Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Life Sciences (462)
- Social and Behavioral Sciences (453)
- Ecology and Evolutionary Biology (426)
- Evolution (392)
- Psychology (384)
-
- Animal Sciences (377)
- Cognition and Perception (374)
- Philosophy of Mind (373)
- Zoology (368)
- Terrestrial and Aquatic Ecology (357)
- Neuroscience and Neurobiology (333)
- Cognitive Neuroscience (330)
- Animal Studies (19)
- Medicine and Health Sciences (19)
- Behavior and Ethology (16)
- Law (16)
- Applied Ethics (15)
- Animal Law (14)
- Veterinary Medicine (10)
- Bioethics and Medical Ethics (9)
- Plant Sciences (9)
- Biodiversity (8)
- Behavioral Neurobiology (6)
- Comparative Psychology (6)
- Environmental Studies (6)
- Marine Biology (6)
- Sociology (6)
- Keyword
-
- Sentience (58)
- Consciousness (36)
- Animal welfare (29)
- Pain (28)
- Fish (23)
-
- Welfare (21)
- Cognition (17)
- Invertebrates (13)
- Animal rights (12)
- Animal cognition (11)
- Animal ethics (11)
- Animal sentience (11)
- Animal suffering (11)
- Emotions (11)
- Ethics (11)
- Evolution (10)
- Nociception (10)
- Precautionary principle (10)
- Dogs (9)
- Sheep (9)
- Animal consciousness (8)
- Brain (8)
- Emotion (8)
- Jealousy (8)
- Zoonoses (8)
- Conservation (7)
- Feelings (7)
- Mind (7)
- Personhood (7)
- Rewilding (7)
Articles 31 - 60 of 511
Full-Text Articles in Ethics and Political Philosophy
Not Just Bony Fish: All Nonmammalian And Nonavian Animals Are Neglected In Both Welfare And General Research, Jennifer A. Mather Ph.D.
Not Just Bony Fish: All Nonmammalian And Nonavian Animals Are Neglected In Both Welfare And General Research, Jennifer A. Mather Ph.D.
Animal Sentience
The lack of research on fish welfare highlighted by Oldfield & Bonano (2024) is only part of a more general problem: a relative neglect of animals other than mammals and birds. The causes are our lack of knowledge, our negative view of what we consider to be “lower” animals and our underestimation of their intelligence and sensitivity. Our estimation will increase as our knowledge increases. As a broader view spreads to the public through the media, it should gradually increase the demand to expand both research and welfare, especially beyond mammals and birds.
Animal Personality And Sentience As Distinct Concepts, Mark Briffa
Animal Personality And Sentience As Distinct Concepts, Mark Briffa
Animal Sentience
Owens et al (2024) discuss how knowledge of both animal personality and sentience in target populations can be leveraged to enhance wildlife conservation programmes. In this commentary I expand on the distinction between these two concepts. Behavioural differences should be considered broadly across conservation programmes, not just those involving species deemed sentient.
Donald Griffin: A Visionary In Science And Consciousness, Charles Foster
Donald Griffin: A Visionary In Science And Consciousness, Charles Foster
Animal Sentience
Carolyn Ristau’s (2024) timely biography reviews Donald Griffin’s pioneering ideas with depth and historical perspective, describing Griffin’s approach to science, his openness to interdisciplinary insights, and his bold stance on consciousness. Ristau’s work highlights Griffin’s relevance to contemporary debates on consciousness and natural selection.
Don Griffin And The Early Days Of Cognitive Ethology, Gordon M. Burghardt
Don Griffin And The Early Days Of Cognitive Ethology, Gordon M. Burghardt
Animal Sentience
Carolyn Ristau’s trilogy provides a comprehensive account of Donald Griffin’s life and work, with the third volume focusing on cognitive ethology. This commentary focuses primarily on my own interactions with Don, particularly during my sabbatical at Rockefeller University when his campaign for cognitive ethology was gaining momentum. I recount my research on reptile behavior and cognition, my collaboration with Don and others at RU, and my role in advancing his ideas while contextualizing them within 19th-century comparative psychology. I also discuss developments in cognitive ethology, including critical anthropomorphism, the challenges of integrating subjective experience into behavioral science, and Griffin’s lasting …
Other Perspectives On Animals, Their Sentience And Cognition, Joyce M. D'Silva Mrs
Other Perspectives On Animals, Their Sentience And Cognition, Joyce M. D'Silva Mrs
Animal Sentience
For those of us who work to achieve legal recognition that animals are sentient beings, and should in many cases be allotted personhood, Donald Griffin is indeed an inspiration and a true game-changer. He put paid to the narrow behaviourist interpretation of animals’ lives promoted by Skinner et al. He became a real heir to Darwin’s belief in animal emotions. He enabled campaigners for animal welfare and indeed animal rights to quote his work as a distinguished scientist to give gravitas to their calls for legal recognition and protection of animals.
An Individuals-Oriented Approach To Conservation, Kristy M. Ferraro
An Individuals-Oriented Approach To Conservation, Kristy M. Ferraro
Animal Sentience
Individual cognitive and emotional differences in personality among animals, along with differences in their behavioral traits, are increasingly important in conservation efforts. It is not only more effective but more ethical to take both collective and individual perspectives into account in both research and practice.
Wildlife Conservation And Adaptation To Humans, Valeria Mazza Phd, Claudio Carere
Wildlife Conservation And Adaptation To Humans, Valeria Mazza Phd, Claudio Carere
Animal Sentience
For many animal species, the ability to adapt to coexistence with the human species and to the environmental changes that humans cause is a biological imperative. This adaptive capacity varies not only between species, but within species. Studying individual differences in animals’ behavioral, cognitive and physiological adaptability is important for integrating ethology and conservation. Findings about animal cognitive capacities, including learning, need to be applied in conservation—but humans need to be educated about ethology, coexistence and conservation too.
Plant Sentience: Not Now, Maybe Later?, Helen Tiffin
Plant Sentience: Not Now, Maybe Later?, Helen Tiffin
Animal Sentience
Segundo-Ortin’s target article provides compelling evidence for physiological and behavioral complexity in plants, bringing us closer to a recognition of some kind of plant cognition – but it does not as yet offer firm grounds for inferring sentience (feeling) in plants, The recent history of the scientific demonstration and recognition of animalsentience in invertebrates, for example, does not entirely rule out the possibility that further research might provide support for plant sentience. Should this ever turn out to be the case, the ethical problems raised are not insurmountable, and would not threaten the now proven case for animal sentience
Limits To Sentience, Donald M. Broom
Limits To Sentience, Donald M. Broom
Animal Sentience
There are many parallels between cellular function in animals and plants. Plants can have complex interactions with their environments. But they lack a central nervous system, which is a prerequisite for sentience (the capacity to feel). In my view the suggestion that plants are sentient is not only empirically incorrect but potentially harmful to the efforts to protect the welfare of sentient beings.
The Elephant In The Garden, Ila France Porcher
The Elephant In The Garden, Ila France Porcher
Animal Sentience
The other commentators on Chapman & Huffman (2018) have pointed out in different ways that despite our biological nature, there is a widespread tendency for humans to believe that we are not only superior to animals, but that we are not animals at all. Alongside our denial of animal sentience and cognition, this has resulted in the denial of our own instinctive natures. It is this denial that is our error, for it is only by understanding our true natural heritage that we can begin to change the runaway path we are on.
Plant Sentience And The Case For Ethical Veganism, Josh Milburn
Plant Sentience And The Case For Ethical Veganism, Josh Milburn
Animal Sentience
Does the possibility of plant sentience pose a problem for ethical veganism? It has not yet been demonstrated that plants are sentient (i.e., that they can feel). Moreover, even if it were demonstrated that plants could feel, it would also have to be demonstrated that they can feel the affectively “valenced” feelings that are ethically significant, such as pain and fear, rather than just neutral sensations such as darker/lighter, or wetter/drier. Finally, if plants could feel valenced feelings, veganism would likely still be the ethical option, on the principle of causing the least harm.
Plants Detect And Adapt, But Do Not Feel, Paul C. Struik
Plants Detect And Adapt, But Do Not Feel, Paul C. Struik
Animal Sentience
Plant sentience is a hot topic in scientific and popular media. There are moral reasons to respect both the service of plants to humanity and their natural integrity as creatures playing their own significant role in a complex ecosystem. However, to infer that plants have certain cognitive capacities that are present also in certain human and nonhuman animals calls for scientific rigor beyond mere analogy. The unique capacities of plants identified by Segundo-Ortin & Calvo are not necessarily linked to sentience. Nor is it likely that sentience is an evolutionary trait that is present to some extent in all living …
Jurisprudence And Animal Protection, Carlos Montemayor
Jurisprudence And Animal Protection, Carlos Montemayor
Animal Sentience
Jurisprudence is based on normative principles that go beyond instrumental reasoning and practical goals concerning what is convenient. It concerns justice and truth. The empirical evidence justifies the legal protection of various species on legal grounds. Given the risks we face regarding climate degradation, international legal agencies must expand the framework of human rights and environmental law in order to effectively protect animals and their environments.
Language Matters, Teya Brooks Pribac
Language Matters, Teya Brooks Pribac
Animal Sentience
The term sentience tends to be associated with affective valence along with affectively neutral sensory states. In the absence of evidence for affectively laden states in plants, the use of the term sentience in the exploration of plant sensory and behavioral complexity is misleading and ethically problematic for its potential to trivialize animal sentience.
Plant Sentience Revisited: Sifting Through The Thicket Of Perspectives, Paco Calvo, Miguel Segundo-Ortin
Plant Sentience Revisited: Sifting Through The Thicket Of Perspectives, Paco Calvo, Miguel Segundo-Ortin
Animal Sentience
In our target article (Segundo-Ortin & Calvo 2023), we proposed the intriguing possibility of plant sentience, drawing parallels with non-human animal studies. This response aims to sift through the rich thicket of perspectives offered by our commentators. To do so, we assess the risks of employing double standards, as well as the tendencies of anthropomorphizing and zoomorphizing in plant studies. We also emphasize the need for clarity in linguistic and conceptual terms, examine the neurophysiological evidence for plant sentience, and discuss the ethical implications of such recognition.
Defining And Exploring Animal Sentience, Andrew N. Rowan, Joyce M. D'Silva Mrs, Ian J.H. Duncan, Nicholas Palmer
Defining And Exploring Animal Sentience, Andrew N. Rowan, Joyce M. D'Silva Mrs, Ian J.H. Duncan, Nicholas Palmer
Animal Sentience
One of the commentaries on the target article notes that "animal sentience" is difficult to define operationally. This response to the commentaries develops a working, usable definition of animal sentience and examines the relationships between animal emotions and sentience.
Plant Sentience? Between Romanticism And Denial: Science, Miguel Segundo-Ortin, Paco Calvo
Plant Sentience? Between Romanticism And Denial: Science, Miguel Segundo-Ortin, Paco Calvo
Animal Sentience
A growing number of non-human animal species are being seriously considered as candidates for sentience, but plants are either forgotten or explicitly excluded from these debates. In our view, this is based on the belief that plant behavior is hardwired and inflexible and on an underestimation of the role of plant electrophysiology. We weigh such assumptions against the evidence to suggest that it is time to take seriously the hypothesis that plants, too, might be sentient. We hope this target article will serve as an invitation to investigate sentience in plants with the same rigor as in non-human animals.
Free Will And Animal Suicide, Sabina Schrynemakers
Free Will And Animal Suicide, Sabina Schrynemakers
Animal Sentience
David Peña-Guzmán presents two arguments against the view that because only humans have free will only humans can commit suicide: (1) nonhuman animals may possess free will, and (2) the libertarian notion of free will is incompatible with scientific explanation. The free will objection to animal suicide is indeed mistaken, but Peña-Guzmán’s criticism of the libertarian notion of free will seems misplaced. His target should instead be the assumption that free choices must be made consciously or self-reflectively or the assumption that freedom cannot come in degrees.
Pain Sentience Criteria And Their Grading, Eva Jablonka, Simona Ginsburg
Pain Sentience Criteria And Their Grading, Eva Jablonka, Simona Ginsburg
Animal Sentience
On the basis of the target article by Crump and colleagues, we suggest a more parsimonious scheme for evaluating the evidence for sentience. Since some of the criteria used by Crump et al. are not independent and some are uninformative we exclude some criteria and amalgamate others. We propose that evidence of flexible learning and prioritization, in conjunction with relevant data on brain organization, is sufficient for assigning pain-sentience to an animal and we suggest a scoring scheme based on four criteria.
Truly Minimal Criteria For Animal Sentience, Mark Solms
Truly Minimal Criteria For Animal Sentience, Mark Solms
Animal Sentience
The criteria for determining animal sentience proposed in the target article are sensible but they lack an explicit functional justification for the focus on pain. This commentary provides an abbreviated account of the most basic functional principles that underpin animal sentience and articulates some minimal criteria for determining its presence.
Crustacean Pain, Michael Tye
Crustacean Pain, Michael Tye
Animal Sentience
This commentary discusses the target article’s methodology, the relevance of the claim that crustaceans lack a neocortex to the thesis that they feel pain, and the evaluation of the results of some trade-off experiments done with hermit crabs.
No Need For Certainty In Animal Sentience, Yew Kwang Ng
No Need For Certainty In Animal Sentience, Yew Kwang Ng
Animal Sentience
This commentary supports Crump et al.’s (2022) point that where risks to welfare are severe, strong evidence of sentience is sufficient to warrant protecting welfare. Crump et al.’s eight criteria for sentience are also useful. Flexible decision-making (5) and flexible behaviour (6) are consistent with Ng (1995). The concession that the “no-need-for-sentience” proposition is unnecessary also strengthens the importance of the target article’s conclusions.
What Might Decapod Sentience Mean For Policy, Practice, And Public?, Richard Gorman
What Might Decapod Sentience Mean For Policy, Practice, And Public?, Richard Gorman
Animal Sentience
Crump et al. provide eight criteria for evaluating sentience in decapods, with scope for for application to other taxa. Their work has attracted the interest of policymakers. This commentary discusses the limitations of conceptual and legal acknowledgement of sentience in chainging practice and public attitudes. More work is needed. Social science may be able to help.
Fine-Tuning The Criteria For Inferring Sentience, Culum Brown
Fine-Tuning The Criteria For Inferring Sentience, Culum Brown
Animal Sentience
“Sentience” means the capacity to feel, and feelings are private affairs. Sentience is hence extremely difficult to quantify in nonhuman animals. We have no direct means of determining whether an animal is sentient. Thus we rely on a series of indirect measures or criteria which collectively provide some level of confidence about the probability that an animal is sentient. Crump et al. propose a modified framework based on 8 criteria for estimating the likelihood of sentience in a target taxon. Whereas I very much like their proposed framework, I would suggest a couple of amendments that may improve it further: …
Generalizing Frameworks For Sentience Beyond Natural Species, Michael Levin
Generalizing Frameworks For Sentience Beyond Natural Species, Michael Levin
Animal Sentience
Crump et al. (2022) offer a well-argued example of an essential development: a rigorous framework for assessing sentience from the perspective of moral concern over an agent’s welfare. Current and forthcoming developments in bioengineering, synthetic morphology, artificial intelligence, biorobotics, and exobiology necessitate an expansion and generalization of this effort. Verbal reports (the Turing Test) and homology to human brains are utterly inadequate criteria for assessing the status of novel, unconventional agents that offer no familiar touchstone of phylogeny or anatomy. We must develop principled approaches to evaluating the sentience of (and thus, our responsibility to) beings of unfamiliar provenance and …
Sentience In Decapods: An Open Question, Mark Briffa
Sentience In Decapods: An Open Question, Mark Briffa
Animal Sentience
Crump et al.’s framework is a powerful tool designed to assist decisions on the ethical treatment of decapod crustaceans. However, the question of whether decapods are sentient (i.e., whether they feel), remains open, perhaps indefinitely. More optimistically, we might design experiments that distinguish among different levels of awareness, sometimes viewed as components of sentience. We should strike a balance between assuming that all organisms are sentient and making unnecessary anatomical assumptions about sentience. Refining current experiments may provide concrete insights about awareness in Decapoda and other taxa.
Does The Sentience Framework Imply All Animals Are Sentient?, Kristin Andrews
Does The Sentience Framework Imply All Animals Are Sentient?, Kristin Andrews
Animal Sentience
The eight criteria proposed in Crump et al.’s framework for evaluating pain sentience in decapod crustaceans are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to markers that could increase confidence in an animal’s sentience more generally. Some of the commentaries have already pointed out that pain is only one kind of sentience (Souza Valente). It has also already been pointed out that there are other criteria for pain that could be usefully added to the framework’s eight (Burrell). This expansive thinking about criteria that can be used to increase confidence in sentience raisess the question: in an expansive …
Distinguishing Epistemic And Moral Grounds For Legal Protection, Carlos Montemayor
Distinguishing Epistemic And Moral Grounds For Legal Protection, Carlos Montemayor
Animal Sentience
The criteria proposed by Crump et al. are based on various cognitive roles associated with sentience. A subset of them may be sufficient for certain kinds of welfare, but the presence of all of them should be considered as clearly sufficient for substantial kinds of legal protection based on their relation to capacities that we consider essential for moral standing in human beings.
Unconscious Humans, Autonomous Machines And The Difficulty Of Knowing Which Animals Are Sentient, Marian Stamp Dawkins
Unconscious Humans, Autonomous Machines And The Difficulty Of Knowing Which Animals Are Sentient, Marian Stamp Dawkins
Animal Sentience
The framework proposed by Crump et al. still leaves much doubt about whether invertebrates such as crabs are sentient. For example, many complex behaviours - even in humans - occur without sentience. Also, simple machines could easily meet all of Crump et al.’s eight proposed criteria for sentience. Acknowledging the limitations of what we currently know about sentience is important both for formulating legislation correctly and for advancing scientific understanding of this most puzzling of biological phenomena.
Sentience Criteria To Persuade The Reasonable Sceptic, Patrick Butlin
Sentience Criteria To Persuade The Reasonable Sceptic, Patrick Butlin
Animal Sentience
When presented with evidence that Crump et al.’s criteria are satisfied for the animals in some taxon, a sceptic could reasonably continue to suspend judgement about whether those animals are sentient. This is because the criteria refer to abilities which are associated with sentience in humans, but it is not clear that sentience is necessary for these abilities. The criteria could be strengthed by requiring evidence of a contrast in performance between cases in which information is carried by felt and unfelt states.