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Sagp Newsletter 2004.1 (December), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Programs of the Society with the Eastern Division (December 2004) and with the American Philological Association (December 2005)

Stoics On The Differentiation Of Character, Margarete Graver

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

I will show that Stoic writers were perfectly capable of distinguishing among character-types also according to secondary differentia that can be exhibited independently of one another and in greater or lesser degree. Just as one may observe variations in the sea floor without disregarding the fact that all of it is equally underwater, so Stoic theory defines traits of character which differentiate one individual from another even where all concerned have the same overall moral standing. Such secondary characteristics are identified even among the virtuous; more numerous, however, and also more philosophically interesting, are the character traits of the nonvirtuous— …

Egoism And Eudaimonia - Maximization In The Nicomachean Ethics, Erik J. Wielenberg

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

I argue that Aristotle holds the following principle:

(AE) An ethically virtuous person always chooses a course of action that he believes promotes his own eudaimonia at least as much as any other course of action he could have chosen.

The claim that Aristotle holds such a principle conflicts with Richard Kraut’s interpretation of Aristotle’s view presented in Kraut’s important book Aristotle on the Human Good. I am inclined to count (AE) as a brand of egoism, primarily on the grounds that it implies that sacrificing one’s own eudaimonia for the sake of the eudaimonia of others is incompatible with …

Sagp Newsletter 2004.3 (April), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

SAGP at the Central Division, April 2004

Theory And Practice In Plato's Theaetetus: The Question Of Knowledge And The Primacy Of Dialectic, Tushar Irani

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Most studies of the Theaetetus concentrate on Plato’s examination of Protagoras’s ‘Man is the Measure’ doctrine— and rightly so. The bulk of the dialogue is after all devoted to an exhaustive critique of this doctrine and its consequences, and in order to understand Plato’s views it is surely crucial to determine what position he sets up in contrast to his own. Commentators differ, however, when it comes to the finer points of Protagoras’s position— particularly concerning the validity of Plato’s infamous self-refutation argument against the Measure Doctrine at 171A6-C7—and its relation to Heraclitean flux. After some preliminaries on the overall …

A Quarrel Between The Ancients And The Moderns: Aristotle's Realism And Modern Skepticism, Michael Bowler

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

For Aristotle, the object as perceived and the subject as perceiving can only be understood with respect to the activity of perception itself and the unity it brings about between the perceived object and perceiving subject. This is a complex unity that requires further analysis and refinement. This unity is the ground of Aristotle’s “realism” with regard to perception. However, if this unity is dissolved into an external, synthetic connection between two dissimilar things only one of which we have access to, then it is at best problematic and perhaps impossible for us to discover anything about the other. This …

Politics Book Iii On 'He Ariste Politeia', Denis Vlahovic

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The thesis of this paper is that, contrary to the common reading of Book III of the Politics, the constitution identified by Aristotle as best in this book is the ideal constitution of Book VII. I present my argument for this thesis in the first part of the paper, where I examine Aristotle’s statements about the best polis, the most important of which is Aristotle’s final word on the matter, at the end of Book III. In the second part of the paper, I examine and criticize the most comprehensive argument for the common reading of Book III, presented in …

Sagp Newsletter 2004.2 (March), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Programs of the Society with the Pacific and Central Divisions, April 2004

Aristotle And Chrysippus On The Psychology Of Human Action: Criteria For Resposibility, Priscilla Sakezles

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Aristotle believes we are responsible for all our voluntary actions; the Stoics hold us responsible for what comes about "through us," that is, whatever is causes by our impulse and assent. The terminology is different, but i conclude that the Stoic and Aristotelian classes of what one is responsible for are coextensive, and their criteria defining responsible actions are nearly identical (where impulse provides the internal origin of the action and assent provides the awareness of what is being done). The only significant difference is that Aristotle claims such actions are in our power to do or not to do …

Aristotle And Theophrastus On The Emotions, William W. Fortenbaugh

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Fortenbaugh here revisits his 1975 study, Aristotle on Emotion, incorporating the contributions of Theophrastus to the Peripatetic synthesis of analyses of the emotions. He modifies earlier views, adding new analyses and illustrative material, replying to criticisms of his positions.

A.P.

Hybristes Ei: Socrates, Alcibiades, And Agathon, Elizabeth Belfiore

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Alcibiades’ portrait of Socrates can be better understood in light of the philosopher’s complementary, but less studied, interactions with Agathon. Like Alcibiades, Agathon attributes to Socrates a superior wisdom that he seeks to acquire by touch (175c7-d2; cf. 218c7-d5), and, like Alcibiades, Agathon accuses Socrates of hybris after failing in this attempt (175e7). There are indications, however, that Agathon is better able to benefit from his association with Socrates than is Alcibiades. After a brief discussion of the Greek concepts of hybris and disdain (section 2), this paper focuses on Socrates’ interactions with these two men. I argue that Socrates …

Ontological Independence In Aristotle's Categories, Phil Corkum

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Aristotle holds that substances (such as you and me) are ontologically independent from nonsubstances (such as our qualities and quantities) but nonsubstances are ontologically dependent on substances. There is then an asymmetry between substances and nonsubstances with respect to ontological dependence. Such asymmetry is widely and rightly thought to be a lynchpin of Aristotelian metaphysics. What is really real for Aristotle are such ordinary objects as you and me. Our properties - my paleness, your generosity - inhabit Aristotle's ontology only in so far as they are ours. This much we can all agree on; and I'll only briefly rehearse …

Metaphysics H 6 And The Problem Of Unity, Hye-Kyung Kim

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

I argue that H 6 should be taken as Aristotle's clarification on the causelessness in the unity of the parts of definition. In H 6 Aristotle is concerned with a general metaphysical problem affecting - threatening - his theory of substance at two major points. The unity of genus and differentia in the definition of form has to be accounted for without appealing to a unifying cause. If it were not accounted for, form would not be the primary cause of being and thus not primary substance. The unity of the parts of the definition of composite substance also has …

Sagp Newsletter 2003 2004 1 December, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Program of the 50th Anniversary Year of the Society, with the three divisions of the American Philosophical Association.

Saying, Meaning And Signifying: Aristotle's Λέγεται Πολλαχῶς, Jurgis (George) Brakas

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The purpose of this essay is to identify the precise meaning of λέγεται as it appears in constructions such as those considered, as well as the meaning of those constructions themselves. My thesis is that λέγεται means “is uttered signifying something.” If we take this to be correct for the moment, then a construction as τἀγαθόν ἰσαχώς λέγεται τῶ ὄντι, γάρ εν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις λέγεται means “ ‘the good’ is uttered signifying as many things as ‘being’ is, for it is uttered signifying something in all the categories”-- for example: god in the category of substance, the virtues in …

Plato's Geometrical Logic, Mark Faller

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Socrates’ brief mention of a complex problem in geometrical analysis at Meno (86d-87c) remains today a persistent mystery. The ostensible reason for the reference is to provide an analogy for the method of hypothesis from the use of hypotheses in analytic geometry. Both methods begin by assuming what is to be demonstrated and then show that the assumption leads to a well-founded truth father than something known to be false.

But why did Plato pick this particular problem in analysis and why at this particular place in the inquiry? For those of us who view the dialogues as pedagogical puzzles …

Form And Flux In The Theaetetus And Timaeus, David P. Hunt

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The subject of this essay is the "Heraclitean" flux in the Theaetetus and its role in the discussion of the first definition of knowledge, particularly in light of the flux doctrine that Plato propounds in the Timaeus. There are two principal interpretive approaches to the argument in this part of the Theaetetus, and the question whether its theory of flux is, to any appreciable degree, Plato's own view is perhaps the central issue dividing the two camps. Though the Timaeus has been cursorily cited by the one camp, and as cursorily dismissed by the other, I believe that a closer …

Parts And Properties In Aristotle's Categories, Phil Corkum

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Call a property recurrent if it can be found in more than one subject, and nonrecurrent otherwise. The question whether Aristotle holds that there are nonrecurrent properties has spawned a lively debate among recent commentators. An assumption held in common by both sides of the debate is that a property is nonrecurrent if it is inseparable from an individual subject. In this paper, I’ll argue that this assumption is false. There are a variety of kinds of separation in Aristotle. When we focus attention on what notion of separation is relevant, we will see that the inseparability possessed by individual …

Targeting Emotion In Early Stoicism, Scott M. Rubarth

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The Stoic sage is a cold, heartless being who would not grieve over the loss of a beloved companion or child. Unmoved, unemotional, uncaring, the sage is an ethical and emotional monstrosity hiding behind the pretension of the so-called virtues of detachment and austerity. That, at least, is how many who study Stoic ethics perceive the sage in regard to his/her emotional life. In this paper I will argue that this conception of the Stoic theory of emotion and passion is misleading; emotions, in fact, are central to Stoic ethics and apatheia should not be confused with the contemporary idea …

Carneades' Pithanon And Its Relation To Epoche And Apraxia, Suzanne Obdrzalek

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Though the interpretation of ancient texts is notoriously difficult, Cameades presents what one might call a worst-case scenario. In the first place, he wrote nothing. His faithful disciple Clitomachus, attempting to play Plato to Cameades' Socrates, reportedly recorded Cameades' teachings in four hundred books. Not one remains. However, Clitomachus' attempt to make a philosophy of Cameades' anti-theoretical stance was not a complete failure; Cameades had a tremendous influence on the later Academy as well as the Stoa, and his views (or lack thereof) have been handed down to us by both Sextus Empiricus and Cicero. These sources are, nonetheless, problematic. …

Limits Highlights From Over 2000 Years Of Developments In Calculus Limits, Lauri A. Nevalainen

Honors Capstones

Capstone submitted as a graduation requirement for the BSU Honors Program.

Sagp Newsletter 2002.4 (May), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

On The Nature Of Heraclitus' Book, Herbert Granger

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Heraclitus is critical of book-learning, yet, unlike Pythagoras, he wrote a book, which presumably he intended to be read. Heraclitus may think himself justified in composing his book because in his composition he remains true to the nature of things, which ‘loves to hide’ (B123). He writes a book that is just as taxing as the nature of things and demands the reader’s careful attention and thorough engagement. Like the Lord in Delphi, and the nature of things, Heraclitus ‘neither speaks out nor conceals, but gives a sign’ (B93). What is more important, he informs his readership about subjects that …

Advising The Cosmopolis, Eric A. Brown

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Plutarch charges that Stoic theory is inconsistent with Stoic political engagement no matter what they decide to do, because the Stoics' endorsement of the political life is inconsistent with their cosmopolitan rejection of ordinary politics (Stoic.rep., ab init.). Drawing on evidence from Chrysippus and Seneca, I develop an argument that answers this charge, and I draw out two interesting implications of the argument. The first implication is for scholars of ancient Stoicism who like to say that Stoicism is apolitical. The argument I reconstruct turns on the political importance of the practice of giving and taking advice, and in this …

Sagp Newsletter 2003.4 (April), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

SAGP at the Central Division 2003

Do Zeno's Arguments Challenge Aristotle's Account Of Motion?, Rose Cherubin

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

What is the relationship between the arguments that Aristotle and Simplicius attribute to Zeno of Elea, and the account of motion that Aristotle presents in the Physics? Do the considerations that Aristotle raises in Physics Z.9 overcome the arguments about motion that he attributes to Zeno? Do they show the Zenonian arguments to be inapplicable or ill formed? Or do considerations that Zeno raises in the discussions attributed to him instead undermine Aristotle's account of motion? Do they undermine the possibility of physics as epistëmë? And why does Aristotle not treat Zeno's arguments about magnitude and plurality in his account …

Is Pyrrhonism Psychologically Possible?, Brian Ribeiro

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

How could there have been a group of philosophers who said they really were skeptics? How could they have claimed to suspend judgment about all non-evident matters which were presented to them and to have gone their way adoxastös (without belief) by (as they said) “following the appearances” (PH 1.23)? That is the question I would like to answer.

Aristotle On Knowledge, Nous And The Problems Of Necessary Truth, Thomas Kiefer

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In this paper, I argue that nous for Aristotle concerns necessary truths. (1) Nous is the solution to the dilemma raised in Posterior Analytics I.3. (2) Knowledge and nous have necessary truths as their subject matter, and are identical to this subject matter. (3) This position creates two problems concerning (i) the innateness of knowledge and nous, and (ii) the mind-dependency of necessary truths. (4) The end of DA III.5 reveals an attempt to solve (i) and (ii): The necessary truths of knowledge and nous are for us innate in a certain way, appear to come to be and pass …

Sagp Newsletter 2002.2 (December), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp Newsletter 2001.2 (December), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.