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Articles 1 - 13 of 13
Full-Text Articles in Social Psychology
Revolutionary Coalition Strength And Collective Failure As Determinants Of Status Reallocation, H. Andrew Michener, Edward J. Lawler
Revolutionary Coalition Strength And Collective Failure As Determinants Of Status Reallocation, H. Andrew Michener, Edward J. Lawler
Edward J Lawler
This experiment investigated the effects of collective performance and coalition strength on the redistribution of status prerogatives in triads. A status hierarchy was established within triads, such that one person held higher control status and the two others held lower status. Each group performed an ambiguous, decision-making task over two trials. Collective performance (i.e., success vs failure) was manipulated via bogus feedback regarding the group’s performance, while coalition strength was manipulated by varying the extent to which the two low-status members, acting together as a revolutionary coalition, could damage the outcomes received by the high-status member. Results indicate a collective-performance …
The Impact Of Status Differences On Coalitional Agreements: An Experimental Study, Edward J. Lawler
The Impact Of Status Differences On Coalitional Agreements: An Experimental Study, Edward J. Lawler
Edward J Lawler
This experiment investigated the impact of status differences between subordinates and face-to-face coalition negotiations on insurgent coalitional action. The effects of these variables were examined in stratified groups, where a leader established inequitable pay-rates, and subordinates could coalesce and destroy a portion of the leader’s outcomes. The results showed that status differences (as opposed to status similarity) undermined the sense of common interests between subordinates and reduced the severity of coalitional action against the leader. Face-to-face negotiations engendered a more cautious approach to coalition negotiations and also reduced the severity of insurgent action. The results suggest that status differences pose …
The Perception Of Power, Samuel B. Bacharach, Edward J. Lawler
The Perception Of Power, Samuel B. Bacharach, Edward J. Lawler
Edward J Lawler
This study examines the impact of some basic exchange-theory variables, the value and scarcity of outcomes, on perceptions of Self and Other power in a conflict setting. Each respondent took the role of an employee in conflict with an employer, and assessed the magnitude of Self and Other (employer) power. Four variables are manipulated: Self’s outcome scarcity, the value of the outcome to Self, Other’s outcome scarcity, and the value of the outcome to Other. The results are consistent with predictions drawn from the Blau, and Emerson (a, b) treatments of dependence relations. The results suggest that the stakes contending …
Power Processes In Bargaining, Edward J. Lawler
Power Processes In Bargaining, Edward J. Lawler
Edward J Lawler
This is a theoretical article that integrates and extends a particular program of work on power in bargaining relationships. Power is conceptualized as a structurally based capability, and power use as tactical action falling within either conciliatory or hostile categories. The core propositions are (1) the greater the total amount of power in a relationship, the greater the use of conciliatory tactics and the lower the use of hostile tactics; and (2) an unequal power relationship fosters more use of hostile tactics and less use of conciliatory tactics than an equal power relationship. Distinct research on power dependence and bilateral …
Time Pressure And The Development Of Integrative Agreements In Bilateral Negotiations, Peter J. D. Carnevale, Edward J. Lawler
Time Pressure And The Development Of Integrative Agreements In Bilateral Negotiations, Peter J. D. Carnevale, Edward J. Lawler
Edward J Lawler
A laboratory experiment examined the effects of time pressure on the process and outcome of integrative bargaining. Time pressure was operationalized in terms of the amount of time available to negotiate. As hypothesized, high time pressure produced nonagreements and poor negotiation outcomes only when negotiators adopted an individualistic orientation; when negotiators adopted a cooperative orientation, they achieved high outcomes regardless of time pressure. In combination with an individualistic orientation, time pressure produced greater competitiveness, firm negotiator aspirations, and reduced information exchange. In combination with a cooperative orientation, time pressure produced greater cooperativeness and lower negotiator aspirations. The main findings were …
Structural Power And Emotional Processes In Negotiation: A Social Exchange Approach, Edward J. Lawler, Jeongkoo Yoon
Structural Power And Emotional Processes In Negotiation: A Social Exchange Approach, Edward J. Lawler, Jeongkoo Yoon
Edward J Lawler
This chapter focuses in the abstract on when and how repeated negotiations between the same actors foster positive feelings or emotions and, in turn, an affective commitment to their relationship. However, we have in mind applications to pivotal dyads within organizations and also to the emergence of "friction” or "stickiness” in market relations. Implicit in the idea that negotiations in pivotal dyads shape institutional patterns is the notion that repeated negotiations between the same two actors are likely to become more than instrumental ways for the particular actors to get work done. We suggest a simple process by which dyadic …
Resolving Conflict Through Explicit Bargaining, Elizabeth Heger Boyle, Edward J. Lawler
Resolving Conflict Through Explicit Bargaining, Elizabeth Heger Boyle, Edward J. Lawler
Edward J Lawler
This article analyzes the impact of conciliatory initiatives on conflict resolution in two-party bargaining. It specifically develops and tests a theory of unilateral initiatives derived from Osgood's (1962) notion of Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction (GRIT). The major propositions of the theory indicate that, given a pattern of mutual resistance or hostility, unilateral initiatives and tit-for-tat retaliation in response to punitive action will produce more conciliation and less hostility by an opponent. To test the theory, a bargaining setting was created in a laboratory experiment in which parties exchanged offers and counteroffers on an issue across a number …
Perceptions Of Power In Conflict Situations, Samuel B. Bacharach, H. Andrew Michener, Edward J. Lawler
Perceptions Of Power In Conflict Situations, Samuel B. Bacharach, H. Andrew Michener, Edward J. Lawler
Edward J Lawler
Subjects rendered judgments regarding the power of the participants in a series of conflictual circumstances where an adversary threatened a target. These situations manipulated four independent variables: (a) the adversary's capacity to damage the target's interests, (b) the adversary's probability of actually attacking, (c) the target's ability to block the impending attack, and (d) the target's capacity to retaliate. Results showed that all of the independent variables affected the subjects' judgments of the adversary's power, while three of them (damage, blockage, and retaliation) affected judgments of the target's power. Differences in the predictive equations for judgments of adversary power and …
Bargaining Toughness: A Qualification Of Level-Of-Aspiration And Reciprocity Hypotheses, Edward J. Lawler, Bruce K. Macmurray
Bargaining Toughness: A Qualification Of Level-Of-Aspiration And Reciprocity Hypotheses, Edward J. Lawler, Bruce K. Macmurray
Edward J Lawler
This research examined the interaction of initial bargaining stance and later concession strategy in dyadic bargaining. Experimental procedures pitted subjects against a programmed opponent and manipulated three variables: initial stance of the opponent across the first two bargaining rounds (tough vs. soft), deadlock vs. no deadlock, and subsequent concession strategy (tough, matching, soft). The results revealed that: (a) with a tough initial stance, a matching strategy produced greater yielding than tough or soft strategies; while in the context of a soft initial stance, a tough concession strategy produced more yielding than a matching or soft concession strategy; and (b) a …
Cooptation And Coalition Mobilization, Edward J. Lawler, George A. Youngs Jr., Michael D. Lesh
Cooptation And Coalition Mobilization, Edward J. Lawler, George A. Youngs Jr., Michael D. Lesh
Edward J Lawler
The question addressed by this research was, “When structural circumstances make revolutionary action likely, under what conditions will a cooptation strategy prevent subordinate revolts?” Experimental procedures established a group status hierarchy consisting of a leader and two subordinates. Groups earned collective outcomes, and the leader usurped an inequitable portion of these outcomes. In this context, the first experiment shows that a cooptation strategy (i.e., offer of a promotion to one of two subordinates) inhibits subordinate revolts. Two additional experiments indicate that the cooptation strategy is most effective (a) if the offer (strategy) provides the target of cooptation a source of …
Endorsement Of Formal Leaders: An Integrative Model, H. Andrew Michener, Edward J. Lawler
Endorsement Of Formal Leaders: An Integrative Model, H. Andrew Michener, Edward J. Lawler
Edward J Lawler
This experiment develops an integrative, path-analytic model for the endorsement accorded formal leaders. The model contains four independent variables reflecting aspects of group structure (i.e., group success-failure, the payoff distribution, the degree of support by others members for the leader, and the vulnerability of the leader). Also included are two intervening variables reflecting perceptual processes (attributed competence and attributed fairness), and one dependent variable (endorsement). The results indicate that endorsement is greater when the group's success is high, when the payoff distribution is flat rather than hierarchical, and when the leader is not vulnerable to removal from office. Other support …
Outcome Alternatives And Value As Criteria For Multistrategy Evaluations, Edward J. Lawler, Samuel B. Bacharach
Outcome Alternatives And Value As Criteria For Multistrategy Evaluations, Edward J. Lawler, Samuel B. Bacharach
Edward J Lawler
No abstract provided.
Comparison Of Dependence And Punitive Forms Of Power, Edward J. Lawler, Samuel B. Bacharach
Comparison Of Dependence And Punitive Forms Of Power, Edward J. Lawler, Samuel B. Bacharach
Edward J Lawler
This paper deals with the impact of power on tactical action in conflict. The theory and research is organized around two conceptual distinctions: one between power based on dependence versus punitive capability, and the other between relative power (i.e., power difference) and "total power" in a relationship (i.e., across actors). The paper will argue that these distinctions are important on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, they are important to explicate the connection between conceptions of power that stress the coercive foundation of power (Bierstedt 1950; Tedeschi, Schlenker & Bonoma 1973) and those that treat power as dependence (Bacharach & …