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2016

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Articles 181 - 210 of 1021

Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

From Thinking Selves To Social Selves, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg Aug 2016

From Thinking Selves To Social Selves, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg

Animal Sentience

I argue that Rowlands’s concept of pre-reflective self-awareness offers a way to understand animals as Social Selves. It does so because it departs from the orthodox conception of self-awareness, which is both egocentric and logocentric. Instead, its focus is on the relation between consciousness and a person’s lived body, her actions and goals. Characterizing persons as pre-reflectively self-aware beings in Rowlands’s sense offers a much more useful conceptual tool to interpret social behaviour in animals.

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What Do We Owe Animals As Persons?, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg Aug 2016

What Do We Owe Animals As Persons?, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg

Animal Sentience

Rowlands (2016) concentrates strictly on the metaphysical concept of person, but his notion of animal personhood bears a moral dimension (Monsó, 2016). His definition of pre-reflective self-awareness has a focus on sentience and on the lived body of a person as well as on her implicit awareness of her own goals. Interestingly, these also play a key role in animal welfare science, as well as in animal rights theories that value the interests of animals. Thus, Rowlands’s concept shows connectivity with both major fields of animal ethics. His metaphysical arguments might indeed contain a strong answer to the question of …

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Heidegger's Way Of Being By Richard Capobianco, Brian Mccormack Aug 2016

Heidegger's Way Of Being By Richard Capobianco, Brian Mccormack

The Goose

A review of Richard Capobianco's Heidegger's Way of Being.

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A Morally Enlightened Positivism? Kelsen And Habermas On The Democratic Roots Of Validity In Municipal And International Law, David Ingram Aug 2016

A Morally Enlightened Positivism? Kelsen And Habermas On The Democratic Roots Of Validity In Municipal And International Law, David Ingram

Philosophy: Faculty Publications and Other Works

A commonplace misconception identifies Kelsen as a one-dimensional legal positivist and Habermas as a one-dimensional legal moralist. I argue, on the contrary, that both theorists defend a complex normative conception of democratic proceduralism that straddles the positivism/naturalism divide. I then show how their extension of this conception to international law commits them to a monistic human rights regime. I conclude that their realistic acknowledgment of the fragmented nature of legal paradigms and regimes entails a complementary qualification of their monism. Section 10.1 situates Kelsen and Habermas’s proceduralism between natural law reasoning and formal positivism in opposition to Schmitt’s political-theological defense …

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If Insects Have Phenomenal Consciousness, Could They Suffer?, Elizabeth S. Paul, Michael T. Mendl Aug 2016

If Insects Have Phenomenal Consciousness, Could They Suffer?, Elizabeth S. Paul, Michael T. Mendl

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron’s (K & B’s) suggestion that insects have the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is a refreshing and challenging departure from the cautious and agnostic stance that is taken by many researchers when considering this possibility. It is impossible to falsify the sceptic’s view that neural and behavioural parallels between humans and insects need not imply either similar conscious experience or even any phenomenal consciousness in insects at all. But if K & B are right, it is important to consider the possible contents of insect consciousness. Here we discuss whether affective consciousness, with its implications for potential suffering, …

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Finding The Self In Tension: The Importance Of Play For Embodied Consciousness In Post-Kantian Philosophical Anthropology And Psychology, Jaime Thomas Denison Aug 2016

Finding The Self In Tension: The Importance Of Play For Embodied Consciousness In Post-Kantian Philosophical Anthropology And Psychology, Jaime Thomas Denison

Philosophy ETDs

My dissertation looks at how four figures in the German philosophical tradition employ a similar concept of play in their models of the Ich', often translated as 'Self', as they explore the complexities of establishing a unity within embodied consciousness. These four figures are: Friedrich Schiller, F.W.J. Schelling, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud. I situate this concept of play within the contemporary debate of the interdisciplinary field of play studies, showing that what emerges is a theory of play that avoids marginalizing it to children and leisure, but rather recognizes it as a state of consciousness that provides a semblance …

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“What Does Philosophy Of Religion Offer To The Modern University?”, Michael Jones Aug 2016

“What Does Philosophy Of Religion Offer To The Modern University?”, Michael Jones

Faculty Publications and Presentations

No abstract provided.

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Subjective Experience In Insects: Definitions And Other Difficulties, Shelley Adamo Aug 2016

Subjective Experience In Insects: Definitions And Other Difficulties, Shelley Adamo

Animal Sentience

Whether insects have the potential for subjective experiences depends on the definition of subjective experience. The definition used by Klein & Barron (2016) is an unusually liberal one and could be used to argue that some modern robots have subjective experiences. From an evolutionary perspective, the additional neurons needed to produce subjective experiences will be proportionately more expensive for insects than for mammals because of the small size of the insect brain. This greater cost could weaken selection for such traits. Minimally, it may be premature to assume that small neuronal number is unimportant in determining the capacity for consciousness.

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We Must Learn To Tell Narratives That Make Us Better – Not Diminish Us, Bruce Janz Aug 2016

We Must Learn To Tell Narratives That Make Us Better – Not Diminish Us, Bruce Janz

UCF Forum

Every four years we turn to our TVs and online sites to cheer on competitors vying for supremacy in an arena where the rules are often unclear and scandal is rife. We hope for an uplifting narrative that shows the best of who we can be, which gives us all something to strive for, but more often than not the narrative degenerates into stories that divide us.

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Bacteria And The Cellular Basis Of Consciousness, Michael L. Woodruff Aug 2016

Bacteria And The Cellular Basis Of Consciousness, Michael L. Woodruff

Animal Sentience

According to Reber’s theory, the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), sentience originates as bio-sensitivity in unicellular organisms. For this reason, Reber regards sentience as evolutionarily foundational. Many bacteria show chemotaxis and, thus, according to CBC, they are sentient. Analysis of the genetic mechanisms underlying bacterial chemotaxis indicates that sentience has no explanatory power in this case. Genetic analysis also fails to show species continuity underlying bio-sensitivity in bacteria and bio-sensitivity in species with nervous systems, so it does not seem that sentience is evolutionary foundational. CBC is rejected on these grounds.

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Unity Of Consciousness In Animals, Bernard E. Rollin Aug 2016

Unity Of Consciousness In Animals, Bernard E. Rollin

Animal Sentience

Both Descartes the rationalist and Hume the empiricist, polar opposites philosophically, denied the unity and continuity of animal mind. Kant pointed out that the presence of retrievable memories entails unity of consciousness. Rowlands now argues that animals too have unity of consciousness.

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To Bee Or Not To Bee?, Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete Aug 2016

To Bee Or Not To Bee?, Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron’s (2016) (K & B’s) case for insect consciousness is a welcome development in an area that, in all of the science and philosophy of mind, is probably the most anthropocentric. In this commentary, we seek to strengthen K & B’s side of the argument by appealing not just to putative neural mechanisms but also to computational theory that supports it (section 1). We also offer some remarks on three distinctions that are relevant to K & B’s thesis and are central to phenomenal awareness: between the capacity for awareness and its contents (section 2); between …

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No Proof For Subjective Experience In Insects, Holk Cruse, Malte Schilling Aug 2016

No Proof For Subjective Experience In Insects, Holk Cruse, Malte Schilling

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron (2016) provide an inspiring review collecting arguments that show quite related functions in humans and insects. Here we extend the comparison to robots, and formulate two critical objections. One concerns an epistemological question related to the phenomenon of subjective experience. The other questions whether insects need integrated spatiotemporal modeling for navigation.

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Consciousness As Integrated Perception, Motivation, Cognition, And Action, Murray Shanahan Aug 2016

Consciousness As Integrated Perception, Motivation, Cognition, And Action, Murray Shanahan

Animal Sentience

This commentary has two aims: first to clarify the behavioural grounds for the ascription of consciousness to non-human animals (including insects), and second to show how Klein & Barron’s views can be reconciled with the core claims of global workspace theory.

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The Moral Dimension Of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness, Susana Monsó Aug 2016

The Moral Dimension Of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness, Susana Monsó

Animal Sentience

Rowlands offers a de-intellectualised account of personhood that is meant to secure the unity of a mental life. I argue that his characterisation also singles out a morally relevant feature of individuals. Along the same lines that the orthodox understanding of personhood reflects a fundamental precondition for moral agency, Rowlands’s notion provides a fundamental precondition for moral patienthood.

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What Makes Us Conscious Is Not What Makes Us Human, Ezequiel Morsella, Erica B. Walker Aug 2016

What Makes Us Conscious Is Not What Makes Us Human, Ezequiel Morsella, Erica B. Walker

Animal Sentience

Consistent with the promising proposal of Klein & Barron (K & B), we discuss how what makes us conscious appears to be distinct from and more widespread in the animal kingdom than what distinguishes us from other species. Many of the abilities that do distinguish humans from other species (e.g., syntax and co-articulation in speech production) can be mediated unconsciously. The kind of functional architecture proposed by K & B may engender an “action selection bottleneck” in both humans and nonhuman species. As noted by K & B, this bottleneck is intimately related to conscious processing.

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Review Of The Moral Complexities Of Eating Meat, Andy Lamey Aug 2016

Review Of The Moral Complexities Of Eating Meat, Andy Lamey

Between the Species

No abstract provided.

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Insect Consciousness: Fine-Tuning The Hypothesis, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg Aug 2016

Insect Consciousness: Fine-Tuning The Hypothesis, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg

Animal Sentience

Although we are mostly supportive, we point out the strengths and weaknesses of Klein & Barron’s (2016) hypothesis that insects have the most basic form of consciousness. The strengths are in their application of Bjorn Merker’s vertebrate-derived ideas to arthropods, using their deep knowledge of insect brains. The weaknesses involve the controversial aspects of some of Merker’s ideas. We describe how the latter can be modified to strengthen the authors’ case for insect consciousness.

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Feel Or Perspective?, Mark Rowlands Aug 2016

Feel Or Perspective?, Mark Rowlands

Animal Sentience

The title of Klein & Barron’s well-argued and thought-provoking target article is, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience.” However, they also frame their claim using the term “consciousness,” which they seem to take as equivalent to “subjective experience.” This assumed equivalence, I shall argue, is problematic in a way that might vitiate their central argument.

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How To Become A Post-Dog. Animals In Transhumanism, Michael Hauskeller Aug 2016

How To Become A Post-Dog. Animals In Transhumanism, Michael Hauskeller

Between the Species

This paper analyses and deconstructs the transhumanist commitment to animal rights and the well-being of all sentient beings. Some transhumanists have argued that such a commitment entails a moral imperative to help non-human animals overcome their biological limitations by enhancing their cognitive abilities and generally “uplifting” them to a more human-like existence. I argue that the transhumanist approach to animal welfare ultimately aims at the destruction of the animal as an animal. By seeking to make animals more like us the freedom to live their life as the kind of creature they are is being denied to them. It is …

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Thoughts On The Aesthetics Of Water, Tom Baugh Aug 2016

Thoughts On The Aesthetics Of Water, Tom Baugh

Contemporary Aesthetics (Journal Archive)

No abstract provided.

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The Normative Problem Of Shame, Timothy James Oakberg Aug 2016

The Normative Problem Of Shame, Timothy James Oakberg

Arts & Sciences Graduate Student Theses and Dissertations

What role should shame play in our lives? This is the normative problem of shame, and it is the focus of this dissertation. Through an examination of empirical research on shame and shame-proneness, I argue that shame should have only a very limited role in our lives. More specifically, we ought not cultivate shame, because a substantial amount of empirical literature points to the conclusion that shame-proneness is counterproductive at both an individual and a societal level. Expanding on this general answer to the normative problem of shame, I discuss in detail three proposals regarding shame from the realms of …

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Tantric Alchemy Of The Soul: A Philosophical Analysis And Synthesis Of Jung And Kashmir Shaivism, Derek C. Wolter Aug 2016

Tantric Alchemy Of The Soul: A Philosophical Analysis And Synthesis Of Jung And Kashmir Shaivism, Derek C. Wolter

Oglethorpe Journal of Undergraduate Research

One of the most fascinating parts of intellectual globalization is the dialogue that occurs between two vastly removed systems of thought. One particular area of interdisciplinary dialogue that has emerged in the last century is between Western psychology and traditional Eastern religious and philosophical thought. Two particular disciplines that bear a striking resemblance ripe for comparative study are Jung’s psychology and Indian Tantrism. Some of this dialogue has already taken place, to a limited extent by Jung himself, but more so by modern pundits of Tantrism, particular Buddhist Tantrism. While some truly important work has been done in the comparative …

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The Significance Of Economic Significance, Dakota M. Sneed Mr. Aug 2016

The Significance Of Economic Significance, Dakota M. Sneed Mr.

Oglethorpe Journal of Undergraduate Research

According to research performed by Deirdre McCloskey two important econometric terms, economic significance and statistical significance, have begun to become confused through equivocation. McCloskey calls for the distinction of the two types of significance but never gives a definition for what economic significance is. I show that statistical significance is necessary but not sufficient for economic significance by virtue of the fact that statistical significance does not say anything about the world or the natures of relationships. Furthermore, I found that the currently existing definitions of economic significance was too inconsistent for meaningful discussion. To remedy this problem, I create …

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Thou And It: Personhood Actualized Through Water Rights, Kierra M. Powell Aug 2016

Thou And It: Personhood Actualized Through Water Rights, Kierra M. Powell

Oglethorpe Journal of Undergraduate Research

While issues of racial and gendered discrimination are more visible and widely discussed, poverty and water based discrimination is often a silent fact of life for the many. As one of the most critical elemental resources required for the sustainability of human life, safe water has been designated a human right, but the current global distribution of water does not mirror this sentiment. The divide in quality water distribution provokes the question: whose life is intrinsically valued? This study seeks to determine the status of personhood as displayed by the movement of water in relation to the underprivileged. I first …

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Universal Modes Of Awareness? A “Pre-Reflective” Premise, Uta M. Jürgens Aug 2016

Universal Modes Of Awareness? A “Pre-Reflective” Premise, Uta M. Jürgens

Animal Sentience

Mark Rowlands holds that creatures endowed with pre-reflective awareness may qualify as persons: In pre-reflective awareness, the self and the unity of mental life are implicit in the stream of experience. Rowlands generalizes from an introspective analysis of pre-reflective consciousness in humans to pre-reflective awareness in general. I describe three examples of empirical findings that corroborate the assumption that animal minds have some of the same basic modes of pre-reflective awareness as human minds.

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Mind-Dependent Kinds, Muhammad Ali Khalidi Aug 2016

Mind-Dependent Kinds, Muhammad Ali Khalidi

Publications and Research

Many philosophers take mind-independence to be criterial for realism about kinds. This is problematic when it comes to psychological and social kinds, which are unavoidably mind-dependent. But reflection on the case of artificial or synthetic kinds (e.g. synthetic chemicals, genetically modified organisms) shows that the criterion of mind-independence needs to be qualified in certain ways. However, I argue that none of the usual variants on the criterion of mind-dependence is capable of distinguishing real or natural kinds from non-real kinds. Although there is a way of modifying the criterion of mind-independence in such a way as to rule in artificial …

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What If Klein & Barron Are Right About Insect Sentience?, Bob Fischer Aug 2016

What If Klein & Barron Are Right About Insect Sentience?, Bob Fischer

Animal Sentience

If Klein & Barron are right, then insects may well be able to feel pain. If they can, then the standard approach to animal ethics generates some implausible results. Philosophers need to develop alternatives to this framework to avoid them.

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Subjective Experience And Moral Standing, Andy Lamey Aug 2016

Subjective Experience And Moral Standing, Andy Lamey

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron’s analysis focuses on the capacity for any subjective experience at all. It does not seek to demonstrate that insects can experience pleasure and pain in particular. This would be something of which insects have not traditionally been thought capable. If further research were to demonstrate that one or more insect species turn out to be conscious, yet incapable of experiencing pleasure and pain, it would give rise to a philosophical question that ethicists have yet to answer: Would a creature that is conscious, but lacks the capacity to feel pain, have moral standing?

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A Study Of Integration: The Role Of Sensus Communis In Integrating Disciplinary Knowledge, Laureen Park Aug 2016

A Study Of Integration: The Role Of Sensus Communis In Integrating Disciplinary Knowledge, Laureen Park

Publications and Research

Integration is an important notion for interdisciplinary studies. Achieving this shows that the interdisciplinary learner has successfully understood the commonalities among disciplines, as well as exercised crucial cognitive skills. This chapter attempts to elucidate how students integrated various disciplinary perspectives in the interdisciplinary course, Weird Science: Interpreting and Redefining Humanity. The study uses Hans-Georg Gadamer’s notion of the sensus communis to clarify how it was that students were processing and accomplishing the goal of integrating different disciplinary perspectives as evidenced in class observation, discussion, and especially student papers. The study demonstrates the ways in which common sense knowledge conditions and …

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