Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Life Sciences (462)
- Social and Behavioral Sciences (453)
- Ecology and Evolutionary Biology (426)
- Evolution (392)
- Psychology (384)
-
- Animal Sciences (377)
- Cognition and Perception (374)
- Philosophy of Mind (373)
- Zoology (368)
- Terrestrial and Aquatic Ecology (357)
- Neuroscience and Neurobiology (333)
- Cognitive Neuroscience (330)
- Animal Studies (19)
- Medicine and Health Sciences (19)
- Behavior and Ethology (16)
- Law (16)
- Applied Ethics (15)
- Animal Law (14)
- Veterinary Medicine (10)
- Bioethics and Medical Ethics (9)
- Plant Sciences (9)
- Biodiversity (8)
- Behavioral Neurobiology (6)
- Comparative Psychology (6)
- Environmental Studies (6)
- Marine Biology (6)
- Sociology (6)
- Keyword
-
- Sentience (58)
- Consciousness (36)
- Animal welfare (29)
- Pain (28)
- Fish (23)
-
- Welfare (21)
- Cognition (17)
- Invertebrates (13)
- Animal rights (12)
- Animal cognition (11)
- Animal ethics (11)
- Animal sentience (11)
- Animal suffering (11)
- Emotions (11)
- Ethics (11)
- Evolution (10)
- Nociception (10)
- Precautionary principle (10)
- Dogs (9)
- Sheep (9)
- Animal consciousness (8)
- Brain (8)
- Emotion (8)
- Jealousy (8)
- Zoonoses (8)
- Conservation (7)
- Feelings (7)
- Mind (7)
- Personhood (7)
- Rewilding (7)
Articles 1 - 30 of 511
Full-Text Articles in Ethics and Political Philosophy
Beyond The Neocortex: Pallial Routes To The Edge Of Sentience, Oryan Zacks
Beyond The Neocortex: Pallial Routes To The Edge Of Sentience, Oryan Zacks
Animal Sentience
In The Edge of Sentience, the sentience candidacy of fishes and reptiles is strengthened if one accepts midbrain-centric theories of human consciousness. In this commentary I attempt to untether the two positions. I suggest that we need not look for a one-to-one match between the neocortex and a single pallial structure outside of mammals. Instead, a sufficient similarity might exist between the mammalian neocortex and the combination of pallium and midbrain in fishes and reptiles. Adopting an evolutionary perspective in the study of vertebrate brains could point to new investigation priorities in human and animal research.
Stepping Toward The Edge, Rony Hirschhorn, Niccolò Negro, Liad Mudrik
Stepping Toward The Edge, Rony Hirschhorn, Niccolò Negro, Liad Mudrik
Animal Sentience
The Edge of Sentience asks us to shift from asking whether an entity is sentient to whether it is a sentience candidate. Candidacy then motivates a debate about proportionate precautions, which Birch argues should be settled by citizens’ panels. This raises the question of what citizens bring to such a debate: what they attribute to entities, how they treat those entities, and how these vary depending on both the attributor and the entity in question. We report survey findings bearing on each question and ask what follows for the composition of the panels entrusted with these judgments.
Could 'Real Existing Ai' Be Sentient?, Tim Crane
Could 'Real Existing Ai' Be Sentient?, Tim Crane
Animal Sentience
Jonathan Birch is rightly sceptical about the idea that today’s AI machines (e.g. LLMs) are candidates for sentience. Nonetheless, he gives three reasons for taking the future possibility of AI sentience seriously. I dispute them all. Birch fails to distinguish the very idea of an artificial mind from computational AI (what I call ‘Real Existing AI’); he does not adequately distinguish a simulation from a replica or copy; and he fails to acknowledge that the appeal to computational functionalism in this context is straightforwardly question-begging.
Birch On Fetal Sentience, Claudia Passos-Ferreira
Birch On Fetal Sentience, Claudia Passos-Ferreira
Animal Sentience
Birch proposes that human fetuses be recognized as sentience candidates from 12 weeks, on the grounds that midbrain-centered theories fall within the zone of reasonable disagreement among theories of consciousness. I raise a methodological and a policy problem for his view. Methodologically, whether the midbrain-centered view belongs within the zone is disputed, so there is no consensus about the consensus. Furthermore, the evidence Birch discusses for 12 weeks does not actually estimate the onset of sentience; the proposed threshold tracks anatomical rather than functional onset. On policy, the US Supreme Court’s Dobbs ruling shows that fetal sentience is difficult to …
Navigating The Edge Of Sentience Without A Scientific Meta-Consensus, Daniel West
Navigating The Edge Of Sentience Without A Scientific Meta-Consensus, Daniel West
Animal Sentience
In The Edge of Sentience (2024, 2025), Birch develops a precautionary framework for crafting public policies about potentially sentient systems. Underlying this framework is a commitment to the democratic principle that the public should authorize all significant moral judgments that arise during the policymaking process. In this commentary, I suggest that Birch’s framework fails to live up to this commitment by requiring scientists without public accountability to make consequential moral judgments. I suggest a friendly amendment to Birch’s framework by replacing the idea of a scientific meta-consensus with the method of formal expert elicitation, a well-tested method of gathering expert …
From Insect Cognition To Sentience: Exploring The Edge, Catherine Macri, Martin Giurfa
From Insect Cognition To Sentience: Exploring The Edge, Catherine Macri, Martin Giurfa
Animal Sentience
What does The Edge of Sentience tell us about insect sentience and consciousness? In this commentary, we reflect on Jonathan Birch’s framework for defining and scientifically investigating sentience in animals. We discuss the methodological challenges of studying subjective experience in evolutionary distant species, and consider trace conditioning, affective states, and neural architectures as potential windows into consciousness in insects. We argue that uncertainty, whether concerning definitions or methodology, should not prevent experimental investigation; rather it should motivate new approaches and experimental designs for exploring the diversity of conscious experience.
The Varieties Of Precaution: Which Risks, Whose Attitudes?, Tomasz Żuradzki
The Varieties Of Precaution: Which Risks, Whose Attitudes?, Tomasz Żuradzki
Animal Sentience
The Edge of Sentience offers an ambitious and timely institutional framework for proportionate precaution under uncertainty about sentience. Its systematic treatment of empirical and theoretical uncertainty across diverse cases is a major contribution. Focusing on the problem of identifying and weighing different risks when designing proportionate precautions, this commentary suggests three areas in which Birch’s framework could be developed further: a more domain-sensitive justification of the priority given to avoiding under-attribution; a clearer distinction among competing forms of risk aversion and their divergent policy implications; and a fuller explanation of how the framework generates different recommendations across cases.
Beyond Better Conditions: Seaweed Farming And The Number Of Sentient Animals In Aquaculture, Shrilaxmi Patil, Matthew Unerman, Wasseem Emam
Beyond Better Conditions: Seaweed Farming And The Number Of Sentient Animals In Aquaculture, Shrilaxmi Patil, Matthew Unerman, Wasseem Emam
Animal Sentience
Oldfield & Bonano (2024) (O&B) document how far fish welfare research lags behind welfare research in other animals. We share O&B’s feelings-based concept of welfare and agree that aquaculture seeded this field; but research volume has not scaled with animal numbers: Welfare attention per farmed fish or decapod remains negligible. Along the lines of preceding commentaries (Maia 2024, Mather 2024), we treat farmed aquatic animals as individuals rather than tonnage. We then raise a point so far absent from the commentary on O&B so far: reducing the number of sentient animals entering intensive systems. Coastal seaweed farming, which cultivates non-sentient …
Why Do We Need To Prove That Pigs Feel?, Aranza Vera-Espinoza, Nancy Harlet Esquivel-Marín
Why Do We Need To Prove That Pigs Feel?, Aranza Vera-Espinoza, Nancy Harlet Esquivel-Marín
Animal Sentience
Birch's framework manages uncertainty but overlooks the likelihood that citizen panels have speciesist biases that reduce precaution to mere harm-management even in species that undoubtedly feel.
Ai Is Not The Kind Of Thing That Can Ever Be Sentient, Lori Marino
Ai Is Not The Kind Of Thing That Can Ever Be Sentient, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
Sentience evolved to allow organisms to move through their environment avoiding harms and achieving benefits. Sentience did not evolve from computation. It evolved from valenced feelings. AI (even robots) are not embodied and are not the kind of thing that needs to be sentient. There is no way to get from computations to feelings. They are qualitatively different things. We should avoid being lulled into thinking that an inanimate object designed to engage our propensity for anthropomorphism, like AI, is actually a mind.
Dimensional Welfare Beyond Pain: Extending The Precautionary Principle In Birch’S “The Edge Of Sentience”, Willa M. Lane, Nicola S. Clayton
Dimensional Welfare Beyond Pain: Extending The Precautionary Principle In Birch’S “The Edge Of Sentience”, Willa M. Lane, Nicola S. Clayton
Animal Sentience
Birch's (2024) The Edge of Sentience identifies sentience candidates primarily through the pain-focused LSE Criteria. Yet, as Birch himself notes in Proposal 17, sentience is not pain. We argue that statutory welfare protections must therefore reach beyond pain, and that the right tool for doing so is Birch et al.’s (2020) dimensionality framework, which characterises conscious experience across five domains. Used together, the LSE Criteria establish that welfare is at stake, while the dimensionality framework maps what is at stake beyond pain to provide a taxon-specific profile of where captivity impoverishes experience. We apply this approach to invertebrate welfare and …
Animal Ethics And The Lowest Common Denominator, John O. Adenitire
Animal Ethics And The Lowest Common Denominator, John O. Adenitire
Animal Sentience
This commentary assesses the pragmatic framework proposed in Jonathan Birch’s The Edge of Sentience (2024). Celebrating the book's exceptional clarity, scientific rigor, and profound real-world impact on UK legislation, I nevertheless have some questions about the method by which Birch arrives at his policy recommendations for animal protection. In seeking an overlapping consensus between deeply divergent ethical and credal viewpoints, the framework risks defaulting to a minimalist, lowest-common-denominator standard of protection for animals. Birch also risks drawing the standard even lower by including serious academic positions in animal ethics that deny moral status for animals altogether. A rights-based approach offers …
On The Edge Of Science?, Mark Briffa, Lynne U. Sneddon
On The Edge Of Science?, Mark Briffa, Lynne U. Sneddon
Animal Sentience
In The Edge of Sentience, Jonathan Birch (2024) provides a thought-provoking synthesis of current perspectives on animal (and artificial) sentience. He addresses the question from conceptual, ethical, regulatory and empirical viewpoints. Here we focus on some of the scientific issues raised, including defining and operationalising the concept of sentience and the implications for policy and regulation. Despite unresolved conceptual challenges, the book makes a compelling case for the continued scientific investigation of animal sentience.
From The Edge To The Grounds Of “Sentientism”, David Degrazia
From The Edge To The Grounds Of “Sentientism”, David Degrazia
Animal Sentience
Birch’s book is a remarkable exploration of the nature of sentience, its moral salience, evidence for its presence, and how to arrive at humane policies regarding our treatment of human beings, animals, brain organoids, and AI systems of uncertain sentience. Although Birch endorses the view that sentience is of fundamental moral importance, he endeavors to remain neutral among reasonable moral views and work out how to navigate through uncertainty—both ethical and epistemological—to arrive at defensible policies. While making common cause with Birch’s project, my own recent book advances a developed case in favor of the “sentientism” Birch endorses.
Natural Behavior Vs. Subjective Experience In Fish Welfare Assessments, Ronald G. Oldfield
Natural Behavior Vs. Subjective Experience In Fish Welfare Assessments, Ronald G. Oldfield
Animal Sentience
Several commentaries on the Oldfield & Bonano (2024) target article proposed that natural behavior should play a larger role in assessing the welfare of fishes in zoos and aquariums. However, the natural-behavior concept of animal welfare has been widely criticized because natural behaviors do not necessarily improve welfare, and unnatural behaviors do not necessarily reduce it. I review the three major concepts of animal welfare — physical health, natural behavior, and affect/feelings — and argue that behavior patterns, whether natural or otherwise, should be evaluated according to their effects on health and subjective experience. Using the affect/feelings concept and the …
Aggression And Fish Welfare: Challenges And Opportunities, Christine M. Soper, Peter D. Dijkstra
Aggression And Fish Welfare: Challenges And Opportunities, Christine M. Soper, Peter D. Dijkstra
Animal Sentience
Oldfield & Bonano’s (2024) [O&B] target article discusses the wellbeing and sociality of bony fishes. Many fish species, such as cichlids, are not only social but territorial. Aggression is normal, but territorial aggression in a captive environment can have a negative impact on welfare. Aggression-related injuries and deaths are prevalent in pet stores as well as research settings. We discuss the need to develop effective methods to minimize the negative consequences of aggression.
Artificial Sentience: The Other Side Of The Story, Amanda Sharkey
Artificial Sentience: The Other Side Of The Story, Amanda Sharkey
Animal Sentience
There is another side to the story of the account of artificial sentience — one that makes the possibility of artificial sentience unlikely: the fundamental difference between living bodies and artificial systems. Sentience occurs in strongly embodied, living entities, and not in disembodied artificial systems, nor in robots. The appearance of sentience is exacerbated by deceptive behaviour and anthropomorphism. The risks of keeping an open mind about the required underlying substrate are in wasted efforts to protect systems that cannot suffer, and in placing inappropriate trust in their abilities.
Both Studying And Protecting Octopuses “On Their Own Terms”, Jennifer Jacquet, Janelle Kaz, Becca Franks, Christine Webb
Both Studying And Protecting Octopuses “On Their Own Terms”, Jennifer Jacquet, Janelle Kaz, Becca Franks, Christine Webb
Animal Sentience
Cephalopods – indeed, all animals – “must be seen on their own terms,” with respect for their autonomy and their ecological imperatives. This will provide greater scientific insight along with a more ethical and accurate understanding of minds beyond our own.
Cephalopod Consciousness On “Their Own Terms”: Who Are “They”?, Willa M. Lane, Victor Ajuwon, Nicola S. Clayton
Cephalopod Consciousness On “Their Own Terms”: Who Are “They”?, Willa M. Lane, Victor Ajuwon, Nicola S. Clayton
Animal Sentience
Mather’s call to consider cephalopods’ consciousness “on their own terms” raises the question of the extent to which cephalopods can be considered a homogenous group. While coloeoid cephalopods share traits that strongly distinguish them from other molluscs and invertebrates, they show vast ecological and morphological diversity, with implications for the design of empirical investigations of consciousness. Extending Mather’s argument, we apply Birch et al.’s (2020) five-dimensional model to compare octopus, cuttlefish, squid, and nautilus. This comparison shows that even within a graded rather than categorical framework, putative consciousness profiles depend on which taxa are included in discussions of “cephalopod consciousness.” …
Donald Griffin, Scientific Revolutions, And Reclaiming Humanity’S Place In The Living World, Paul Waldau
Donald Griffin, Scientific Revolutions, And Reclaiming Humanity’S Place In The Living World, Paul Waldau
Animal Sentience
Donald Griffin’s work revolutionized cognitive ethology and continues to challenge human exceptionalism by emphasizing rigorous, unbiased inquiry. His legacy calls for a deeper recognition of humanity’s place within the broader animal community, urging interdisciplinary approaches that bridge science, ethics, and cultural traditions to foster a more inclusive understanding of life.
Donald Griffin, Cognitive Ethology, And Animal Life Histories, Walter Veit
Donald Griffin, Cognitive Ethology, And Animal Life Histories, Walter Veit
Animal Sentience
Carolyn Ristau offers a stellar investigative biography of Donald Redfield Griffin and his influence on the science and philosophy of animal minds. This commentary focuses on his aim to study animal minds through an ethological lens—that is, by examining the evolved, adaptive functions of mental capacities and consciousness in natural environments, rather than confining research to controlled laboratory settings. I argue that, far from being romantic, this approach can be firmly grounded in modern life history theory.
Précis Of The Edge Of Sentience: Risk And Precaution In Humans, Other Animals, And Ai, Jonathan Birch
Précis Of The Edge Of Sentience: Risk And Precaution In Humans, Other Animals, And Ai, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience
We often face grave practical decisions that seem to hinge on whether a system is sentient. This family of cases includes invertebrate animals, people who are unresponsive after brain injury, fetuses, neural organoids, and now AI technologies. We must decide what to do despite ongoing disagreement about the nature of sentience. In our state of uncertainty, we should pragmatically transform the question from “Is it sentient?” to “Is it a sentience candidate, an investigation priority, or neither?”. When a system is a sentience candidate, it is negligent to fail to consider precautions. We should instead evaluate precautions for their proportionality …
What Is It Like To Be A Cognitive Ethologist?, Anne Wordsworth She/Her
What Is It Like To Be A Cognitive Ethologist?, Anne Wordsworth She/Her
Animal Sentience
Donald Griffin not only made the study of animal minds acceptable for scientific investigation but the work of the cognitive ethologists that he inspired made animals and their lives fascinating and accessible to the greater public. The scrupulously detailed examination of his life and work by Ristau ensures that this history will always be there to respect his work and his legacy
Cognitive Ethology, Animals And Society, And The American Sociological Association, Arnold Arluke
Cognitive Ethology, Animals And Society, And The American Sociological Association, Arnold Arluke
Animal Sentience
Griffin’s The Question of Animal Awareness (1976) and Animal Minds (2001) enabled and emboldened other disciplines to expand their research to include non-human animals. The creation of a dedicated section on human-animal relationships in sociology’s national professional organization is but one example.
Donald Griffin, Sentience, And Animal Research Ethics, John Gluck
Donald Griffin, Sentience, And Animal Research Ethics, John Gluck
Animal Sentience
Recollection of early encounters with Donald Griffin’s pioneering work on animal awareness, provoking intense, often hostile academic responses, later forgotten.
Can We Use Judgement Bias To Assess The Welfare Of Fish In Aquariums And Zoos?, Culum Brown
Can We Use Judgement Bias To Assess The Welfare Of Fish In Aquariums And Zoos?, Culum Brown
Animal Sentience
This commentary examines the potential of tests of judgment bias to assess fish welfare in aquariums and zoos. Judgment bias offers a non-invasive approach to interpreting affective states in animals, using cognitive responses to ambiguous stimuli as indicators of mental wellbeing. Despite the constraints of captive environments—such as limited handling and species diversity in exhibits—recent adaptations of judgment-bias protocols make them suitable across taxa, including fishes. Collaborations with progressive zoos and aquariums could facilitate this research, based on the shared goal of enhancing animal welfare and promoting public education.
Psychological And Social Well-Being Of Bony Fishes In Zoos And Aquariums, Ronald G. Oldfield, Patrick Bonano
Psychological And Social Well-Being Of Bony Fishes In Zoos And Aquariums, Ronald G. Oldfield, Patrick Bonano
Animal Sentience
Research on the behaviour of animals in zoos has been conducted for decades, and observations have provided information that has improved the psychological and social well-being of animals. However, research on fishes in zoos and aquariums seems to be lacking. Here, we assess the current state of research on fishes in zoos and aquariums by surveying the peer-reviewed literature. Our assessment differs from previous surveys in that we examine the taxonomic classes Chondrichthyes (sharks and rays) and Osteichthyes (bony fishes) separately. Our survey finds that bony fishes have been drastically underrepresented in zoo journals, more drastically than chondrichthyans, revealing an …
Norms And Variance Fail To Predict Butterfly Effects On Social Dynamics By Idiosyncratic Individuals, Stephen F. Stringham, Lynn Rogers, Ann Bryant
Norms And Variance Fail To Predict Butterfly Effects On Social Dynamics By Idiosyncratic Individuals, Stephen F. Stringham, Lynn Rogers, Ann Bryant
Animal Sentience
Adaptations and adjustments to current environmental conditions are manifest in behavioral norms. Knowing norms facilitates population-level prediction, but doesn’t predict individual behavior where idiosyncrasies might trigger “butterfly effects." Knowledge of individual quirks is particularly important for risk assessment and management during close encounters between humans and potentially lethal wildlife, including bears (Ursus spp.). Innovative foraging techniques can alter population vigor and viability. Traits at the tails of a bell curve might hold the greatest potential for adapting to environmental change.
Wildlife Conservation: The Importance Of Individual Personality Traits And Sentience, Karen A. Owens, Gosia Bryja, Marc Bekoff
Wildlife Conservation: The Importance Of Individual Personality Traits And Sentience, Karen A. Owens, Gosia Bryja, Marc Bekoff
Animal Sentience
Individual differences in personality types within the same species have been studied much less than differences between species and populations. Personality differences are related to risk-taking and exploration, which in turn correlate with individuals' daily responses, decisions, and fitness. Bold and shy personality types can have different advantages and disadvantages under different social or environmental pressures. Analyzing personality differences has helped clarify how elk habituate to a well-populated area and how management strategies can be adapted to them. For wolves newly repatriated to Colorado, individual personality factors are likely to prove important for adapting to their new homes as well …
Precommentary: Animal Personality Needs Animal Sentience, Ralph Adolphs, Yue Xu
Precommentary: Animal Personality Needs Animal Sentience, Ralph Adolphs, Yue Xu
Animal Sentience
We are grateful to Owens, Bryja & Bekoff (2024) for their important discussion of individual differences in animals, emphasizing the role of personality in conservation, wildlife research, and wellbeing. But their emphasis also raises new challenges: How should we conceive of personality in nonhuman species? what modern tools could be leveraged to best measure it? and, perhaps most important of all: how can we ensure that the conscious experience of animals — their capacity for wellbeing and for suffering — is not forgotten along the way? We touch on each of these challenges in this invited Precommentary in the hope …