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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Other Economics
Slow-Fast Analysis Of A Multi-Group Asset Flow Model With Implications For The Dynamics Of Wealth, Mark Desantis, David Swigon
Slow-Fast Analysis Of A Multi-Group Asset Flow Model With Implications For The Dynamics Of Wealth, Mark Desantis, David Swigon
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
The multi-group asset flow model is a nonlinear dynamical system originally developed as a tool for understanding the behavioral foundations of market phenomena such as flash crashes and price bubbles. In this paper we use a modification of this model to analyze the dynamics of a single-asset market in situations when the trading rates of investors (i.e., their desire to exchange stock for cash) are prescribed ahead of time and independent of the state of the market. Under the assumption of fast trading compared to the time-rate of change in the prescribed trading rates we decompose the dynamics of the …
Centrality And Cooperation In Networks, Boris Van Leeuwen, Abhijit Ramalingam, David Rojo Arjona, Arthur Schram
Centrality And Cooperation In Networks, Boris Van Leeuwen, Abhijit Ramalingam, David Rojo Arjona, Arthur Schram
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, teams with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.
Big Data In Economics, Matthew Harding, Jonathan Hersh
Big Data In Economics, Matthew Harding, Jonathan Hersh
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
Big Data refers to data sets of much larger size, higher frequency, and often more personalized information. Examples include data collected by smart sensors in homes or aggregation of tweets on Twitter. In small data sets, traditional econometric methods tend to outperform more complex techniques. In large data sets, however, machine learning methods shine. New analytic approaches are needed to make the most of Big Data in economics. Researchers and policymakers should thus pay close attention to recent developments in machine learning techniques if they want to fully take advantage of these new sources of Big Data.
'To Sell Or Not To Sell': Licensing Versus Selling By An Outside Innovator, Swapnendu Banerjee, Sougata Poddar
'To Sell Or Not To Sell': Licensing Versus Selling By An Outside Innovator, Swapnendu Banerjee, Sougata Poddar
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We study various modes of technology transfer of an outside innovator in a spatial framework when the potential licensees are asymmetric. In addition to different licensing options, we also look into the option of selling the property rights of innovation and find the optimal mode of technology transfer. For licensing we find the optimal policy is to offer pure royalty contracts to both licensee firms when cost differentials between the firms are relatively small compared to the transportation cost, otherwise offer a fixed fee licensing contract to the efficient firm only. Interestingly, we show the innovator is always better-off selling …
A Portable Method Of Eliciting Respect For Social Norms, Erik O. Kimbrough, Alexander Vostroknutov
A Portable Method Of Eliciting Respect For Social Norms, Erik O. Kimbrough, Alexander Vostroknutov
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
Recent models of prosociality suggest that cooperation in laboratory games may be better understood as resulting from concern for social norms than from prosocial preferences over outcomes. Underlying this interpretation is the idea that people exhibit heterogeneous respect for shared norms. We introduce a new, abstract task to elicit a proxy for individual norm-following propensity by asking subjects to choose from two actions, where one is costly. We instruct subjects that “the rule is” to take the costly action. Their willingness to incur such a cost reveals respect for norms. We show that choices in this task are similar across …
Trends And Disparities In Leave Use Under California's Paid Family Leave Program: New Evidence From Administrative Data, Sarah H. Bana, Kelly Bedard, Maya Rossin-Slater
Trends And Disparities In Leave Use Under California's Paid Family Leave Program: New Evidence From Administrative Data, Sarah H. Bana, Kelly Bedard, Maya Rossin-Slater
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We use novel administrative data to study trends and disparities in usage of California's first-in-the-nation paid family leave (PFL) program. We show that take-up for both bonding with a new child and caring for an ill family member increased over 2005–2014. Most women combine PFL with maternity leave from the State Disability Insurance system, resulting in leaves longer than 6 weeks. Most men take less than the full 6 weeks of PFL. Individuals in the lowest earnings quartile and in small firms are the least likely to take leave. There are important differences in take-up across industries, especially for men.
Cooler Heads Prevail: An Experimental Study On The “Cooling” Effect Of The Strategy Method On Agent Resentment, Jing L. Davis
Cooler Heads Prevail: An Experimental Study On The “Cooling” Effect Of The Strategy Method On Agent Resentment, Jing L. Davis
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
This study investigates whether agents’ resentment of controls in a gift-exchange game can be effectively mitigated using the strategy method where agents’ effort choices are elicited contingent on all possible contract choices by principals. The results suggest that allowing agents to contemplate contract choices prospectively results in less resentment and that agents exert higher effort than without this “cooling” process.
Preference Conformism: An Experiment, Enrique Fatas, Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap, David Rojo Arjona
Preference Conformism: An Experiment, Enrique Fatas, Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap, David Rojo Arjona
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
This paper reports on an experiment designed to test whether people’s preferences change to become more alike. Such preference conformism would be worrying for an economics that takes individual preferences as given (‘de gustibus es non disputandum’). So the test is important. But it is also difficult. People can behave alike for many reasons and the key to the design of our test, therefore, is the control of the other possible reasons for observing apparent peer effects. We find evidence of preference conformism in the aggregate and at the individual level (where there is heterogeneity). It appears also to be …
Testing The Boundaries Of The Double Auction: The Effects Of Complete Information And Market Power, Erik O. Kimbrough
Testing The Boundaries Of The Double Auction: The Effects Of Complete Information And Market Power, Erik O. Kimbrough
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We report boundary experiments testing the robustness of price convergence in double auction markets for non-durable goods in which there is extreme earnings inequality at the competitive equilibrium (CE). Following up on a conjecture by Smith (1976a), we test whether the well-known equilibrating power of the double auction institution is robust to the presence of complete information about traders’ values and costs and the presence of symmetric market power. We find that complete information is insufficient to impede convergence to CE prices; however, introducing market power consistently causes prices to deviate from the CE, whether or not subjects possess complete …