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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Models and Methods
Strategic Defense And Attack For Series And Parallel Reliability Systems: Comment, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson
Strategic Defense And Attack For Series And Parallel Reliability Systems: Comment, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
The contest-theoretic literature on the attack and defense of networks of targets focuses primarily on pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Hausken's 2008 European Journal of Operational Research article typifies this approach, and many of the models in this literature either build upon this model or utilize similar techniques. We show that Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium is invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provides necessary conditions for his solution to hold. The complete characterization of mixed-strategy equilibria remains an open problem, although there exist solutions in the literature for special prominent cases.
Non-Partisan ‘Get-Out-The-Vote’ Efforts And Policy Outcomes, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson
Non-Partisan ‘Get-Out-The-Vote’ Efforts And Policy Outcomes, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan ‘get-out-the-vote’ efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing participation in the electoral process, we find that they have a meaningful impact on policy outcomes and are an important political influence activity for nonprofit advocacy organizations. In equilibrium, nonpartisan gotv efforts are more likely to arise in those segments of the electorate that are sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante voter abstention rate). Among those …
Electoral Poaching And Party Identification, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson
Electoral Poaching And Party Identification, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
This article studies electoral competition in a model of redistributive politics with deterministic voting and heterogeneous voter loyalties to political parties. We construct a natural measure of `party strength' based on the sizes and intensities of a party's loyal voter segments and demonstrate how party behavior varies with the two parties' strengths. In equilibrium, parties target or `poach' a strict subset of the opposition party's loyal voters: offering those voters a high expected transfer, while `freezing out' the remainder with a zero transfer. The size of the subset of opposition voters frozen out and, consequently, the level of inequality in …