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Theory, Knowledge and Science Commons™
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- Arrow Theorem (1)
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Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Theory, Knowledge and Science
Garbage-In, Garbage-Out: Item Generation As A Threat To Construct Validity, Terri A. Scandura Phd, Lucy R. Ford
Garbage-In, Garbage-Out: Item Generation As A Threat To Construct Validity, Terri A. Scandura Phd, Lucy R. Ford
Terri A. Scandura
Item generation has received only cursory attention in the research literature, despite the fact that it seems obvious that poorly written items will result in poor psychometric properties of measures. In this paper, we review the literature on item generation, develop a typology of threats to construct validity, and evaluate five commonly usedorganizational research measures with respect to typology. Our results demonstrate that the sampled measures have significant problems that may represent threats to construct validity. recommendations for improved item generation practice are offered.
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …