Digital Commons Network^™

Project Tackle 12 Years Of Cia And Taiwanese Joint Reconnaissance Overflights, Maximilian Digiovanni

Honors Theses and Capstones

Project TACKLE was a joint collaborative project between the CIA and the Taiwanese government to facilitate U-2 spy plane missions flown by Taiwanese pilots over China. These missions, conducted from 1962 to 1974, provide critical insights regarding the US and Taiwan’s fluctuating relationship during this period. TACKLE missions played a crucial role in informing policymakers on a variety of subjects, such as the progress of China’s rapidly evolving nuclear weapons program. This paper situates the TACKLE missions within the broader political context of their time to highlight the constant prioritization challenge that plagued the program.

Indopacom Force Structure: A Trajectory Into The 2030s, Robert Burke

Graduate Theses/Dissertations

Over the past ten years Taiwan has become a major point of friction between the United States and People’s Republic of China with both militaries preparing for a potential conflict over the island. China vastly expanded its military forces and capabilities over the past thirty years and is intent on obtaining the ability to both seize Taiwan by force and prevent the United States from generating enough combat power to intervene and defend the island. The Pentagon began to restructure its conventional forces in the Western Pacific at the end of the 2010s, implementing new operational concepts designed to fight …

The Vietnam War And The Regional Context, Wen-Qing Ngoei

Research Collection School of Social Sciences

This chapter traces Southeast Asia’s overall pro-U.S. trajectory from before and through the American war in Vietnam, a process in which the region’s anticommunist nationalists collaborated with the United States and Britain to gain, and remain in, power. Between the late 1940s through the early 1960s, indigenous anticommunist elites in Thailand and the Philippines rose to political dominance with U.S. assistance; in Malaya and Singapore they did so with British support. The United States and Britain, with their Malayan and Singaporean allies, would influence developments within Indonesia that precipitated the Indonesian Army’s rightwing coup of 1965, a transformative event that …

Cmsi Translations #11: Mid-Life Overhaul And Upgrade Of The Type 052c Guided Missile Destroyer, Ju Lang

CMSI Translations

The construction of the Type 052C guided missile destroyer took a long time, and it was experimental in the sense of "taking small steps for rapid progress" (xiao bu kuai pao). In fact, it was also the engineering prototype of the standard fleet destroyer Type 052D. The first and second Type 052C ships were launched in April and October 2003, respectively. They were the most advanced guided missile destroyers of the PLAN at that time, but the subsequent four ships of the same type were launched in October 2010, July 2011, and January and July 2012, respectively.

Book Review: Deterrence In The 21st Century: Statecraft In The Information Age, Timothy L. Thomas

Parameters Bookshelf – Online Book Reviews

Authors: Eric Ouellet, Madeleine D’Agata, and Keith Stewart

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Thomas (US Army, retired), analyst and Parameters editorial board member

Analyst Timothy L. Thomas provides a useful overview of “well-documented and thought-provoking compilation of Canadian perspectives on the interaction of modern-day deterrence postures affected by disinformation threats.” Thomas notes that “the book offers many new concepts for senior defense community experts to consider regarding deterrence and disinformation concepts and an expansive bibliography.” He also highlights the book’s treatment of China, Russia, and Hamas and writes that “[t]he numerous deterrence types . . . indicate that classical …

Air Supremacy, The Enabler Of Close Air Support Operations – An Evaluation Of Past, Present, And Future Air Campaigns., Owen Topolnicki

Senior Honors Theses

The achievement of gaining aerial supremacy, or lack thereof, is the hinge upon which Close Air Support (CAS) swings. The attainment of it enables CAS specialist aircraft, not unlike the Ju-87 Stuka or A-10 Thunderbolt II, to be exceptionally effective in their operating environment. While the lack of it, forces aircrews to pioneer new solutions either in the form of multi-role aircraft (capable of self-defense), or other innovative solutions similar to unmanned aerial systems (UAS’s), as aptly seen in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Thus, the ability of an air force to gain air supremacy and to do so quickly, …

Cmsi Note #11: Admiral Miao Hua's Fall: Further Navy Fallout?, Andrew S. Erickson, Christopher Sharman

CMSI Notes

Pending investigation, Xi Jinping’s protégé Admiral Miao Hua (苗华) has been suspended from his duties as a member of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) and Director of the CMC Political Work Department. This decision was made by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Central Committee, Defense Spokesperson Senior Colonel Wu Qian announced at the scheduled monthly People’s Liberation Army (PLA) press briefing on 28 November 2024, because Miao is “suspected of serious violation of discipline.” By the time such CCP investigations become public, conviction is a foregone conclusion. Miao’s fall thus raises three principal questions: Why is he being removed, will …

Cmsi Translations #10: Transformation, How Significant Is The Role Of An Airfield Station?, Gao Hongwei, Shen Hongquan, Zhang Tong

CMSI Translations

In recent years, with the expansion of mission tasks, multiple services and multiple aircraft types organizing training at the same Southern Theater Command Navy aviation airfield station has gradually become the norm. In the face of increasingly heavy combat training support tasks, they closely monitor powerful enem(ies), accelerate transformation and construction, and have achieved a historic leap from single aircraft-type support to multiple aircraft-types support, from small flying periods of short-term deployed training support to large flying periods of regularized deployed training support, and from daytime simple meteorological conditions support to allweather support, with core support capabilities being comprehensively enhanced.

Weapons Of Influence: Unpacking China’S Global Arms Strategy, Jake R. Rinaldi

The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters

This article explores the strategic motivations behind China’s arms sales and uses Chinese-language analyses from influential party and military institutions to identify five main interests driving Chinese arms exports: protecting economic investments, gaining influence in conflict zones, enhancing partner military capabilities, building diplomatic relationships, and offsetting research and development costs. The article integrates primary sources to reveal how arms sales advance Beijing’s geopolitical aims. The findings highlight how China’s arms trade shapes partner and adversary military capabilities and underscore the need for the United States and its allies to compete in the arms trade to mitigate China’s growing influence.

Parameters Winter 2024-25, Usawc Press

The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters

Welcome to the Winter 2024–25 issue of Parameters. This issue consists of an In Focus special commentary, three forums (Indo-Pacific, Security Cooperation, and Historical Studies), and the regular Civil-Military Relations Corner installment.

The Philippines’ Security In The Face Of China's Rising Threats, Shang-Su Wu

The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters

This article contends that the United States has insufficiently acknowledged the extent of the Philippines’ vulnerability and its importance in preserving the balance of power. While many scholars have focused on Taiwan’s strategic importance, few have considered the state of the Philippines’ military capabilities in maintaining the region’s status quo. This article traces the modern history of the Philippines’ military and defense capabilities and examines the current state of the country’s defenses and the likely outcomes of different military scenarios. It concludes by providing practical recommendations on how the United States can help the Philippines within the constraints of its …

Book Reviews, Usawc Press

The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters

No abstract provided.

Study No. 8, Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects For A Cross-Strait Invasion, Andrew S. Erickson, Conor M. Kennedy, Ryan D. Martinson

CMSI Studies in Chinese Maritime Development

Through concerted efforts over the past quarter-century, the People's Republic of China has achieved the most dramatic military buildup since World War II. Previously limited in its ability to conduct its Joint Firepower Strike, Joint Blockade, and Joint Island Landing Campaigns against Taiwan, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is making rapid progress across the board as it prepares to meet the requirements of Xi Jinping’s Taiwan-focused Centennial Military Building Goal of 2027. Drawing on research, writing, and insights from some of the world’s leading experts, CMSI’s latest edited conference volume probes key questions concerning Beijing’s determined pursuit of the Chinese …

Cmsi Translations #9: Mine Countermeasure Operations In A Cross-Strait Island Landing Campaign, Tian Ying

CMSI Translations

Sea mines are a type of cheap, easy to produce naval weapon that can be used both offensively and defensively. They have played a huge tactical role and even a strategic role in many wars from ancient times to the present day. Sea mines have low production costs, and they are powerful, simple to use, easy to emplace, and difficult to remove. They are characterized by the long-term threat they can pose to ports and shipping lanes. Countering sea mines is relatively difficult and requires the expenditure of rather large resources by the side conducting mine countermeasure operations.

China’S Naval Diplomacy In The Baltic Sea At The Beginning Of The Twenty-First Century—A Lost Window Of Opportunity, Tobias Kollakowski

Naval War College Review

The PLA Navy engaged Baltic Sea states heavily in the first and second decades of the twenty-first century, but these cooperative efforts ultimately failed as the contradiction with more-aggressive and concerning Chinese policies overall became untenable.

Cmsi Note #10: China's Summer Of 2024: The Missing Chapter, Ryan Martinson

CMSI Notes

Key Takeaways:

• In the summer of 2024, two Chinese oceanographic survey ships—the Xiang Yang Hong 01 and Kexue—conducted marine scientific research activities in the Bering Sea. Their actions represented a significant expansion of PRC marine data collection in this region.
• The Bering Sea is a key segment in the sea lanes connecting China with the Arctic Ocean. Thus, the operations of these two vessels should be understood as part of the unprecedented ramp-up in Beijing’s Arctic endeavors that occurred in 2024.
• The main purposes of the two Bering Sea cruises are unknown. However, both ships were built to meet …

China Maritime Report No. 42: Invasion Plans: Operation Causeway And Taiwan's Defense In World War Ii, Ian Easton

CMSI China Maritime Reports

Main Findings

• During World War II, the United States and the Empire of Japan each developed plans and marshaled forces for a climactic battle over Taiwan. Both sides regarded the island as an area of strategic consequence.
• Code-named Operation CAUSEWAY, the American invasion of Taiwan would have been the largest amphibious campaign in the Pacific Theater and the largest sea-air-land engagement in world history.
• Strategists in Japan believed the attack was coming and designed a blueprint for the defense of Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands called SHO-GO(捷 2 号作戦, or “Operation Victory No. 2”), which envisioned a bloody campaign of …

Cmsi Translations #8: U.S.-Philippine Military Cooperation In The South China Sea: Challenges And Responses, Zhang Yilong

CMSI Translations

With the new generation of Philippine government taking office, U.S.-Philippines relations have rapidly warmed, and the depth and breadth of their military cooperation have increased. This has brought new challenges and threats to China’s national security. How to deal with these challenges will be a difficult problem before us.

Cmsi Translations #7: Guarantee Of Strategic Security: Expert Discusses China’S Strategic Nuclear Submarines Achieving Continuous Duty, Chi Guocang

CMSI Translations

In April of this year, the U.S. Department of Defense released a China military power report, which stated that the Chinese Navy currently has at least six Type 094 ballistic missile nuclear submarines, and has the capability for at least one of them to be on continuous readiness duty. It also said that this is the first time it has been possible for the Chinese Navy to permanently maintain at least one strategic missile nuclear submarine at sea to perform strategic duty tasks. So, what is “continuous readiness duty” (quatianhou zhanbei zhiban), how can it be achieved, and why did …

Us-China Trade Relations As It Relates To Section 301 Of The 1974 Ustr And Ipr, Maxim Epstein

The Gettysburg Journal for Public Policy

No abstract provided.

China Maritime Report No. 41: One Force, Two Force, Red Force, Blue Force: Pla Navy Blue Force Development For Realistic Combat Training, J. Michael Dahm

CMSI China Maritime Reports

Since the mid-2010s, there has been a concerted effort to professionalize a PLAN “blue force” as an opposition force, or OPFOR, in maritime exercises and training. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) routinely refers to its blue forces as metaphorical “whetstones” used to sharpen the PLA for a future fight against enemies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Efforts to develop a PLAN blue force appear to have accelerated over the past several years in response to Chairman Xi Jinping’s decade-long demand for more realistic combat training.

This report examines recent developments in the PLAN’s blue force. It comprises four …

Cmsi Note #9: On The Plan's "Core Operational Capabilities", Ryan D. Martinson

CMSI Notes

Key Takeaways:

• The PLAN is prioritizing the development of what it calls “four core operational capabilities.” These capabilities include 1) integrated near seas operations, 2) far seas mobile operations, 3) strategic deterrence and counterstrike, and 4) amphibious warfare.
• Analysis of Chinese writings suggest the focus of these efforts is on prevailing in a high-end conflict involving the U.S. military.
• The PLAN seeks the ability to dominate the near seas, strike U.S. bases and sea lines of communication in waters east of the first island chain and in the Indian Ocean, achieve “reliable, credible, and effective” deterrence against the U.S. through …

Cmsi Translations #5: Strengthen National Defense Mobilization And Reserve Force Construction, Yu Yunxian, Zhang Pengxuan

CMSI Translations

The report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party proposed "strengthening national defense mobilization and reserve force construction." In the face of the Era's requirements for strengthening the country and the military, the serious situation of national security, and the real existence of the risk of war, we must place the construction of national defense mobilization and reserve forces in a more important strategic position, and strive to promote the high-quality development of national defense mobilization and reserve force construction from a new starting point.

Cmsi Note #8: Recent Changes In The Pla Navy's Gulf Of Aden Deployment Pattern, Dennis J. Blasko

CMSI Notes

Key Takeaways:

• Since December 2008, the PLAN has deployed 46 counter-piracy escort task forces (TFs) to the Gulf of Aden on a UN-authorized mission.
• Most TFs have included two combatants—a combination of destroyers, frigates, and amphibious transport docks—and a supply ship. Starting with the 33^rd TF, which departed China in August 2019, every TF has comprised one Type 052D destroyer, one Type 054A frigate, and one supply ship.
• One TF generally is on station near the Horn of Africa at all times, while for less than half that time another TF is either on the way to relieve it …

Cmsi Note #7: Pla Navy Reserve: Out Of The Shadows And Into The Forefront?, Tiffany A. Tat

CMSI Notes

As a part China’s goal to build a fully modernized military by 2035, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is improving its reserve forces through increased defense spending, critical policy changes, and organizational restructuring. Reserve forces (后备力量) encompass the PLA Reserve (预备役部队) and paramilitary forces, such as the militia, which fall under the leadership of the Central Military Commission and can be mobilized by the National Defense Mobilization Department to support combat. The many components that make up China’s fighting force such as active-duty PLA forces, China Coast Guard, and the militia have been studied in depth; however, the PLA Reserve …

China's Theater-Range, Dual-Capable Delivery Systems: Integrated Deterrence And Risk Reduction Approaches To Counter A Growing Threat, Justin Anderson, Chris Andrews

Research and Case Studies

China has engaged in a dramatic buildup of its nuclear forces over the past decade. While much of the attention on China’s new nuclear arsenal has focused on its development and expansion of its strategic nuclear triad, this growth has also included significant numbers of theater-range, dual-capable delivery systems. These forces are not capable of reaching the U.S. mainland but can range U.S. and allied forces and bases across strategically significant swathes of the Indo-Pacific.

This research project assessed the growing threat to the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies posed by these systems. It then considered ways and means …

American Sanctions On China's Space Program: Effective Economic Statecraft?, Paul J. Bolt

Space and Defense

American economic statecraft as a tool to manage competition with China’s Space Program is likely to remain contentious as it amplifies enduring debates in U.S. foreign policy: i) the tension between international realism and American liberalism; ii) the questionable benefit of government involvement in picking winners and losers from the private sector; and iii) the difficulty of defining long-term success in foreign policy outcomes.

Cmsi Note #6: Sharpening The Sword: Chinese Navy Aircraft Carrier Battle Group Defense Zones, Daniel Clayton Rice

CMSI Notes

Perspectives and Key Takeaways:

• Chinese state media’s Channel 7 recently released a series of videos that described China’s aircraft carriers and the carrier battle groups, including their history, composition, and operational theory.
• The videos describe the carrier battle group (CVBG) “Outer Defense Zone” (外防区), also called the “Depth Defense Zone” (纵深防区), as 185 km to 400 km away from the aircraft carrier.
• The “Middle Defense Zone” (中防区), or the “Area Defense Zone” (区域防区) is described as 45 km to 185 km away from the aircraft carrier.
• The video details the “Inner Defense Zone” (内防区), otherwise called the “Point Defense Zone” …

China Maritime Report No. 39: A Hundred Men Wielding One Gun - Life, Duty, And Cultural Practices Aboard Plan Submarines, Conor M. Kennedy

CMSI China Maritime Reports

Submarine performance is not just measured in technical terms, but also in how crews operate over time. As the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) increasingly deploys its submarine force beyond the near seas on long-distance combat readiness and training missions, studying the force’s human components benefits a broader understanding its overall effectiveness. This report explores work and living conditions, crew endurance, service culture, political requirements, and approaches to resolving human issues in the submarine force. An inherently dangerous and challenging profession, the submarine force has gradually developed numerous solutions to address various challenges to prevent non-combat attrition among crews. Life …

China, Faits Accomplis And The Contest For East Asia: The Shadow Of Shifting Power, Kevin D. Stringer, Joshua Adam Hastey

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.