Ancient Philosophy Commons^™

Aristotle On The Truth Of Things, John Thorp

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Aristotle on the truth of things

Abstract

Most of Aristotle's texts dealing with truth are unexceptionable: truth belongs only to sentences or beliefs, and it does so in virtue of a correspondence between those sentences or beliefs and the things in the world that they are about. Single words cannot be true, and the things in the world, whether single or compound, cannot be true either. There is however one text, Chapter 10 of Book Theta of the Metaphysics, that breaks with these familiar and comfortable views; it allows that single words or thoughts can be true, and also …

Sagp Newsletter 2012/13.1 East Philol, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp Ssips 2012 Abstracts, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp Ssips 2012 Program, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Making Room For Matter, David Ebrey

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Socrates rejects material causes in the Phaedo, in sharp contrast to Aristotle, who gives them a fundamental role in his account of the natural world. Why do they disagree about this? It is sometimes suggested that Socrates rejects material causation because he requires causes to be rational or to be teleological. You might think, then, that Aristotle can have material causes because he does not have any such requirement. In this paper I argue for a different explanation. Plato and Aristotle ultimately disagree about material causation because of a difference in their causal frameworks: Socrates thinks that each change has …

The Republic’S Reluctant Rulers, Christopher Buckels

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

I attempt to resolve three closely related problems concerning philosophers’ rule over Kallipolis in Plato's Republic. First and foremost, it seems that the rulers should willingly take up ruling, since it is just to rule and the rulers are just people. So why does Plato emphasize that they must be compelled to rule? Second, since just acts are beneficial, how does ruling, qua just act, benefit philosophers? Third, since Plato has been accused of jumping unfairly between just actions and just souls, what exactly is the connection between the two? I submit that these questions are intricately related, so that …

Sagp Newsletter 2011/12.4 Pacific, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Homeopoesis: Aristotle On Nutrition And Growth, John Thorp

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

This paper seeks to understand how Aristotle’s ideas about nutrition avoid cancerous growth: why does the flesh that is distilled out of the digestive process, and that travels out to the various parts of the body, not just produce formless growth? De Anima II.5 gives a purely formal reply ("limit and ratio:") Using GA and GC I try to put together Aristotle's schematic account of the process.

Sagp Newsletter 2011/12.3 Central, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Letter From David Gallop, David Gallop

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Recollections from the 1964 SAGP conference at Amherst College.

Politeia As Citizenship In Aristotle, John J. Mulhern

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Recent studies of the citizen and citizenship in Aristotle, such as those of Hansen, Morrison, and Collins, have focused attention on a somewhat neglected topic in Aristotle’s work. While a definitive treatment of this topic awaits a comprehensive catalogue of the uses of politeia in the Politica and the Ath. at least, with over 500 occurrences in the Politica alone, in this paper I contribute to the catalogue project by considering some examples of Aristotle’s use of politeia in idioms from earlier Greek literature which express participation in citizenship, giving a share in citizenship, and so on. I consider also …

Aristotle's Rhetorodicy, John Thorp

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

There is a well-known question about Aristotle's view of rhetoric: on the one hand he inherited the typical Platonic disdain for rhetoric as a concealer of truth; but on the other he throws himself with verve into the elaboration of a rhetorical manual. This paper points up a little-noticed Aristotelian justification for rhetoric, one that sees rhetorical contests as means for discovering the truth; it asks how such an optimistic view might be grounded.

Cephalus And Euthydemus, Matthew Carter Cashen

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Cephalus makes only a brief appearance in Plato’s Republic, but his conversation with Socrates has generated remarkable disagreement: while some think Plato’s portrayal of the rich old metic is largely positive, many, including Julia Annas, Peter Steinberger, and Mark Gifford, argue that beneath Plato’s superficially sympathetic portrait lies a subtext of condemnation and malice. In this paper, I reject the later interpretation, defending Cephalus against two common charges: first, that Plato finds Cephalus’ views on the relationship between money and virtue morally outrageous, and next, that Plato exploits readers’ background knowledge of the historical Cephalus’ tragic fate to employ the …

Sagp Newsletter 2011/12.2 East Philol, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp/Ssips 2011 Program, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp Fordham Abstracts 72611, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Aristotle On Truth, Facts, And Relations: Categories, De Interpretatione, Metaphysics Gamma, Blake Hestir

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Aristotle’s conception of truth looks like this:

TA-Schema: ‘S is P’ is true ↔ S is P.

TA-Schema(n): ‘S is not P’ is true ↔ S is not P.

By Tdf Aristotle need only mean that stating with respect to some property P that is in the case some subject S that P is in the case of S, is what amounts to truth. More precisely then for Aristotle the TA-Schema would amount to:

TA-Schema*: ‘S is P’ is true ↔ the universal P is instantiated in the case of S. TASchema( n)*: ‘S is not P’ is true ↔ …

Climate And Teleology In Aristotle's Physics Ii.8, Yancy Hughes Dominick

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Weather, including rain, happens as a result of natural and teleological processes, but that is compatible with the claim that rain falls not for the sake of something, but of necessity, and any benefit from the rain comes by chance. Aristotle need not embrace the conclusion, therefore, that it rains for the sake of the crops. Climate, on the other hand, is regular and beneficial. If the disjunct from Physics II.8 holds, climate ought to be for the sake of something even while rain is not.

Sagp Newsletter 2010/11.3 Pacific, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Justice As Self-Transmitting Power And Just Acts In Republic 4, Andrew Payne

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In his influential paper “A Fallacy in Plato’s Republic,” David Sachs charged Plato with committing a fallacy of irrelevancy. Plato’s Socrates is asked to show that justice understood as acting in conformity with conventional morality, so-called vulgar justice, is beneficial to the just person. Socrates actually demonstrates something else, namely that psychic justice, a state of internal harmony between parts of the soul, is beneficial to its possessor. A generation of Plato scholarship has reacted to Sachs’ reading of the Republic by using discussions of moral psychology and education elsewhere in the dialogue to bridge the gap between psychic justice …

Sagp Newsletter 2010/11.2 Central, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Shame And Conflict - Lysis's Philosophical Akrasia, L. Albert Joosse

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

We will see a conflict within Lysis between his newly stimulated love for wisdom and his habitual self-restraint. Born and raised an aristocrat, Lysis experiences conflict when his mind is enticed outside its wonted limits. What he experiences is, in fact, shame of himself: he notices that part of him falls short of the ideal he has been brought up with and to which part of him still adheres. His is a philosophical akrasia.

Ceaselessly Testing The Good Of Death, Danielle A. Layne

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The hope Socrates invokes during his defence becomes a statement to be tested and corroborated, and thus a catalyst for discovery rather than a valueless rejection of all arguments, beliefs or in Socratic terms “hopes.” In his prison cell Socrates tests the propositions in the Apology that death may be a good and in the Phaedo these arguments affirm Socrates’ hope, making it the more valuable belief. Thus since no man willing chooses evil, a valueless not knowing, over the good, the value-laden hope regardless of not-knowing, Socrates commits himself to the “great perhaps” of the immortality of the soul. …

A Religious Revolution? How Socrates' Theology Undermined The Practice Of Sacrifice, Anna Lannstrom

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Mark McPherran and Gregory Vlastos argue that Socrates’ theology threatened Athenian sacrificial practices because it rejected the do ut des principle (aka the principle of reciprocity). I argue that their arguments are flawed because they assume that the Athenians understood sacrifice as something like a commercial transaction. Drawing upon scholarship in anthropology and religious studies, I argue that we need to revise that understanding of sacrifice and that, once we do, McPherran’s and Vlastos’ arguments no longer show that Socrates would have been a significant threat to the practice of sacrifice. Finally, I argue that McPherran’s Socrates does undermine sacrifice, …

Sagp Newsletter 2010/11.1 East Philol, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp/Ssips 2010 Program, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Intelligible Matter In Aristotle, John Thorp

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The oxymoronic phrase ‘intelligible matter’ occurs three times in Aristotle. In two passages it has the same meaning; in the third the meaning seems radically different. This gives the impression that the Aristotelian language of metaphysics is distressingly slack. This paper argues, against the nearly unanimous voice of two millennia of commentaries, that ‘intelligible matter’ has the same meaning in all three loci. In doing so it develops a capital distinction that tightens up the apparatus of Aristotelian metaphysics.

Aristotle On Learning In De Anima Ii.5, John F. Bowin

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Just as the coming to be of a substance may be described as either an extended process or the completion of an extended process depending on whether it is described as the coming to be of the composite or of the individual form, so the process of learning may be described as either an extended process or the completion of an extended process depending on whether it is described as the oscillation between states of truth and error or as the ‘settling down’ or cessation of this oscillation at the stage where knowledge has become a stable disposition (hexis). And …

Causation, Agency, And Law In Antiphon: On Some Subtleties In The Second Tetralogy, Joel Mann

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

That no one can or should be convicted in a law court on pollution charges is, I suggest, the implicit message of Antiphon’s second Tetralogy. More than a mere rhetorical exercise, Antiphon offers us a rational and compelling critique of religious law and of legal responsibility generally. In so doing, he anticipates modern puzzles in the philosophy of law as well as some of their more sophisticated solutions. A work not only of ingenious skepticism but also of considerable subtlety, the second Tetralogy should be considered the product of a philosopher who made perhaps the most substantial extant contribution to …

Sagp Newsletter 2009/10.4 Pac, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.