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Full-Text Articles in Psychology

Reply To Valverde, Paul B. Thompson Jan 1992

Reply To Valverde, Paul B. Thompson

RISK: Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002)

Professor Thompson responds to Valverde's argument, in the last issue, that his approach to Risk puts too much emphasis on the distinction between Risk subjectivism and Risk objectivism. In doing so, he asserts, inter alia, that anchoring Risk judgments in a probabilistic framework does not go far enough in rejecting reigning Risk-analysis notions of "real Risk."


Ua35/11 Student Honors Research Bulletin, Wku Honors Program Jan 1992

Ua35/11 Student Honors Research Bulletin, Wku Honors Program

WKU Archives Records

The WKU Student Honors Research Bulletin is dedicated to scholarly involvement and student research. These papers are representative of work done by students from throughout the university.

  • Balyeat, Douglas. Expectations Gap: Where Were the Auditors?
  • Brown, Kaye. Larry McMurtry: Saddle Up or Leave the Old West Behind
  • Fridy, Geraldine. Stephen Crane's Maggie. Another Example of Patriarchal Misogyny?
  • Hazelwood, Shirley and Kay Redfern. Effectiveness of Psychosocial rehabilitation Programs: Do They Make a Difference in the Re-hospitalization of the Mentally Ill?
  • Johnson, Sean. Effects of Time-out as a Procedure to Decrease Maladaptive Behavior
  • Leibering, Elisa, Michelle Nye and LauraLee Wilson. Euthanasia: Legal, …


Who's Afraid Of Multiple Realizability?: Functionalism, Reductionism, And Connectionism, Justin Schwartz Dec 1991

Who's Afraid Of Multiple Realizability?: Functionalism, Reductionism, And Connectionism, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

Philosophers have argued that on the prevailing theory of mind, functionalism, the fact that mental states are multiply realizable or can be instantiated in a variety of different physical forms, at least in principle, shows that materialism or physical is probably false. A similar argument rejects the relevance to psychology of connectionism, which holds that mental states are embodied and and constituted by connectionist neural networks. These arguments, I argue, fall before reductios ad absurdam, proving too much -- they apply as well to genes, which are multiply realizable, but the reduction of which to DNA is one the core …