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Full-Text Articles in Other Economics
Coordination And Evolutionary Dynamics: When Are Evolutionary Models Reliable?, Daniel Graydon Stephenson
Coordination And Evolutionary Dynamics: When Are Evolutionary Models Reliable?, Daniel Graydon Stephenson
ESI Publications
This study reports a continuous-time experimental test of evolutionary models in coordinated attacker–defender games. It implements three experimental treatment conditions: one with strong coordination incentives, one with weak coordination incentives, and one with zero coordination incentives. Each treatment exhibits identical equilibrium predictions but distinct evolutionary predictions. Observed behavior was tightly clustered around equilibrium under both the zero coordination treatment and the weak coordination treatment but widely dispersed from equilibrium under the strong coordination treatment. This result was anticipated by explicitly dynamic models but not by conventional stability criteria. In contrast to the widely maintained assumption of sign-preservation, subjects frequently switched …
Experimental Research On Contests, Roman M. Sheremeta
Experimental Research On Contests, Roman M. Sheremeta
ESI Working Papers
Costly competitions between economic agents are modeled as contests. Researchers use laboratory experiments to study contests and test comparative static predictions of contest theory. Commonly, researchers find that participants’ efforts are significantly higher than predicted by the standard Nash equilibrium. Despite overbidding, most comparative static predictions, such as the incentive effect, the size effect, the discouragement effect and others are supported in the laboratory. In addition, experimental studies examine various contest structures, including dynamic contests (such as multi-stage races, wars of attrition, tug-of-wars), multi-dimensional contests (such as Colonel Blotto games), and contests between groups. This article provides a short review …
Indefinitely Repeated Contests: An Experimental Study, Philip Brookins, Dmitry Ryvkin, Andrew Smyth
Indefinitely Repeated Contests: An Experimental Study, Philip Brookins, Dmitry Ryvkin, Andrew Smyth
ESI Working Papers
We experimentally explore indefinitely repeated contests. Theory predicts more cooperation, in the form of lower expenditures, in indefinitely repeated contests with a longer expected time horizon, yet our data do not support this prediction. Theory also predicts more cooperation in indefinitely repeated contests compared to finitely repeated contests of the same expected length, but we find no significant difference empirically. When controlling for risk and gender, we actually find significantly higher long-run expenditure in some indefinite contests relative to finite contests. Finally, theory predicts no difference in cooperation across indefinitely repeated winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests. We find significantly less cooperation …
Trust In Humans And Robots: Economically Similar But Emotionally Different, Eric Schniter, Timothy W. Shields, Daniel Sznycer
Trust In Humans And Robots: Economically Similar But Emotionally Different, Eric Schniter, Timothy W. Shields, Daniel Sznycer
ESI Working Papers
Trust-based interactions with robots are increasingly common in the marketplace, workplace, on the road, and in the home. However, a looming concern is that people may not trust robots as they do humans. While trust in fellow humans has been studied extensively, little is known about how people extend trust to robots. Here we compare trust-based investments and emotions from across three nearly identical economic games: human-human trust games, human-robot trust games, and human-robot trust games where the robot decision impacts another human. Robots in our experiment mimic humans: they are programmed to make reciprocity decisions based on previously observed …