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Full-Text Articles in Metaphysics

Yi-Jing Integral (Yi): A New Natural And Cosmic Ba-Gua, Harry Donkers Aug 2019

Yi-Jing Integral (Yi): A New Natural And Cosmic Ba-Gua, Harry Donkers

Comparative Philosophy

In this paper we elaborate on the neo-Confucian interpretation of the Yi-Jing system. Based on a further exploration of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity of Zhou Dunyi, we develop a cosmological-anthropological model in constructive engagement with Western thoughts and views on systems and on the universe. The vital energy (qi) and the pattern (li) play central roles in this model and also in the interpretation of the images and forces of the trigrams. This leads to a comparative model, based on a quadrant system with four perspectives: naturality, rationality, humanity and morality. This model fits …


Recapture, Transparency, Negation And A Logic For The Catuṣkoṭi, Adrian Kreutz Jan 2019

Recapture, Transparency, Negation And A Logic For The Catuṣkoṭi, Adrian Kreutz

Comparative Philosophy

The recent literature on Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭi centres around Jay Garfield’s (2009) and Graham Priest’s (2010) interpretation. It is an open discussion to what extent their interpretation is an adequate model of the logic for the catuskoti, and the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā. Priest and Garfield try to make sense of the contradictions within the catuskoti by appeal to a series of lattices – orderings of truth-values, supposed to model the path to enlightenment. They use Anderson & Belnaps's (1975) framework of First Degree Entailment. Cotnoir (2015) has argued that the lattices of Priest and Garfield …


Sino-African Philosophy: A Re-“Constructive Engagement”, Paul A. Dottin Jan 2019

Sino-African Philosophy: A Re-“Constructive Engagement”, Paul A. Dottin

Comparative Philosophy

“Constructive-Engagement” is a meta-philosophical and meta-methodological “strategy” suggested by Chinese and comparative philosophy scholar Bo Mou for analyzing and enriching philosophical exchange. In this paper, I will use this strategy towards an end, on a scale, and with a topic not attempted before. I will use it as a “template” for redesigning a poorly developing area of cross-cultural comparison I call Sino-African reflective studies (SARS). My goal in this work-in-progress is to design a plan for reconstituting SARS as Sino-African philosophy (SAP), an inclusive yet coherent field of research and innovation unified through organizing principles. I will design the overhaul …


Apophatic Community: Yannaras On Relational Being, Fred Dallmayr Jan 2019

Apophatic Community: Yannaras On Relational Being, Fred Dallmayr

Comparative Philosophy

For Martin Heidegger the story of Western philosophy ended basically in egocentrism or the metaphysics of “subjectivity”; however, he acknowledged the possibility of another path in Greece: that of pre-Socratic thinking. Yet, there is a further path he did not acknowledge: the tradition of Orthodox philosophy and theology. The paper focuses on some key works of the prominent contemporary Greek philosopher Christos Yannaras, for a long time professor in Athens. Taking over the notions of “Being” and ontology, Yannaras construes them (with Heidegger) not as ontic “substances” amenable to epistemic knowledge, but as guideposts to “relational” or participatory experience. His …


Dialetheism, Paradox, And Nāgārjuna’S Way Of Thinking, Richard H. Jones Jul 2018

Dialetheism, Paradox, And Nāgārjuna’S Way Of Thinking, Richard H. Jones

Comparative Philosophy

Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness, his ideas on “two truths” and language, and his general method of arguing are presented clearly by him and can be stated without paradox. That the dialetheists today can restate his beliefs in paradoxical ways does not mean that Nāgārjuna argued that way; in fact, their restatements misrepresent and undercut his arguments.


Self And Social Roles As Chimeras, Mary I. Bockover Jan 2018

Self And Social Roles As Chimeras, Mary I. Bockover

Comparative Philosophy

In Against Individualism, Henry Rosemont argues against a contemporary Western concept of self that takes rational autonomy to be the “core” of what it means to be a person. Rational autonomy is thought to be the only essential feature of this core self, endowing us with an independent existence and moral framework to act accordingly—as independent, rational, autonomous individuals. In marked contrast, and drawing from the Analects of Confucius, Rosemont defines personhood as consisting of social roles and their correlative responsibilities. We are persons relationally, only in virtue of the roles that interdependently connect us to each other. Rosemont …


The Yogācāra Theory Of Three Natures: Internalist And Non-Dualist Interpretations, Matthew Mackenzie Jan 2018

The Yogācāra Theory Of Three Natures: Internalist And Non-Dualist Interpretations, Matthew Mackenzie

Comparative Philosophy

According to Vasubandhu’s Trisvabhāvanirdeśa or Treatise on the Three Natures, experiential phenomena can be understood in terms of three natures: the constructed (parikalpita), the dependent (paratantra), and the consummate (pariniṣpanna). This paper will examine internalist and anti-internalist or non-dualist interpretations of the Yogācāra theory of the three natures of experience. The internalist interpretation is based on representationalist theory of experience wherein the contents of experience are logically independent of their cause and various interconnected cognitive processes continually create an integrated internal world-model that is transparent to the cognitive system that creates and uses it. …


In Memoriam: Richard Lane Tieszen (1951-2017) Jul 2017

In Memoriam: Richard Lane Tieszen (1951-2017)

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


The Self: Kierkegaard And Buddhism In Dialogue, David Wisdo Jul 2017

The Self: Kierkegaard And Buddhism In Dialogue, David Wisdo

Comparative Philosophy

Is it possible for there to be a fruitful dialogue between Søren Kierkegaard and Buddhists regarding the understanding of the self? In this paper, I explore the possibilities for such a dialogue by first discussing the rejection of substantialism shared by Kierkegaard and Buddhists. Next, although many Buddhists accept a reductionist account of the kind found in the Abhidharma tradition, Madhyamaka thinkers such as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti are well-known for offering an account of the self, based on the notion of emptiness (śūnyatā), which resembles in some ways the account of the self that is proposed by Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Anti-Climacus …


Moving, Moved And Will Be Moving: Zeno And Nāgārjuna On Motion From Mahāmudrā, Koan And Mathematical Physics Perspectives, Robert Alan Paul Jul 2017

Moving, Moved And Will Be Moving: Zeno And Nāgārjuna On Motion From Mahāmudrā, Koan And Mathematical Physics Perspectives, Robert Alan Paul

Comparative Philosophy

Zeno’s Arrow and Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (Mūlamādhyamakakārikā, MMK) Chapter 2 (MMK/2) contain paradoxical, dialectic arguments thought to indicate that there is no valid explanation of motion, hence there is no physical or generic motion. There are, however, diverse interpretations of the latter text, and I argue they apply to Zeno’s Arrow as well. I also find that many of the interpretations are dependent on a mathematical analysis of material motion through space and time. However, with modern philosophy and physics we find that the link from no explanation to no phenomena is invalid and …


The Quest For Ethical Truth: Wang Yangming On The Unity Of Knowing And Acting, Weimin Shi Jul 2017

The Quest For Ethical Truth: Wang Yangming On The Unity Of Knowing And Acting, Weimin Shi

Comparative Philosophy

Drawing an analogy between Wang Yangming’s endeavor to know ethical truth and Descartes’ quest for epistemic certainty, this paper proposes a reading of Wang's doctrine of the unity of knowing and acting to the effect that the doctrine does not express an ethical teaching about how the knowledge that is already acquired is to be related to acting, but an epistemological claim as to how we know ethical truths. A detailed analysis of Wang’s relevant texts is offered to support the claim.


Vol 8 No 2 Editor's Words, Bo Mou Jul 2017

Vol 8 No 2 Editor's Words, Bo Mou

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 8 No 2 Contents Page Jul 2017

Vol 8 No 2 Contents Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 8 No 2 Information Page Jul 2017

Vol 8 No 2 Information Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 8 No 2 Cover Page Jul 2017

Vol 8 No 2 Cover Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


The Perspective And Perspective-Transcending Dimensions Of Consciousness And Its Double-Aboutness Character: Bridging Searle And Zhuang Zi, Bo Mou Jan 2017

The Perspective And Perspective-Transcending Dimensions Of Consciousness And Its Double-Aboutness Character: Bridging Searle And Zhuang Zi, Bo Mou

Comparative Philosophy

What I intend to do here are closely related three things. First, in response to Searle’s “reply” comments on my previous article “Searle, Zhuang Zi, and Transcendental Perspectivism”, I will clarify and further elaborate one of the central points concerning the “perspective” dimension and “perspective-transcending” dimension of consciousness there. Second, more substantially, I will strengthen my point by explaining the “double-aboutness” character of consciousness which is intrinsically related to the foregoing two dimensions of consciousness concerning its “hooking-up-to-objects” capacity; through a semantic-ascent strategy, I will also explain how the point has substantial theoretic implications for exploring the issue of how …


Searle And Buddhism On The Non-Self, Soraj Hongladarom Jan 2017

Searle And Buddhism On The Non-Self, Soraj Hongladarom

Comparative Philosophy

In this brief note I continue the discussion that I had with John Searle on the topic of the self and the possibility of continuity of consciousness after death of the body. The gist of Searle's reply to my original paper (Hongladarom 2008) is that it is logical possible, though extremely unlikely, that consciousness survives destruction of the body. This is a rather startling claim given that Searle famously holds that consciousness is the work of the body. Nonetheless, he claims that such issue is an empirical matter which could perhaps be discovered by future science. Another point concerns identity …


Searle’S Master Insight And The Non-Dual Solution Of The Sixth Patriarch: Sorting Through Some Problems Of Consciousness, Robert E. Allinson Jan 2017

Searle’S Master Insight And The Non-Dual Solution Of The Sixth Patriarch: Sorting Through Some Problems Of Consciousness, Robert E. Allinson

Comparative Philosophy

The Platform Sutra, which dates back to the seventh century C.E., is one of the classic documents of Chinese philosophy and is the intellectual autobiography of Hui Neng, the Sixth Patriarch of Ch’an Buddhism. In the Platform Sutra, the Sixth Patriarch demonstrates that the spiritual and intellectual problems of consciousness stem from a false adherence to the dualistic standpoint. The Sixth Patriarch utilizes ingenious arguments to demonstrate how one can escape the problems of dualism. An example of a constructive engagement between Chinese philosophy and Searle is to compare and contrast the arguments of Hui Neng with those of …


Malagasy Time Conceptions, Casey Woodling Jan 2017

Malagasy Time Conceptions, Casey Woodling

Comparative Philosophy

In this paper I discuss Øyvind Dahl’s argument (1995,1999) for the conclusion that Malagasy people conceive of the future as coming from behind them and not as being before them as most worldviews do. I argue that we have good reason not to attribute this view to Malagasy people. First, it would mark an inefficient and anomalous way of keeping track of the past and future. Second, the linguistic and testimonial evidence presented by Dahl doesn’t support the conclusion. Even though this specific argument fails, Dahl has many enlightening things to say about Malagasy time conceptions, such as the various …


Between The Internal And The External: Kant’S And Patañjali’S Arguments For The Reality Of Physical Objects And Their Independence From Mind, Ana Laura Funes Maderey Jan 2017

Between The Internal And The External: Kant’S And Patañjali’S Arguments For The Reality Of Physical Objects And Their Independence From Mind, Ana Laura Funes Maderey

Comparative Philosophy

Although coming from two very different paths, both Kant and Patañjali present similar strategies to refute the skeptic argument that denies the real and independent existence of physical objects. This essay examines both strategies through the reconstruction of Kant’s and Patañjali’s twofold refutation of idealism: one based on the perceptual distinction between the real and the illusory, and the other one based on the ontological necessity of a permanent external object to understand change. I argue that the second strategy is philosophically stronger due to its phenomenological recognition of the body as a grounding point, and that this is possible …


Neither Ātman Nor Anattā: Tapering Our Conception Of Selfhood, Roman Briggs Jan 2017

Neither Ātman Nor Anattā: Tapering Our Conception Of Selfhood, Roman Briggs

Comparative Philosophy

I provide critical discussion of conception of and talk of psychic integration which I take to be both excessive and deficient; these viciously extreme positions are championed by the Apostle Paul and St. Augustine (and both their religious and their secular cultural descendants in the West), and by Jacques Lacan and María Lugones (and their contemporaries), respectively. I suggest that we must negotiate a Buddhist-inspired understanding located between these extremes in endorsing any acceptable conception of the self, generally speaking—a conception which, contra the strong antirealist about selves, allows for the continued use of selfhood in everyday discourse, but which, …


Editor's Words, Bo Mou Jan 2017

Editor's Words, Bo Mou

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 8 No 1 Contents Page Jan 2017

Vol 8 No 1 Contents Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 8 No 1 Information Page Jan 2017

Vol 8 No 1 Information Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 8 No 1 Cover Page Jan 2017

Vol 8 No 1 Cover Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Where Does The Cetanic Break Take Place? Weakness Of Will In Śāntideva’S Bodhicaryāvatāra, Stephen E. Harris Jul 2016

Where Does The Cetanic Break Take Place? Weakness Of Will In Śāntideva’S Bodhicaryāvatāra, Stephen E. Harris

Comparative Philosophy

This article explores the role of weakness of will (akrasia) in the Indian Buddhist tradition, and in particular within Śāntideva’s Introduction to the Practice of Awakening (Bodhicaryāvatāra). In agreement with Jay Garfield, I argue that there are important differences between Aristotle’s account of akrasia and Buddhist moral psychology. Nevertheless, taking a more expanded conception of weakness of will, as is frequently done in contemporary work, allows us to draw significant connections with the pluralistic account of psychological conflict found in Buddhist texts. I demonstrate this by showing how Amélie Rorty’s expanded treatment of akrasia as including …


Vol 7 No 2 Contents Page Jul 2016

Vol 7 No 2 Contents Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 7 No 2 Information Page Jul 2016

Vol 7 No 2 Information Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Vol 7 No 2 Cover Page Jul 2016

Vol 7 No 2 Cover Page

Comparative Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Sunyata In The West, David Grandy Dec 2015

Sunyata In The West, David Grandy

Comparative Philosophy

I argue that sunyata, or something like it, manifested itself in early Western thought. While Plato and Aristotle resisted emptiness or nothingness, they nevertheless felt themselves obliged to venture close to its edge in order to ground their explanations of changing reality to unchanging principles. These principles (Plato’s receptacle and Aristotle’s prime matter) embody much of the indeterminancy long associated with the Mahayana understanding of sunyata. Although their function was to enable lasting (static) explanations of reality by putting change out of play, they themselves shade off toward a featureless being evocative of non-being. Moving along a somewhat …