History of Philosophy Commons^™

Sagp Ssips 2001 List Of Papers, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

List of papers presented at the 2001 SAGP/SSIPS Conference

Philosophy As Liturgical Action: An Essay On Plato's Politics, Gene Fendt

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Plato teaches that the arche and telos of politics is liturgical action. No 'purely secular' foundation of a polis is possible. Politics necessarily opens beyond itself and is therefore subject to theological critique and theotic fulfillment (or not). The Republic teaches about the primacy of the liturgical; in the Laws Plato presents the proper liturgical act for human beings.

Oh Brother! The Fraternity Of Rhetoric And Philosophy In Plato's Gorgias, Roslyn Weiss

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Brothers abound in the Gorgias, as do types of fraternal relations. I look for that form of fraternity in the Gorgias that Plato means to serve as a model or paradigm for the ideal relationship between rhetoric and philosophy. The Gorgias acknowledges deficiency not only in rhetoric but in philosophy as well, and recognizes merit in both rhetoric and philosophy, so that there is potential for the two to complement one another and when they do, to be of real benefit.

Candidates For Aristotle's Natural Slaves, D. Brendan Nagle

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The aim of this paper is to identify empirically potential candidates for natural slaves among the vast number of coerced workers in the ancient world, barbarian and Greek alike.

Socratic Perfectionism Ii, George Rudebusch

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

This paper is part two of an argument that Socrates is an agent-neutral perfectionist (like J. S. Mill) rather than an agent-relative perfectionist (e.g. in Crime and Punishment, the egoist Raskolnikov and the altruist Sophie). The argument is based on Plato's Lysis.

Sagp Newsletter 2002.3 (March), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Classical Insights And Today's World, Julius M. Moravcsik

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Professor Moravscik, as President of the Society, was invited to present his views on the current state of classical philosophy at the turn of the millennium. He comments on the role of the History of Philosophy in current education, sketches the work done in classical philosophy during the 20th century, posits Aristotelianism as an antidote for Cartesianism, and recommends a Platonic perspective for epistemology.

Worlds Within World Within The One: Anaxagoras' Parmenidean Cosmology, John E. Sisko

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The long-standing puzzle regarding the relation between Anaxagoras' pluralism and Parmenides' monism can be met and solved on its own terms. We need not deny that Parmenides was a numerical Monist and we need not suppose that Anaxagoras failed to adequately consider Parmenides' basic principles. Anaxagoras did not attack these basic principles, because he thought that they were compatible with pluralism. He not only provided a brilliant explanation of the emergence of our world within the Chaos, but he posited a fascinating cosmology of worlds within worlds within the One. And since his Chaos is Parmenides' One under an alternative …

Sagp Newsletter 2001.4 (May), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Earth And Stars In The Cosmology Of Xenophanes, Alexander P.D. Mourelatos

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The doxography for Xenophanes of Colophon unambiguously attributes to him a theory that all the meteora, i.e. all 'objects suspended above us' or 'objects seen in the sky' are different types of clouds. My concern in this paper is with two sets of assumptions that are likely to have framed Xenophanes' theory: a) assumptions concerning the size and shape of the eareth, and b) assumptions concerning the motions of the fixed stars.

Literary And Poetic Performance In Plato's Laws, Gerard Naddaf

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Plato’s evaluations of the written and spoken word are complex, even ambiguous. On the one hand, he clearly privileges the give-and-take oral conversation as the paradigm for philosophical discussion, and on the basis of this paradigm he offers strong critiques of the written word, notably in the Phaedrus and Letter 7. On the other hand, he is a most famous enemy of the oral performance of poetry − notwithstanding the fact that in the Republic he gives ‘music’ a prominent place in education. When we turn to the Laws, we encounter another aspect or dimension of Plato’s thinking about the …

Thinking, Thought And Nous In Aristotle's De Anima, Michael Bowler

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Michael Wedin in his “Tracking Aristotle’s Nous’’ wishes to argue that the most plausible interpretation of De Anima, Book III, chapter 5 is . .that these chapters provide the essentials of a thoroughly finitistic account of individual noetic activity.” I want to argue that Wedin’s account is not the most plausible interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of individual noetic activity. I think Wedin’s interpretation misses a crucial distinction between the actualization of mind and the being of mind, insofar as he argues that mind is identical simpliciter with its object in the act of knowing when in fact, for Aristotle, mind …

Sagp Newsletter 2001.3 (March), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

The Socratic Fallacy In The Early Dialogues, Priscilla Sakezles

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In ‘Plato’s Euthyphro: An Analysis and Commentary’ (33), Peter Geach attributes two assumptions to Socrates which he calls the ‘Socratic Fallacy’ since its locus classicus is the early Socratic dialogues:

(A) if you know you are correctly predicating a given term ‘T,’ you must ‘know what it is to be T’ in the sense of being able to give a general criterion for a thing’s being T;

(B) it is no use to try and arrive at the meaning of‘T’ by giving examples of things that are T.

Geach claims that (B) follows from (A) because assuming (A) is true, …

The ‘Digression’ In Plato’S Theaetetus: A New Interpretation, David Levy

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In this paper I argue that the “digression” (Tht. 172D-177C) plays a central role in Plato’s overall critique of Protagoras’s measure doctrine. Properly understood, the digression itself constitutes an argument against accepting a particular interpretation of the measure doctrine. This argument is based upon the unacceptable moral and political consequences that result from an institutional validation of extreme conventionalism. Commentators, such as Robin Waterfield and Gilbert Ryle, who dismiss this passage as pointless, and translators, such as Gwynneth Matthews, who omit the passage entirely, fail to draw the important connections among the measure doctrine, the Athenian legal system …

The Transformation Of The Investigation Of F In Plato's Dramas Of Definition, David Wolfsdorf

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In this paper I consider which formal characteristics, if any, occur in the investigations. In addition, I am interested in whether there is a transformation of formal characteristics among the dramas of definition.

Methodologically, the paper focuses on what I call the surface claims and arguments of the text. By that I mean the explicit claims and arguments Socrates and his interlocutors make about the identity of F. This aspect of the texts is distinguished from their literary or dramatic aspects as well as any indirect claims and arguments about F, however these might occur. The neglect of the literary …

Sagp Newsletter 1999-2000.2 November, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Announcement of the SAGP panels with the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in Boston, December 28, 1999, and with the American Philological Association in Dallas, December 28, 1999.

Sagp Newsletter 1999-2000.1 July, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Announcement of the program for the 1999 SAGP/SSIPS conference in Binghamton, October 22, 23, 24, 1999.

Is There A Focal Meaning Of Being In Aristotle?, Jiyuan Yu

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

At the beginning of Metaphysics Γ Aristotle claims that there is a science which is concerned with being qua being. 'Being’ is said in many senses. Different beings are not said to be purely homonymous, but rather to be “related to one thing (πρόσ ἕν)”(1003a33- 4). G.E.L Owen translates this ττρός ἕν formula as "focal meaning", and in his paraphrase, it means that all the “senses [of ‘being’] have one focus, one common element”, or “a central sense”, so that “all its senses can be explained in terms of substance and of the sense of ‘being’ that is appropriate to …

Animal Perception In Early Stoicism: A Response To Richard Sorabji, Scott Rubarth

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The Stoics cannot deny that animals perceive things in relation to each other things (e.g. the scent coming from that direction). The dog must minimally connect the scent a direct if we are to explain the animal following an animal's trail. And it is also true that if the animal is to act on a stimulus it must connect the stimulus with a desire or experience. The dog must connect the scent with its desire or hunger. However, I do not agree that the animal must believe that the scent is coming from a given direction or even believe that …

On Separating The Intellect From The Body: Aristotle's De Anima Iii.4, 429a10-B5, John E. Sisko

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Aristotle is clearly aware that the theory of separable intellect is not without its own difficulties. One difficulty is that of how intellect is to come to possess its objects. These objects first exist (potentially) in material things, but material things (it would seem) share no underlying generic sameness with separable (immaterial) intellect. So, upon consideration of his own account of agency and patiency, which requires that agent and patient hold something in common (see Generation and Corruption 1.7), it becomes unclear to Aristotle how it is that separable intellect, having nothing in common with anything else, is to ever …

Are Ends Subject To Deliberation In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics? A Reply To David Wiggins, Anthony Crifasi

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

We focus upon the difficulties involved in Wiggin's interpretation of deliberation, since these form the basis for his later analyses. Wiggins grounds his thesis that ends are subject to deliberation upon the view that the various virtues are constituents of happiness. As constituents of the ultimate end itself, they would not be ordered to any higher end. Consequently, the virtues would be incommensurable with one another, since conflicts between virtues would not be resolvable in terms of any common end. It is perfectly understandable that under this view the sole arbiter of such conflicts would be “situational appreciation,” as Wiggins …

Are Ends Subject To Deliberation In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics? A Reply To David Wiggins, Anthony Crifasi

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Conflicts between virtues would not result in the radical incommensurability described by Wiggins (having no common end at all). Such a highest end would by no means be a “universal rule” in the sense criticized by Wiggins in his reply to Allan, since particular circumstances could, as always, affect or prevent altogether the manner and means by which the end would be actualized. The “situational appreciation” of practical wisdom would therefore still play a vital role in the practical actualization of any virtue. Since the benefits of this interpretation include the elimination of radical incommensurability without appeal to universal Kantian …

Aristotle On Existential Import And Nonreferring Subjects, Scott Carson

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Much contemporary philosophy o f language has shown considerable interest in the relation between our linguistic practice and our metaphysical commitments, and this interest has begun to influence work in the history of philosophy as well. In his Categories and De interpretatione, Aristotle presents an analysis of language that can be read as intended to illustrate an isomorphism between the ontology of the real world and how we talk about that world. Our understanding of language is at least in part dependent upon our understanding of the relationships that exist among the enduring πράγματα that we come across in our …

Epicurus, Sententia Vaticana Xxiii, Eric A. Brown

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Sententia Vaticana 23, as usually emended, says that every friendship is choiceworthy for its own sake. I argue that this sentence should not be attributed to Epicurus. No other evidence supports the attribution of this view to Epicurus, and much other evidence counts strongly against it. It would be better to reject the emendation, so that the sentence says, in somewhat awkward but not entirely unprecedented Greek, that every friendship is by itself a virtue, or to attribute the emended sentence not to Epicurus but to the later, more timid Epicureans who, according to Cicero, conceded more value to friendship …

Sagp Newsletter 1998-99.3 November, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Announcement of the SAGP panels with the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in Washington DC December 28 and with the American Philological Association, also in DC, December 30.

Aristotle On Akratic Action: How Rational Is It?, Patrick Mooney

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

My answer to the question asked in the paper’s title is: akratic action-acting contrary to what one believes or knows is the best course of action open to one, or “weakness of will”—is not rational at all, according to Aristotle (here restricting myself to his discussion of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics, VII. 1-3). In saying that it is ‘not rational at all,’ I have in mind that there is no “intellectual,” or “cognitive,” faculty at work which so much as helps to bring about the akratic act-there is, in other words, no way in which the akrates “figures out” …

Sagp Newsletter 1998-99.5 April, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Announcement of the SAGP panel with the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association in New Orleans, May 7, 1999.

The Receptivity Of Νοῦς In De Anima Iii.4, Joseph M. Magee

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

• For Aristotle, the faculty of thought is legitimately characterized as being receptive of its objects. To construe Aristotle as holding that it is not renders a significant part of DA 3.4 to be of highly questionable internal coherence, since it makes it seem that he is claiming that something foreign might intrude into a power that has no organ and render that power inoperable. Moreover, failure to acknowledge the intellect's receptivity renders what is clearly supposed to be an explanation (mind is unmixed because it 7 knows all things) otiose and virtually unrelated to the logic of his argument. Finally, …

Porphyry And Plotinus On The Reality Of Relations, Dirk Baltzly

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Both Plotinus and Porphyry contribute in their own ways to the tradition of neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories. In 6.1-2, Plotinus argues that Aristotle’s ten categories are not adequate as an account of the genera of Being and that for this purpose they ought to be supplanted by the five greatest kinds from Plato’s Sophist. In 6.3, he acknowledges that it would be desirable to have a system of categories, not genera, for the sensible realm. He proposes several reductions of Aristotle’s ten categories to more compact schemes and finally seems to settle on the number five: composite, relative, quantity, …