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Full-Text Articles in Aesthetics
Advice For Nonactualists: Embrace Metaphysically Vague Ficta, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Advice For Nonactualists: Embrace Metaphysically Vague Ficta, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
I here critically discuss “the Selection Problem”, a vexing problem for metaphysicians who are realists about fictional entities and who further claim that such entities are identified with nonactualia. The Selection Problem arises due to the fact that the nonactualist is forced to defend the view that ficta are somehow discovered, or selected, by authors who then present them to us so we may entertain their exploits. But how exactly does an author manage this when there are a vast number of eligible candidates to be found in the relevant nonactual realms? I argue that the realist who is also …
The Puzzle Of Fictional Resemblance, Jeffrey C. Goodman
The Puzzle Of Fictional Resemblance, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
This paper discusses a puzzle, the heart of which is this question: How is it that real individuals can resemble fictional individuals? It seems that any answer given by one who has taken a stand on the ontology of fictional individuals will come with significant drawbacks. An Anti-Realist will have to explain, or explain away, the apparent truth of our positive assertions of resemblance, while a Realist will have to explain how we are to understand resemblance in light of either the further claim that fictional characters are not associated with properties in the same way real individuals are, or …
Fictional Universal Realism, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Fictional Universal Realism, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
Certain realists about properties and relations identify them with universals. Furthermore, some hold that for a wide range of meaningful predicates, the semantic contribution to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which those predicates figure is the universal expressed by the predicate. I here address ontological issues raised by predicates first introduced to us via works of fiction and whether the universal realist should accept that any such predicates express universals. After discussing the lines of reasoning given by Braun (2015) and Sawyer (2015) for fictional universal anti-realism, I propose a novel, Kripke-inspired argument for the same. I ultimately …
Review Of Anthony Everett's "The Nonexistent", Jeffrey C. Goodman
Review Of Anthony Everett's "The Nonexistent", Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
I here review Anthony Everett's monograph, The Nonexistent
Creatures Of Fiction, Objects Of Myth, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Creatures Of Fiction, Objects Of Myth, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
Artifactualists hold that some abstracta are contingent entities, products of the intentional activities of people. A great many artifactualists are fictional creationists, asserting that fictonal characters are abstracta of this sort, but some, notably Kripke (1973), Salmon (1998, 2002), and Braun (2005), further embrace mythical creationism. They hold that certain entities that figure in false theories are likewise abstracta that are produced by our intentional activities. A paradigm example would be Vulcan, the planet proposed by Le Verrier to be the cause of perturbations in the orbit of Mercury. I here argue that one may not reasonably take the metaphysical …
On Inadvertently Created Abstracta, Fictional Storytelling, And Scientific Hypothesizing, Jeffrey C. Goodman
On Inadvertently Created Abstracta, Fictional Storytelling, And Scientific Hypothesizing, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
In my “Creatures of Fiction, Objects of Myth” (2014), I present and defend an argument for thinking that mythical creationism – the view that mythical objects like phlogiston and Vulcan are abstract artifacts – is false. One intriguing sort of objection to my argument has been recently put forth by Zvolenszky (2016); she claims that a crucial premise is seen to be unjustified once one considers the phenomena of inadvertently created abstracta, specifically, inadvertently created fictional characters. I here argue that even if we admit inadvertently created abstracta into our ontology, my argument survives. I ultimately defend a view on …
Review Of Peter Alward's "Empty Revelations", Jeffrey C. Goodman
Review Of Peter Alward's "Empty Revelations", Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
I here review Peter Alward's monograph Empty Revelations
A Problem For Fine Individuation And Artist Essentialism, Jeffrey C. Goodman
A Problem For Fine Individuation And Artist Essentialism, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
Fine Individuation says it’s impossible for distinct people who are not collaborating on a work of art to produce one and same artwork. This is an intra-world thesis, but is necessarily true, if true at all. Author-Essentialism says it’s impossible for someone else to produce one and the same work of art produced by some actual artist. This is an alleged necessary truth regarding cross-world relations. Both theses have been vigorously defended. I here argue that both are false, but for reasons that are entirely novel.
Pretense Theory And The Imported Background, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Pretense Theory And The Imported Background, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
Kendall Walton’s pretense theory, like its rivals, says that what’s true in a fiction F depends in part on the importation of background propositions into F. The aim of this paper is to present, explain, and defend a brief yet straightforward argument – one which exploits the specific mechanism by which the pretense theory says propositions are imported into fictions – for the falsity of the pretense theory.
Fictionalia As Modal Artifacts, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Fictionalia As Modal Artifacts, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
There is much controversy surrounding the nature of the relation between fictional individuals and possible individuals. Some have argued that no fictional individual is a possible individual; others have argued that (some) fictional individuals just are (merely) possible individuals. In this paper, I offer further grounds for believing the theory of fictional individuals defended by Amie Thomasson, viz., Artifactualism, by arguing that her view best allows one to make sense of this puzzling relation. More specifically, when we realize that the view allows for an identification of merely possible individuals with fictional individuals, we see that the utility, and hence …
Defending Author-Essentialism, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Defending Author-Essentialism, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
Creationism is the view that fictional individuals such as Sherlock Holmes are contingently existing abstracta that come about due to the intentional activities of authors. Author-essentialism is the stronger thesis that the author responsible for bringing a fictional individual into existence at a time is essential to the existence of that individual. Takashi Yagisawa has recently attacked this view on the following grounds: author-essentialists rely on an ontological parallelism between fictional individuals and whole works of fiction, but this parallelism fails to obtain. I here argue that Yagisawa’s grounds are weak.
A Defense Of Creationism In Fiction, Jeffrey C. Goodman
A Defense Of Creationism In Fiction, Jeffrey C. Goodman
Faculty Scholarship
Creationism is the conjunction of the following theses: (i) fictional individuals (e.g. Sherlock Holmes) actually exist; (ii) fictional names (e.g., ‘Holmes’) are at least sometimes genuinely referential; (iii) fictional individuals are the creations of the authors who first wrote (or spoke, etc.) about them. CA Creationism is the conjunction of (i) – (iii) and the following thesis: (iv) fictional individuals are contingently existing abstracta; they are non-concrete artifacts of our world and various other possible worlds. Takashi Yagisawa has recently provided a number of arguments designed to show that Creationism is unjustified. I here critically examine three of his challenges …