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Full-Text Articles in Psychology

‘Pleasures’, ‘Pains’ And Animal Welfare: Toward A Natural History Of Affect, D. Fraser, I. J.H. Duncan Jan 1998

‘Pleasures’, ‘Pains’ And Animal Welfare: Toward A Natural History Of Affect, D. Fraser, I. J.H. Duncan

Animal Welfare Collection

In hedonic theories of motivation, 'motivational affective states' (MASs) are typically seen as adaptations which motivate certain types of behaviour, especially in situations where a flexible or learned response is more adaptive than a rigid or reflexive one. MASs can be negative (eg unpleasant feelings of hunger or pain) or positive (eg pleasant feelings associated with eating and playing). Hedonic theories often portray negative and positive MASs as opposite ends of a one-dimensional scale.

We suggest that natural selection has favoured negative and positive affect as separate processes to solve two different types of motivational problems. We propose that negative …


Science, Values And Animal Welfare: Exploring The ‘Inextricable Connection’, D. Fraser Jan 1995

Science, Values And Animal Welfare: Exploring The ‘Inextricable Connection’, D. Fraser

Animal Welfare Collection

In conceptualizing animal welfare, it is useful to distinguish among three types of concepts. 'Type l' are single, measurable attributes. 'Type 2' are single attributes that cannot be measured directly but can be estimated by correctly combining various contributing attributes. 'Type 3' are concepts involving multiple attributes which are grouped together because they serve some common function, and whose relative importance cannot be established in an entirely objective way. Individuals who treat animal welfare as a type 1 concept may propose single, objective measures of welfare, such as longevity or levels of stress-related hormones; however, this approach rests on judgements, …


Animal Pain, Bernard E. Rollin Jan 1985

Animal Pain, Bernard E. Rollin

Experimentation Collection

Some time ago, I received a telephone call from an eminent primatologist asking me to give the keynote address at a scientific seminar on animal pain. My first response was to express surprise that they were inviting a philosopher. His reply was remarkable, if only for its rarity among scientists: "The truly interesting and important issues concerning pain in animals are not scientific ones," he said. "They are moral, philosophical, and conceptual ones. And the total failure of science to engage or even acknowledge these issues discredits biomedical science and weakens its conceptual base." I hope to show you that …


Recognition And Alleviation Of Pain In Animals, P. A. Flecknell Jan 1985

Recognition And Alleviation Of Pain In Animals, P. A. Flecknell

Animal Welfare Collection

The pain and distress which animals experience as a consequence of their use by man figures prominently in discussions of animal welfare. Some improvements have been made in animal housing and husbandry practices and it is likely that further progress will be made in this field. In comparison, relatively little attention has been given to the problem of minimizing the pain and distress caused to animals by the various procedures to which they are subjected. The most publicized of these are the wide range of experimental techniques which are undertaken using laboratory animals, but also includes procedures such as castration …


Animal Boredom: Is A Scientific Study Of The Subjective Experiences Of Animals Possible?, Françoise Wemelsfelder Jan 1984

Animal Boredom: Is A Scientific Study Of The Subjective Experiences Of Animals Possible?, Françoise Wemelsfelder

Sentience Collection

The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between different meta-scientific frameworks and the science of animal welfare. Animal Boredom 117 During the past few years, I have become more and more convinced that the great difficulty science has in studying subjective experience in its objects, might be related to the denial of any role to subjective experience in the observer as an interpretational guide. Can a quality in the world around us be observed, when this same quality is deliberately excluded from the process of observing?

As a practical example for the discussion described above, the phenomenon …