation And Artist Essentialism, Jeffrey C. Goodman
A Problem For Fine Individuation And Artist Essentialism, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
Fine Individuation says it’s impossible for distinct people who are not collaborating on a work of art to produce one and same artwork. This is an intra-world thesis, but is necessarily true, if true at all. Author-Essentialism says it’s impossible for someone else to produce one and the same work of art produced by some actual artist. This is an alleged necessary truth regarding cross-world relations. Both theses have been vigorously defended. I here argue that both are false, but for reasons that are entirely novel.
Fictionalia As Modal Artifacts, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Fictionalia As Modal Artifacts, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
There is much controversy surrounding the nature of the relation between fictional individuals and possible individuals. Some have argued that no fictional individual is a possible individual; others have argued that (some) fictional individuals just are (merely) possible individuals. In this paper, I offer further grounds for believing the theory of fictional individuals defended by Amie Thomasson, viz., Artifactualism, by arguing that her view best allows one to make sense of this puzzling relation. More specifically, when we realize that the view allows for an identification of merely possible individuals with fictional individuals, we see that the utility, and hence …
The Hollow Truth Of Ockham's Razor, Jeffrey C. Goodman
The Hollow Truth Of Ockham's Razor, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
When considering what sorts of entities we ought to believe in and what sorts of principles should guide those beliefs, a lot of attention gets paid to Ockham’s Razor. The Razor can be formulated in a number of different ways, but it is often given as the following slogan: ‘Do not multiply entities beyond necessity.’ Alex Oliver has remarked that this “Ockhamite prohibition against an overly generous ontology…seems to boil down to the rather banal exhortation not to believe in the existence of anything unless one has a reason to so believe.” I am not concerned with whether or not …
A Novel Category Of Vague Abstracta, Jeffrey C. Goodman
A Novel Category Of Vague Abstracta, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
Much attention has been given to the question of ontic vagueness, and the issues usually center around whether certain paradigmatically concrete entities – cats, clouds, mountains, etc. – are vague in the sense of having indeterminate spatial boundaries. In this paper, however, I wish to focus on a way in which some abstracta seem to be locationally vague. To begin, I will briefly cover some territory already covered regarding certain types of “traditional” abstracta and the ways they are currently alleged to be vague. I then wish to discuss two types of “nontraditional” abstracta and the sense in which I …
A Critical Discussion Of Talking Past One Another, Jeffrey C. Goodman
A Critical Discussion Of Talking Past One Another, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
One sort of usage of the phrase ‘talking past one another’ that is quite prevalent in the philosophical literature suggests the following account of a particular phenomenon of miscommunication: Agent A and agent B talk past one another during a philosophical discussion if and only if A has in mind one meaning or conception of a crucial expression P that is distinct from some meaning or conception of P had in mind by B. In this paper, however, I argue that this account – given the sort of phenomenon it is intended to be an account of – misses the …
Defending Author-Essentialism, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Defending Author-Essentialism, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
Creationism is the view that fictional individuals such as Sherlock Holmes are contingently existing abstracta that come about due to the intentional activities of authors. Author-essentialism is the stronger thesis that the author responsible for bringing a fictional individual into existence at a time is essential to the existence of that individual. Takashi Yagisawa has recently attacked this view on the following grounds: author-essentialists rely on an ontological parallelism between fictional individuals and whole works of fiction, but this parallelism fails to obtain. I here argue that Yagisawa’s grounds are weak.
An Extended Lewis-Stalnaker Semantics And The New Problem Of Counterpossibles,, Jeffrey C. Goodman
An Extended Lewis-Stalnaker Semantics And The New Problem Of Counterpossibles,, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
Closest-possible-world analyses of counterfactuals suffer from what has been called the ‘problem of counterpossibles’: some counterfactuals with metaphysically impossible antecedents seem plainly false, but the proposed analyses imply that they are all (vacuously) true. One alleged solution to this problem is the addition of impossible worlds. In this paper, I argue that the closest possible or impossible world analyses that have recently been suggested suffer from the ‘new problem of counterpossibles’: the proposed analyses imply that some plainly true counterpossibles (viz., ‘counterlogicals’) are false. After motivating and presenting the ‘new problem’, I give reasons to think that …
A Defense Of Creationism In Fiction, Jeffrey C. Goodman
A Defense Of Creationism In Fiction, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
Creationism is the conjunction of the following theses: (i) fictional individuals (e.g. Sherlock Holmes) actually exist; (ii) fictional names (e.g., ‘Holmes’) are at least sometimes genuinely referential; (iii) fictional individuals are the creations of the authors who first wrote (or spoke, etc.) about them. CA Creationism is the conjunction of (i) – (iii) and the following thesis: (iv) fictional individuals are contingently existing abstracta; they are non-concrete artifacts of our world and various other possible worlds. Takashi Yagisawa has recently provided a number of arguments designed to show that Creationism is unjustified. I here critically examine three of his challenges …
Where Is Sherlock Holmes?, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Where Is Sherlock Holmes?, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
Most philosophers would say that fictional characters lack spatiotemporal location simply because such entities do not exist. However, even prominent believers in ficta hold that they must lack location. I here focus on the views of one such believer, Amie Thomasson, and her Artifactual Theory. The fundamentals of her ontology seem correct, but I argue that the view implies that ficta do have location. I provide a diagnosis of an argument Thomasson gives for the contrary, and then suggest a way for the Artifactual Theory to account for the locations of ficta. I conclude by discussing some potential applications of …