Ancient Philosophy Commons^™

Cyprian The Apologist, Philip Palmer

Doctoral Dissertations and Projects

Cyprian has not generally been viewed as an apologist of the Patristic era. This study examines whether Cyprian should be considered an apologist under a four-part definition of the term, which coheres with the New Testament uses of apologia and apologeomai and finds expression in the work of the recognized second-century apologists Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Mathetes, Minucius Felix, and Tertullian. It is argued that Cyprian engaged in an extensive program of apologetics characterized by these same four elements.

Sagp Newsletter 2013/14.1 East Philol, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp Ssips 2013 Program, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp Ssips Abstracts 2013, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

To The Jew First: A Socio-Historical And Biblical-Theological Analysis Of The Pauline Teaching Of `Election' In Light Of Second Temple Jewish Patterns Of Thought, Anthony Thornhill

Doctoral Dissertations and Projects

Paul's "doctrine" of election has remained a controversial and enigmatic topic for centuries. Few studies, however, have approached Paul's doctrine through the context of Second Temple Judaism. This study examines Paul's view of election through the lens of Second Temple Jewish texts written prior to 70 CE. In doing so, it is argued that the best framework through which to view Paul's discussion of election is through a primarily corporate model of election. While such a model is rooted in Judaism, Paul departs from his Jewish contemporaries in arguing that the locus of election is in God's Messiah, Jesus.

Why I Am Not A Materialist, John Cramer Dr.

Oglethorpe Journal of Undergraduate Research

Materialism is a world view that insists the world is nothing but matter. My purpose here is to show it is not a viable world view. Its monism creates severe difficulties for it, centered on the nature of the human mind and the truth of beliefs. Nor is it fit for human consumption because it denies human uniqueness and denigrates human needs.

Ideal And Ordinary Language In Plato's Cratylus, Franco Trivigno

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Interpreters of Plato’s Cratylus are faced with a puzzle. If Socrates’ etymologies (397a-421c) are intended to be parodies, as many have thought,^[1] what is the status of the imitation theory of letters (421c-427d), which provides the theoretical foundation for etymology and, as some have thought, indicates Plato’s ambition to construct an ideal language?[2] In this paper, I focus on three questions: [1] whether Plato thought that imitation provided a suitable basis for an ideal language; [2] whether Plato thought that the development of an ideal language would be philosophical possible or desirable; [3] whether he thought that ordinary …

We Should Always Call The Receptacle The Same Thing: Timaeus 50b6-51b6, Christopher Buckels

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Plato’s Timaeus is a challenge to understand and to interpret, but its central ontological innovation, a third kind in addition to the standard Platonic categories of Being and Becoming, is, even according to Timaeus himself, a murky and difficult topic. I endeavor to shed a meager light on this shadowy entity, the Receptacle of all Becoming, by examining an argument Timaeus gives for the claim that “we should always call it the same thing” (50b6-7).[1] This claim comes immediately after the famous gold analogy, about which I will say only a few words, and so it also closely follows …

Sagp Newsletter 2012/13.3 Pac, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp Newsletter 2012/13.2 Central, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Aristotle On The Truth Of Things, John Thorp

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Aristotle on the truth of things

Abstract

Most of Aristotle's texts dealing with truth are unexceptionable: truth belongs only to sentences or beliefs, and it does so in virtue of a correspondence between those sentences or beliefs and the things in the world that they are about. Single words cannot be true, and the things in the world, whether single or compound, cannot be true either. There is however one text, Chapter 10 of Book Theta of the Metaphysics, that breaks with these familiar and comfortable views; it allows that single words or thoughts can be true, and also …

Sagp Newsletter 2012/13.1 East Philol, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp Ssips 2012 Abstracts, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp Ssips 2012 Program, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Making Room For Matter, David Ebrey

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Socrates rejects material causes in the Phaedo, in sharp contrast to Aristotle, who gives them a fundamental role in his account of the natural world. Why do they disagree about this? It is sometimes suggested that Socrates rejects material causation because he requires causes to be rational or to be teleological. You might think, then, that Aristotle can have material causes because he does not have any such requirement. In this paper I argue for a different explanation. Plato and Aristotle ultimately disagree about material causation because of a difference in their causal frameworks: Socrates thinks that each change has …

The Republic’S Reluctant Rulers, Christopher Buckels

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

I attempt to resolve three closely related problems concerning philosophers’ rule over Kallipolis in Plato's Republic. First and foremost, it seems that the rulers should willingly take up ruling, since it is just to rule and the rulers are just people. So why does Plato emphasize that they must be compelled to rule? Second, since just acts are beneficial, how does ruling, qua just act, benefit philosophers? Third, since Plato has been accused of jumping unfairly between just actions and just souls, what exactly is the connection between the two? I submit that these questions are intricately related, so that …

Sagp Newsletter 2011/12.4 Pacific, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Homeopoesis: Aristotle On Nutrition And Growth, John Thorp

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

This paper seeks to understand how Aristotle’s ideas about nutrition avoid cancerous growth: why does the flesh that is distilled out of the digestive process, and that travels out to the various parts of the body, not just produce formless growth? De Anima II.5 gives a purely formal reply ("limit and ratio:") Using GA and GC I try to put together Aristotle's schematic account of the process.

Sagp Newsletter 2011/12.3 Central, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Letter From David Gallop, David Gallop

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Recollections from the 1964 SAGP conference at Amherst College.

Politeia As Citizenship In Aristotle, John J. Mulhern

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Recent studies of the citizen and citizenship in Aristotle, such as those of Hansen, Morrison, and Collins, have focused attention on a somewhat neglected topic in Aristotle’s work. While a definitive treatment of this topic awaits a comprehensive catalogue of the uses of politeia in the Politica and the Ath. at least, with over 500 occurrences in the Politica alone, in this paper I contribute to the catalogue project by considering some examples of Aristotle’s use of politeia in idioms from earlier Greek literature which express participation in citizenship, giving a share in citizenship, and so on. I consider also …

Aristotle's Rhetorodicy, John Thorp

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

There is a well-known question about Aristotle's view of rhetoric: on the one hand he inherited the typical Platonic disdain for rhetoric as a concealer of truth; but on the other he throws himself with verve into the elaboration of a rhetorical manual. This paper points up a little-noticed Aristotelian justification for rhetoric, one that sees rhetorical contests as means for discovering the truth; it asks how such an optimistic view might be grounded.

Cephalus And Euthydemus, Matthew Carter Cashen

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Cephalus makes only a brief appearance in Plato’s Republic, but his conversation with Socrates has generated remarkable disagreement: while some think Plato’s portrayal of the rich old metic is largely positive, many, including Julia Annas, Peter Steinberger, and Mark Gifford, argue that beneath Plato’s superficially sympathetic portrait lies a subtext of condemnation and malice. In this paper, I reject the later interpretation, defending Cephalus against two common charges: first, that Plato finds Cephalus’ views on the relationship between money and virtue morally outrageous, and next, that Plato exploits readers’ background knowledge of the historical Cephalus’ tragic fate to employ the …

Sagp Newsletter 2011/12.2 East Philol, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp/Ssips 2011 Program, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Sagp Fordham Abstracts 72611, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Aristotle On Truth, Facts, And Relations: Categories, De Interpretatione, Metaphysics Gamma, Blake Hestir

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Aristotle’s conception of truth looks like this:

TA-Schema: ‘S is P’ is true ↔ S is P.

TA-Schema(n): ‘S is not P’ is true ↔ S is not P.

By Tdf Aristotle need only mean that stating with respect to some property P that is in the case some subject S that P is in the case of S, is what amounts to truth. More precisely then for Aristotle the TA-Schema would amount to:

TA-Schema*: ‘S is P’ is true ↔ the universal P is instantiated in the case of S. TASchema( n)*: ‘S is not P’ is true ↔ …

Climate And Teleology In Aristotle's Physics Ii.8, Yancy Hughes Dominick

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Weather, including rain, happens as a result of natural and teleological processes, but that is compatible with the claim that rain falls not for the sake of something, but of necessity, and any benefit from the rain comes by chance. Aristotle need not embrace the conclusion, therefore, that it rains for the sake of the crops. Climate, on the other hand, is regular and beneficial. If the disjunct from Physics II.8 holds, climate ought to be for the sake of something even while rain is not.

Sagp Newsletter 2010/11.3 Pacific, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.

Justice As Self-Transmitting Power And Just Acts In Republic 4, Andrew Payne

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In his influential paper “A Fallacy in Plato’s Republic,” David Sachs charged Plato with committing a fallacy of irrelevancy. Plato’s Socrates is asked to show that justice understood as acting in conformity with conventional morality, so-called vulgar justice, is beneficial to the just person. Socrates actually demonstrates something else, namely that psychic justice, a state of internal harmony between parts of the soul, is beneficial to its possessor. A generation of Plato scholarship has reacted to Sachs’ reading of the Republic by using discussions of moral psychology and education elsewhere in the dialogue to bridge the gap between psychic justice …