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Full-Text Articles in Public Economics
Common-Value Procurement Auctions With Renegotiation, Rimvydas Baltaduonis, Lucas Rentschler
Common-Value Procurement Auctions With Renegotiation, Rimvydas Baltaduonis, Lucas Rentschler
Economics Faculty Publications
This note contains the equilibrium bid functions for two types of common-value procurement auctions: 1) a procurement auction in which bids represent an enforceable contract; 2) a procurement auction in which, upon learning the true cost of supplying the good, the winning bidder can renegotiate the contract with the buyer, and each bidder must submit a bond with their bid, which is returned at the end of the auction unless they are the low bidder and renegotiate the contract.
El Mal De Chagas Y Su Potencial De Eliminación, Eileen Stillwaggon
El Mal De Chagas Y Su Potencial De Eliminación, Eileen Stillwaggon
Economics Faculty Publications
La Asamblea Mundial de la Salud ha elegido algunas enfermedades como blancos para la eliminación. Hay mucha esperanza y una alta probabilidad de que varias enfermedades, recientemente llamadas desatendidas, sean eliminadas en las próximas décadas. Vamos a presenciar el fin de la transmisión de la dracunculiasis, la filariosis linfática, la poliomielitis, y en las Américas por lo menos, la oncocercosis. Ya se ven éxitos significativos como la cuasi erradicación de la dracunculiasis y paso importantes en contra de otras aflicciones. [Original Spanish version]
The World Health Assembly has chosen some diseases as targets for elimination. There is much …
An Experimental Study Of Complex-Offer Auctions From Wholesale Energy Markets, Rimvydas Baltaduonis
An Experimental Study Of Complex-Offer Auctions From Wholesale Energy Markets, Rimvydas Baltaduonis
Economics Faculty Publications
A Payment Cost Minimization auction has been proposed as an alternative to the Offer Cost Minimization auction for use in wholesale electric power markets with an intention to lower procurement cost of electricity. Efficiency concerns have been raised for this proposal while assuming that the true production costs would be revealed to the auctioneer in a competitive market. Using an experimental approach, the study compares the performance of these two complex-offer auctions, controlling for the level of unilateral market power. The analysis finds that neither auction results in allocations that correspond to the true cost revelation. Two auctions perform similarly …