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Full-Text Articles in Comparative Philosophy
The Modal Catuṣkoṭi: Formalizing Emptiness In Classical Modal Logic, Chance Chapman
The Modal Catuṣkoṭi: Formalizing Emptiness In Classical Modal Logic, Chance Chapman
Comparative Philosophy
Nāgārjuna’s arguments in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā rely extensively on modus tollens, yet this inference is invalid in the paraconsistent frameworks typically used to formalize the catuṣkoṭi. We develop a modal extension of Belnap-Dunn semantics to address this, expressed as: ¬□(v(P) = t) ∧ ¬□(v(P) = f) ∧ ¬□(v(P) = b) ∧ ¬□(v(P) = n). This formula applies self-reflexively, resolves longstanding interpretive debates regarding verses within Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and Vigrahavyāvartanī such as his “no thesis” defense, and bridges interpretive gaps between traditionally designated Eastern and Western logical traditions, providing a Western analytical translation of Indian dialectic into symbolic modal logic that …
Is The Mahāyāna Buddhist Doctrine Of Mutual Dependence A Case Of Begging The Question?, A. K. Jayesh
Is The Mahāyāna Buddhist Doctrine Of Mutual Dependence A Case Of Begging The Question?, A. K. Jayesh
Comparative Philosophy
This paper employs a number of argumentative strategies that the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna employs in his Yukti-corpus to demonstrate that the Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine of mutual dependence is not a case of begging the question. More precisely, this paper demonstrates that to say that A and B are mutually dependent is not to say that what grounds B is grounded in what it itself grounds; it is to say that both A and B lack ontological independence, and that they are a part of a changing, interdependent whole. Mutual dependence thus is a case of dynamic holism, and not of …
Anātman & Lack: Between Nāgārjuna And Lacan, Carter Morris
Anātman & Lack: Between Nāgārjuna And Lacan, Carter Morris
The Confluence
The notion of the Self lies at the heart of subjectivity. This paper aims to analyze and compare two intellectual traditions that have their own subversive philosophies of the Self and subjectivity—these two traditions being Mādhyamaka Buddhism and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Beginning with primers on both Nāgārjuna’s philosophy and Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory, this paper will discuss the comparative psychologies and philosophies of subjectivity presented by the ideas of non-Self and Lack, respectively. Also briefly compared are the implied metaphysics of both Śūnyatā and Lacanian Lack. An examination of these comparisons’ weaknesses follows along with some closing remarks.
A Madhyamaka Critique Of Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument, Tyler J. Jungbauer
A Madhyamaka Critique Of Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument, Tyler J. Jungbauer
Comparative Philosophy
Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience argument objects to the possibility of emergent causation (both downward and same-level) based on both (1) the causal overdetermination of both (a) higher-level emergent events and (b) lower-level basal events, and (2) the causal closure principle of the physical domain. Kim argues that emergent causation entails epiphenomenalism. Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy skeptically critiques the primary (ultimate) existence of causal phenomena and instead suggests that all such phenomena may only be secondarily (conventionally) existent. Mādhyamikas acknowledge that, conventionally, emergent phenomena appear to cause both basal phenomena and other emergent phenomena. However, contra Kim, Mādhyamikas doubt that causal relations ultimately …
Dualism And Psychosemantics: Holography And Pansematism In Early Buddhist Philosophy, Federico Divino
Dualism And Psychosemantics: Holography And Pansematism In Early Buddhist Philosophy, Federico Divino
Comparative Philosophy
In the Indian philosophical debate, the relationship between the structure of knowledge and external reality has been a persistent issue. This debate has been particularly prominent in Buddhism, as evidenced by the earliest Buddhist attestations in the Pāli canon, where reality is described as a perceptual defection. The world (loka) is perceived through cognition (citta), and the theme of designation (paññatti) is central to the analysis of the Abhidhamma. Buddhism can be viewed as navigating between nominalism and cognitive normativism, as it deconstructs language, which is seen as an obfuscating element that separates the subject from the world. In this …
Caducitas And Śūnyatā: A Neoplatonist Reading Of Nāgārjuna, Fabien Muller
Caducitas And Śūnyatā: A Neoplatonist Reading Of Nāgārjuna, Fabien Muller
Comparative Philosophy
In this paper I am addressing the question whether Nāgārjuna’s doctrine should be understood as a theory that describes reality itself (ontology) or as a theory of our relation to reality (epistemological, logical, psychological, etc.). To answer this question, I propose to compare Nāgārjuna’s concept of emptiness to that of ‘caducity’, a key element in the ontology of Renaissance Neoplatonist philosopher Francisco Patrizi. By showing that these concepts are similar, I argue that Nāgārjuna’s standpoint can be considered as that of ontology.
Appearance And Momentariness: The Nature Of Being Between Nāgārjuna, The Sarvāstivādins And Neo-Parmenidism, Federico Divino
Appearance And Momentariness: The Nature Of Being Between Nāgārjuna, The Sarvāstivādins And Neo-Parmenidism, Federico Divino
Comparative Philosophy
In this article I will try to demonstrate the existence of points in common between the eternalist instances of Parmenidean philosophy and the Buddhist formulations made by some parts of the Abhidhamma, Nāgārjuna, and the Sarvāstivādins. These three philosophies have numerous points in common with Emanuele Severino’s formulations from the point of view of what is defined as neo-Parmenidism. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the points in common between these systems of thought are due to a basic affinity which, despite having led them to emphasize different themes, present similar reasoning and logical consequences, which allow …
Dialetheism, Paradox, And Nāgārjuna’S Way Of Thinking, Richard H. Jones
Dialetheism, Paradox, And Nāgārjuna’S Way Of Thinking, Richard H. Jones
Comparative Philosophy
Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness, his ideas on “two truths” and language, and his general method of arguing are presented clearly by him and can be stated without paradox. That the dialetheists today can restate his beliefs in paradoxical ways does not mean that Nāgārjuna argued that way; in fact, their restatements misrepresent and undercut his arguments.
The Self: Kierkegaard And Buddhism In Dialogue, David Wisdo
The Self: Kierkegaard And Buddhism In Dialogue, David Wisdo
Comparative Philosophy
Is it possible for there to be a fruitful dialogue between Søren Kierkegaard and Buddhists regarding the understanding of the self? In this paper, I explore the possibilities for such a dialogue by first discussing the rejection of substantialism shared by Kierkegaard and Buddhists. Next, although many Buddhists accept a reductionist account of the kind found in the Abhidharma tradition, Madhyamaka thinkers such as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti are well-known for offering an account of the self, based on the notion of emptiness (śūnyatā), which resembles in some ways the account of the self that is proposed by Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Anti-Climacus …
Moving, Moved And Will Be Moving: Zeno And Nāgārjuna On Motion From Mahāmudrā, Koan And Mathematical Physics Perspectives, Robert Alan Paul
Moving, Moved And Will Be Moving: Zeno And Nāgārjuna On Motion From Mahāmudrā, Koan And Mathematical Physics Perspectives, Robert Alan Paul
Comparative Philosophy
Zeno’s Arrow and Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (Mūlamādhyamakakārikā, MMK) Chapter 2 (MMK/2) contain paradoxical, dialectic arguments thought to indicate that there is no valid explanation of motion, hence there is no physical or generic motion. There are, however, diverse interpretations of the latter text, and I argue they apply to Zeno’s Arrow as well. I also find that many of the interpretations are dependent on a mathematical analysis of material motion through space and time. However, with modern philosophy and physics we find that the link from no explanation to no phenomena is invalid and …
Neither Ātman Nor Anattā: Tapering Our Conception Of Selfhood, Roman Briggs
Neither Ātman Nor Anattā: Tapering Our Conception Of Selfhood, Roman Briggs
Comparative Philosophy
I provide critical discussion of conception of and talk of psychic integration which I take to be both excessive and deficient; these viciously extreme positions are championed by the Apostle Paul and St. Augustine (and both their religious and their secular cultural descendants in the West), and by Jacques Lacan and María Lugones (and their contemporaries), respectively. I suggest that we must negotiate a Buddhist-inspired understanding located between these extremes in endorsing any acceptable conception of the self, generally speaking—a conception which, contra the strong antirealist about selves, allows for the continued use of selfhood in everyday discourse, but which, …
Nāgārjuna’S Pañcakoṭi, Agrippa’S Trilemma, And The Uses Of Skepticism, Ethan A. Mills
Nāgārjuna’S Pañcakoṭi, Agrippa’S Trilemma, And The Uses Of Skepticism, Ethan A. Mills
Comparative Philosophy
While the contemporary problem of the criterion raises similar epistemological issues as Agrippa’s Trilemma in ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism, the consideration of such epistemological questions has served two different purposes. On one hand, there is the purely practical purpose of Pyrrhonism, in which such questions are a means to reach suspension of judgment, and on the other hand, there is the theoretical purpose of contemporary epistemologists, in which these issues raise theoretical problems that drive the search for theoretical resolution. In classical India, similar issues arise in Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī, but it is not entirely clear what Nāgārjuna’s purpose is. Contrary …